The Moral Formation of Business Students A Philosophical and Empirical Investigation of the Business Student Ethos Jelle van Baardewijk The Moral Formation of Business Students A Philosophical and Empirical Investigation of the Business Student Ethos Jelle van Baardewijk Colofon ISBN: 978-94-92801-63-0 © Copyrights, Jelle Jan van Baardewijk, 2018 Layout and print: proefschrift-aio.nl VRIJE UNIVERSITEIT The Moral Formation of Business Students A Philosophical and Empirical Investigation of the Business Student Ethos ACADEMISCH PROEFSCHRIFT ter verkrijging van de graad Doctor aan de Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, op gezag van de rector magnificus prof.dr. V. Subramaniam, in het openbaar te verdedigen ten overstaan van de promotiecommissie van de Faculteit der Geesteswetenschappen op donderdag 20 december 2018 om 15.45 uur in de aula van de universiteit, De Boelelaan 1105 door Jelle Jan van Baardewijk geboren te Ankeveen promotor: prof.dr. G.J. Buijs copromotor: dr. A.M. Verbrugge Table of Content Voorwoord 9 Chapter 3: Empirical (Q-)Research: What Students Say 83 84 General Introduction 16 Introduction 1.1 Challenges for Today’s Economy 20 3.1 Methodology: What is 28 3.2 Interview Samples and Derivation of Concourse Statements 87 35 3.3 The Q-analysis and its Results 96 1.4 Organization of the Argument 40 3.4 Interpretation of Results: A First 1.5 Audiences Addressed 42 1.2 ‘Ethos’ and the Conceptual Framework of ‘Moral Ethology’ Q methodology? 1.3 A Moral-Ethological Analysis of Business Schools 84 Preview of the Different Types of Ethos 3.5 Type A: The Do-Good-Managers 97 Part I: The Contested Business School Ethos 46 3.7 Type C: The Searching-Managers 101 Introduction Part I 47 3.8 Type D: The Balancing-Managers 103 3.6 Type B: The Market-Managers 99 100 3.9 Type E: The Radical-MarketManagers Chapter 2: Literature Review: What Scholars Say 49 Introduction 50 103 3.10 Similarities Between the Types of Ethos 104 Conclusion 106 Evaluation Part I 108 2.1 Mintzberg: A ManagementReality-Check for Business Schools 54 2.2 Goshal: Hidden Values in the Scientific Business Mind-Set 59 2.3 Moldoveanu and Martin: An Innovation and Creativity Critique 63 2.4 Carnegie: Liberal Arts to Counter Market-Thinking 66 2.5 Grey: Making Management Education Self-Critical 68 2.6 Schleef: The Ideological Problem in Business Studies Conclusion 71 74 5.5 MacIntyre on Modern Society Part II: The Origins of the Contested Business School Ethos 114 Introduction Part II 115 and the Role of Management Chapter 4: The History of Business Schools 117 Introduction 118 4.1 Phase I (1900-1960): The SocialPractical Onset of Business Schools 118 4.2 Phase II (1960-1990): The Scientific Transformation of Business Schools 124 4.3 Phase III (1990-): The Marketization of Business Schools 130 4.4 How the Content (the ‘What’) of Business Education affects its Form (the ‘How’) 135 4.5 The Dominance of the AngloSaxon Model in Today’s Business Schools 140 Conclusion 146 Chapter 5: Business Schools as Institutions of Modernization 149 Introduction 150 5.1 Modernization: Weber, Habermas and MacIntyre 151 5.2 Hidden Values in Scientific Theories and Consultancy Tools of Business Studies 159 5.3 MacIntyre on the Hidden Cultural Values in Modern Ethics 165 5.4 MacIntyre on Today’s Ethics of Emotivism/Expressivism 169 171 Conclusion 178 Evaluation Part II 182 7.5 Hegel and the Modern Part III: Towards an Enriched Business Student Ethos 184 Introduction Part III 185 Economy – An Evaluation Chapter 6: A Moral Ethological Analysis of Business (With MacIntyre Beyond MacIntyre) 189 Introduction 190 6.1 MacIntyre’s Virtues-GoodsPractice-Institution Schema 196 6.3 What is the Purpose of a Firm? The ‘Thin’ Answer 247 Introduction 248 8.1 Aristotle on a Cultivated Ethos and Different Types of 249 8.2 What is Practical Understanding? Heidegger) 258 8.3 Cultivate the Moral Identity 201 of Students (Taylor, Frankfurt, Nussbaum) 6.4 What is the Purpose of Business and Management? A ‘Thick’ Answer Chapter 8: Towards a new Business Mindset (Polanyi, Schön, Sennett, 6.2 MacIntyre’s Ideas of the Narrative Identity and Traditions 245 Knowledge 190 240 Conclusion 266 Conclusion 274 Evaluation Part III 277 General Conclusion 282 Summary 298 Appendix: Q-Statements 306 Literature 308 Index 322 207 6.5 Make Practice-Institutions Purposeful with Citizen Involvement. Conclusion 215 222 Chapter 7: A Moral Ethological Analysis of Markets (the relevance of Hegel) 225 Introduction 226 7.1 Hegel’s Attempt to Unite Individuality with the Common Good 227 7.2 Hegel on Consumption, Production and Bildung 231 7.3 Hegel on Social and Political Organization of the Market 234 7.4 Hegel’s ‘Statism’ in between Communitarianism and Liberalism 236 Het lijkt erop dat alles gericht is op iets goeds: Alle vaardigheid, ieder wetenschappelijk onderzoek, ook elke handeling en ieder streven. Aristoteles, Ethica Nicomachea, 1094a 8 Voorwoord Dit proefschrift behelst een onderzoek naar het èthos van studenten bedrijfskunde aan Nederlandse universiteiten. Èthos is een term van Aristoteles die wijst op de houding en gewoontes van een mens. Een èthos omvat de manier waarop hij aangedaan is, hoe hij zich oriënteert in de wereld, wat zijn opvatting van een goed leven is en hoe dit alles terugkomt in zijn handelen. Iemand ontwikkelt een èthos door opvoeding en onderwijs en meer in het algemeen door de cultuur waarin hij opgroeit en leeft. In zijn Ethica Nicomachea laat Aristoteles zien hoe een deugdelijke levenshouding alleen kan bestaan in een gemeenschap waarin zij wordt gecultiveerd. Aristoteles’ gevoeligheid voor deze dimensie van de deugd laat zich mede verklaren doordat zulke gemeenschapsvormen in zijn tijd onder druk stonden. Door oorlogen en de opkomst van populisten was de vanzelfsprekende context waarin de jeugd een goede levenshouding kon ontwikkelen aan het verbrokkelen. Tegen deze achtergrond beschrijft Aristoteles hoe een waarlijk goed leven eruit kan zien. Hij hanteert daarbij een aristocratisch levensideaal en pleit voor het belang van een goede opleiding van de elite. Het èthos dat zo wordt overgedragen op de jeugd stelt haar in staat om actieve burgers te worden die kunnen rechtspreken. De economie speelde in dit levensideaal een ondergeschikte rol. De economie van het oude Athene was niet kapitalistisch in de moderne zin van het woord. Een thema als handel of handwerk zou wat Aristoteles betreft geen onderwerp van studie hoeven te zijn. Aristoteles leefde dus in een andere wereld dan de onze. Toch stelt de terminologie en de blik die hij ontwikkelt ons in staat een wezenlijke dimensie van het goede leven te articuleren. In onze tijd kan een beschouwing van een goed leven niet voorbijgaan aan de economische wereld, die een groot stempel drukt op onze cultuur. Gezien die positie van de commercie mag het niet verbazen dat zoveel jongeren, zeker 10% in het wetenschappelijk onderwijs en tot wel 50% in het hoger onderwijs, voor bedrijfskunde of aanverwante studies kiezen. Ik kan erover meepraten: die keuze voor bedrijfskunde heb ik zelf 18 jaar geleden ook gemaakt, en tot de dag van vandaag blijf ik gefascineerd door de wereld van innovatie en financiën. Wel heb ik aan den lijve kunnen ondervinden hoe weinig ruimte een opleiding tot bedrijfskundige vandaag de dag biedt om de vraag naar het goede leven te stellen. Pas tijdens mijn studie filosofie werden mij de handvatten aangereikt om me serieus met vragen bezig te houden als: Waar komt het dominante economische denken in onze cultuur eigenlijk vandaan? Kunnen we in het huidige economisch-technologische bestel de 9 natuur nog wel beschermen? Dringt marktwerking niet te ver door in onze instituties, niet in de laatste plaats de universiteit zelf, en hollen wij daarmee onze maatschappij niet uit? En hoe zit het met de geestelijke kant van de economie? Staat de huidige vrijemarkteconomie een zinvolle invulling van het leven niet eerder in de weg dan dat ze er iets aan bijdraagt? Terwijl ik deze vragen stelde, begon ik me ook af te vragen welke houding mij tijdens mijn opleiding bedrijfskunde was bijgebracht. Zie daar de kiem van dit onderzoek. Om de grondhouding van studenten bedrijfskunde systematisch te kunnen onderzoeken, grijp ik terug op Aristoteles’ begrip van èthos omdat daarmee het samenspel van houding en omgeving kan worden gevat. Wie met deze invalshoek naar de studie bedrijfskunde kijkt, ontdekt al snel dat er in feite verschillende manieren zijn waarop studenten door de spreekwoordelijke ‘wasstraat’ van de universiteit gaan. Er is een grote groep studenten die een studie bedrijfskunde volgt in de hoop daarna veel geld te kunnen gaan verdienen. Er zijn ook studenten die een kritisch èthos hebben. Zij zien de economie als een onderdeel van de maatschappij en hebben oog voor de keerzijden van een vrijemarkteconomie, zoals de macht van kapitaal of het feit dat het moeilijk is ecologische belangen te verdisconteren in een marktmodel. De scheiding tussen deze groepen is niet absoluut. Uit mijn onderzoek blijkt dat er bovendien grijstinten zijn. Dé student bedrijfskunde bestaat niet. Toch laat het onderzoek zien dat de studie bedrijfskunde wel degelijk een basaal èthos overdraagt op alle studenten waarin waarden als efficiency en winst hoofdzaak, en maatschappij en ethiek bijzaak zijn. Dit onderzoek toont ook aan dat deze situatie niet toevallig is ontstaan maar voortvloeit uit de geschiedenis van het bedrijfsleven en de daaraan verbonden geschiedenis van het bedrijfskundeonderwijs. In die geschiedenis zien we de marktlogica en het kwantitatief-wetenschappelijke denken steeds belangrijker worden. Op dat marktdenken klinkt inmiddels veel maatschappelijke kritiek, maar die resoneert nog te weinig in de curricula van bedrijfskundestudies. Dat heeft te maken met de dominantie van de economie, wiskunde en statistiek in de bedrijfskunde; kwantitatieve vakken die passen bij een marktlogica maar zich niet goed aan een thema als maatschappelijke verantwoordelijkheid laten koppelen. Dat de economie voor zoveel studenten versmalt tot het domein van de klinkende munt, is dus niet zomaar het gevolg van een (neo)liberaal vertrouwen in de markt maar hangt ook samen met een moderne wetenschapsopvatting waarin rekenen belangrijker is dan moraal en geschiedenis. Zowel docenten als studenten zijn geneigd de eigen discipline juist vanwege deze kwantitatieve elementen als objectief en onafhankelijk te beschrijven. 10 Dit lijkt er de reden van te zijn dat datgene wat er niet zo onafhankelijk en objectief aan is over het hoofd wordt gezien. In de onderwijskunde wordt in dit verband ook wel over het hidden curriculum gesproken. Met dit onderzoek wijs ik op diverse normatieve aspecten van de studie bedrijfskunde die als het ware verstopt zitten in de studieboeken en de opvattingen van studenten en docenten. Denk bijvoorbeeld aan de sterke focus op het grote internationale bedrijfsleven, de nadruk op geld en efficiency, specifieke opvattingen over leiderschap en ook aan een tekort aan aandacht voor werkpraktijken. Om het ethos van bedrijfskundestudenten te versterken moet dit hidden curriculum in de eerste plaats zichtbaar worden. Als filosoof onder de bedrijfskundigen heb ik me er de afgelopen jaren daarom veel aan gelegen laten liggen om studenten gevoelig te maken voor de impliciete aannames van bepaalde theorieën, modellen of handelingen. Ik heb bovendien geprobeerd ze de concepten en tradities aan te reiken om een academische grondhouding te ontwikkelen vanwaaruit ze morele dilemma’s kunnen herkennen en er weloverwogen standpunten over kunnen innemen. Soms werd ik daarbij overvallen door gewetensvragen ten aanzien van de rol die mijn eigen zogenaamd kritische vak speelt in het grotere kader van de studie: Is het verstandig om bijvoorbeeld aan studenten bedrijfskunde te vertellen dat ethische dilemma’s eigenlijk geen eenduidig goede oplossing kennen? Hoe verstandig is het om het utilitarisme zo uitvoerig te bespreken als menig standaardboek ethiek doet? Wordt een student een beter manager als hij Kant’s zedenwet kan reproduceren op een tentamen en er verder tijdens de studie niets meer over hoort? Ik vrees soms dat een tweetal ethische vakken in een opleiding die verder een behoorlijk onkritisch èthos overdraagt, zoals aangetoond in dit onderzoek, wellicht zelf geïnstrumentaliseerd wordt als rechtvaardiging voor beslissingen die zonder werkelijke morele afweging worden genomen. Zoals Plato in zijn strijd met de Sofisten – toch de consultants van het oude Athene – al opmerkte: voor iedere beslissing is wel een moreel argument te vinden, maar dat maakt de beslissing nog niet goed. In dit verband is het niet geruststellend dat het aantal colleges bedrijfsethiek landelijk stijgt, maar het aantal ethische misstanden daarmee gelijke tred lijkt te houden. Denk bijvoorbeeld aan woekerpolissen (ING), kartelvorming (Heineken), boekhoudfraude (Ahold), steekpenningen (SBM Offshore) enzovoort. Uit het stijgende aantal colleges ethiek spreekt wel degelijk een behoefte van faculteiten om studenten kritischer op te leiden. Om het hidden curriculum van bedrijfskunde niet alleen zichtbaar te maken maar ook daadwerkelijk tegenwicht te bieden, is mijns inziens een fundamentele 11 verandering nodig in het èthos van bedrijfskundigen. Daarvoor zal dus onder andere een meer pluriform beeld van wetenschap moeten ontstaan waar verschillende vormen van kennis deel van uitmaken. Ik pleit ervoor om de bedrijfskunde als studie daartoe beter te verbinden met de werkpraktijken en tradities van onze economie. Bij een dergelijke integrale visie op wetenschap past ook een opvatting van ethiek die niet exclusief gericht is op individuele verantwoordelijkheid en dilemma’s, maar ook op de collectieve verantwoordelijkheid van bedrijven en instituties. Om maatschappelijkeconomische problemen rond bijvoorbeeld geld, grenzen en natuur daadwerkelijk ethisch te doordenken, speelt die dimensie immers een beslissende rol. Op dit punt biedt de neoaristoteliaanse traditie meer houvast dan de academische ethiek, precies omdat de mens daarin niet opgevat wordt als een geïsoleerd individu maar als deel van een gemeenschap en de daarin breder levende, gedeelde opvattingen van het goede leven. De universiteit zelf is een instituut van waaruit zij collectief vorm probeert te geven aan het goede leven. Met dit proefschrift hoop ik een heroriëntatie te geven voor een nieuwe studie bedrijfskunde waarbij aan deze dimensies recht gedaan wordt op een manier die past bij onze tijd. Moge het naast collega-onderzoekers ook studenten en bestuurders inspireren! Ik heb dit proefschrift gedurende zes jaar geschreven, naast een onderwijsbaan: krap drie jaar heb ik aan dit onderzoek besteed; de andere drie heb ik het vak bedrijfsethiek gegeven dat studenten bedrijfskunde van de Vrije Universiteit verplicht volgen. Het waren drukke jaren waarin ik veel kansen heb gekregen waarvoor ik hier een aantal mensen en instanties wil bedanken. Ik ben allereerst de Faculteit der Geesteswetenschappen van de Vrije Universiteit dank verschuldigd voor de financiering van twee volle onderzoeksjaren. Het derde onderzoeksjaar is gefinancieerd door de de Goldschmeding Foundation, die ik daarvoor zeer erkentelijk ben. Mijn onderzoek was bovendien onderdeel van een groter onderzoeksproject over markt en moraal dat gefinancierd is door de Templeton World Charity Foundation Inc. Dit proefschrift is beoordeeld door een commissie waarvan ik de leden hier wil bedanken: Lisa Herzog, Marjolein Lips-Wiersma, Lieven Decock, Gjalt de Graaf en Johan Wempe. Als docent heb ik veel hoorcolleges gegeven over het werk van Aristoteles, Marx, Foucault, Popper en andere klassiekers. In andere colleges behandelde ik de kernargumenten uit de ethiek en wetenschapsleer. Daarnaast heb ik veel werkcolleges gegeven en tientallen minorwerkstukken en bachelorscripties over thema’s uit de toegepaste filosofie begeleid en beoordeeld. In mijn 12 onderwijs meen ik mijn steentje te hebben bijgedragen aan de vorming van studenten. Toch heeft Nietzsche gelijk wanneer hij stelt: der Lehrer selbst lehrt am meisten en daarom wil ik al mijn studenten bedanken voor de levendige discussies. Ik dank ook de School of Business and Economics van de Vrije Universiteit voor het vertrouwen dat zij in mij stelde om het vak bedrijfsethiek in de loop der jaren mede te ontwerpen en te doceren. Ik heb dit proefschrift geschreven onder begeleiding van Govert Buijs en