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Taking its cue from Yājñavalkya's famous one-off cryptic pronouncement in favour of meat-eating, and building on the ground-breaking work by Alsdorf and others, this essay attempts to draw a passably coherent picture of the development of... more
Taking its cue from Yājñavalkya's famous one-off cryptic pronouncement in favour of meat-eating, and building on the ground-breaking work by Alsdorf and others, this essay attempts to draw a passably coherent picture of the development of Indian vegetarianism out of the daunting mass of the diverse and often contradictory statements found scattered throughout the śāstras (‘codes of the law’). To summarize, whereas it is not doubtful, despite the outrage of many contemporary Brahmanic Hindus, that sacrificed animals (and even cows!) were consumed in Vedic times, meat-eating fell gradually into disfavour chiefly owing to the rise of the ideal of ahiṁsā (‘non-violence’) as brandished mainly as an anti-sacrificial weapon by the heterodox VI cent. BC (and earlier) śrāmaṇa movements such as Jainism and Buddhism. It should be noted, however, that ahiṁsā did not automatically entail a strict. ethically motivated vegetarianism in both religions (and a vegetarian diet is still not compulsory for Buddhists to this day), as it seems to have originally been held mostly on tabuistic grounds. Ahiṁsā was later adopted by Brahmanic Hinduism and provided with a sounder philosophical grounding (although magico-tabuistic preoccupations did survive to some extent) in the two core upaniṣadic doctrines of advaita (‘monism’) and rebirth: where all is One, the animal I kill is (my)Self; where everybody reincarnates, the animal I kill is but the fallen condition of one who was once a man: hence animals must not be killed.
The topic of the proofs of God’s existence in the context of Indian philosophy is usually brought up in connection with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, and particularly with the “the crown and glory of the literature bearing on this subject”... more
The topic of the proofs of God’s existence in the context of Indian philosophy is usually brought up in connection with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, and particularly with the “the crown and glory of the literature bearing on this subject” (G. Bhattacharyya), i.e. the Nyāyakusumañjali of Udayana. While the problem of the foundation of a rational theology became central for the above school between ca. 600 and 900 CE, an intriguing anticipation at a much earlier date can be descried in the still rudimentary theology sketched in a cluster of aforisms in the Samādhi Pāda of the Yogasūtras. In particular, YS I, 15  (tatra niratiśayaṃ sarvajñabījam, translated by Woods as «in this [Īśvara] the germ of the omniscient is at its utmost excellence») sounds like an argument of sorts for God’s existence, and as such it has been regarded by the commentators, who have taken pains to make explicit the logical structure of the proof. This paper will discuss some of the interpretations offered, pointing out and briefly discussing the striking resemblance in theoretical structure of the proof (in particular as expounded by Vijñānabhikṣu) to the classical argument “ex gradibus entium” of scholastic theology.
[The «Renaissance Orientale and the Imagination of India in the Literature of Romanticism]
The motto of the Delphic oracle, γνῶθι σεαυτόν (nosce te ipsum, “know thyself”), has enjoyed an immense fortune in Western philosophical culture; among the early Greek thinkers it became particularly associated with Socrates as we know... more
The motto of the Delphic oracle, γνῶθι σεαυτόν (nosce te ipsum, “know thyself”), has enjoyed an immense fortune in Western philosophical culture; among the early Greek thinkers it became particularly associated with Socrates as we know him through Plato, who mentions the motto in connection with Socrates’ attitude to philosophical enquiry in no less than five dialogues (Philebus, Phædrus, Charmides, Protagoras, Timaeus, Alcibiades I). On the other side, exhortations to know (one’s)self are rife in the Indian Upaniṣads, beginning with Yājñavalkya’s famous admonishment to his beloved “philosophical” wife, Maitreyī, that the ātman alone should be contemplated, listened to, reflected and meditated upon. But what is the “self” which is the object of the quest in both philosophical traditions? On the Indian side, its equation with the spiritual principle is more straightforward, since the term ātman covers at once both the function as the reflexive pronoun and the meaning of “soul”. On the Greek side, on the other hand, the equation of tò autó with psychḗ is not immediately apparent, and must be gained through philosophical investigation. In both traditions, however, access to the real essence of the ātman/psychḗ is difficult to obtain through rational discourse, and extra-rational devices are sometimes resorted to in order to assist and catalyze the theoretical insight. Among them, surprisingly enough, the metaphor of the pupil of the eye, named equivalently kórē and kanīnikā in either language, is applied on very similar terms in the story of Prajāpati’s teaching to Indra and Virocana narrated in the eighth chapter of the Chāndogya Upaniṣad and in Socrates’ instruction to Alcibiades in the dialogue named after the latter.
Il lessico della “legge” in ambito indiano, come in tutte le culture, annovera una varietà di lessemi, tra cui spiccano, nella piú antica epoca vedica, dhā́man (e affini), dhárman (in seguito dharma), r̥tá e l’elusivo vratá. Dopo un breve... more
Il lessico della “legge” in ambito indiano, come in tutte le culture, annovera una varietà di lessemi, tra cui spiccano, nella piú antica epoca vedica, dhā́man (e affini), dhárman (in seguito dharma), r̥tá e l’elusivo vratá. Dopo un breve excursus sulle rispettive pertinenze linguistiche, si prenderanno in esame le due nozioni piú caratterizzanti, quella piú specialmente vedica di r̥ta e quella per certi versi piú complessa di dharma, che perviene a soppiantare quasi del tutto la prima nella letteratura del periodo epico-classico. Per il lessema r̥ta gli studiosi sono divisi sulla derivazione dalla rad. 3. er- ‘muoversi’ (ἕρχομαι, orior) o dalla rad. 1. ar- (< H2er) ‘adattare’ (ἀραρίσκω, rītus), mentre dharma(n) si riconnette certamente alla rad. 2. dher- ‘mantenere, sostenere’ (θρόνος, firmus): appare dunque già fondata nell’etimologia la differente connotazione, rispettivamente dinamica e statica, delle due nozioni, la prima delle quali significa, si potrebbe dire sinteticamente e tenendo conto di entrambe le derivazioni proposte, il ‘cursus’ ordinato e armonioso delle cose (in una dimensione piú metafisica che riecheggia nel concetto greco (etimologicamente imparentato) di ἁρμονία); mentre la seconda, in qualche modo subordinata alla prima, designa piuttosto i ‘pilastri’ su cui tale ordine si regge, in una dimensione piú rituale ed etico-sociale che cosmica, e tenendo conto degli apporti “pratici” della prassi rituale e del costume (mōs). Per ciò che riguarda la discussa etimologia di r̥ta, mentre la maggioranza degli studiosi (Grassmann, Bergaigne, Darmester, Renou, Benveniste etc.) ha favorito la derivazione da √ar- ‘adattare’, la derivazione da √er- ‘muoversi’, originariamente proposta da Oldenberg e poi ripresa da Apte, ha di recente trovato una nuova fautrice in Jurewicz, nel quadro delle nuove prospettive metodologiche aperte dalla linguistica cognitiva. A prescindere dall’etimologia, non si può omettere di menzionare il significato di ‘verità’ che già per Lüders, recentemente ripreso da Brereton, costituisce il nucleo semantico del termine, capace di dar conto di tutti gli usi vedici, per continuare poi come significato esclusivo in età classica (segnatamente nel privativo an-r̥ta ‘falsità’). Emerge comunque pur nella varietà delle prospettive una dimensione ontologico-metafisica della nozione di r̥ta di cui Franklin e Chaturvedi hanno messo in rilievo gli addentellati con le analoghe valenze della presocratica ἁρμονία: si cercherà di mostrare come specialmente in ambito indiano tale dimensione sia pervasiva, elaborandosi fin da epoca antica (il Nāsadīya Sūkta del R̥g Veda) quella concezione della Realtà come tensione armonica degli opposti (l’eraclitea παλίντροπος ἁρμονίη!) che impronterà durevolmente di sé il pensiero filosofico-religioso indiano successivo che dal Veda trae alimento, tanto in ambito mitico che speculativo, dal mitologema brahmanico e poi epico-puranico del daivāsura alla dottrina teologica vaisnavita dell’avatāra (per non citare che due esempî tra i piú significativi).
