Georgia’s Protesters Won the Battle but Not the War

The government backed down, much to Russia’s chagrin, but it could reintroduce a reviled law.

By , an associate fellow at the Royal United Services Institute.
Georgian opposition supporters rally calling for the government to follow a pro-Western path, outside the parliament in Tbilisi on March 9.
Georgian opposition supporters rally calling for the government to follow a pro-Western path, outside the parliament in Tbilisi on March 9.
Georgian opposition supporters rally calling for the government to follow a pro-Western path, outside the parliament in Tbilisi on March 9. ZURAB TSERTSVADZE/AFP via Getty Images

On March 7, a Georgian woman passionately and fearlessly waved a drenched EU flag against water cannons in the middle of a large-scale protest in Tbilisi. The anger and determination to fight for Georgia’s European future was a common emotion that drove tens of thousands of people into the streets to protest the so-called foreign agents law, which aimed to label all civil society organizations and media that receive more than 20 percent of their funding from abroad as “foreign agents.” Many protesters marched waving Georgian, EU, and Ukrainian flags.

On March 7, a Georgian woman passionately and fearlessly waved a drenched EU flag against water cannons in the middle of a large-scale protest in Tbilisi. The anger and determination to fight for Georgia’s European future was a common emotion that drove tens of thousands of people into the streets to protest the so-called foreign agents law, which aimed to label all civil society organizations and media that receive more than 20 percent of their funding from abroad as “foreign agents.” Many protesters marched waving Georgian, EU, and Ukrainian flags.

The primary message that protesters wanted to communicate with the government as well as the West was a desire to get rid of the law on “transparency of foreign influence,” commonly known as the “Russian law.”

The official justification for pushing this initiative through was the need to ensure transparency of funding. Yet the resemblance of the Georgian law to the Russian foreign agents law, which has been used by the Kremlin for more than a decade to suppress independent and critical voices, alarmed Georgians and the international community. The legal initiative was seen as a threat to Georgia’s candidate status and eventual membership in the EU.

The Georgian version of the law was introduced by a parliamentary group called People’s Power. It is a relatively new group known for its anti-Western stance that includes MPs who used to be part of the ruling Georgian Dream party.

The Georgian government received multiple warnings and calls from foreign officials urging it to abandon the deeply controversial law. EU foreign-policy chief Josep Borrell stressed that the law would have a “chilling effect on civil society and media organizations” and would deprive citizens of the opportunity to benefit from their work. Borrell also noted that the law is in direct contradiction with EU values and standards. The U.S. Embassy in Georgia has also sent a direct message by calling the law “Kremlin-inspired.”

By falsely comparing it to the American Foreign Agent Registration Act, supporters of the law counted on blurring the lines and portraying the law as compatible with democratic aspirations.Yet the concerns and advice from Georgia’s friends and strategic partners failed to reverse the decision prior to massive protests in front of the Georgian Parliament. The proponents of the law seem to have underestimated the potential consequences of their determination to pass the law, assuming Georgians would be apathetic or that opposition would die down.

From the era of Mikheil Saakashvili’s presidency to Georgian Dream’s rule, citizens have had a vast range of grievances that quite often led them into the streets. In the recent past, presidential and parliamentary election results have sparked street protests. Thousands of people marched into the streets of Tbilisi in November 2019, when Georgian lawmakers failed to pass constitutional amendments to hold elections under a proportional system.

According to the December 2022 opinion poll conducted by the National Democratic Institute (NDI), 61 percent of Georgians believe that none of the Georgian parties represent their interests. The high degree of apathy led the advocates of the foreign agents law to believe that masses would not bother to go out into the streets to protect nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and media.

Additionally, by falsely comparing it to the American Foreign Agent Registration Act (FARA), introduced in 1938 to fight against Nazi and Soviet propaganda, the initiators and supporters of the law counted on blurring the lines and portraying the law as compatible with democratic aspirations.