Ad Verbrugge. Zonder de vrije en filosofische gesprekken met Govert had het er totaal anders uitgezien. Govert leerde me om als praktisch filosoof niet tevreden te zijn met een sprekende anekdote, en inspireerde me empirisch onderzoek te doen. Ad Verbrugge was behulpzaam bij de structurering van de argumentatie en het uiteindelijke boek. Indirecter heeft ook hij grote invloed gehad op de inhoud ervan. De ethologische invalshoek die ik hier hanteer mag dan voor een aanzienlijk deel terug gaan op Aristoteles, Ads uitwerking ervan heeft mij al in mijn studiejaren geïnspireerd en doet dat tot op de dag van vandaag. Uit de prettige samenwerking met Govert en Ad zijn naast dit proefschrift inmiddels drie boeken voortgekomen: Waartoe is de Universiteit op Aarde? (2014) beschrijft de crisissituatie waarin universiteiten verkeren. Onderwijs in Tijden van Digitalisering (2017) gaat over de rol van techniek in het onderwijs. Het voorlopige hoogtepunt is Het Goede Leven en de Vrije Markt (2018) waarin we een filosofisch weeginstrument ontwikkelen om de vrijemarkteconomie te analyseren en te beoordelen. Het meedenken en meeschrijven aan al deze boeken is voor mij een cruciale ervaring geweest en heeft ook de opzet en inhoud van dit proefschrift beïnvloed. Daarnaast hebben we een nieuwe opleiding opgericht, Filosofie van Cultuur en Bestuur, met een daarbij horende onderzoeksgroep. In dat verband heb ik samengewerkt met Emanuel Rutten en Gabriël van den Brink. Beiden wil ik hier bedanken voor het commentaar dat zij leverden op eerdere versies van dit proefschrift, alsook voor onze intellectuele samenwerking in het algemeen. Wat mijn onderwijs betreft, heb de achterliggende jaren veel samengewerkt met Johan Wempe. Ik heb mogen putten uit zijn grote ervaring op het gebied van de bedrijfsethiek en doe in dit proefschrift mijn voordeel met de vele gesprekken die wij tussen de colleges door voerden. Ik ben daarnaast ook dank verschuldigd aan Gjalt de Graaf voor zijn enthousiasme en adviezen over het gebruik van de Q-methode. Wat betreft de empirische componenten van mijn onderzoek heb ik ook dankbaar gebruik gemaakt van de adviezen van Anouk van Loon. De combinatie van filosofie en vakwetenschappelijk onderzoek is niet eenvoudig en ik dank Theo van Willigenburg voor zijn inbreng op dit 13 punt. Mijn onderzoeksontwerp heb ik besproken met Elke Müller en Michiel Hemminga en de methodologische kanten met Alistair Niemeijer. Met Vincent Blok heb ik vruchtbare gesprekken gevoerd over sociale wetenschappen en filosofie. Dank jullie wel. Filosoferen is een kwestie van studeren, nadenken en schrijven, maar ook van praten en discussiëren. Ik dank vooral mijn vrienden Martijn Stronks en Rogier van Bemmel voor de talloze gesprekken en redetwisten. Met Martijn heb ik vrijwel dagelijks gegrapt en over filosofie gesproken. Met dit proefschrift trakteer ik hem op een stevig neoaristoteliaans dieet en ik verwacht dat het hem na al zijn Franse en literaire omzwervingen zeer goed zal smaken. Met niemand heb ik zo uitvoerig en bij herhaling over de kernargumenten van mijn proefschrift gesproken als met Rogier van Bemmel. Hij is het wijsgerige zwaargewicht dat mij steeds weer uitdaagde de zaak dieper te doordenken en beter op te schrijven. We hebben samen de meest obscure filosofische en spirituele teksten besproken en ik verwonderde me tijdens dergelijke gesprekken over de bizarre omvang van zijn geheugen en de kracht van zijn filosofisch vernuft. Een andere vriend die ik wil bedanken is Haroon Sheikh. Samen met hem en de rest van de denktank Freedomlab – waarin ik een bescheiden rol mag spelen – heb ik veel brainstorms beleefd over politiek, economie en techniek. Ik dank in dit verband ook Arif Hühn, Sjoerd Bakker, Jessica van der Schalk, Julia Rijssenbeek, Pim Korsten en Alexander van Wijnen. Dan zijn er nog twee vrienden die ik apart wil noemen voor hun inspiratie: Michel Rekveld en René Koekkoek. Ook wil ik hier vermelden dat mijn Neder-Engels is gepolijst door Chiara Okma-Geuzebroek, Brian Bloch en vooral door Lisa Negrijn. Tot slot wil ik mijn familie bedanken. Zonder de hulp van mijn vriendin Lorine van Loon had ik het geheel niet in krap drie jaar kunnen schrijven. Niet alleen beïnvloeden onze gedachtewisselingen mijn onderzoek meer dan zij beseft, zonder haar en onze lieve kinderen Romée en Kasper had ik ook nooit zo vertrouwensvol over het goede leven kunnen schrijven. Voor mijn bespiegelingen daarover stonden ook mijn ouders model. Mijn vader Jan van Baardewijk is een classicus die ondernemer werd, mijn moeder Ebby Pelsma een socioloog die bestuurder werd. Net als mijn ouders, hebben ook mijn schoonouders, Yvo en Liesbeth van Loon, ons gezin gesteund en geïnspireerd. Ook hen wil ik daarom uitdrukkelijk bedanken. Gelukkig heb ik ook broers, Laurens en Merijn, en een zus Lieke, die me stuk voor stuk laten zien hoe je een zinvol leven kunt leiden in een wereld die soms best complex in elkaar steekt. Dank, dank – dank! 14 15 General Introduction Since 1913, when the first Dutch business school was established, business schools have grown ever more prominent.1 Today, they form the largest departments at most Dutch universities, in terms of student numbers.2 Although business schools emerged in response to a specific demand from the economy – large Dutch corporations like Philips and Shell grew rapidly and required suitably educated managers – they are now also an established part of academia. Their task is still to teach students how the world of business works and to prepare them for an active role in it, for example as the manager of a company. Business schools are thus the ‘nurseries’ of the corporate world. However, as the influence of business on our day to day lives can hardly be overestimated, business schools are also important societal institutions that also bear great social responsibility. The problem-solving ability and moral precepts of business school graduates are in fact a major influence on how the economy runs. Their teachers therefore influence what goals corporations set and what means graduates deploy to achieve them. Positioned at the intersection of academia and the economy, it is reasonable to expect business schools also to help their students reflect on the role of business and markets in society and understand and navigate the moral dilemmas their work will entail. As I demonstrate below, it is a matter of concern that academic research indicates that business schools are falling short on this task. Over the last few decades, scholars have debated the content and purpose of business schools critically. Due to the Enron debacle, the subprime mortgage crisis, and the 1 2 16 Technically, this first Dutch school was an applied business economics department (in Rotterdam), although one can easily recognize a first rudimentary business school in this institution. In this research, I prefer to speak of ‘business school’ – which is normal in scholarship on this topic – rather than ‘faculty’ or ‘department’, although I mean a university-based business education institution and not an independent school. We have one independent school in the Netherlands (Nijenrode), focusing on MBA’s and postgraduate education, to which my conclusions do not apply. As both economics departments and business schools educate managers of business, I call both business schools here. Up until the 1990s, most business education programs were identified as economics programs, but these were de facto programs in business (economics) rather than regular economics. See Chapter 3 for more information on the history of business schools. The database of The National Bureau of Economic Policy Analysis (CBS Statline) reveals that business studies had between 2500 and 3000 alumni per year between 2006 and 2016, which is approximately 8% of the total yearly number of Dutch bachelor alumni. This number makes business studies the largest field of academic study. However, related fields – such as business economics, public organization, technical business studies, accountancy, and (to a certain extent) communication sciences – overlap considerably with business studies. A broader definition, including the relevant tracks of these related fields, means that the number is around 12%. In Dutch universities of applied sciences (hogescholen), 50% of all students study business (see: Inspectie van het Onderwijs. Ministerie van Onderwijs, Cultuur en Wetenschap, De Staat van het Onderwijs, 2017, esp. p.192.). collapse of the financial markets in 2008, business schools have attracted ever more scrutiny.3 This has led to an increased interest in business ethics, corporate social responsibility, and sustainability in the context of business studies. Scholars, potential employers, accrediting agencies, and business school alumni have worldwide stimulated this interest.4 Some of their suggestions have resulted in improvements, but these are mostly a drop in the ocean. If business studies address topics such as business ethics and corporate social responsibility, this is usually done in a separate course. 5 They do not form an integral part of the curriculum. Throughout most of the curriculum, students are taught that what matters most in business is increasing profits and increasing the market share. 6 To change this, business schools would need to do more than offer two relatively isolated courses on ethics and corporate social responsibility throughout the course of a program, although such corner stones are of course necessary. 7 Establishing truly suitable academic training for future managers requires a rethinking of what it means to do business well, also for society as a whole. 3 4 5 6 7 Locke, Robert R., ‘Reform of finance education in US business schools: an historian view’, in: Real-world economics review, 2011, issue no. 58, pp. 95-112. (I refer to and discuss elements of Locke’s work in Chapter 4.) An empirical study among a thousand top level managers of Icelandic firms, many of whom are alumni of business schools, shows that these “managers believe that business schools should assist future employees in understanding ethics by including business ethics in the curriculum.” (Sigurjonsson, Throstur, Olaf, Vlad Vaiman, Audur Arna Arnardottir, ‘The Role of Business Schools in Ethics Education in Iceland: The Managers’ perspective’, in: Journal of Business Ethics, 2014, 122, pp. 25-38, p. 35.) The Association of Advance Collegiate Schools of Business (AACSB) endorses the need for business ethics, although this accreditation agency is also fiercely criticized for not formally acknowledging business ethics as a stand-alone course. See for a critical and empirical-informed perspective on the ‘willingness’ of the AACSB to support more business ethics education: Floyd, A. Larry, Feng Xu, Ryan Atkins, ‘Ethical Outcomes and Business Ethics: Toward Improving Business Ethics Education’, in Journal of Business Ethics, 2013, 117, pp. 753-776, p. 754. In the United States, only half of the MBA programs offered ethics as an obligatory course in 2011 (and business schools with a religious affinity offer courses in business ethics more often). (Wright, Norman S., Bennett, Hadyn, ‘Business ethics, CSR, sustainability and the MBA’, in: Journal of Management and Organization, 2011, 17: 641-655, p. 642.) Research further shows that within business schools, departments of management and marketing (compared to finance, economics) are more likely to integrate elements of ethics education in programs. (Evans, Joel M., Linda K. Trevi o, Gary R. Waver, ‘Who’s in the Ethics Driver’s Sea? Factors Influencing Ethics in the MBA Curriculum.’, in: Academy of Management Learning & Education, 2006, vol. 5, no. 3, pp. 278-293.) To my knowledge, no studies have been conducted for the Dutch situation in this regard. However, I nuance this picture in Chapter 3, where I show that there is a group of marketers and a group of socially engaged students. Nonetheless, this research aims to draw attention to the dominance of a certain idea of management in terms of profit and shareholder value within business school. See for a scale of the ways in which courses of ethics can be integrated in curricula: PainterMorland, M., E. Sabet, P. Molthan-Hill, H. Goworok, S. De Leeuw, ‘Beyond the curriculum: integrating sustainability into business schools’, in: Journal of Business Ethics, 139 4, 2016, pp. 737754. (Also see footnote 5.) 17 1 This research thus proposes to focus this rethinking on the ‘ethos’ that is both implicitly and explicitly instilled in students of business administration throughout their stay at university. That is, to focus on the way students learn to interpret and take a stance towards the economic world during their studies. In doing so, this research develops its own methodology - ‘moral ethology’ - which helps to outline some cornerstones for a different type of business education. It presents the framework for a new ethos inspired by the work of Aristotle and the (Neo-Aristotelian) way that Ad Verbrugge and Alasdair MacIntyre have updated his thinking. The moral ethology partly overlaps with the recent empirical and praxeological turn taken in applied ethics. 8 I would like to briefly consider the meaning of ethos (I discus it more elaborately below, cf. section 1.2). In his Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle uses the notion ‘ethos’, to which our notion of ‘ethics’ is related, in the context of his description of a good life. 9 He surmises that people do not become good citizens just by learning theory. What is necessary to become good in Aristotle’s sense of the word is the integral development of a personality in the context of a ‘polis’ or city-state. Although our economy does not revolve around a small community like the polis of Athens, the formal structure of the argument Aristotle developed is still of relevance today. 10 Aristotle used ‘ethos’ to describe the result of a moral development. ‘Ethos’ denotes a ‘character’, or the ‘habits’ that are nourished through the institutions of family, education and life in the public realm and enable people to see, talk about and relate to their world in a certain way. With Aristotle, one could argue that the ideal business student’s ethos would not only allow him or her to earn a living, but also to understand what finance really means, how wealth in general constitutes part of the prosperity of society at large, and what his or her role in society could and perhaps should look like. Such an ethos presupposes a wise outlook on life and a suitable vocabulary for discussing the ‘goods’ inherent 8 9 10 18 In applied ethics, especially in care ethics, there is an interesting conversation between practical and theoretical knowledge. See for a recent theoretical discussion: Klaver, K., E. van Elst, A.J. Baart, ‘Demarcation of the ethics of care as a discipline: discussion article.’, in: Nursing Ethics 2014; 21, pp. 755–765. For a specific example of a combination of practical and theoretical reflection in care ethics, including a reflection on management, see: Vosman, F., A. Niemeijer, A., ‘Rethinking critical reflection on care: late modern uncertainty and the implications for care ethics’ in: Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy, 2017 (doi: 10.1007/s11019-017-9766-1), esp. section The Rise and Fall of Managers. See: Aristoteles Lexikon, ‘ethos’, ed. Rolf Geiger, Philipp Brüllmann, Kröner Taschenausgabe (459), 2005, pp. 212-216. (also see: Chapter 8.3.) See: Solomon, Robert C., ‘Historicism, Communitarianism, and commerce: an Aristotelian Approach to Business Ethics’, in: Contemporary Economic Ethics and Business Ethics. ed. Peter Koslowski, Springer Verlag Berlin-Heidelberg 2000, pp. 117-146. (I refer to and discuss elements of Solomon’s work in Chapter 6 and 7.) to it. Yet, this (Neo-Aristotelian) picture seems far from the reality of today’s business schools, but it does help us understand what is going on there. The moral ethological outlook reveals that business schools not only convey textbook knowledge, but also habits that are acquired through studying, interaction with professors and student life in general. In the context of today’s universities, an ethos is conveyed through the assumptions, beliefs, and ideas contained in study material and teaching through which students, often unconsciously, learn to relate to the world. In the terms of educational research: an ethos is not only shaped by the official curriculum and the mission statements of business studies, but also by the ‘hidden curriculum’, which is filled with implicit messages, which might be at odds with the official message of a university (cf. section 1.3). I am not arguing that business schools deliberately have a secret agenda to advance a capitalist ideology, 11 but I do question the nursery function of these institutions within the broader context of our economy and society. Moreover, I do not claim that business schools are the only institutions to influence our economy – in fact, many managers are graduates from quite different programs – but their influence is relatively large, and larger than many people might think. 