In the introduction to his Rājamārtaṇḍa commentary to the Yogasūtras, king Bhoja, the XI sec. philosopher Paramāra ruler, proudly vaunts the terseness and perspicuity of his commentatorial work in contradistinction to the practice of... more
In the introduction to his Rājamārtaṇḍa commentary to the Yogasūtras, king Bhoja, the XI sec. philosopher Paramāra ruler, proudly vaunts the terseness and perspicuity of his commentatorial work in contradistinction to the practice of others who, as he remarks with some irony, are wont to obscure what is clear by much unnecessary philosophical prattle, whereas they quickly dispose of what is really in need of explanation with an easy spaṣṭam (“[the sense is] plain”). In reality, Bhoja’s commentary sometimes gives the impression of a certain shallowness as compared to the “standard” commentary going by the name of Vyāsa, and at places it even seems to betray a poor understanding of the root text, or indeed a faulty conception of its philosophical implications. After giving some relevant examples, the paper concentrates on one major instance, where at three different places (II, 6; III, 35; III, 55) Bhoja seems to deny the kartṛtva of  prakṛti, contradicting the basic Sāṃkhya tenet, also shared by Yoga, which ascribes unconscious agency to Nature and idle consciousness to Spirit. The misconception is noticed also in the Kiraṇa subcommentary to the Rājamārtaṇḍa by Śrīkṛṣṇavallabhācārya, who tries to exhonerate Bhoja from blame, albeit with only partial success.
The paper offers some insights on the pertinence of the notion of īśvara to the conceptual frame of Pātañjala Yoga, arguing for its unsystematic origin in the mystical experience of the yogin, against the backdrop of puranic bhakti... more
The paper offers some insights on the pertinence of the notion of īśvara to the conceptual frame of Pātañjala Yoga, arguing for its unsystematic origin in the mystical experience of the yogin, against the backdrop of puranic bhakti theism  casting the paremeśvara in the role of the supreme yogin emanating and reabsorbing the universe in a yogic alternation of enstasis and alienation. Within the compass of the rudimentary attempt towards a theoretical integration of the experiential notion of īśvara in the seven relevant sūtras of the I book of the Yoga Sūtras, the paper highlights what amounts to a “proof of God’s existence” in YS I,25, discussing its interpretation by the chief commentators, and the resemblance in theoretical structure of a variant of the proof as expounded by Vijñānabhikṣu to the classical proof “ex gradibus entium” of scholastic theology.
Uno dei piú celebri episodi upanisadici che hanno per protagonista il famoso maestro Yājñavalkya lo vede trionfare in una disputa teologica su numerosi avversari, l’ultimo dei quali, Vidagdha Śākalya, subisce un atroce destino per aver... more
Uno dei piú celebri episodi upanisadici che hanno per protagonista il famoso maestro Yājñavalkya lo vede trionfare in una disputa teologica su numerosi avversari, l’ultimo dei quali, Vidagdha Śākalya, subisce un atroce destino per aver avuto l’ardire di sfidarlo oltre il lecito: l’interrogativo finale che gli propone Yājñavalkya si rivela per lui un vero rompicapo, di nome e di fatto: incapace di rispondere, tasya hā mūrdhā vipapāta, ovvero, secondo una delle traduzioni piú correnti, “la sua testa andò in frantumi”. Si tratta dell’unico caso in cui un testo ci presenta l’attuazione effettiva dell’enigmatica minaccia di esplosione della testa che costituisce un topos del brahmodya, ovvero la ‘disputa sul brahman’, nelle sue varie forme. Già molti studiosi si sono cimentati a delucidare, da un lato, il reale significato dell’espressione formulare che coinvolge la rad. vi-pat — se da intendersi in una valenza variamente metaforica (‘perder la testa’ nel senso di andare in confusione, oppure ‘perdere la faccia’) ovvero letterale; d’altro lato, l’origine dell’espressione stessa, che taluno colloca, come già detto, nell’ambito teologico del brahmodya, ma talatro ritiene duplice, affiancando all’ambito teologico un ambito giuridico, le due radici originariamente distinte essendo poi confluite in un tronco unico; o ancora, le circostanze e i contesti nei quali la minaccia trova applicazione, attraverso l’analisi di una varietà di narrazioni desunte dai Brāhmaṇa, dalle Upaniṣad, dal canone pāli del Buddhismo, fino a storie piú recenti del Rāmāyaṇa e del Mahābhārata. Sulla base di questi antecedenti, il presente contributo intende mostrare come le diverse modalità con cui ricorre il topos dello ‘scoppio della testa’ si possano in realtà ricondurre sotto la rubrica comune di una divaricazione tra parola e verità: lo scoppio della testa minaccia chi dice e non sa, oppure chi, in un modo o nell’altro, sa e non dice. Questo secondo aspetto, già presente in alcuni testi collaterali già noti ma relativamente meno studiati afferenti all’argomento, risulta chiaramente dall’esame di un nuovo testo che ora per la prima volta (a mia conoscenza) viene introdotto nella discussione: nella raccolta di novelle della Vetālapañcaviṁśati, la “Venticinquina del demone”, un re vincolato all’ingrato compito di portare a spalla un cadavere fino al luogo in cui deve esser utilizzato per un rituale di magia nera si sente apostrofare dalla salma, posseduta da un vetāla, che gli racconta una storia conclusa da un indovinello e gli ingiunge di dichiararne la soluzione, qualora ne sia a conoscenza, sotto pena di scoppio della testa; rispondendo, il re scampa alla minaccia, ma infrange un tabú della favella, ciò che lo costringe a riprendere da capo l’ordalia, in una fatica di Sisifo da cui l’unica via d’uscita è che il re, non sapendo, non dica.
Apūrvaṃ vyākaraṇakauśalam ity āstām: “let it remain an example of unprecedented grammatical skill” — thus sarcastically remarks the Dvaitin commentator Jayatīrtha on Śaṅkarācārya’s sleight of hand to turn written saṃbhūti into asaṃbhūti... more
Apūrvaṃ vyākaraṇakauśalam ity āstām: “let it remain an example of unprecedented grammatical skill” — thus sarcastically remarks the Dvaitin commentator Jayatīrtha on Śaṅkarācārya’s sleight of hand to turn written saṃbhūti into asaṃbhūti at one of the many difficult turns the Īśa Upaniṣad has in store for his strictly monistic stance. But Jayatīrtha’s own master Madhva is renowned in his own right for his “unprecedented skill” in conjuring up whole unattested smṛti passages to corroborate his interpretations. Indeed, more specimens of “unprecedented skill” are displayed in turn by each of the great bhāṣyakāras of the three conflicting schools — Advaita, Dvaita and Viśiṣṭādvaita — on this Upaniṣad, which on account of its extreme pithiness is singularly suited to demonstrate the length dārśanikas are willing to go to make an authoritative text square each with his own preconceived philosophical outlook.
A most telling example of the preemptive force of world-views on actual theoretical practice in the Indian context.
The intriguing similarity between the allegories of the soul chariot in Plato’s Phædrus and in the Kaṭha Upaniṣad has been pointed out — if not thoroughly investigated — by several scholars, accompanied with varying assessments, largely... more
The intriguing similarity between the allegories of the soul chariot in Plato’s Phædrus and in the Kaṭha Upaniṣad has been pointed out — if not thoroughly investigated — by several scholars, accompanied with varying assessments, largely dependent on each individual scholar’s assumptions concerning the bare possibility or the degree of likelihood of contacts and influences between early Greek and Indian thought, the significance (or otherwise) of the intercultural comparative endeavour, or, indeed, the methodological soundness of even positing the question, in the almost complete absence of pertinent historical documentation.
Because assessments are to such a great extent  influenced by theoretical assumptions, the paper will start with some methodological considerations in order to define the grounds, scope and limits of the attempted comparison, also drawing on the methodological discourses of other related fields, like mythology and folklore.
A review of the relevant texts of the Phædrus and the Kaṭhopaniṣad will come next, setting out both the congruencies and the discrepancies in the treatment of the chariot allegory. A detailed survey of kindred passages in both literary traditions (which I have presented elsewhere) lies outside the purview of this paper, but a summary reference to its results will help substantiate the contention that the allegory of the soul chariot is integral to upaniṣadic thought in a way that is unparalleled in Greek thought, thus supporting the conjecture of diffusion in a westward direction.
Finally, the paper will briefly discuss what I regard as the paramount difference — i.e. the conspicuous absence of the idle passenger in the Phædrus allegory vs. his centrality to the allegory of the Kaṭha — and its significance as a theoretical watershed between Upaniṣad-based Indian and Plato-influenced Greek philosophy.