Hoping that few in Georgia would understand that FARA does not target NGOs and rather is aimed at lobbying firms operating in the United States on behalf of foreign governments, the Georgian version of the law would have been implemented easily. The initiators went so far as to present two versions of the law. The first version, they claim, is a more liberal law than FARA and the second one is a direct translation of the U.S. law focused on regulating foreign lobbying.

The trouble is that Georgians promptly realized that the law had nothing in common with Georgia’s declared European aspirations. Most importantly, despite deep polarization, eclectic political tastes, and societal divisions, if there is a single goal that the majority of Georgians agree on (81 percent, according to the NDI poll) it is Georgia’s European future.

Ironically, it was roughly a year ago that Georgia had an unprecedented window of opportunity to pursue its goal of getting closer to the EU. In light of the war in Ukraine, Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova applied for EU candidacy status. While Moldova and Ukraine were granted candidacy status, Georgia—once a front-runner—settled for a so-called European perspective—defined as the development of “a European public sphere rooted in core EU values such as respect for human dignity, equality, inclusion and the rule of law”—and a chance to try again. In the meantime, the EU has given the Georgian government a list of 12 ambitious requirements that need to be addressed if Georgia wants to be reconsidered for candidacy status.

The EU recommendations touch upon some of the most problematic issues, such as the need to resolve political polarization, ensure a free and pluralistic media environment, and greater engagement of civil society in the decision-making processes. The proposed law on foreign agents violates these recommendations and would almost certainly botch Georgia’s last hopes to be granted candidacy status—something that could lead to further protests and imperil Georgian Dream’s reelection chances.

As much as this law would give the government greater control over civil society and the media, it would also cut Georgia off from its European path.

It was precisely the threat to Georgia’s European future that drove tens of thousands of people into the streets. The younger generations that were seen as largely apolitical stunned the political elite by their fearless determination to face water cannons while chanting “No to the Russian law.”

This time, Georgians won by forcing the government to withdraw the law. Yet many fear that this may only be a temporary, strategic retreat, and there might be a new plan in the making that would involve better preparing the ground for the reintroduction of the foreign agents law. As much as this law would give the government greater control over civil society and the media, it would also cut Georgia off from its European path. In light of upcoming parliamentary elections in 2024, this would be a risky move given how strong pro-European sentiments currently are across all sectors of Georgian society. Indeed, if the EU denies Georgia candidacy status, the government will likely face far larger protests.

For its part, the Kremlin has been deeply disappointed by the government’s lack of resilience to withstand the protests and push through a law that has served them so well at home.

Russian officials and propagandists were quick to blame the West for orchestrating another revolutionary scenario and have even threatened Georgia with re-invasion. RT chief Margarita Simonyan claimed that the protests were an attempt to open up a second front against Russia and urged the Kremlin to bombard Tbilisi “without any fuss.” Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov assessed the protests as Western-orchestrated attempts for regime change.

Such threats are empty attempts—especially in light of Russia’s failures in Ukraine—to weaken pro-Western sentiments in Georgia by spreading fear of war. The Kremlin’s reaction alone speaks volumes and indicates how damaging the implementation of the foreign agents law could have been for Georgia.

For now, protesters managed to avert a major setback to Georgia’s international image and a dramatic deterioration of its fragile democracy. Yet, since the forced withdrawal of the law, the rhetoric has been strengthened toward framing the law as compatible with Western democratic systems through the provision of misleading examples from the United States and Canada (Canada recently announced it might introduce a very different law on foreign influence in a very different political context.)

It is highly unlikely that the foreign agents law will return to the Parliament in its old form, but the current disinformation campaign in favor of the law indicates that a rebranded version might be reintroduced prior to the 2024 elections. Such a decision will almost certainly sabotage chances of Georgia receiving EU candidacy status, while the pro-European Georgians would likely accuse the government of jeopardizing the process.

Continuous, large-scale protests would eventually threaten the long-term stability of the regime. Instead of coming up with deeply regressive initiatives, the country’s focus should be placed on fulfilling EU recommendations. Georgia can hardly afford to miss this opportunity.

Natia Seskuria is an associate fellow at the Royal United Services Institute. Twitter: @nseskuria

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