12 The focus on ethos enables this research to be both empirical in its approach – in this case, through a (Q-)survey amongst students – and normative in outlook. 13 The qualitative empirical research investigates what constitutes the dominant ethos of business students, whether we should distinguish between several types of ethos and how the current situation has emerged. From this, we turn to the normative side of moral ethology and try to identify possible problems associated with this type (or these types) of ethos, such as inconsistencies, lacunas and misunderstandings and propose 11 12 13 I problematize the relationship between business studies and real-world business. There is serious critical scholarship on this relationship (cf. section 2.5 and 2.6) and there is cynic literature as well. A good example of the latter, which I do not discuss, for it is hyperbolic and even destructive: Stewart, Matthew, The Management Myth, New York, W.W. Norton, 2009, esp. pp.7-99; pp. 289305. The relationship between the economy and university is often analyzed regarding departments of economics. This brings forth interesting research, but I focus on today’s business students, not students in economics. There are ten times (!) more students in business than in economics. On the negative impact of studying economics on student morality, see the classic paper: Frank, Robert H., Thomas Gilovich, Dennis T. Regan, ‘Does Studying Economics Inhabit Cooperation?’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 7, no.2, 1993, pp. 159-171. (Also see footnote 2). Of course, one can undertake empirical research without interpreting it from a moral ethological perspective. The other way around, a moral ethological study needs empirical research. This is odd in theoretical philosophy, which is mainly concerned with concepts, but increasingly normal in applied ethics and applied philosophy (the tradition of care ethics, referred to in footnote 8, is an example). Nonetheless, I aim to demonstrate that my moral ethological approach constitutes conceptual progress, and is not only an application of philosophical- and ethical thinking. 19 1 philosophically justifiable and well-founded improvements. In short, the main research question is: ‘What characterizes the ethos of business students, how did it emerge, and how can we improve it?’ In the remainder of this introduction, I first demonstrate the need for a rethinking of current business studies curricula. I identify three major challenges the economy faces today and argue that current business students are not being prepared adequately to deal with them. Moreover, I show that the secondary literature is pessimistic about current business schools and gives very little hope regarding these challenges (1.1). I then describe the moral ethology in general terms (1.2) and concretize it in relation to the topic of business education (1.3). I end this introduction with a short overview of the argument (1.4) and the readers addressed (1.5). 1.1 Challenges for Today’s Economy The main question to be answered tentatively in this section is: do business schools train students adequately to deal with the challenges the economy faces today? Or, which seems to be an inconvenient truth, are they in fact part of the challenge at this moment, rather than the solution? The challenges highlighted here illustrate how values prevalent in the current economic system might be at odds with larger societal values. Here are some of these challenges: (1) The growth of the financial sector in relation to the economy as a whole. (2) The ambivalent impact of the marketization of many social practices and the related growth in the number and power of managers. (3) The continuing overall bias of our economy towards growth, given earth’s now all too evident natural limits.14 I will now elaborate on these challenges one by one. 14 20 Of course, this list could be longer. Consider, for instance, the processes of globalization and robotization – a topic briefly discussed in Chapter 8 of this study. The loss of jobs in the Western world due to these two processes is alarming and has corrosive effects on middle classes. Yet, globalization and robotization are partly a result of these first three (aside from also having their own dynamics). Without the shareholder focus of many large corporations, for instance, there would be less pressure to create offshore chains of production and to invest in computers instead of people. (1) A significant challenge of today’s economy is the growth of the financial sector and the systematic risk it poses to the rest of the economy. Important public research institutions such as the OECD, the IMF, and the WRR warn of the fragility of the current financial system. The financial crisis of 15 2008 demonstrated the disastrous consequences of glitches in this financial system. In the wake of the crisis, it was discovered that important financial institutions, such as ABN AMRO bank and the small Dutch bank of systematic irresponsible investments and even fraud. 16 DSB, were guilty Furthermore, the safeguards of the financial system had failed: international rating agencies had been uncritical of financial ‘innovations’.17 Hitherto trusted institutions received criticism for putting individual people and families at risk by selling them financial products such as sub-prime mortgages. Cynically, while this was happening, some of the concerned major corporations did have official ethics policies, which many (not all) had instrumentalized for façade purposes. 18 In the wake of the crises, individuals were all too often framed as the bad apples in what remained a ‘healthy’ sector. 19 An example of this is the imprisonment of banker Tom Hayes for the Libor-scandal, a series of fraudulent actions regarding the interbank rate, in which many banks were involved, including the Rabobank, and which came to light in 2012.20 The Libor-scandal shows how difficult it is to distinguish between rule-breaking, rule-bending and a 15 16 17 18 19 20 For a historical overview regarding the Netherlands, including international comparisons, see Finance and Society: Restoring Balance, a report by the Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy. See esp. p. 151 and further. Download full Dutch report: https://www.wrr.nl/publicaties/rapporten/2016/10/12/samenleving-en-financiele-sector-inevenwicht Download summary in English: https://english.wrr.nl/publications/reports/2016/10/12/finance-and-society-restoring-thebalance The risky strategies of these two banks are not coincidental but part of the changed ethos of banking throughout the 1980s and 1990s. On the history of banking in the Netherlands and the dynamics of globalization and deregulation that lead to reckless investments (ABN AMRO) and irresponsible consumer products (DSB), see: Ibid., esp. chapters 3 and 4. Financial innovation that had supposedly made the banking system more solid, increased the total risk, without banks or rating agencies noticing it. The business of risk transfer became the major risk itself, behind the façade of AAA-ratings. See, for instance: Brunnermeier, Markus, ‘Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch 2007-2008’, in: Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 23, no. 1, Winter 2009, pp. 77-100. On the pretention of being ethical in business, but de facto doing little to achieve this, see: Sims, Ronald R., Johannes Brinkman, ‘Enron Ethics (or: Culture Matters More than Codes)’, in: Journal of Business Ethics, 45, 2003, pp. 243-256. Kish-Gephart J. J., Harrison D. A., Treviño L.K., ‘Bad apples, bad cases, and bad barrels: metaanalytic evidence about sources of unethical decisions at work, in: Journal of Applied Psychology, 2010, vol. 95, no1, pp.1-31. On the Libor-scandal, see: Enrich, David, The Spider Network: the wild story of a math genius, a gang of backstabbing bankers, and one of the greatest scams in financial history, Harper Collins Publishers, New York, United States, 2017. 21 1 deficit of regulation in the financial sector. This is also the central problem behind the revelations presented in the (2015) Panama Papers and (2017) Paradise Papers, which revealed large-scale tax ‘avoidance’ by large companies such as Apple and celebrities such as Bono.21 Apparently, this is normal for the biggest banks. Indeed, the Netherlands plays a part in this international system, as taxhaven.22 In addition, the Big Four accounting firms manage this architecture and have repeatedly been criticized for their subpar craftmanship and lack of integrity by the Dutch Authority of Financial Markets.23 In recent years, many large banks have paid fines for fraudulent activities, but the question is whether the financial system will really change. If nothing else, the correctional intention of these punishments implies that redemption of the current system is possible by the enforcement of existing rules. The problem, however, is that many of the dubious activities of financial corporations remain officially legal, even though the financial crisis of 2008 had large repercussions for the real economy and harmed many people.24 The (2015) bestseller Swimming with the Sharks by journalist Joris Luyendijk suggests that ‘financials’ are not sufficiently in control of the system of financial products they have created.25 The problem Luyendijk addresses is a general lack of control and decency in finance. However, bankers, consultants, and accountants show little willingness to make a fundamental shift. This does not necessarily mean that all financials are immoral people. What we seem to witness here is a process of “moral neutralization”, as business ethicists call it, “in which people justify to themselves that what appeared to be morally questionable behavior is after all acceptable”.26 21 22 23 24 25 26 22 This is the book that revealed the panama papers: Obermayer, Bart, Obermaier, Frederik, The Panama Papers: Breaking the Story of how the Rich and Powerful Hide Their Money. One World, London, United Kingdom, 2017. Regarding the research on the Panama Papers (and other relevant scandals) in relation to the Netherlands, I recommend the informative website https://www.panamapapers.nl which collects much journalism on this topic. See this report: Quality of PIE Audit Firms, June 28 2017, The Dutch Authority of Financial Markets, link: https://www.afm.nl/en/professionals/nieuws/2017/juni/kwaliteitslag-oob On the social costs of the 2007 financial crisis, see: Engelen, Ewald, Ismail Ertürk, Julie Froud, Sukhdev Johal, Adam Leaver, Michal Moran, Adriana Nilsson, Karel Williams, After the Great Compliance. Financial Crisis and the Politics of Reform. Oxford University Press, Oxford, United Kingdom, 2011. Luyendijk, Joris, Swimming with the Sharks (or. Dit Kan Niet Waar Zijn Atlas Contact), Guardian Faber Publishing, Oxford, United Kingdom, 2015. Kvalnes, Oyvind, Salvor Nordal, ‘Normalization of Questionable Behavior: An Ethical Root of the Financial Crisis in Iceland.’ In: Journal of Business Ethics. 2018 Download: https://doi. org/10.1007/s10551-018-3803-8 (2) A second challenge our economy faces, is the process of marketization of non-market realms and the negative impact this has on society. In fact, many scholars agree that the lack of governmental control and the instalment of commercial mechanisms in the financial sector in the 1990s caused the financial crisis.27 Still, marketization continues. Firstly, because markets tend to grow, and secondly because governments stimulate this growth and the creation of new markets. The natural growth of markets is fueled by the fact that marketization is profitable. That is why corporations tend to marketize as much of life as possible. Uber marketized our car-usage and made a potential taxi-driver out of every car-owner. AirBnB made a potential hotel of people’s homes. Google controls many internet communications now. Yet, this market development is criticized: Uber for its terms of employment, AirBnB for undermining the livability in large cities and Google for its monopoly on the internet and invasion of privacy. It is fashionable to speak of these companies as ‘disruptive innovators’ and the public slowly discovers that disruption has negative effects on society at large. To some extent, these companies are flourishing because they commodify social wealth – leisure time, social security – and not because they create something new.28 This raises questions about the nature of the internet – should it perhaps be a public, not a private realm? – and the major tech businesses, which should perhaps be controlled more strictly.29 Governments also stimulate marketization since the 1980s, it has introduced market and quasi-market mechanisms into a wide range of public institutions. This happened in media, museums, infrastructure, and education. In some cases, this has led to real and successful markets, such as in telecommunication, which was a state sector twenty years ago.30 In other cases, such as in higher education, market models have formed a source of inspiration for a different type of organization. The state encourages universities to use what Stefan Collini 27 28 29 30 Thus, a more solid financial sector needs more constraints and regulation. See: Roubini, Nouriel, Stephen Mihm, Crisis Economics – A Crash Course in the Future of Finance. The Penguin Press, New York, 2010. Also see footnote 13. The power of the ‘FANG’s’ (Facebook, Amazon, Netflix, Google) and other major platform companies, such as Uber, receives much criticism. See for example: Dolata, Ulrich, ‘Apple, Amazon, Facebook, Microsoft. Market Concentration – Competition – Innovation Strategies.’ SOI Discussion paper. University of Stuttgart. Download: http://www.unistuttgart.de/soz/oi/publikationen/soi_2017_1_Dolata.Apple.Amazon.Google. Facebook.Microsoft.pdf See, for example: Mazzucato, Mariana, The Value of Everything. Making and Taking in the Global Economy, esp. Chapter 7 Extracting Value Through the Innovation Economy, Allen Lane, New York, United States, 2018. Yet, even the telephony market is dependent on its state-led history. See: Mazzucato, Marianna, The Entrepreneurial State. Debunking Public vs. Private Sector Myths. Anthem Press, New York, United States, 2015. 23 1 calls “the language of the company report”.31 In this language, students are knowledge-consumers, performance indicators replace academic judgments and productivity-indices measure and rate publications. This process is associated with ‘New Public Management’ – a new type of management that utilizes a specific vocabulary of ‘input’, ‘output’, ‘task-management’, ‘flexibility’, and so on.32 These new markets and management vocabularies also influence the way the government perceives its own activity. As the title of the (1992) book behind this development suggests, it is a make-over of the idea of the market-state-nexus: Reinventing Government: how the entrepreneurial spirit is transforming the public sectors. In the Netherlands, we have witnessed many cases of mismanagement due to the introduction of market and management principles in the public domain: Philadelphia, MeaVita, InHolland, Vestia and Amarantis. In these cases, we see managers that invest too much in buildings, ICT, and internationalization while the primary purposes – supplying basic housing, care, education – move to the background.33 Yet, the problems that have arisen out of New Public Management are roughly comparable to those in the private sector. 