As is well known, the Platonic doctrine of anamnesis aims to provide a solution to a difficult epistemological problem: how can one learn what he still ignores? for, if he utterly ignores it, he cannot even purpose to learn it. The answer... more
As is well known, the Platonic doctrine of anamnesis aims to provide a solution to a difficult epistemological problem: how can one learn what he still ignores? for, if he utterly ignores it, he cannot even purpose to learn it. The answer of the Meno is that learning actually is remembering what we used to know, but have forgotten.  For its part, the Yogasūtra in a group of aphorisms of the Kaivalya Pāda confronts us with what seems to amount to an intriguing variant of the same doctrine, this time meant to cope with an “existential” problem typically Indian, yet in a way similar: how can one become (as a consequence of karman) what he was not? He who was not a cow in the former life did not possess her competences either (e.g. relishing pasture); hence how can he assume her mode of being in the next life? Patañjali’s answer is similar to Plato’s: taking on a mode of being actually is becoming once again what we had already been, although we do not consciously remember it. ========== Com’è noto, la dottrina platonica dell’anamnesi intende fornire una soluzione a un difficile problema epistemologico: come si può imparare ciò che ancora non si conosce? Infatti, se non lo si conosce per nulla, neppure ci si può proporre di impararlo. La risposta del Menone è che conoscere è in effetti ricordare quanto già in qualche modo sappiamo ma avevamo dimenticato. Dal canto suo, un gruppo di aforismi del Kaivalya Pāda degli Yoga Sūtra ci presenta una curiosa variante della medesima dottrina, intesa questa volta ad affrontare un problema “esistenziale” tipicamente indiano, eppure in qualche modo simile: come si può diventare (per effetto del karman) ciò che non si era? Chi non era nella scorsa vita una vacca neppure ne possedeva le competenze (per esempio, cibarsi d’erba); come può dunque assumerne il modo di essere nella vita ventura? La risposta degli Yoga Sūtra è analoga a quella del Menone: assumere un modo di essere è in effetti ridiventare ciò che già siamo stati ma di cui non serbiamo piú memoria consapevole.
As is well known, the Platonic doctrine of anámnēsis aims to provide a solution to a difficult epistemological problem: how can one learn what he still ignores? for, if he utterly ignores it, he cannot even purpose to learn it. The answer... more
As is well known, the Platonic doctrine of anámnēsis aims to provide a solution to a difficult epistemological problem: how can one learn what he still ignores? for, if he utterly ignores it, he cannot even purpose to learn it. The answer of the Meno is that learning actually is remembering what we used to know, but have forgotten. On the other hand, some aphorisms of the Kaivalya Pāda  of the Yogasūtras confront us with what seems to amount to an intriguing variant of the same doctrine, this time meant to cope with an “existential” problem typically Indian, yet in a way similar: how can one become (as a consequence of karman) what he was not? He who was not a cow in the former life did not possess her competences either (e.g. relishing pasture); hence how can he assume her mode of being in the next life? According to the interpretation of the relevant sūtras offered in Bhoja’s Rājamārtaṇḍa commentary, Patañjali’s answer turns out to bear an uncanny resemblance to Plato’s: taking on a mode of being actually is becoming once again (i.e. “recalling”, as it were) what we had already been, although we do not consciously remember it.
This paper fits into the author’s ongoing undertaking to approach some fundamental philosophical themes in the kindred Greek and Indian philosophical traditions from a comparative perspective, showing how such approach can benefit both sides by fostering a deeper understanding of shared philosophical questions. In relation to the present object, it will be shown how the frame of the Platonic anámnēsis can help throw light on the import of a hitherto neglected group of pātañjala sūtras, while intimating a new possibility for the interpretation of a moot passage in Plato’s Meno which has so far defied the perspicacity of the scholars.
The motto of the Delphic oracle, γνῶθι σεαυτόν (nosce te ipsum, “know thyself”), has enjoyed an immense fortune in Western philosophical culture; among the early Greek thinkers it became particularly associated with Socrates as we know... more
The motto of the Delphic oracle, γνῶθι σεαυτόν (nosce te ipsum, “know thyself”), has enjoyed an immense fortune in Western philosophical culture; among the early Greek thinkers it became particularly associated with Socrates as we know him through Plato, who mentions the motto in connection with Socrates’ attitude to philosophical enquiry in no less than five dialogues (Philebus, Phædrus, Alcibiades I, Charmides, Protagoras). On the other side, exhortations to know (one’s)self are rife in the Indian Upaniṣads, beginning with Yājñavalkya’s famous admonishment to his beloved “philosophical” wife, Maitreyī, that the ātman alone should be contemplated, listened to, reflected and meditated upn. But what is the “self” which is the object of the quest in both philosophical traditions? On the Indian side, its equation with the spiritual principle is more straightforward, since the term ātman covers at once both the function as the reflexive pronoun and the meaning of “soul”. On the Greek side, on the other hand, the equation of tò autó with psychē is not immediately apparent, and must be gained through philosophical investigation. In both traditions, however, access to the real essence of the ātman/psychē is difficult to obtain through rational discourse, and extra-rational devices are sometimes resorted to in order to assist and catalyze the theoretical insight. Among them, surprisingly enough, the metaphor of the pupil of the eye, named equivalently kórē and kanīnikā in either language, is applied on very similar terms in the story of Prajāpati’s teaching to Indra and Virocana narrated in the 8th prapāṭaka of the  Chāndogya Upaniṣad and in Socrates’ instruction to Alcibiades in the dialogue named after the latter.
The deluge myth, while enjoying a wide diffusion all over the Eurasian continent, has found its most important literary developments in the Near-eastern, Classical and Indian worlds. Apropos of these traditions, the question has often... more
The deluge myth, while enjoying a wide diffusion all over the Eurasian continent, has found its most important literary developments in the Near-eastern, Classical and Indian worlds. Apropos of these traditions, the question has often been raised of their mutual relationship. As regards the Indian tradition in particular, several renowned scholars of the past have postulated its dependance on the sumero-semitic tradition, but nowadays the prevailing opinion speaks in favour of its autonomous development. Nevertheless, the structure of the Indian myth, whose careful recognition should indeed constitute the requisite basis for any further insight into the problem of its relationships, has not been adequately investigated.
In my paper I purpose first of all a survey of the extant material by presenting, besides the well-known versions of the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa, Mahābhārata, Matsya and Bhāgavata Purāṇa, to which the analysis has usually been confined so far, some other less known versions, like those of the Viṣṇudharmottara and Kālikā Purāṇa, which add highly significant traits to the picture. Secondly, on the basis of that material, I intend to show as the Indian myth as a whole exhibits its own peculiar structure, quite different from the structure of the myths of the other great traditions, except for a couple of very generic features, which are, I should think, almost unavoidable in any deluge myth by reason of its very internal structure, and are as such quite worthless in either establishing or denying any historical relationship whatsoever.
It had already been remarked, in this connection, that the Indian myth lacks all kind of ethical motivation, as the deluge itself is part of the ongoing cosmogonic process, hence naturally grounded; or that the closing sacrifice has an utterly different meaning in the Indian and semitic myth. However, scholars had hitherto failed to notice, as I believe, the specifically Indian import of the symbolism of the ship — tipically preexistent, and not fashioned by the protégé —, the peculiarity of the symbolic plexus of the ship and fish, later enriched by the rope as third element, and its solidarity with other mythical representations, with which a deep-rooted homology unexpectedly comes to light in spite of the seeming eterogeneity.
In conclusion, the Indian deluge myth shows unmistakable original traits in its indissoluble connection with such typically Indian themes as (to mention but a few) the multilevel cyclical cosmic structure, the notion of residue, the avatāra, the divine monoceros, the earth foundering under the burden of the living.
