Azerbaijan's lightning victory in Nagorno-Karabakh, which cost at least 200 Armenian lives including 100 civilians, has given rise to both relief and unease in the West. The relief stems from the prospect of a thorny and explosive quarrel drawing to a close, at a time when engaging in a second war, following Ukraine, would be perilous and under conditions close to international law. It's worth noting that, on this matter, international law has not acknowledged the primacy of self-determination over territorial integrity since 1994 and in general remains quite vague on minority rights.
Nevertheless, there is also a great deal of unease because in this case, respect for the law poorly conceals the blatant injustice inflicted on a people who did not adopt a "separatist" ideology 30 years ago, but have lived on this land for 20 centuries. What's more, they have suffered a genocide that remains unrecognized by the state descended from the one that committed it: Turkey, the main supporter of Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, who now openly aims to purge the Armenian presence from "his" land through fire, famine, cold and fear.
In the eyes of realpolitik, there is a clear division: The relief is for today, the unease for tomorrow, when persecution or destruction occurs, or when the traces of crimes resurface at a time when the mass exodus will have rendered any doubts about the merits of the enclave's "re"-integration into Azerbaijan irrelevant.
A certain restlessness in the international community suggests that the reasons for the relief might be less solid than believed. This is especially true about the primary one: the belief that the issue is closed because Armenia no longer counts for anything, and that Aliyev has achieved his wartime goal. Instead, we heard him, emboldened by his victory, reiterate his next objective: Opening up a sovereign corridor between Azerbaijan's main territory and its western exclave [located between Armenia and Iran], Nakhichevan, with Baku control at both the entry and exit. This would enable him to block the border between [the two countries].
Threatening environment
Iran has made it clear that this would be a red line for them. On the other hand, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Aliyev's ally and perhaps inspiration, has been pressing for this axis to be opened up. He has done so in the name of a large-market economic perspective that appeals to the Americans at a time when they aim to rival the "New Chinese Silk Roads." But he also portrays it as an embodiment of the "one nation, two states" doctrine that would unite Ankara and Baku.
You have 54.68% of this article left to read. The rest is for subscribers only.