34 There is a new ‘class’ of managers in all types of large organizations that receives criticism for prioritizing procedures, administration, and balance-sheets over the purposes for which the organization exists in the first place.35 This ‘managerialism’ is an important explanation for the unease or even unhappiness people experience in their work: many people feel misunderstood and decelerated by managers and managerial structures.36 Business scholars Locke and Spender even argue that this combination of market- and management thinking explains the dramatic decline of the United States automobile industry.37 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 24 Collini, Stefan, Speaking of Universities, Verso 2017, London, United Kingdom, p. 17. See for a systematic reflection by a historian: Lorenz, Chris, ‘Surveillance? Universities, Neoliberalism, and New Public Management.’ in: Critical Inquiry (38), 2012. For a sociological reflection, see: Espeland, Wendy N., Michael Sauder, ‘Rankings and Reactivity. How Public Measures Re-create Social Worlds’, in: American Journal of Sociology, 113, 2007, no. 1, pp. 1-40. See: Waal, de, Steven, ‘Transformatie van Publiek Leiderschap’, in: Waartoe is Nederland op Aarde? ed. Gabriel van den Brink, 2018, Amsterdam, the Netherlands, pp. 269-299. Mazzucato, Mariana, The Value of Everything. Making and Taking in the Global Economy, esp. Chapter 7 Extracting Value Through the Innovation Economy, Allen Lane, New York, United States, 2018. For a philosophical analysis of the self-fulfilling aspects of management, such as audits intended to check the functioning of business that end-up redefining it, see: Verner C. Petersen, Self-Fulfilling Aspects of Unrealistic Assumptions in Management Theory, in: Philosophy of Management, vol. 9, no. 3, 2010. See: Brink, Gabriel, Thijs Jansen, Dorien Pessers (eds.), Beroepszeer. Waarom Nederland niet goed werkt, Boom Uitgeverij, Amsterdam, the Netherlands, 2005. Locke, Robert R, John S. Spender, Confronting Managerialism. How the Business elite and their Schools threw our Lives out of Balance. 2011. For a systematic critical-historical analysis of markets, marketization and financialization in different cultures and eras, see: Van Bavel, Bas, The Invisible Hand? Oxford University Press, Oxford, United Kingdom, 2016, esp. pp. 20-21. Let me be clear: I am not implying that we should argue against any form of markets and management. I argue in this research (especially in Part III) that it is important to embed markets in social contexts and have managers attune to the way these contexts work. This is, however, at odds with a certain understanding of management as a generic activity applicable to any form of organization. An innovative example, in which management is attuned to a specific domain, is Buurtzorg Nederland, a care organization with very few managers (as isolated roles) and many self-managing teams. 38 (3) A third challenge concerns the scarcity of natural resources and the consequences for our environment of utilizing them. The natural world does not have the capacity to continue to sustain the current growth-focused economy. This idea is not new: The (1972) publication Limits of Growth addressed the need for a different treatment of the natural world.39 There is a pressing need for an alternative economic system in which we cultivate the natural world responsibly. The current abuse has a negative influence on climate change, the rate of biodiversity loss, the depletion of finite resources such as phosphorus, and so on. Part of the problem with these inter-related issues is a lack of financial incentive to avoid environmental damage – they are economic externalities. From a purely financial standpoint, it seems logical to use finite resources and pollute the environment, since society shares the costs of its consequences, while the costs of avoiding pollution falls on the business itself – a state of affairs called the ‘tragedy of the commons’. Despite some hopeful developments, such as the (2015) Paris Agreement – a milestone of international cooperation on tackling human-induced climate change – a strictly growth-oriented mindset is still prevalent in society and academia. This inability to develop a more sustainable economy is related to previous challenges. Consider, for instance, Shell’s recent massive investment in gasexploitation. Shell has argued in a public statement that it cannot take the step towards sustainable energy directly but must transfer to gas as an intermediate step.40 This investment is aimed at short- and mid-term growth. One can also interpret this move differently: It is likely that Shell is anticipating a collective 38 39 40 The entrepreneur who started Buurtzorg, Jos de Blok, co-edited an insightful book: Blok, Jos, Herman Suichies, Thijs Jansen, Het alternatief voor de zorg. Humaniteit boven bureaucratie. Uitgeverij Stichting Beroepseer, Culemborg, the Netherlands, 2016. Meadows, Donella H., Dennis L. Meadows, Jørgen Randar, William W. Behrens III (eds.), The Limits of Growth, New York Universe Books, New York, United States, 1972. Dutch Journalist Jelmer Molmers has written a series of articles on Shell’s irresponsible investment strategies. See, for instance this post from April 8th: https://decorrespondent. nl/5563/shellknew-in-deze-interne-documenten-kun-je-zelf-lezen-wat-shell-sinds-1986-weet-overklimaatverandering/613092667-fad068b1 For international research, see: http://www.ciel.org/news/crackintheshell/ 25 1 downscaling of oil and gas usage and seeks to maintain its revenue by acquiring a larger market-share. From a legal and strictly economic perspective, Shell’s move is sound, but it is morally questionable, since research shows a pressing need to transition to renewable energy sources. Instead of investing where it is needed most, Shell opts for a traditional business model. This model orients towards satisfying shareholders by providing a safe return of investment. Another example of the interrelatedness of these challenges is ‘Dieselgate’. In 2015, the United States Environmental Protection Agency discovered the systematic manipulation of the measured pollution rates of cars. A plausible explanation for the whole affair is not that German carmakers had corrupt CEOs, but rather that these CEOs pressured employees to achieve sales goals, no matter the cost. To do this, diesel cars would have to be more environmentally friendly than they were. Employees were under so much pressure that developing software specifically designed to manipulate emission-test results seemed like a viable option to them.41 Officially, Volkswagen was producing ‘clean diesels’, just as Enron officially won prizes for its policy of CSR, but behind this moral façade, a culture of competition and blind focus on financial results had led to immoral actions and an immoral organization. This does not necessarily mean that shareholders, CEOs, and managers hold immoral ideas, but the way they strategize and organize do have (unintended) immoral consequences, caused by a blindness to any moral compass. The inability to make business models more sustainable is related to the shareholder model of corporations, the balance-sheet mentality of managers and a general market world-view. As philosopher of science Bruno Latour demonstrates in his book Modes of Existence, today’s standard science model, especially in economics, still presupposes the earth – and nature in general – to be a mere mechanistic ‘object’, instead of an eco-system in which we live.42 A strictly economic analysis of environmental issues suggests that the sustainability problem is a ‘market failure’, which means that markets are failing to do what they supposedly do so well, namely maximize the satisfaction of preferences. Strictly economically speaking, sustainability is a problem that requires better markets and better managers. Latour criticizes this line of reasoning for presupposing an inherently flawed view of nature. What we fail to see in an economistic perspective on sustainability and society, is that people are not mere consumers seeking to find and refine tastes, but that they 41 42 26 On Dieselgate, see: Ewing, Jack Faster, Higher, Farther. The Volkswagen Scandal. W.W. Northon and Company Inc., New York, United States, 2017. Latour, Bruno, Modes of Existence, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachutes, London, England, 2013, esp. Introduction. are also citizens, looking for a morally ‘good life’, not only for themselves but also for their children and the society in which they live together – carried by a finite earth. The (1) rise and scale of global finance, (2) marketization, managerialism and (3) the boundless use and abuse of nature are related, in the sense that these challenges concern the common good. The question is whether students are sufficiently aware of these challenges and to what extent do they have the (intellectual) equipment to resolve them? Do today’s business faculties take their shaping roles as nursery institutions of future business people seriously? The answer to the latter seems to be ‘no’: Regrettably, research indicates that Dutch business schools continue to work with the theories that reflected and formed the economic basis for the financial crisis of 2008 and prevent us from replacing our growth-focused economy with an alternative system. A short review of this literature drives home the point. Over the last decades, scholars have critically debated the content and purpose of business schools. The criticism is diverse, and I review it comprehensively in Chapter 2. Henry Mintzberg (2005), Sumatra Goshal (2005) and Philip Hühn (2011) criticize the focus of business schools on leadership and their reliance on abstract, analytical models that inculcate students with a hierarchical mentality. Robert R. Locke (2011) and John C. Spender (2015) criticize the lack of concreteness of business programs and the use of outdated hierarchical management models. Rakesh Khurana (2007) and Marcel Metze (2011) point towards the lack of social awareness in business schools. Pfeffer and Fong (2002) show that business education is no guarantee of a job in management. Christopher Grey (2002), Debra Schleef (2006) and the Carnegie Foundation (2011) question the (scant) morality in business administration and the lack of critical reflection. Moldevanue and Martin (2010) argue business schools do not prepare students sufficiently for the radical technological changes that lie ahead. This brief overview demonstrates that recent publications on business education raise questions about the scientific, practical, moral, technological, and professional value of business studies. So far, this scholarship has not been able to inspire much change in business studies. Most scholars in the business-studies debate are experienced business professors who offer genuine and in-depth analyzes of business schools, but as A. Pettigrew and K. Starkey observe, many of these “remain personal accounts about an apparently massively under researched terrain.”43 We thus have a 43 Pettigrew, A, and K. Starkey, ‘The legitimacy and impact of business schools – key issues and a research agenda.’ In: Academy of Management Learning & Education, 2016, Vol. 15, no. 4, pp. 649664, p. 652. 27 1 problematic situation. Business studies are influential in a world that faces major challenges, with a great impact on everyday life in general and there is ample reason to believe that they are not up to the task of facing these issues. Yet, the terrain remains under-researched. 44 This study seeks to partly solve these problems by developing a method that allows for both an empirical investigation of the current state of business education and the development of a normative framework to identify shortcomings and potential solutions. 1.2 ‘Ethos’ and the Conceptual Framework of ‘Moral Ethology’ The study sets out to consider university-based business studies in the Netherlands with respect to the ethos that it both explicitly and implicitly instils in students. 45 As stated above, ‘ethos’ refers to the habitual interpretation of our world, especially with regard to our own relating, acting and speaking. It is also said to pertain to an interpretation of the ‘goods’ of business and the ‘good life’ in general. It is not only about convictions, but also about what is and is not subject to conscious consideration in the first place. I refer to the method (or: framework) required to study an ethos as ‘moral ethology’. I describe the key aspects of this method in this section, which is tentative and acquires its full meaning in the rest of this research (especially Part III). Moral ethology focuses on shared practices that help a group of people to strive for a ‘good life’. Moral ethology offers a vocabulary which enables us to attach words to certain phenomena that we tend to overlook in other perspectives. This in turn allows us to pose ethical questions about the purpose of certain activities and the desirability of certain developments. Applied to business school students, moral ethology investigates their collective understanding of matters related to their roles as students and the moral perspective they have on themselves, society, and the economy. Studying business from this perspective provides us with a normative framework, as far as it enables us to determine whether the business-student ethos enables business students to conduct business in a way that contributes to the good life for society. 44 45 28 There is good scholarship on the history (of ideas) of business education (cf. Chapter 4.1-4.3), but there is little attention for the practical studying-side of business education. Fortunately, there is a growing body of international literature on this practical side, although not very empiricallyinformed (cf. Chapter 2, Introduction). In fact, this research is based on an explorative qualitative empirical research, consisting of 20 interviews and 43 Q-research respondents. This research is not representative for the business student ethos, but it is indicative. It would be interesting to (quantitatively) expand this research, although I argue that it indicates important characterizations of the Dutch business student ethos nonetheless (cf. section 3.1-3.3; also see General Conclusion). The major difference between the focus on ethos and the various other strategies for analyzing business education is the focus on the entire process of student formation in relation to business and society. I believe that this approach could be used more widely, for example to analyze the way any group functions, such as a company, a hospital or retirement home, sports club or a collective of artists. 46 But the focus here is on business schools and its study objects: ‘business’, as the institutions of ‘markets’, in which people ‘manage’ work. Primarily Aristotle’s use of the word ‘ethos’ inspires my research approach. I do not follow the common use of ‘ethology’ in biology – for instance by Frans De Waal47 – or its use in the work of John Stuart Mill. 48 In turn, my use and modification of the Aristotelian notion of ethos is inspired by the works of the Dutch philosopher Ad Verbrugge.49 He developed his own ‘ethology’ in his study on shortcomings in the work of Martin Heidegger, who developed a concept of life (Dasein) and togetherness (Mit-Sein), which Verbrugge shows to lack a regard for the ‘good’ life in the moral Aristotelian sense of the word. My use of moral ethology is more pragmatic (or: applied) than the ethology developed in Verbrugge’s books and publications, to which I refer throughout this research.50 46 47 48 49 50 There is a growing body of literature on ‘social practice theory’, focusing on social issues, such as work or sports, rather than focusing solely on individual behavior (see below in text). See: Schmitt, Robert Soziologie der Praktiken. Konzeptionelle Studien und empirische Analyzen. Suhrkamp Taschenbuch, Berlin 2012. The most widely known use of the notion ‘ethology’ can probably be found in the study of animal behavior. Certain biologists working in this field argue that some species of animals display rudimentary forms of moral behavior, such as conflict mitigation and solidarity. Dutch primatologist Frans de Waal, for instance, shows that Chimpanzees understand that there are social rules among their kin that they are expected to follow. However interesting this may be, the framework developed in this research is not helpful for our purposes, because in this perspective, morality is dependent on groups (of animals), whereas I aim to develop a notion of ethology that helps to normatively test and change the taken-for-granted direction of a group of people. I decided against using the term ‘human ethology’, as that could suggest that biological-ethological schemes could help interpret social action, which is not the line of reasoning followed here. For a philosophical discussion on De Waals ethological analysis, see: Korsgaard, Christine M., ‘Morality and the Distinctiveness of Human Action.’ In: Primates and Philosophers: How Morality Evolved, 98-119. ed. Stephen Macced, Jdsiah Ober, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press (for a reconstruction of De Waals theory, see Part I in that book). Another use of ‘ethology’ stems from John Stuart Mill’s System of Logic. Mill proposes developing a new psychological science to analyze both individual and collective character. His proposal to use the word ‘ethology’ was never adopted and I will not pursue his ideas here, as his approach remained underdeveloped and does not contribute to our purposes. Moral ethology focuses on the way people collectively share a certain way of life and comes much closer to what is called culturaland social philosophy than Mills’ ethology of mind and psychology. Verbrugge, Ad, ‘De vorming van cultuur en de dynamiek van de tijd. ‘Globalisering, onderwijs en de lokale opgaven van de hoge cultuur’, in: Wat heet Beschaving? Roger Scrutons cultuur en onderwijskritiek, Klement Uitgeverij, Utrecht, the Netherlands, 2011, pp. 158-230. Verbrugge, Ad, Verwaarlozing van het Zijnde. Een ethologische kritiek van Heideggers Sein und Zeit. Boom Uitgevers, Amsterdam, the Netherlands, 2001, see esp. ch. 1-2. 29 1 1.2.1 Moral ethology is a situational approach Moral ethology solves a problem that plagues many familiar ethical theories such as deontology, utilitarianism, virtue ethics and contractualism. The problem with these approaches is that the rules, ideals, and judgments they develop about duties and obligations are separated from their context, be it business, the economy, education, or culture. Moral ethology reveals connections between the different motives people have and the shared habits and traditions they follow. 51 There are two possible objections to standard ethical theories dealt with much more appropriate in my moral ethology: 1) Standard ethical theories focus on universal claims about ethics, separated from a specific context, which is problematic, since it is too abstract. 2) Standard ethical theories often presuppose an abstract idea of moral motivation, as if people are motivated in isolation from the contexts in which they function and the roles they play. Ethos has the meaning of habit and custom – or Habitus as the French sociologist Bourdieu has called it.52 The difference with the approach of Bourdieu lies in my emphasis on the sustainability of the described ethos; are the customs that people have and follow sufficiently strong, coherent, and able to cope with inherent conflict, or are they even self-undermining? Hence, my moral ethological analysis helps to clarify the essential elements that make people undertake certain things together in a certain cultivated way. An ethos crosses the strict boundaries between the moral and the efficient, or how framing makes some elements appear to constitute taken-for-grantedtruths, and others to be values-open-for-discussion. In other words, with the notion of ethos, I break out of and evade the dichotomy between values and economic interests. We all aspire towards both a prosperous and a fulfilling life. A tendency in business is to control the search for efficiency with the use of moral codes and corporate law. Ethology digs a layer deeper; it is not concerned with clear ethical go’s and no-go’s, such as discrimination, bribery, and tax evasion. Rather, it looks for the way a certain group of people and their overall conception of the world leads to a certain form of society and sustains it. This is not simply an ethical perspective, for my claim is also that there are values inherent to economic concerns; it is all about values. What I oppose is that we tend to believe that ‘the economy’ or ‘business’ is inherently adverse to ‘values’. 51 52 30 See footnote 8 for comparable strategies in care ethics. See for a look on business education from a Bourdieusian (meta-)perspective: Vaara, Eero, Eric Fay, ‘How can a Bourdieusian Perspective Aid Analysis of MBA Education?’ in: Academy of Management, Learning and Education, 2011, vol. 10, No. 1, pp. 27-39. 1.2.2 Moral ethology emphasizes the collective One fundamental premise of moral ethology is that collective endeavor is more than purely the outcome of an aggregate of individual wills. A problem with standard ethical theories is that most of them, despite a high level of sophistication, are abstract and often mainly pertain to individuals qua individuals. This makes sense as far as it is always the individual that acts. Of course, it is indeed very dangerous to lose sight of individual responsibility, but to lose sight of the collective dimension of our decisions aimed at living the ‘good life’ can also have serious consequences. Students are asked to study the key concepts of ethics, such as the right duties, utilities, rights, and virtuous actions, and to apply them to their lives. Ethical reflection on collective action is often liberal and presupposes an individual conception of freedom. The moral ethological approach attempts to understand the substantial shared forms in which people live together. It focuses on what is perceived as the good life, rather than on what is right (see next section). The interest for the collective in this type of philosophy often focuses on the infrastructure people presuppose to being able to develop in their lives. Martha Nussbaum, for instance, describes the need for care and education of individuals so that they can realize their ‘capabilities’.53 Moral ethological analysis differs in its focus on the shared forms and ideas people have and that direct their lives. It is concerned with the standards and forms that enable people to fulfil their lives and recognize those of others as members of a certain group, like a company or club. There is a normativity within these standards and forms, that the ethological approach seeks to describe. Ethologically speaking, the ‘individual’ and his ‘rights’ are focal points from an abstract level of analysis. People are born in families, educated in schools and work and live with others. Their togetherness is more fundamental than their individuality.54 Within this larger context of society, the state and culture, people can of course still be individuals, but this presupposes an elementary order that protects their individuality and enables them to prosper and to individualize. The moral ethological framework does acknowledge the existence of individual life. It is rather the focus on the social forms that underlies it, that differentiates it from liberal ethical theories. This means that the notion of ethos is not 53 54 See, for instance: Nussbaum, Martha, Frontiers of Justice. Disability, Nationality. Species Membership. The Belknap Press of Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachutes London, England, 2006, esp. chapter 3. Empirical research in moral psychology shows that the decisions of other people very strongly influence individual moral decision-making. See, for instance: Baron R.S., Vandello, J.A., Brunsman, B., ‘The forgotten variable in conformity research: impact of task importance on social influence’, in Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 71.5, 1996, pp. 915-27. 31 1 one of strict communitarianism; it leaves latitude for the notion of personal responsibility and reflection. At the same time, the notion of ethos clearly comes from the neoaristotelian tradition. I think this tradition has something to offer to understand the moral formation of students. Philosophers with a liberal understanding of society start with individuals, but I start from the society and its institutions and the way they help to individualize people. 1.2.3 Moral ethology seeks the good life An ethos is a shared form of understanding which conveys what constitutes the good life. Moral ethology endeavors to find this underlying idea of good in the ethos of groups. Indeed, even the most realistic and factually-based ambitions should also be understood in the light of an implicit or explicit concept of the good life. For example, the renowned economist Milton Friedman stated that he considers it good to have profit as the sole objective of business. Even this seemingly nihilistic stance is motivated by an idea of the good life – for Friedman, the pursuit of profit was good, because it helped society achieve economic and societal freedom through prosperity.55 With this perspective on the good life, moral ethological research is in line with that of philosophers like Charles Taylor and Alasdair MacIntyre, who also focus on the good life of people and not so much on what is right.56 They agree that justice, rights and ‘the right’ are important dimensions of life, but also express the view that life can be unjust in many other ways, for instance due to inhumane management, ignorance of the importance of local culture and national languages. 1.2.4. Moral ethology is interested in the local I have already pointed to the etymological meaning of ethos as ‘habit’ and ‘custom’. There is a third and important meaning: ‘place’. In some languages, this relationship is reflected in related words. In both Dutch and German, the words for habit (gewoonte/Gewohnheit) resemble those for home (woning/ Wohnung). In Latin, the relationship is expressed in habitat/habitus. Moral ethology takes location, region, and nationality seriously as determinant of identity. This is a crucial difference from many ethical theories, for instance with that of Nussbaum, which is directed at the cultivation of humanity in general.57 55 56 57 32 See: Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, United States, 1962. Taylor, Charles, Sources of the Self, The Making of the Modern Identity, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United States, 1989, p. IX. Nussbaum, Martha, Cultivating Humanity. A classical Defense of Reform in Liberal Education, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, United States, London, England, 1997. The process of modernity and the unfolding of global markets, together with the internet, have made the world remarkably interconnected. However, locality still plays an important role in life. The sociological research of Katerina C. Knorr insists that the mere fact that certain financial specialists work in de-localized realms of trade makes them less social.58 Psychological research demonstrates that speaking English in countries like the Netherlands makes people individualistic, opportunistic and less social.59 The sociologist Manuel Castells has described, in his (1996-‘98) trilogy The Information Age: Economy, Society, and Culture, that the process of globalization and digitalization will bring forth a counter force of the search for local identity.60 This hypothesis has turned out to be rather prophetic, if we think about Brexit and the rise of populistic parties all over the Western world. For a long period, social scientists and politicians agreed that we live in a globalized world of individual agents and that ‘local’ anchors of people in cities, regions and nation states are a relic of the past – a restriction to be overcome on the way to boundless productivity. Seen from the perspective of moral ethology, however, we should always still consider locality. It is part of the human condition to embrace certain places, not only as a counterforce to globalization. This does not imply that moral ethology is in any sense nationalistic or populistic. It is realistic in its description of the local aspects of identity, and complementary to the sociological insight that today’s recurrence of nationalism is a response to the process of globalization. A moral ethological perspective helps to clarify both these elements of modern life: living in a globalized economy, using some universal digital systems, but nonetheless being citizens in countries and embedded in cities and regions. 1.2.5. Moral ethology, discourse theory, praxeology and phronetic research Now that some essential characteristics of moral ethology have been laid out – it is situational, collective, related to the good life and certain locations – it can be contrasted to some related approaches. Some social research, the notion of ‘discourse’ is used, “a specific ensemble of ideas, concepts and categorizations that are produced, reproduced and transformed in a particular set of practices and through which meaning is given to physical and social 58 59 60 See: Karin Knorr Cetina, ‘The synthetic situation: interactionism for a global world’ in Symbolic Interaction 32 (2009), 1, pp. 67-87. Urbig, Diemo, Vivien Procher, Katrien Muhlfeld, Arjen van Witteloostuijn, ‘Come on and take a free ride: Contributing to public goods in native and foreign language settings’, in: Academy of Management Learning & Education, 2016, vol. 15, no.2, 268-286. Castells, Manuel, The Rise of the Network Society, Blackwell Publishing, 2000 [1996] Oxford, United Kingdom, Chapter 6 The Space of Flows. 33 1 realities.”61 There are two major differences between the concept of ethos and discourse: (1) The notion of ‘discourse’ is usually used to analyze words, texts and thinking in general, whereas ‘ethos’ has a broader meaning, because with ‘ethos’, we include not just text, but also behavior, customs and institutional surroundings and interaction. Michel Foucault used the term discourse to analyze how a certain practice with its own symbols and texts produces its own world-view, in which things are perceived as ‘truths’. For instance, the discourse of psychiatry, sexuality, or punishment, three examples that Foucault discussed often, constitute their own world in which some things are good or bad, normal or abnormal, just or unjust.62 This is an inspiring way of looking at social reality, although it places more emphasis on the role of language than does the notion of ethos. (2) More importantly, discourse theory tends to be more negative than constructive, focusing on the ‘knowledge-power structure’, whereas the notion of ‘ethos’ is less anarchistic and provides more latitude for improvement.63 Despite these differences, moral ethology and discourse theory share an interest in the way people think and speak about actions. The same cannot be said of moral ethology and the growing literature of praxis theory that focuses much more on the bodily and material side of activities.64 Hence, it is certainly not necessary to follow and observe business students everywhere they go, and to develop a ‘thick account’ of how they cooperate, study, have fun, and so on. Another difference from praxis theory, which is rather ethnographic in focus, is that moral ethology focuses more on ethics and on the ‘goods’ inherent to human activities.65 Moral ethology is nonetheless indebted to this tradition in its focus on the case-study. The Danish sociologist Bent Flyvbjerg has established his own variety of praxeological research and calls it phronetic planning.66 The main goal of this research tool is to clarify and improve society’s practical rationality, through 61 62 63 64 65 66 34 Philips, N. Hardy, C. Discourse Analysis. Investigating Processes of Social Construction. Qualitative Research Methods Series 50, London, Sage Publishing, 2002, p.3. See for an overview on the use of ‘discourse’ in social science and philosophy, as well as in the work of Michel Foucault himself: Heracleous, Loizos, Discourse, Interpretation, Organization, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United States, 2009. See for a classic example of discourse analysis in organizational studies: Willmott, H, ‘Strengthen is ignorance; slavery is freedom: managing culture in modern organizations. Journal of Management Studies, 30:4, 1993, pp. 515-552. Reckwitz, Andreas, Die Transformation der Kulturtheorien. Zur Entwicklung eines Theorieprogramms. Weilerwist 2000. See for an example of praxis theory: Schmidt, Robert, Soziologie der Praktiken. Konzeptionelle Studien und empirische Analyzen. Suhrkamp Verlag Berlin, 2012. See: Flyvbjerg, Bent, ‘Phronetic Planning Research: Theoretical and Methodological reflections.’ In: Planning Theory & Practice, vol. 5, no. 3, pp. 283-306, 2004. elucidating where we are within a certain project, and where we want to go. Phronetic planning works with practical examples, mostly ‘mega-projects’ like a new highway or borough. The main difference from moral ethology is that phronetic planning commences with premises that moral ethology tries first to discover and uncover. (1) For instance, the idea that a good manager is like a wise (phronetic) planner, is a good and widely acknowledged suggestion. Yet, this research first tries to describe how students currently understand knowledge generally and especially academic knowledge. (2) Another issue is that phronetic planning is overly enthusiastic about practical wisdom, which is interesting, but ethologically speaking, there is more to business than the ideal of becoming a wise steward, such as developing technological-practical knowledge. An important comparable interest with phronetic research, is the desire to ask questions about the goal and direction of certain activities. In sum, the moral ethological framework (or: approach) helps to identify the ethos of business studies. It questions the degree to which programs are: • Situational. Are students made aware of and receptive to the actual work world and their values, in which they will later work? • Social. Are students taught how business is part of society and how individuals are part of relations? • Good life. Are students able to see life in terms of the ‘good’ and ‘goods’ that people aspire to through their various activities? • Local. Are students aware of the local (national, regional, earth-bound) aspects of the economy and society? 1.3 A Moral-Ethological Analysis of Business Schools We already mentioned that moral ethology is empirical in approach and normative in outlook. Moral ethology is interdisciplinary and combines explorative psychological, sociological, historical, and conceptual philosophical research. Now that this general approach has been outlined, it is time to explain in more detail how I apply it in this study. To discern the ethos of Dutch business school students, I started by analyzing relevant written sources, such as curricula, influential texts, and study materials.67 I also studied the historical forerunners of contemporary business schools and the history of management to understand the origins of the current situation. 67 I do not undertake new systematic textbook research. For textbook research, see for instance: Cummings, Stephan, Todd Bridgman, ‘The Relevant Past: Why the History of Management Should Be Critical for Our Future’ in: Academy of Management Learning & Education, 2011, vol. 10, no. 1, 77-93. A classic example is: Boltanski, Luc, Eve Chiapello, The New Spirit of Capitalism, tr. Gregory Elliott, London, United Kingdom, Verso, 2005 (or. Le nouvel esprit du capitalism Editions Gallimard 1991), esp. Part I.1 Management Discourse in the 1990s, pp. 57-102. 35 1 This investigation informed the questions of an empirical study conducted at the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, the Radboud University Nijmegen, and the Wageningen University. I took interviews as preliminary research at other universities, like the Erasmus University Rotterdam and University of Amsterdam, but it proved difficult for these universities to cooperate in serious follow-up Q-research. Faculties declined or were hesitant to cooperate and due to my limited time-frame it proved difficult to reach out to enough cooperative individual teachers. My case study is based on 15 in-depth interviews and 43 Q-research participants, which is normal for this type of explorative social research.68 In addition to the preliminary interviews with students, I spoke to 5 stakeholders, such as business and ethics professors and a study advisor. The details of the interviews and the Q-research will be explained in Chapter 2. An important decision concerning this empirical part should be elaborated here: which aspects of the business students’ ethos should be researched? How can we understand what studying at Dutch business schools really entails? My analytical strategy was threefold: I conducted literature research, empirical research, and conceptual research. I distinguish six formative sources of the student ethos, see Figure 1, that together build the student-ethos. I briefly discuss these sources and mention what I emphasis in this research. I refer in brackets to the coming chapters; a systematic introduction of the organization of the argument follows in section 1.4. The empirical analysis of the business student ethos (cf. Chapter 3) focuses on interviews and especially Q-research among students, i.e. the selfperception of students (the center piece of Figure 1). All six formative sources give shape to this self-perception to some degree, but as I show hereafter not all these aspects are scrutinized and some are more important than others. (1) The first formative source will be inquired by reflecting on the goals of study-programs as they are formulated by teachers and retained in the mission statements of business schools. This is a fruitful strategy, especially if one focuses on the big reforms in business schools and the ideas of important reformers. The (1984) book The End of Practical Man shows how certain individual professors in Germany brought about major shifts in German curricula. The (2011) book The Roots, Rituals, and Rhetorics of Change, for instance, shows how philanthropic institutions like the Ford Foundation had significant influence in the changing of business schools’ mission statements. In this research I refer to this type of institutional literature (cf. Chapter 4.1- 68 36 Flyvbjerg, Bent, ‘Five Misunderstandings About Case-Study Research’, in: Qualitative Inquiry, vol. 12, no. 2, April 2006, pp. 219-245. 4.3), but I have done no new research on the official aims of business schools in the sense of a systematic analysis of its goals. 2) Knowledge and skills acquired during studies. 1) The vision of teachers and faculty about the goal of business education. 3) The role of business in business studies. èthos of business students - in the self-perception of students. 4) The academic context and ideals that structure business studies. 6) The percception of parents and society of business studies. 5) Extracurricular activities and student culture in general. Figure 1: Formative sources of student ethos (my own schedule) The problem with studying the goals of the study-programs as they are formulated by teachers and retained in the mission statements of business schools is that one easily overlooks the ‘hidden curriculum’, as it is called in pedagogics. Sambel and McDowell broadly define this hidden curriculum as “what is implicit and embedded in educational experiences in contrast with the formal statements about curricula and the surface features of educational interaction.”69 Students see things one way, teachers another; yet the hidden curriculum is not necessarily ‘known’ to either of these groups. The ethos of any educational program can, however, hide “in plain sight,” as Gair and Mullins put it.70 Indeed, the current study shows that the official curriculum and hidden curriculum of business studies in Dutch business schools show 69 70 Blasco, Maribel, ‘Aligning the hidden curriculum of management education with PRME: an inquiry based framework’, journal of management education, 36(3) pp. 364-388, p. 364. Gair, M., G. Mullins ‘Hiding in plain sight.’, in: The hidden curriculum in higher education, ed. E. Margolis, New York, NY: Routledge, 2001, pp. 21-41, p.21. 37 1 considerable overlap. That is, the values underlying the models transmitted – make money, be efficient, do as your told, et cetera – are often communicated to students unambiguously. 71 This is not just theoretical knowledge in Dutch curricula (conveyed in theoretical presuppositions) but these values are also transmitted in a practical way (students are taught to apply these values to themselves, their studies, and their surroundings) (cf. Chapter 4.4). Students are not necessarily able to critically reflect on the values present in their business thinking. For example, in interviews many told me that a business is more than a vehicle of profit, but they often had difficulty defining a firm that entailed anything more than just that. So implicitly, a substantial group of students regards the general business mind-set as the finance mind-set, despite the theories they have learned about the broader goals of companies. Thus, this kind of implicit and hidden knowledge codetermines the student ethos. An analysis of institutional goals does not uncover these ‘hidden’ layers. (2) The second formative source of student ethos can be researched by a systematic analysis of the theories and skills that are taught at business schools. There are several studies that give such an overview, although they are mostly focused on the canon of business studies and not so much on how this canon is inculcated in programs of business studies; what is left out, what is paid most attention to, and so on. Yet, there is considerable consensus about what typical business thinking is and there is also systematic research on how this thinking evolves. This research refers to the work of J.C. Spender on typical business thinking, who distinguishes between two major paradigms, namely ‘scientific theories’ like Agency Theory and ‘consultancy tools’ like SWOT (cf. Chapter 5.2).72 There is also systematic scholarship of the way certain authors are represented in textbooks throughout the years, for instance of how the presentation of Max Weber’s sociology changes throughout the century in business textbooks. 73 I refer to this type of research throughout my analysis. I also describe some often-used theories and philosophically analyze the content, especially Max Weber’s and Fredrick Taylor’s, to discern major presuppositions in it. 71 72 73 38 See this example of a (hidden) curriculum analysis in economics: Colander, David, ‘Integrating Sex and Drugs into the Principles Course: Market-Failures Versus Failures-of-Market Outcomes, in: Journal of Economic Education, Winter 2003, 34, 1 pp. 82-91. Spender, J.C., ‘A Rumination on Managerial Judgment’, in: Revue Française de Gestion, no 238 2014, pp. 19-32. Cummings, Stephan, Todd Bridgman, ‘The Relevant Past: Why the History of Management Should Be Critical for Our Future’ in: Academy of Management Learning & Education, 2011, vol. 10, no. 1, 77-93. (3) Another formative resource of student ethos can be found by describing the perception business people have of business schools. There is a clear relation between the business school ethos and the business ethos, for they reciprocally define the ends of companies and create the tool-box with which students – future employees and managers – seek to achieve them. Such a research angle would complement this research, but it is not the road taken. Perhaps future research could undertake such an endeavor – for instance, by means of interviews with people from specific sectors that employ graduates. This study does refer to some general developments in the economy and the extent to which curricula mirror these, like the rise of shareholder capitalism and short-term investors in the economy.74 However, I do not present a systematic inquiry into the direct relations between business and business schools and the way certain corporations may push curricula into a certain direction.75 (4) This research focuses on university-based business schools in the Netherlands and presumes that the ethos of business students is partly formed by the institutional context and ideas about universities in general. I contest the idea that the corporate world expects business programs to deliver graduates with a one-sided view of business, for many business people seek to hire graduates who can think creatively and critically. Nonetheless, there is a tendency among students and teachers to primarily understand studies of business in relation to a narrow (‘profit only’) interpretation of the role of business in society. In any case, business studies are situated in universities – state funded in the Netherlands – so it is justified to ask to what degree these institutions fit the academic profile. In fact, I argue that business schools are strongly formed by scientific ideals and much of the problems and hiatus of business ethos are related to a narrow understanding of what universityeducation is. (5) A student ethos is not only a result of studying but is also formed during student-life in general. All types of activities in this phase are important: whether students live in lodgings or with their parents, do sports, have jobs, and so on. The interviews I undertook to prepare for the Q-study strongly suggest that students spent considerable time with other students in study 74 75 For an empirically-based research on the rise of ‘impatient capital’ in large companies in the United States, see for instance: Graham, John R., R. Campbell, Harvey, and Shiva Rajgopal, ‘Value Destruction and Financial Reporting Decisions’, in: Financial Analyst Journal, vol. 62, no. 6, 2006. For a recent example of such research, see: Vatan Hüzeir, Germain Fraser, A Pipeline of Ideas. How the Rotterdam School of Management facilitates climate change by collaborating with fossil fuel industry, Rotterdam, The Netherlands, Changerism, 2017. 39 1 associations. Those associations also organize career events based on which students develop expectations about their future jobs. However, this formative source on students’ extra-curricular activities is not explored any further. (6) The same holds for the perceptions of parents and society in general about what a business student ethos is. Interviews with parents could certainly complement the picture that I draw. Another angle could be a systematic research into the public perceptions about managers by Dutch people, for instance, how they are perceived in the fiction of Willem Elsschot, the nonfiction of Joris Luyendijk, or TV-series like Suits. I will come back to these sources at the end of this research (cf. Chapter 8.3), albeit not as a means of understanding business school ethos, but as a solution to improve it, because I think much can be learned from non-academic sources of knowledge about the relation between business and the good life. 1.4 Organization of the Argument Now that it is clear on what formative sources of the business student ethos this research focuses, I will briefly describe the organization of my argument. Part I describes the current business student ethos with the help of secondary literature and qualitative empirical research. Part II considers the current business student ethos from a historical and social-philosophical perspective. Part III develops the moral ethological interpretation of crucial concepts in the business student ethos. Part I commences in Chapter 2 with a reconstruction of the literature on business education (I sum up the scholars discussed in section 1.1). Thereafter, I describe the current Dutch business student ethos in Chapter 3, focusing on how students themselves perceive management, business, markets, and morality. The field of business education is an under researched terrain that I explore, using a qualitative research method called Q-research. 