El mito del diluvio, aunque goce de una gran difusión en todo el continente euroasiático, ha logrado sus desarrollos literarios más importantes en el Cercano Oriente, en el mundo clásico y en la India. A propósito de estas tradiciones,... more
El mito del diluvio, aunque goce de una gran difusión en todo el continente euroasiático, ha logrado sus desarrollos literarios más importantes en el Cercano Oriente, en el mundo  clásico y en la India. A propósito de estas tradiciones, muy a menudo se ha planteado la pregunta de su relación recíproca. En cuanto a la tradición india en particular, varios eruditos de renombre en el  pasado habían postulado su dependencia de la tradición sumero-semítica, pero hoy en día la opinión predominante habla a favor de su desarrollo autónomo. No obstante, la estructura del mito indio, cuyo detenido análisis debería constituir la base indispensable para una mejor comprensión del problema de sus relaciones, no ha sido adecuadamente investigada. En este ensayo se introduce primeramente una presentación del material existente, que incluye, además de las versiones usuales del Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa, Mahābhārata, Matsya y Bhāgavata Purāṇa, algunas otras versiones menos conocidas, como las del Viṣṇudharmottara y Kālikā Purāṇa, que añaden rasgos muy reveladores al cuadro. Después, sobre la base de ese material, se intenta mostrar como el mito indio exhibe su propia estructura características , diferente de la estructura de los mitos de las otras grandes tradiciones, a excepción de un par de elementos muy genéricos, que son, creo yo, casi inevitables en cualquier mito de diluvio en razón de su necesidad interna, y por lo tanto no tienen consecuencia para establecer o rechazar cualquier relación histórica que sea. Ya se había  señalado, a este respecto, que el mito indio carece de toda forma de motivación ética, ya que el diluvio en sí constituye parte del proceso cosmogónico, y por lo tanto tiene una base natural; o que el sacrificio final tiene un sentido completamente diferente en el mito indio y semítico. Sin embargo, hasta ahora los estudiosos han pasado por alto la particularidad específicamente india del simbolismo del barco — típicamente preexistente, y no fabricado por el protegido —; la peculiaridad del plexo simbólico del barco y del pez, enriquecido posteriormente por la cuerda como tercero elemento; y su coherencia con otras representaciones míticas, en cuya conexión  sale inesperadamente a la luz una homología profundamente arraigada a pesar de la aparente heterogeneidad de las imágenes. En conclusión, el mito indio del diluvio exhibe  rasgos originales inconfundibles en su enlace indisoluble con temas típicamente indios como (por mencionar sólo algunos) la estructura cósmica cíclica, la noción de residuo, el avatāra, el divino monocerote, el hundimiento de tierra bajo la carga de los vivientes
Il mito del diluvio, pur godendo di un'ampia diffusione in tutto il continente euroasiatico, ha ottenuto i suoi più importanti sviluppi letterari nel vicino Oriente, nel mondo classico e in India. Riguardo a queste tradizioni, si è spesso... more
Il mito del diluvio, pur godendo di un'ampia diffusione in tutto il continente euroasiatico, ha ottenuto i suoi più importanti sviluppi letterari nel vicino Oriente, nel mondo classico e in India. Riguardo a queste tradizioni, si è spesso sollevata la questione della loro reciproca relazione. Per quanto concerne, in particolare, la tradizione indiana, molti rinomati studiosi del passato hanno postulato una sua dipendenza dalla tradizione sumero-semitica, ma oggi l'opinione prevalente si pronuncia a favore del suo sviluppo autonomo; tuttavia, la struttura del mito indiano, la cui attenta analisi dovrebbe costituire la base indispensabile per una migliore comprensione del problema dei loro rapporti, non è stato ancora adeguatamente indagato. Il presente contributo presenta dapprima una breve rassegna del materiale, comprendente, oltre alle versioni ben note dello Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa, Mahābhārata, Matsya e Bhagavata Purana, cui l'analisi si è finora solitamente limitata, anche alcune altre versioni meno note, come quelle del Viṣṇudharmottara e del Kālikā Purāṇa, che aggiungono tratti assai significativi al quadro. Quindi sulla base di quel materiale si cerca di mostrare come il mito indiano nel suo complesso presenti una struttura unica, differente dalla struttura dei miti delle altre grandi tradizioni in questione, fatta eccezione per un paio di caratteristiche molto generiche che devono essere, si direbbe, praticamente inevitabili in qualsiasi mito del diluvio in ragione della sua necessità intrinseca, e quindi non hanno rilevanza nello stabilire o rifiutare rapporti storici di sorta. Era già stato osservato, a questo proposito, che il mito indiano è privo di qualsiasi forma di motivazione etica, in quanto l'alluvione in sé è parte del processo cosmogonico e quindi ha una base naturale; o che il sacrificio finale ha una valenza completamente diversa nel mito indiano e semitico. Tuttavia, gli studiosi avevano finora mancato di rilevare la valenza specificamente indiana del simbolismo della nave — tipicamente preesistente, e non fabbricata dal protetto —; la peculiarità del plesso simbolico della nave e del pesce, in seguito arricchito dalla fune come terzo elemento; e la sua solidarietà con altre rappresentazioni mitiche, con cui viene inaspettatamente  alla luce un’omologia profondamente radicata nonostante l'apparente eterogeneità delle immagini. In conclusione, il mito indiano del diluvio presenta caratteristiche originali distintive nel suo legame indissolubile con temi tipicamente indiani come (per citarne solo alcuni) la struttura cosmica ciclica , la nozione del residuo, l'avatāra, il divino monocero, lo sprofondamento della terra sotto il peso dei viventi.
«Other nations made gods, kings, spirits; the Greeks alone made men» wrote famously Jäger, enthusiastically celebrating the purported exceptionality of the Greek ‘miracle’ in his epoch-making early XX century work, Paideia. Die Formung... more
«Other nations made gods, kings, spirits; the Greeks alone made men» wrote famously Jäger, enthusiastically celebrating the purported exceptionality of the Greek ‘miracle’ in his epoch-making early XX century work, Paideia. Die Formung des griechischen Menschen, which was to exert a persistent influence on western self-representation, giving new scope to western supremacism by the added distinction of its Hellenic roots. Taking its cue from Jäger’s advocacy of paideía, or culture in the higher  sense of Bildung, as a uniquely Greek (and by extension European) creation, this paper seeks to expose the untenability of such an assumption by comparison to the parallel notion of saṁskṛti in the Indian milieu. It does so first of all by arguing that Jäger’s premises are flawed and methodologically unsound on various accounts, and most of all because they endorse a restrictive notion of culture that, in addition to being unreasonable in itself, is utterly inconducive to fruitful historical investigation. Secondly, after a brief discussion of the Vedic and priestly foundations of the peculiarly Indian notion of culture vis-à-vis the Homeric and aristocratic roots of the Greek one, the paper tries to show, with the help of several examples, how the Indian notion of saṁskṛti, besides possessing its own unique features over against the Greek paideía, also shares with the latter a number of parallel traits, and most importantly the very concept, which Jäger recognizes as paramount, of culture as the conscious creation of an ideal type which selectively binds its exponents to the preservation and transmission of the values of an élite — however differently embodied, in the warrior aristocracy, in Greece, and in the priestly class in India. Nevertheless, despite the major role played by the brāhmaṇas as the custodians of high culture throughout Indian history, the contribution of the kṣatriya class has by no means been of lesser consequence. After an intermezzo challenging the notion, still fondly cherished in some circles, of the unmistakably Greek specificity of that all-important department of culture, i.e. philosophy, the paper winds up by drawing a quick sketch of the outstanding culture-shaping significance of the Indian epics, the Rāmāyaṇa and the Mahābhārata, and their pervasive and enduring influence even well into the contemporary Indian society, exceeding by far whatever meaningfulness the Homeric epics may still be credited with in the contemporary ‘disenchanted’ western world.
The episode of Alexander’s interview with the gymnosophists has come down to us in several versions, among which the one in Plutarch’s Vita Alexandri is the most renowned. In this connection, the question arises whether the solutions... more
The episode of Alexander’s interview with the gymnosophists has come down to us in several versions, among which the one in Plutarch’s Vita Alexandri is the most renowned. In this connection, the question arises whether the solutions given by the naked philosophers to the puzzles propounded by Alexander can be shown to reflect genuine Indian doctrines. Challenging Dumézil’s reply in the affirmative, the author contends that they cannot. While most questions and answers are scarcely relevant to the investigation, as being of little (if any) philosophical import, the analysis concentrates on the more significant ones, and especially on the solution offered to the question as to which of the two — day or night — came first. According to Dumézil, the gymnosophist’s answer reported by Plutarch, i. e. that the day came first, by one day, reflects the vedic doctrine of the primeval cosmogonic role of Dawn and Light. Against this may be argued in the first place that such doctrine does not enjoy any prominent status in the Vedas themselves — quite to the contrary, it stands up disadvantegeously to many all-important texts, such as the Nāsadīyasūkta, which assign the primeval status to Darkness — and cannot therefore be regarded as being specifically Indian any more than its opposite. Secondly, it is shown that the Greek tradition is at great variance on this very point, to the extent that all logically conceivable solutions (i. e., precedence of day by one day / day by one night / night by one day / night by one night) are represented in some version or other. This inconsistency appears to stem from the fact that no particular doctrine (Indian or whatever) was envisaged; according to the present author, we have reason to believe that the gymnosophist’s reply was rather meant to set off by means of a paradox the sheer impossibility of a solution (all four alternatives being equivalent to that effect). This interpretation is reinforced by the gymnosophist’s own remark confessing the aporetical nature of his reply, and finally by a further recourse to paradox — this time a variant of the well-known “paradox of the liar” — which the author lays bare in the otherwise inexplicable dénouement of the anecdote.
In the frame of my ongoing research devoted to the elucidation of the notion of tejas (‘ardent/fierce energy’), the present paper purposes to investigate an aspect that has so far lurked in the background of the former contributions,... more
In the frame of my ongoing research devoted to the elucidation of the notion of tejas (‘ardent/fierce energy’), the present paper purposes to investigate an aspect that has so far lurked in the background of the former contributions, despite its crucial significance to the notion of tejas itself: namely, its liability to transference.
As a prominent instance of so-called “substance-powers” or Daseinsmächte, as Glasenapp originally termed them, meaning by such term “hypostases of qualities and processes conceived as self-standing substances”, tejas shares the transferability which is an essential property of substances — in contradistinction to qualities, which, existing only in alio and not enjoying an independent status, cannot be transferred as such. (As has already been noted, Indian thought is apt to hypostatize what would elsewhere be counted a mere quality: a well known case in point is puṇya, i.e. ‘virtue/merit’, which is not regarded in the śāstras as the inherent attribute of the virtuous, but rather as a stock of goods liable to be alienated to someone else).
The basic mechanics of tejas transfer, configuring either an increment or a decrement, can be further specified according to a fourfold typology: i) bestowal with inception of being; ii) bestowal with promotion of status; iii) withdrawal with demotion from status; iv) withdrawal with cessation from being. Such fourfold typology depends on a twofold acception of the notion of tejas, either (in a broader sense, brought out, e.g. in Viṣṇudharmottara Purāṇa I, 171, 2-7: ajeyaṃ vaiṣṇavaṃ tejas tac ca nityaṃ ca jantuṣu | nāśam āyānti te sarve hīnā vaiṣṇavatejasā) as the Lord’s selfsame cosmic life-sustaining energy, or (in a more restricted sense, brought out, e.g. in Bhagavad Gītā 10, 41: yad yad vibhūtimat sattvaṃ śrīmad ūrjitam eva vā | tat tad evāvagaccha tvaṃ mama tejo’mśasaṃbhavam) as a special supererogatory dispensation, building up the pre-eminence of exceptionally powerful beings. Whereas the bestowal and withdrawal of tejas in the general sense cannot but entail, respectively, origination and dissolution, the shift of (supererogatory) tejas in the special sense can have less drastic consequences.
"The word tejas, from root tij ‘sharpen’ and hence originally meaning ‘sharpness’, came very soon to express the notion of a peculiar ‘substance-power’ with distinctive fiery connotations. Such notion of tejas is very prominent,... more
"The word tejas, from root tij ‘sharpen’ and hence originally meaning ‘sharpness’, came very soon to express the notion of a peculiar ‘substance-power’ with distinctive fiery connotations. Such notion of tejas is very prominent, especially in the epic and puranic literature, and has often attracted the attention of scholars, but its development has not yet been subjected to thorough investigation. This paper anticipates a few results of the author’s current research, offering some hints to bridge the gap between vedic and puranic usage.
Although the word tejas occurs only sparingly in the Ṛg Veda, and regularly only in connection with the root meaning, as other tij-derivatives, the germs are already visible of a metaphorical extension of the basic meaning of ‘sharpness’ pointing to the later acception. The frequency increases considerably in the Atharva Veda, where tejas is usually found associated with other ‘Daseinsmächte’ such as varcas, ojas and the like. In the Brāhmaṇas tejas is consistently connected with fire as a specific ‘energy’. The upanisadic usage is heterogeneous, but a few passages can be singled out in which tejas comes decidedly to the foreground as one of the ultimate constituents of reality. Such doctrines as the well known teaching of Uddālaka Aruṇi to his son Śvetaketu in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad on the threefold propagation of being through the hierarchy of tejas, āpas and anna, and still more some later Maitrāyaṇī doctrines, may be regarded as the early antecedents of the distinctive epic-puranic development of the notion of tejas as a (kind of) energy wielded by the supreme Lord for the accomplishment of his cosmic tasks.
Tejas plays a central role in some of the most characteristic mythical themes of each of the great gods of Hinduism, such as Viṣṇu’s avatāras, Śiva’s interrupted love-making to Pārvatī and Skanda’s unnatural birth from the spilt seed, the severing of Brahmā’s unauspicious fifth head, the origin of Devī, and Sūrya’s shaping on Viśvakarman’s lathe, to mention but a few.
By analysing the vast corpus of tejas myths motive-wise it is possible to enucleate from the context its most significant traits, and thereby gain a deeper insight into its authentic meaning. Only a few can be mentioned here. In the Purāṇas tejas is a kind of energy with fiery connotations. In spite of its ancient association with procreation and seed, it is typically destructive — or if at all creative, it regularly carries destructive implications or undertones. Its dangerous potential can be traced back to the notion of excess which is already inherent in the rigvedic usage. Tejas may be congenital in some overpowerful beings, both animate — such as gods, demons, seers, kings — and inanimate — such as weapons and poison, but its ultimate source is the supreme Lord, who can infuse it either directly or indirectly. Hence tejas is not permanent, like a property: rather, as is appropriate to a substance-power, it is eminently liable to be lost or transferred or withdrawn in consequence of sin, impurity, defeat, death or simply purposelessness ensuing from final success. Although on the one hand the Bhagavad Gītā’s proclaim holds good that all tejas comes from the Lord, yet it also obeys its intrinsic laws, which the Lord himself cannot infringe — a paradoxical impotence on which is built the common pattern of so many avatāra myths. An explanation is to be sought in the enduring dialectic rooted deep in Indian culture and sprouting along the course of its development the conflicting branches of monism and theism, ritualism and devotion, belief in magic and surrender to grace. "
I have already examined elsewhere (“The Development of ‘Tejas’ from the Veda-s to the Purāṇa-s”, WZKSA 36 (Suppl. 1993): 137-147) how the word tejas, originally meaning ‘sharpness’, came very soon to convey the notion of a peculiar... more
I have already examined elsewhere (“The Development of ‘Tejas’ from the Veda-s to the Purāṇa-s”, WZKSA 36 (Suppl. 1993): 137-147) how the word tejas, originally meaning ‘sharpness’, came very soon to convey the notion of a peculiar ‘substance-power’ (viz. roughly ‘fiery energy’, ‘ardour’) with distinctive connotations vis-à-vis other kindred substance-powers, such as varcas, ojas, yaśas and the like, which are also current from the Atharva Veda onwards. Such notion of tejas attained great prominence in the epic and puranic literature, where, besides playing a central role in some of the most characteristic mythical themes of each of the great hindu gods,  it lies at the core of sundry narrative motives, displaying a well definable set of semantic traits. Some of these — its connotations of abruptness, keenness and excess, its destructive associations and dangerous potential, its congeniality to certain classes of beings and above all (what is perhaps its most typical feature) its liability to transfer — have already been mentioned (even if not yet adequately investigated) in the aforesaid paper, mostly with reference to puranic literature. The purpose of the present paper is to trace and briefly discuss some recurring patterns of tejas in the vast corpus of the Indian epics — i. e. its occurrence in compounds, collocations, formulas, complementary couples and other meaningful structures — which will contribute to shed some light on the different and sometimes conflicting pertinences of its polyvalent notion.
Following up my paper “Patterns of Tejas in the Epics” delivered at WSC 12 (Helsinki 2003) this paper purposes to examine the way the notion of tejas — formerly (in vedic times) just yet another of many kindred Daseinsmächte or... more
Following up my paper “Patterns of Tejas in the Epics” delivered at WSC 12 (Helsinki 2003) this paper purposes to examine the way the notion of tejas — formerly (in vedic times) just yet another of many kindred Daseinsmächte or substance-powers such as ojas, varcas, yaśas and the like — attains paramountcy in the puranic synthesis of common traditional lore, becoming a regular attribute of the parameśvara in his different personae, on the one hand, as well as crystallizing specific tejas mythologemes around the most characteristic traits of each of the great hindu gods, on the other.
Paraśuràma, later to be regularly reckoned as the 6th in standard daśāvatara lists, does not yet appear to entertain any special reationship to Viṣṇu in the earlier portions of the Epics, where the first details of the main features of... more
Paraśuràma, later to be regularly reckoned as the 6th in standard daśāvatara lists, does not yet appear to entertain any special reationship to Viṣṇu in the earlier portions of the Epics, where the first details of the main features of his legend are to be found: i) the uncanny circumstances of his (and Viśvāmitra's) birth; ii) the killing of Kārtavīryārjuna and the 21-fold extermination of the kṣatriya-s; iii) the beheading of his mother Reṇukā; to which the Rāmāyaṇa adds the episode of the meeting of the two Rāmas and the defeat of the elder at the hands of the younger. Indeed, in the Karṇaparvan of the Mahābhārata he is rather depicted as Śiva's bhakta, as would seem more in character with the “deviant” traits of his behaviour. How then did he win acceptance among the ranks of Viṣṇu's avatāra-s? The Viṣṇudharmottara Purāṇa (VDh) I, 23-73, is arguably the first full-fledged account wherein we may inquire for the mode of his newly acquired dignity. As it turns out, such acceptance, which even later was seldom unreserved on account of the scarcely Viṣṇu-like ruthlessness of his exploits, is right from the beginning only partial, and qualified by certain doctrines which, if not altogether peculiar to the VDh, do nevertheless come in a distinctive flavour in that Purāṇa, such as the doctrine of the “thousands of manifestations” (pràdurbhāva-sahasrāṇi) and above all that of vaiṣṇava tejas. In the VDh Paraśurāma is certainly not what will be later termed a pūrṇāvatāra, not even an aṁśāvatāra, but just another instance — side by side with his arch-enemy Kārtavīrya — of those powerful beings which partake in an eminent degree of Viṣṇu's own world-sustaining energy.