76 This research method is suited for the identification of certain groups – or: types of ethos – within a broader community of people (cf. Chapter 3.1). A sociologist or educational researcher might have expanded the qualitative research, perhaps even with quantitative research, but the road taken in this research is historical, social philosophical and ethical. Moral ethology requires empirical 76 40 I mentioned above that it is under researched more elaborately (section 1.1, esp. footnote 40). research as a starting point,77 but it also demands insights into the historical and cultural-intellectual context, to which I turn in Part II. In Part II, Chapter 4, I interpret the results of my empirical research with the help of secondary literature from business school historians, mainly Locke (1984, 1989), Khurana (2007), Spender (2015) and regarding the Dutch situation, mainly Van Baalen (1995). I propose to interpret the current business student ethos as the result of (1) an adaptation of the Anglo-Saxon model, (2) which is part of a larger development of modernization. Chapter 5 describes modernization as the development that made our lives more rational, but also more compartmentalized. Compared to the gentleman of the ancient city-states – as we find him in the works of Aristotle – we do not live in a cultural unity as members of a state, but perceive ourselves as free individuals aiming at the realization of our own goals. An economy is not organized to benefit the state, but encourages individuals to pursue their own goals. With the help of Weber, Habermas and MacIntyre, I show that this detachment from society and the isolation of corporations is a result of modernization processes, which also affect science. For Aristotle, it would have been odd to separate ‘facts’ from ‘values’ the way modern scientists aim to do. As an alternative to the narrow modernistic perspective on life in which many aspects of life are isolated, I develop my – Aristotle- and MacIntyre-inspired – moral ethological framework, which enables us to see things more holistically. With this framework, I answer three elementary questions – which also structure the three chapters of Part III – and those answers together, form a crucial part for a renewed blueprint for business education. (1) What is the purpose of business? I argue in Chapter 6 that the ‘thin’ market definition does enable us to understand business as a purposeful structure of society. We need a ‘thick’ definition in which we can do justice to the practical work-side of business and keep sight of its moral-social function. This also has implications for the way we need to educate business students as (would-be-) future managers. Management is not only about finding the efficient way to reach financial goals, but also about balancing the different goals business has. (2) How is business related to the market, society, and state? Business studies teach students to think about management in firms, but less about the larger institutional and societal context in which they operate. Inspired 77 This is different in social philosophy (which is often rather anecdotic) or ethics (which mostly works with thought experiments or ideal-type cases). A typical social philosopher in this regard is MacIntyre (1981) or Bauman (2000). A typical ethicist regarding our research question is Solomon (1992) or Moore (2016). There are, of course, authors that are somewhere between social science, philosophy, and ethics, such as Latour (2012), Boltanski and Chiapello (1992). Also see the tradition of applied ethics in care (cf. footnote 8). 41 1 by Hegel, I argue in Chapter 7 that business should be understood as part of the market realm which in turn is part of society in which the state plays an important role. This is not an argument against the market, but against the dominant notion that market forces always bring freedom. Hegel is one of first authors who philosophically analyzed the ambivalence of the market realm as a domain of individual freedom and alienation; and it is still well worth considering his analysis. These two questions – regarding business and its relationship with society – bring forth a third ethological question: (3) How can we develop a good and knowledgeable personal ethos? With the aid of Aristotle, I argue (Chapter 8) for a different judgment-based concept of knowledge and personal development for business studies, encompassing analytical thinking, political thinking, practical wisdom, and practical knowledge. Hence, I plead for plural forms of knowledge, and render his line of thought current with the help of Frankfurt, Sennett, and Taylor, among others. 1.5 Audiences Addressed Here I briefly note which audiences I want to address with this research. I have more than one purpose with this research and it is likely to interest different types of readers: (1) policy makers of universities and business faculty deans, (2) scholars with an interest in the question ‘What are universities for?’, who relate this question to market mechanisms, (3) philosophers and business ethicists with an interest in economy and education, (4) business people that hire graduates from business schools, (5) students and student organizations interested in alternative ways to organize education in economics and business. (1) First, I address those concerned with the public policy of higher education in general. More specifically, I address the directors of education and deans of business faculties. For this audience, my exposition might be overly conceptual and not in accordance with their daily issues and policy making. Yet, I articulate the forgotten and hidden values of programs in business education that are not solely a result of the business curriculum sec but also of its institutional embedding in faculties by means of policy. Here I think this research touches upon two sides: I try to understand the business student ethos as it prevails in business schools and at the same time this ethos also influences the way we organize business faculties and universities in general. Many Dutch deans have an MBA-background and/or generally consider themselves to be a kind of manager. As I described above, universities have replaced their classic organizational model into a quasi-market model. I think we need a more refined vocabulary than that of commerce to address the fundamental questions, like 42 ‘What do we want our students to learn at a university-based business school?’. I think an answer to this question requires an answer to ‘What is the goal of business?’ but I do not think we can answer the former question in terms of the latter only. I contest a narrow conception of business studies as institutes for training the managerial workforce. However, I do not wish to isolate business studies from real-world business and speak of the value of education without reference to the reality of which students aspire to be part. (2) The second type of readers I address are scholars interested in business education and the debate on the ‘idea of the university’. In this debate the role of market-thinking – often framed as Neoliberalism78 or New Public Management79 – plays a crucial role and my research shows how business studies fuels and legitimates this thinking. (3) My third group of addressees consists of philosophers and ethicists, especially those who conduct philosophy and ethics in relation to business, management, and markets. Moreover, I address scholars who combine an interest in these topics with an interest in the work of MacIntyre. My researchquestion is meant to provide an understanding of the ethos of business studies, but I deem it necessary to comprehensively discuss the ideas of MacIntyre. An elementary philosophical debate I interfere in with this research is that about a moral understanding of the market. I think it is possible to defend the market as a mechanism that enables us to find a fulfilling life but at the same time it is a corrosive mechanism that requires boundaries. In combining a liberal appreciation of market mechanisms and communitarian reluctance about the market, I offer a vindication of state-curbed market-economies. (4) The fourth group I address are the corporations that hire business graduates. This research is restricted to an analysis of business and management as these are perceived by business students and I think this offers valuable insights into the mentality of future employees. (5) The fifth group of addresses consists of students, especially those looking for a different type of academic business education, but also students in general that are involved in the discussion on the need for Bildung in academia.80 For instance, the students of the network Rethinking Economics that want 78 79 80 See: Olssen, Mark, Michael A. Peters, ‘Neoliberalism, higher education and the knowledge economy: from the free market to knowledge capitalism’, in: Journal of Education Policy, vol. 20, no. 3, May 2005, pp. 313-345. See: Lorenz, Chris, ‘Surveillance? Universities, Neoliberalism, and New Public Management.’ in: Critical Inquiry (38), 2012. For students reflecting on the need for Bildung, see: Van de Ven, Thomas et all, ‘Waar is de Bildung?’ in: Waartoe is de Universiteit op Aarde? ed. Ad Verbrugge and Jelle van Baardewijk, Boom Uitgeverij, 2014. 43 1 to develop alternatives for the dominant Neoclassical mindset in the science of economics.81 Other examples are, the students that organize alternative educational tracks, like the Bildung Academie.82 81 82 44 See: www.rethinkingeconomics.org. See: www.debildungacademie.nl. 1 45 Part I: The Contested Business School Ethos 46 Introduction Part I To identify the ethos typical for business schools this part commences with an inventory of the current state of the debate on business schools. This debate raises important questions about the scientific, practical, moral, professional and the overall value of business studies. I reconstruct the different critiques on business schools in detail and subsequently translate these into relevant research questions that help to understand the state of Dutch business schools. Then I ‘translate’ the insights gained from the secondary literature into my moral ethological framework. The opening Chapter (2) helps to answer our research question in two ways: Firstly, the analysis of secondary literature gives an idea on the ethos of business schools in general. Secondly, this analysis is preparatory for the empirical analysis undertaken in Chapter 3. And the other way around, it helps to interpret the results of that empirical analysis. We will see that the qualitative empirical study overlaps on some points with the secondary literature, while it differs quite strongly on others. At the end of this Part I we have an idea of the possible types of ethos of current business students. In Part II, I historically and philosophically analyze the roots of this status quo, after which I develop conceptual-ethical improvements in Part III. 47 48 Chapter 2: 2 Literature Review: What Scholars Say 49 Introduction This chapter deals with the secondary literature on business schools. Most of the books and articles reconstructed in this chapter were selected on relevance in academic journals, mainly Academy of Management & Education and Journal of Management Inquiry. The books and articles are the ‘classics’ of a small field of study located at the threshold of research in business and education. These are the authors, that I will discuss subsequently in this chapter: 2.1 Henry Mintzberg, 2.2 Sumatra Goshal, 1.3 Moldevenue and George Martin, 1.4 the Carnegie Foundation, 1.5 Christopher Grey and 1.6 Debra Schleef. The work of Robert Locke and Rhakesh Khurana, which are also very important contributions to the field of business studies research, form the primary source of the historical analysis in Part II, Chapter 4. Although both Locke and Khurana offer perspectives on what I call the ethos of business studies, I consider their originality mainly by their construction of historicallyinformed ‘grand narratives’ on what business schools do good and wrong. All the mentioned authors have opened important discussions on business studies or have lifted existing ones to new levels. Interestingly, many of them have written historically informed works based partly on long personal experience in both business and business education. What is missing, however, in most critiques on business studies by the previously mentioned authors – a caveat at which the authors of Rethinking the MBA. Business Education at a Crossroads (2010) correctly point – are interviews and surveys that would form a sound empirical base. 83 Indeed, Rethinking the MBA: Business Education at a Crossroads is a welcome field-study of the best business schools of the United States. Yet, this book also illustrates a problem in this type of field research. Namely, how to accurately measure the success, or lack of success, of business schools? Then, the question that requires an answer before empirical results can be collected and interpreted is how to define success. What is successful studying? The answer to this question depends on your idea of education itself. How should we understand and define education? Much ink is spent on these basic questions in scientific debates on education, didactics, and pedagogy. Most educational scholars favor a ‘thick’ understanding of education as a process that involves instrumental qualification and socialization of students 83 50 The shortage of empirical research is also noted in: Pettigrew, Andrew, Ken Starkey, ‘From the Guest Editors: The Legitimacy and impact of Business Schools – Key Issues and a Research Agenda’, in: Academy of Management Learning & Education, vol. 15, no. 4, 2016, pp. 649-664, p. 651. into ‘educated persons’.84 The literature overview undertaken in this chapter dovetails with this idea, for the discussed scholars do not defend a narrow training, intended to equip students for one job. This is in line with the literature on education in general. In recent and current interdisciplinary debates by scholars of education – like Gert Biesta85 – we can see a shift away from a reductive and skills-focused model of education, which we could perhaps call the ‘transmission model of studying’, towards a view of studying as involving a process of socialization and acquiring contextsensitive judgment.86 This latter ‘transformative model of education’ may at first sight be more applicable to a study in medicine, in which a student is not only learning new information but is also involved in the process of becoming a doctor, than to the study of business, which is generally not perceived as a study aimed at training the student to become a member of a certain profession. However, the overview of critical literature on business education given in this chapter shows that all critics are in favor of the transformative model of business education. 87 This is contrary to what one might expect in a debate on business schools, namely that they would favor the straightforward transmission model; they have higher aims. Nonetheless, we should ask the question whether these higher aims influence the practices of business schools and are not mere slogans and mission statements.88 At this moment it is crucial to realize that all discussed authors take a moreor-less normative stance in their analysis of business schools, mostly based on three assumptions: (1) What is the goal of a business school, and therewith of a university? (2) What is and what should management be? (3) How does business function and how should it function? Some authors have high expectations, others rather low, but all implicitly or explicitly answer these three questions throughout their research into the functioning of business schools. Remarkably, the authors with high ethical and societal standards – like Carnegie and Grey – have a different take on the role universities must 84 85 86 87 88 Miedema, Siebren, ‘Overdracht of Vorming als doel van het onderwijs. Waarom levensbeschouwing en kwaliteit van leven alles met elkaar te maken hebben’, in Radix 35:4, 2009, pp. 229-237. Biesta, Gert, The Beautiful Risk of Education, Paradigm Publishers, Boulder, United States, See especially Chapter 7 on Virtuosity. See: Moore, Axel, The Good Teacher: dominant discourses in Teaching and Teacher Education, Routledge, London, United Kingdom, 2004. Business scholars Petriglieri and Petriglieri argue business schools should focus on rituals to develop their institutions of ‘identity workplaces’. I consider this concept of identity workspaces less apt to describe the current situation than that of ethos. See: Petriglieri, Gianpiero and Petriglieri, Jennifer, ‘Identity Workspaces: The Case of Business Schools, in: Academy of Management Learning & Education, vol. 14, no.4, 2015, 625-647; ‘Can Business Schools Humanize Leadership?’, in: Academy of Management Learning & Education, vol. 14, no.4, 2015, 625-647. See: Collini, Stefan, Speaking of Universities, Verso, London, United Kingdom, 2017, esp. Chapter 1. 