In the fairly late daśāvatāra lists enumerating Viṣṇu’s ten ‘canonical’ descents among the myriads which are believed to happen time and again, two Rāmas consistently occupy the sixth and seventh place, to wit Rāma of the Bhṛgu family,... more
In the fairly late daśāvatāra lists enumerating Viṣṇu’s ten ‘canonical’ descents among the myriads which are believed to happen time and again, two Rāmas consistently occupy the sixth and seventh place, to wit Rāma of the Bhṛgu family, son of Jamadagni, and Rāma of the Raghu lineage, son of Daśaratha. The latter obviously requires no introduction; as for the former, lately dubbed Paraśurāma or ‘Rāma with the axe’ by association with his most characteristic weapon, his main exploits — his predestined birth as a warrior-like brahmin, the beheading of his own mother at his father’s command and especially the 21fold extermination of the kṣatriyas in revenge for the murder of his father — are already known to the Mahābhārata, and later subsumed by the puranic literature. But there is another remarkable episode the Mbh does not appear to know about, which apparently only surfaces in the late Balakaṇḍa of the Rāmāyaṇa: the episode of the encounter of the two Rāmas.
The story runs basically as follows: Paraśurāma has heard about Rāma’s wondrous feat of the breaking of Śiva’s bow at the court of Janaka, which has earned him the hand of princess Sītā, and comes raging to challenge him. This time Rāma shall prove his strength by stringing Viṣṇu’s bow, receiving it from Paraśurāma’s hands. Rāma is successful, Paraśurāma is punished for his arrogance and retreats to mount Mahendra without further ado.
Apart from the Rāmāyaṇa, a variant of the story is found in the Vulgate, which has however been discarded by the CE of the Mahābhārata. In the Purāṇas the episode occurs rather inconspicuously in the Padma, Narasiṁha and Viṣṇudharmottara. It appears, however, to have found greater favour with kāvya: after Kalidāsa’s masterly reworking in the Raghuvaṁśa other mahākāvyas featuring (or at least mentioning) our episode include Bhaṭṭi’s Rāvaṇavadha and Kumāradāsa’s Jānakīharaṇa. Playwrights seem to have been particularly keen on the theme; dramatic works featuring it include the Yajñaphala ascribed to Bhāsa, Bhavabhūti’s incomplete Mahāvīracarita, and Rājaśekhara’s Bālarāmāyaṇa. The episode likewise figures prominently in late bhakta and śākta Rāmāyaṇas both sanskrit and vernacular, such as the sanskrit Adhyātma and Adbhutarāmāyaṇa, the tamil Kamparāmāyaṇam, the hindi Rāmcaritmanas by Tulsīdās, as well as other medieval works like the Rāmavijaya by Śaṅkaradeva.
In this paper I purpose to focus on an analysis of the way Kalidāsa’s retelling in the Raghuvaṁśa relates to its epic model, as well as on the way it has in turn influenced later versions of the episode.
The comparatively late tantric embodiment of so-called Hinduism gives final shape to a conception the germs of which had indeed been present in the Indian religious world from the earliest times on — namely, that religious practices and... more
The comparatively late tantric embodiment of so-called Hinduism gives final shape to a conception the germs of which had indeed been present in the Indian religious world from the earliest times on — namely, that religious practices and the attendant prescriptive texts must constantly evolve and adapt under the pressure of the “heaviness of time” (kālagaurava) — by sanctioning in a recurrent strophe the partition of the Scriptures according to the declining world ages (yuga): whereas vedic ritual as laid down in the “Heard” Revelation  (śruti) was fit for the Perfect Age, new and less demanding forms of worship, with their corresponding Scriptures, had to be promulgated down the course of time to cater to the failing powers of the human generations: the “Remembered” Codes (smṛti) in the following Age of Triads, then the “Ancient” Lore (purāṇa) in the Age of Duality and finally the “Newcome” Tradition (āgama) in the present Age of Strife.
Outside the tantric context, however, the Purāṇas have been regarded as the authoritative Scriptures also for the present age of degeneration, and they have fulfilled their role as custodians and upholders of the living tradition by various strategies aimed at striking a difficult and sometimes precarious balance between conservation and innovation. Indeed, the notion of constant adaptive evolution is built-in in the very name of the Purāṇas, which according to a long-established (para)etymology defines them as “from of old becoming ever new”. This paper will analyze some of the ways the authors of this remarkable class of texts have gone about their wondrous task of making for change while ensuring continuity.
The comparatively late tantric embodiment of so-called Hinduism gives final shape to a conception the germs of which had indeed been present in the Indian religious world from the earliest times on — namely, that religious practices and... more
The comparatively late tantric embodiment of so-called Hinduism gives final shape to a conception the germs of which had indeed been present in the Indian religious world from the earliest times on — namely, that religious practices and the attendant prescriptive texts must constantly evolve and adapt under the pressure of the “heaviness of time” (kālagaurava) — by sanctioning in a recurrent strophe the partition of the Scriptures according to the declining world ages (yuga): whereas vedic ritual as laid down in the “Heard” Revelation (śruti) was fit for the Perfect Age, new and less demanding forms of worship, with their corresponding Scriptures, had to be promulgated down the course of time to cater to the failing powers of the human generations: the “Remembered” Codes (smṛti) in the following Age of Triads, then the “Ancient” Lore (purāṇa) in the Age of Duality and finally the “Newcome” Tradition (āgama) in the present Age of Strife. Outside the tantric context, however, the Purāṇas have been regarded as the authoritative Scriptures also for the present age of degeneration, and they have fulfilled their role as custodians and upholders of the living tradition by various strategies aimed at striking a difficult and sometimes precarious balance between conservation and innovation. Indeed, the notion of constant adaptive evolution is built-in in the very name of the Purāṇas, which according to a long-established (para)etymology defines them as “from of old becoming ever new”. This paper will analyze some of the ways the authors of this remarkable class of texts have gone about their wondrous task of making for change while ensuring continuity.
«Simon Pietro mi ami tu? Ebbene, pasci le mie pecorelle». Altri cieli, altri pastori, altri colori nella cangiante tavolozza delle religioni… nell'arcadia di Vṛndāvana, Kṛṣṇa, il bel pastore, non si cura di ricondurre all'ovile le... more
«Simon Pietro mi ami tu? Ebbene, pasci le mie pecorelle». Altri cieli, altri pastori, altri colori nella cangiante tavolozza delle religioni… nell'arcadia di Vṛndāvana, Kṛṣṇa, il bel pastore, non si cura di ricondurre all'ovile le pecorelle smarrite, bensí smarrisce le pastorelle, adescandole con il miele del suo flauto a lasciare il conforto dell'ovile nel cuor della notte per abbandonarsi con lui all'ebbrezza delle danze silvestri. Kṛṣṇa è anzitutto il divino Maestro e il supremo Signore che nella teofania della Bhagavad Gītā atterrisce il suo devoto con la visione cosmica del suo mysterium tremendum-ma è forse piú vicino al cuore degli hindu nel mysterium fascinans del suo alter ego adolescente, i cui freschi amori bucolici sono doviziosamente narrati nel Bhāgavata Purāṇa e poi celebrati nell'immortale Gītagovinda di Jayadeva.
Uttaṅka, one of the lesser known epic ṛṣis, makes his first appearance as a brahmacārin in the Ādiparvan of the Mahābhārata in a context devoted to initiatory stories illustrating the virtue of obedience (śuśruṣā) as paramount in the... more
Uttaṅka, one of the lesser known epic ṛṣis, makes his first appearance as a brahmacārin in the Ādiparvan of the Mahābhārata in a context devoted to initiatory stories illustrating the virtue of obedience (śuśruṣā) as paramount in the master-disciple relationship. Unlike his immediate predecessors’ (Aruṇi, Upamanyu and Veda) however, the gist of Uttaṅka’s story — at his master’s wife’s behest, the perilous quest for a pair of wondrous earrings, won at the risk of life, stolen, carried to the underworld and finally regained — is not confined to exemplifying the attitude of the ideal disciple, as becomes all the more apparent by a comparison to an alternative version in the Āśvamedhikaparvan (and its Skanda Purāṇa abridgement). Whereas in the Ādiparvan (= A) version the narrative appears to have undergone an extensive brahmanization, stressing the values of loyalty and obedience to the master as well as of ritual purity, and bringing out by contrast the respective social stands of brāhmaṇas and kṣatriyas, in the Āśvamedhikaparvan (= B) version there come to the foreground some typical features of the folktale more or less suppressed in the alternative account, such as the magical objects (the earrings, only here described as such), the ogre (king Saudāsa, the owner of the earrings, only here characterized as man-devourer), the difficult questions, the swift mount etc.; and even more the underlying structure, evidencing the specific functions of the folktale. On closer investigation, however, there glimpses through the surface layers of the edifying story and the folktale an even deeper level, seemingly presenting us with an Indian version of the universal myth of the hero’s descent to the netherworld in quest of immortality. Several clues are there: a prologue (in B) mentioning Uttaṅka’s despair upon realizing his approaching old age; an incongruous hint at his rejuvenation; the vivifying properties of the kuṇḍalas; Saudāsa’s and his queen’s characters, displaying features (grim appearance, anthropophagy, invisibility) typical of the guardians of the dead; the ordeal; the theft of the kuṇḍalas by a serpent; the time symbolism of the netherworld, etc.
This interpretation is corroborated by the odd re-emergence of some key themes and motifs in the most diverse contexts in other narratives featuring Uttaṅka as a ṛṣi in his post-discipleship career, among which most prominent are the story of the killing of the asura Dhundhu and the aetiological myth about the origin of so-called “Uttaṅka’s clouds” (uttaṅkamegha). Although to unravel the complex net of relationships linking these stories with one another as well as with sundry narratives pertaining to other mythical characters would exceed by far the limits of the present paper, a couple of especially noteworthy instances may be pointed out. The theme of ambrosia disguised under loathsome appearances is common to both the quest and the aetiological myth, under reversed circumstances: either readily offered and reluctantly (and unwittingly) accepted, or reluctantly offered and unwittingly refused. The motif of the netherworld and the fiery subterranean stallion (elsewhere the fiery submarine mare) links the quest and the Dhundhumāra myth in an even more elusive yet intriguing fashion, while evoking other well known destructive underworld stallions, such as Sagara’s missing aśvamedha horse responsible for the burning of his sixty thousand sons (to mention but the most obvious).
Uttaṅka’s name is unknown to the older literature. His epic-puranic character is built up by three main narratives: i) the quest for the wondrous earrings; ii) the killing of asura Dundhu; iii) the origin of “Uttaṅka’s clouds”. The... more
Uttaṅka’s name is unknown to the older literature. His epic-puranic character is built up by three main narratives: i) the quest for the wondrous earrings; ii) the killing of asura Dundhu; iii) the origin of “Uttaṅka’s clouds”. The present paper is devoted to the analysis of i), extant in two different versions: A) MBh I, 3, 78 ff.; and B) MBh XIV, 56-58 (of which SkP VII, 3, 2 is but an abridgement, albeit with a couple of innovations). The gist of the story is the perilous quest for a pair of wondrous earrings, won at the risk of life, stolen and carried to the underworld and finally rescued. Version A of the story appears to have undergone an extensive brahmanization, stressing the values of loyalty and obedience to the master as well as of ritual purity, and bringing out by contrast the respective social stands of brāhmaṇa-s and kṣatriya-s. In version B there come to the foreground some typical features of the folktale more or less suppressed in A, such as the magical objects (the earrings, only here described as such), the ogre (king Saudāsa, the owner of the earrings, only here characterized as man-devourer), the difficult questions, the swift mount etc.; and even more the underlying structure, evidencing the specific functions of the folktale as identified by Propp. On closer investigation, however, there glimpses through the surface layers of the edifying story and the folktale an even deeper level, seemingly presenting us with an Indian version of the universal myth of the hero’s descent to the netherworld in quest of immortality. Several clues are there: a prologue in B mentioning Uttaṅka’s despair upon realizing his approaching old age; an incongruous hint at his rejuvenation; the vivifying properties of the kuṇḍala-s; Saudása’s and his queen’s characters, displaying features (grim appearence, anthropophagy, invisibility) typical of the guardians of the dead; the ordeal; the theft of the kuṇḍala-s by a serpent; the time symbolism of the netherworld, etc. Although admittedly none of the above is tranchant, the proposed interpretation seems all the more plausible when brought to bear on other pieces of narrative, from which the ambrosia-theme is clearly seen to be anything but incidental to the Uttaṅka cycle. Such is for instance the uttaṅkamegha myth, where Uttaṅka unwittingly forfeits ambrosia graciously conceded by Kṛṣṇa but disguised by jealous Indra under disgusting appearances.
In the frame of my work towards a critical edition of the hitherto unpublished Śivadharmottarapurāṇa, this paper purposes to present a brief analysis of the contents of the upapurāṇa in 12 chapters, (i. e., according to the colophons of... more
In the frame of my work towards a critical edition of the hitherto unpublished Śivadharmottarapurāṇa, this paper purposes to present a brief analysis of the contents of the upapurāṇa in 12 chapters, (i. e., according to the colophons of some MS: goṣaḍaṅgavidhi, vidyādānaphala, pañcamahāyajñaguṇādhyāya, satpātraguṇa, śivasaṃgati, pāpabheda, narakaviśeṣa, saṁsāraprasavākhyāna, svarganarakacihna, jñānayoga, prāyaścittakathana and [lokanirūpaṇa]), highlighting in particular some noteworthy aspects of the doctrines of śivajñāna, bhukti and mukti, as well as a rather unusual version of ṣaḍaṅga yoga.
The paper presents a few results of my work towards a critical edition of the Śivadharmottara (= Śdhut), a hitherto unpublished and little known puranic text of about 1750 strophes in 12 chapters that purposes to be a sequel to the... more
The paper presents a few results of my work towards a critical edition of the Śivadharmottara (= Śdhut), a hitherto unpublished and little known puranic text of about 1750 strophes in 12 chapters that purposes to be a sequel to the likewise unpublished Śivadharma. Although both texts style themselves rather as śāstras (or even āgamas) they have been ascribed to the category of purāṇas following the practice of nibandhakāras. A detailed analysis of the contents of the Śdhut has been provided elsewhere (DICSEP 3). Here I am focusing on some features of the text that appear to deserve special mention. Among these is an instance of the distinctively tantric doctrine of ṣaḍaṅgayoga which is peculiar to the Śdhut in that it specifies japa instead of tarka as is almost invariably the case elsewhere. A propos of sect dynamics, I briefly trace the evidences of conflictuality and the strategies of propaganda enacted by the Śdhut in a presumably vaiṣṇava socio-religious context. As regards the place and date of the work, I argue for a southern origin and a comparatively late date (not before XII cent.), discarding Hazra's conclusions which posit a northern origin between VII and VIII cent.
The paper presents a glimpse of the doctrine of śaiva yoga as outlined in the tenth chapter of the Śivadharmottara, a text extant in manuscript form, usually bundled with other manuscripts making up the so-­called Śivadharma corpus. The... more
The paper presents a glimpse of the doctrine of śaiva yoga as outlined in the tenth chapter of the Śivadharmottara, a text extant in manuscript form, usually bundled with other manuscripts making up the so-­called Śivadharma corpus. The chapter, styled jñānayogaḥ in the colophon, after introducing the need for the knowledge of Śiva, gives some proofs of his existence, then goes on to extol the value of the śaivāgama against its detractors. There follows an enumeration of the tattvas  mainly  along  sāṃkhya  lines. After an instruction about the favourable places, dispositions, and postures for its practice, the main subject of yoga as a means towards the attainment of the  twin purpose of aiśvarya (that is to say, “sovereignty” through superhuman powers) and final deliverance is then broached, characterizing yoga as a “sacrifice of knowledge” exempt from the  blame  of hiṁsā. The text goes on  to  describe  different forms and  degrees of meditation, then introduces the peculiar doctrine of ṣaḍaṅgayoga (“six-­limbed yoga”, in contradistinction to Patanjali’s more widely renowned aṣṭāṅga° or “eight-­limbed” yoga) comprising prāṇāyāma, pratyāhāra, dhāraṇā, dhyāna, japa, and samādhi, each limb being consecutively described in some detail. The chapter winds up with an overview of the progress of the yogin, including a list of the obstacles he has to face, the fruits of the several steps of yogic ascent and its final goal: he who knows and announces this redeeming knowledge truly becomes “the mother, father and kinsman of the world, its master and Śiva himself”.
A detailed summary of the contents of the Arbudakhaṇḍa, constituting the third section of the Prabhāsakhaṇḍa, the 7th khaṇḍa of the Skanda Purāṇa. Like the other three sections of the Prabhāsakhaṇḍa, numbering 491 adhyāyas in total, also... more
A detailed summary of the contents of the Arbudakhaṇḍa, constituting the third section of the Prabhāsakhaṇḍa, the 7th khaṇḍa of the Skanda Purāṇa. Like the other three sections of the Prabhāsakhaṇḍa, numbering 491 adhyāyas in total, also the Arbuda-khaṇḍa, counting 63 adhyayas and 1825 ślokas, is a māhātmya, devoted to the magnification of the region of mount Arbuda (or Ābū, as it is called nowadays), the highest peak of the Aravalli range in southern Rājasthān near the Gujarat border. Today mostly renowned for the magnificent Dilvāṛā jaina temples, the region was known in ancient times as a Śaiva tirtha, already mentioned in the Tīrthayatraparvan of the Mahābhārata.
Epico-puranic Hinduism revolves around bhakti towards a personal Lord, who bestows his favours — be they consisting in bhukti (fruition) or mukti (salvation) — on his devotees according to the way of their worshipful approach: ye yathā... more
Epico-puranic Hinduism revolves around bhakti towards a personal Lord, who bestows his favours — be they consisting in bhukti (fruition) or mukti (salvation) — on his devotees  according to the way of their worshipful approach: ye yathā māṃ prapadyante tāṁs tathaiva bhajāmy aham, as the well-known śloka of the BhG runs, which Śaṅkara glosses: yena prayojanena… māṃ prapadyante tāṁs tathaiva… anugṛhnāmy aham, laying stress on purpose ― prayojana. Besides innumerable passages conforming to this conception, however, Purāṇas are rife with narratives of a different kind, diverging from it under two main aspects: on one side, as the grace accorded does not stem either directly or indirectly from the Lord; on the other side, as it dispenses with the devotee’s worshipful intention, or even with his actual awareness. These narratives may be grouped under a few distinct heads: a) spontaneous efficacy of specific places and times; b) salvation of purposeless agents like animals, corpses and other inanimate beings; c) salvation of the reckless evil-doer; d) salvation of the god-hater. The present paper presents some examples of each type, concluding with some thoughts on the theoretical background of the puranic doctrines of “unintentional salvation”.
After discussing the integration of the Śaṅkara Gītā (ŚG) which makes up adh. 51 to 65 of the first khaṇḍa of the Viṣṇudharmottara Purāṇa and briefly summarizing its contents, the paper focuses on the three avatāra myths (viz. of the... more
After discussing the integration of the Śaṅkara Gītā (ŚG) which makes up adh. 51 to 65 of the first khaṇḍa of the Viṣṇudharmottara Purāṇa and briefly summarizing its contents, the paper focuses on the three avatāra myths (viz. of the Boar, Man-Lion and Dwarf) narrated in adh. 3 to 5 of the same Gītā. A detailed analysis of their textual relationship to concurrent versions found in the Harivaṁśa and Brahma Purāṇa evinces the considerable antiquity of the ŚG version. A distinctive feature of the latter appears to be the invention of the nṛ-varăha (Man-Boar) figure in lieu of the more usual varāha (Boar), prompted by the intent of bringing the relevant myth in line with the two other myths of the trilogy, which are bent on highlighting the magic of the “grant of boons” and the correlative need for the avatāra to have recourse to the well-known “loophole in the law” technique (best exemplified in the Man-Lion myth, especially in its mature form as narrated in the late Bhāgavata Puraṇa) in order to successfully cope with his task.
Dopo una sommaria rassegna dei principali luoghi testuali del Viṣṇudharmottara Purāṇa afferenti alla mitologia degli avatāra (o meglio, prādurbhāva) il contributo prende piú specialmente in esame le narrazioni concernenti la trilogia del... more
Dopo una sommaria rassegna dei principali luoghi testuali del Viṣṇudharmottara Purāṇa afferenti alla mitologia degli avatāra (o meglio, prādurbhāva)  il contributo prende piú specialmente in esame le narrazioni concernenti la trilogia del Cinghiale, Uomo-leone e Nano, mettendone in risalto la notevole coerenza dottrinale pur tra versioni presenti in contesti diversi, separati e lontani nella vasta massa dell’opera. Si discute poi in particolare l’innovazione della figura dell’Uomo-cinghiale (accanto alla classica manifestazione teriomorfa) motivata dal taglio caratteristico impartito dal VDh alla mitologia dell’avatāra, volto a sottolineare l’indispensabile trasformismo delle manifestazioni salvifiche, di volta in volta commisurate alla cangiante dialettica dei rapporti divino-demoniaci governata dal meccanismo magico della concessione del vara.
A tentative report of fieldwork in the area of present day Mount Abu hill station, site of the famous Dilwara jain temples, in the light of the description of the former tīrtha-kṣetra (place of pilgrimage) sacred to Śiva in the Sanskrit... more
A tentative report of fieldwork in the area of present day Mount Abu hill station, site of the famous Dilwara jain temples, in the light of the description of the former tīrtha-kṣetra (place of pilgrimage) sacred to Śiva in the Sanskrit Arbuda Māhātmya of the Skanda Purāṇa.
This volume contains 20 papers emerging from the Epics and Purāṇas panel at the 15th World Sanskrit conference (New Delhi, January 2012). A body of scholars of international standing pursue a diverse range of inquiries into the... more
This volume contains 20 papers emerging from the Epics and Purāṇas panel at the 15th World Sanskrit conference (New Delhi, January 2012). A body of scholars of international standing pursue a diverse range of inquiries into the Mahābhārata, Harivaṃśa, Rāmāyaṇa and the Purāṇas. Offering new and often provocative insights into their narratives, textual histories, ideological concerns, theological agendas and reception histories, these papers provide an excellent overview of the current state of epic and Purāṇic research.

Twelve of the articles primarily concern aspects of the Mahābhārata and its khila, the Harivaṃśa. Two of these explore the relationship of the Mahābhārata to Buddhism. Two papers offer stimulating discussions of matters arising from the preparation of the concluding volume to the 30-year Princeton Rāmāyaṇa translation project, a landmark in Indological research. The remaining six papers analyse aspects of the Purāṇas, three within the broader mythological and ideological contexts shared by the epics and Purāṇas, and three in regard to the regional traditions represented by Sthala- Purāṇas and Māhātmyas.

The sum of this volume’s parts demonstrate the vibrancy of the fields to which it contributes, a vibrancy underscored by the diversity of their methodological approaches and insights. Many of these insights will endure; some chart new and promising directions in Indological research. Above all, this volume further reinforces the foundational and enduring importance of these immense texts to the literatures, histories and cultures of South Asia and beyond.
Jung visited India just once, in 1938, bringing back mixed feelings from the encounter, which he put down in two papers: “The dreamlike world of India” (1939) and “What India can teach us” (1939); to which must be added the memoir... more
Jung visited India just once, in 1938, bringing back mixed feelings from the encounter, which he put  down in two papers: “The dreamlike world of India” (1939) and “What India can teach us” (1939); to which must be added the memoir recorded in Aniela Jaffé’s  “Erinnerungen, Träume und Gedanken von C. G. Jung”. What he relates about that voyage offers us a precious clue to understand not only the mood in which he undertook it, but also the conditions and the limits of his general attitude towards India.
Contemporary research has long recognized the highly problematic nature of the notion of Hinduism, which has hitherto defied all attempts to come up with a satisfactory definition. While some experts have gone so far as to propose that... more
Contemporary research has long recognized the highly problematic nature of the notion of Hinduism, which has hitherto defied all attempts to come up with a satisfactory definition. While some experts have gone so far as to propose that the term itself should be discarded because it is unable to subsume the extremely diverse panorama of the religious phenomena of the Indian subcontinent under a unitary heading, others have suggested that the concept of Hinduism, though lacking univocal or even analogical unity, may still be meaningful if correctly understood, in accordance with a ‘polythetic-prototype’ approach, as a blanket notion based on a form of somewhat baffling but nonetheless real ‘family resemblance’ that effectively underlies even its most distant manifestations. Hinduism being such, it will not be surprising to find such diversity reflected in its Scriptures. In the present essay four different classes have been identified  (ultimately reduced to three for the sake of convenience): śruti or ‘audition’, smṛti of ‘remembrance’, and āgama or ‘tradition’. Each of these confronts the translator with its own particular problems, which may be summed up, with reference to the changing relationship between text and interpretation as the twofold condition of every translation, as follows: while in the case of śruti the text is well-established but the interpretation elusive, with smṛti the interpretation is comparatively straightforward but the text fluid, both in fact and by right, and with āgama the text is virtually inaccessible to the profane and the interpretation is enigmatic.