51 2 play than business authors like Moldevanue and Martin, but in the solutions for improvement of business curricula agree strongly. For instance, the need for multiple sorts of reflection is addressed by all authors; sometimes because it is thought to be typical for the academic mind-set, sometimes because it is considered necessary for effective management. Most authors are critical on how business studies are conducted, although they have not become cynical and do present interesting improvements. To underpin the claim that there is a broad consensus on the problems business schools face, let us shortly consider an empirical survey of the field. In this study, the successfulness of business studies is defined in a straightforward ‘thin’ way, namely as preparatory for business. 89 Jeffrey Pfeffer and Christina Fong wrote a seminal article to test this interpretation of effectiveness in the Academy of Management Learning & Education, ominously titled The End of Business Schools? Less Success than Meets the Eye.90 The research questions of Pfeffer and Fong were: Firstly, is an MBA degree, other things being equal, related to career success and attainment, such as salary? And secondly, is the level of mastering an MBA, for example the grades for course work, predictive for the outcomes that index success in business? Their answers – in both cases a decisive ‘no’ – must have given business schools some headaches. “Business Schools are not very effective: neither possessing an MBA degree nor grades earned in courses correlate with career success, results that question the effectiveness of schools in preparing their students.”91 The analytical strategy of Pfeffer and Fong is that the question the pragmatic legitimacy of business schools, for they ask whether MBA programs create value for graduates. If Pfeffer and Fong are right, this is not the case, although then the question arises why business studies are so popular? There surely seems to be ‘some’ attractiveness about these programs! In any way, the authors discussed in this literature review have a more complex angle on the subject: they question the effectiveness of business schools, but they also include questions of the scientific and moral value of business studies. 89 90 91 52 In fact, one could question whether a real-world business would want graduates with a narrow training. Managerial tasks change rapidly in today’s economy and requires a flexible mind-set. The thin idea of business is perhaps more a result of certain theories and models than an empirical fact (this is a topic we come back to in the coming sections). See for a list of references to this article: Starkey, Ken Armand Hatchuel, Sue Tempest, ‘Rethinking the business school’, in: Journal of Management Studies 41:8, December 2004, pp.613-643. And, for those who think that at least research is flourishing, Pfeffer and Fong add: “[..] there is little evidence that business school research is influential on management practice, calling into question the professional relevance of management scholarship.” See: Pfeffer and Fong, ‘The end of business schools? Less success than meets the eye.’, in: Academy of Management Learning and Education, 2002, vol. 1, no. 1, pp.78-95, p. 78. A final remark: The works of the scholars analyzed in this chapter mostly focus on business schools in the United States and the United Kingdom. Some of this criticism has spread to other countries, like Finland, Germany, Brazil, and the Netherlands.92 However, up until now the scholarly debate on business schools seems to be an Anglophone affair. I come back to the difference between Rhinelandic and Anglophone cultures more elaborately in Chapter 4.5. Before we can reconstruct the secondary literature step by step, two caveats must be made relating to the differences between Dutch and Anglophone business schools: the first about the perceived difference between bachelor and masters programs, and the second about the differences and resemblances between mainstream and elite universities. Firstly, the critiques discussed are mostly directed at the famous Master of Business Administration programs (MBA’s), but hold true too for undergraduate programs. As the Carnegie Foundation for Advancement of Teaching – their book on this topic, Rethinking Undergraduate Business Education, (cf. Chapter 2.4) –, has found out in its research in the United States: “[U]ndergraduate business seems to be widely understood as a kind of simplified MBA program. In the institutions that do offer both MBA and undergraduate business degrees, the undergraduate program rarely has its own faculty or dean and its curriculum resembles that of the graduate program.”93 I expect the same holds for the Dutch academic system, but that is only an academic guess. This means that not all the critiques here explored are applicable to the Dutch situation, although the next chapter shows that there are indeed large similarities with Anglophone MBA’s (on the main difference, cf. Evaluation Part I, pp. 90-95; for summary see p. 29). Secondly, we must take into consideration differences in educational systems. An institutional difference is the Anglophone tradition of top-universities: the ‘Ivy League’ in the US and ‘Oxbridge’ in England. The French have their École Normale Supérieur, but the other North-Western European countries have a more balanced educational landscape without exceptional education institutions. Nijenrode University perhaps comes close in some respects: it is more expensive and more elitist, but still relatively accessible, affordable, and not of outstanding but of rather normal intellectual level compared to say Harvard Business School or INSEAD. Significantly, many of the discussed critiques on business schools in 92 93 Juusola, Kateriina, Kertu Kettunen and Kimmo Alajoutsijärvi ‘Accelerating the Americanization of Management Education: Five Responses from Business Schools.’ In: Journal of Management Inquiry. Vol. 24(4), 2015, pp. 347-369. See especially: pp. 350-352, p. 356. Also see: Boyacigiller, Nakiye Avdan, Nancy J. Adler, The Parochial Dinosaur: Organizational Science in a Global Context, in: The Academy of Management Review, Vol. 16, No. 2, Apr.1991), pp. 262-29. A. Colby, T. Ehrlich, W. M. Sullivan, J.R. Dolle, Rethinking undergraduate business education, p. 3. 53 2 the Anglophone world, are aimed at top-universities. This must be considered, because it makes some of the critiques inapplicable to the specific situation in the Netherlands. The Dutch academic culture is far less achievement-orientated than the ‘Ivy League’ and ‘Oxbridge’ cultures are, and this even seems to be a difference with regular American universities.94 Now I turn to the reconstruction of the scholarly critics; commencing with Mintzberg. 2.1 Mintzberg: A Management-Reality-Check for Business Schools Managers not MBA’s (2004) is a bestselling book on business education by a real insider: organization specialist and management guru Henry Mintzberg. The book’s subtitle is telling: A Hard Look at the Soft Practice of Managing and Management Development. Its core argument is that business schools are not making managers, nor teaching the right insights for management. In fact, Mintzberg claims business schools have a negative effect on business. He thinks both business and business education are deeply troubled. Mintzberg’s line of argument presupposes a certain understanding of management which he defines and clarifies. What is good management according to Mintzberg? “Effective management”, as Mintzberg prefers to call it, is a blend between “a good deal of craft (experience) with a certain amount of art (insight) and some science (analysis).”95 Too much art creates heroic management; too much analysis creates technocratic management. Both are undesirable for Mintzberg. He envisions a more ‘balanced’ managerial style that he calls ‘engaging’. MBA’s, now, should prepare students for this type of managing. However, Mintzberg does not believe in management education for wouldbe-managers who are not at the same time gaining considerable managerial experience, preferably by working half the time, studying the other half. He thinks management for young and inexperienced people is the same as psychology for those who have never met any other people. With this concept of good management Managers not MBA’s is a major attack on many MBA programs and a bullet aimed at Dutch programs. Yet, the irony is that many business faculties in fact do not conceive their own programs as management programs. Rather, they see their education as a general study in business, and subsequently they might easily reason 94 95 54 In fact, regarding student motivation (in terms of general enthusiasm for studying, grades, and years of studying), Anglo-Saxon universities might function as an example for the Dutch. See: Esther Mirjam Sent, ‘Amerikaanse toestanden op Nederlandse universiteiten?’, in: Waartoe is de Universiteit op Aarde? Ed. Ad Verbrugge, Jelle van Baardewijk, Boom Uitgeverij 2014, pp. 95-103. Mintzberg, Henry, Managers, not MBA’s. A hard look at the soft practice of managing and management development, San Francisco, United States, Berrett-Koehler Publisher, 2004, p.1. that Mintzberg’s critique does not apply to their programs. This would be the wrong conclusion though: he does argue general business education is very problematic in itself. In these programs students learn to think big and analytic. However, many of them end up in actual managing positions and seriously risk breaking down companies instead of engaging in them. For Mintzberg, the trouble starts at the very beginning, as he writes in a paper version of his book: “the pool of applicants from which the students are chosen is not defined by their leadership ability, real or potential, but simply by their desire for an MBA.”96 Why does Mintzberg claim business schools to be management schools? Does he not obscure an important difference between theoretical and practical education, between experimental knowledge and academic knowledge? In addition, have not all professional educations – such as medicine, engineering, and law – made this theory-shift since WWII? Of course, Mintzberg has noticed this. But he remarks: management certainly applies science, but a layperson can still be much better in managing than an expert. And this is a very important difference with doctors, engineers, and lawyers, who act upon codified knowledge that they have formally acquired. “Upon wheeled into an operating room, few of us would be inclined to second-guess the surgeon. (‘Could you cut a little lower please?’)”97 For Mintzberg, management is neither a science nor a profession. It is largely a facilitating activity: managers “have to bring out the best in other people.”98 Furthermore, Mintzberg stresses that managing is an ambiguous activity: working with people, processing vague information; it is not about a universal insight or ‘one best way’ of managing. Management is a soft practice and labels as experience, wisdom, and judgment describe it very well. This is in sharp contrast to the students applying for an MBA: Mintzberg claims they are often inexperienced, too analytical, and want to make a quick buck. Or, to put it differently, students are learning a lot about management as an object field. However, they do not learn to internalize managerial thinking. Mintzberg argues that the ‘learning by doing’ approach would be a lot better than the regular MBA programs. To him, management is not marketing plus accounting plus finance. Management is a thing in itself and Mintzberg claims this synthetic field is ‘reduced’ to a set of narrow specializations. Analysis has mistakenly taken the place of synthesis in MBA education. “Think of the MBA 96 97 98 Mintzberg, Henry, “Training Managers, not MBA’s”, in: On Management. The Free Press, 1989, pp. 78-89, p.81. Mintzberg, Henry, Managers, not MBA’s. A hard look at the soft practice of managing and management development, San Francisco, United States, Berrett-Koehler Publisher, 2004, p.12. Ibid. p.12. 55 2 as the IKEA model of management education: the schools supply the pieces, neatly cut to size; the students do the assembly. Unfortunately, the schools don’t supply instructions. Worse still, the pieces don’t fit together.”99 Next, analysis is interpreted as decision making. The strategy process, for example, is described in terms of ‘choice’ and ‘decision’. And mathematics is perceived as the right form of intelligence to deal with choices and decisions. A complementary approach in current MBA’s, is found in the case method in which students must take a stand. The premise, according to Mintzberg, falsely being that good managers are decisive. Students are instilled with an attitude of talking and convincing, not with listening and looking. Cases are often biased in more ways than one: students learn to think about the ‘big picture’ in which they ‘individually’ play an important role, based on little information, and minimum knowledge about history or social context. According to Mintzberg students primarily acquire confidence in their own analytic powers during their MBA-studies. After a critical talk Mintzberg gave in INSEAD about MBA-education, “one woman put up her hand and said that while it is true that the program might not teach them that much about managing, it did give them the confidence to manage. I thanked her for making my point!”100 As previously said, Mintzberg thinks good managing as a practice combines art, craft, and analysis. Figure 2 shows these three dimensions as poles of a triangle within which different styles of management can be located.101 Mintzberg claims that good management is balanced, while MBA education fosters a narrow, unbalanced view. Effective management requires order, through systematic analysis (1). Then, art (2) brings in the necessary imagination and craft (3) the experience to ground the first two. Mintzberg claims that these three modes of managing each carry their own shadows. Too much analysis makes a manager calculating; too much imagination makes him heroic; and too much experience makes him conservative. Effective management, then, according to Mintzberg, is shown in the inner triangle of Figure 2, where the three styles coexist and one or two are actually stronger. A third, even smaller triangle, shows that Mintzberg suggests an overbalanced style of managing is also dysfunctional, since it lacks any clear style at all. 99 Ibid. p.37. 100 Ibid. p.75. 101 Ibid. p.93. 56 ART (vision) 2 Narcissistic Style Visionary Style Heroic Style too balanced? Engaging Style Problem-solving Style Tedious Style Calculating Style SCIENCE (analysis) dispirited managing CRAFT (experience) Figure 2: Mintzberg’s triangle of managerial types. Within the middle triangle, Mintzberg distinguishes three effective styles: (1) Visionary managers combine experience with arts. This style is common among successful entrepreneurs. (2) Problem solving managers, not so much artistic as analytical, but also rooted in experience. This style is seen among factory foremen or project managers. (3) Engaging managers, who do a lot of coaching and facilitating. Now Mintzberg argues that MBA programs are devoid of craft and consequently teach students to become analytical and/or artistic managers. However, there is not much art in class either, despite the talks on insight, vision and creativity. This is, according to Mintzberg, related to the tacit nature of both artistic knowledge and craftsmanship. Typical for the analytic managing style is an interest in ‘hard facts’ and ‘data’. Within this analytic approach Mintzberg finds a bias towards shareholders, whom we can perhaps call the hero types on the financial end of the economic spectrum.102 102 Before Mintzberg, business scholars J. Krantz and T.N. Gilmore have also analyzed the relation between heroism and leadership. They argue that the management classic In Search of Excellence (1982) of Peters and Waterman is an example of the celebration of the business hero. The leader, as portrayed in this widely read book, is someone with a lot of vision, a clear sense of purpose and mission which influences followers. Krantz, J, T.N. Gilmore, ‘The Splitting of Leadership and Management as a Social Defense’, in: Human Relations, Volume 43, Number 2, 1990, pp.183-204. 57 Mintzberg is very critical about this type of leadership. One of his main points is that business schools should stop overemphasizing leadership as if a manager or CEO is a special person. The analytic thinking coupled with the cult of heroic leadership has made many of the largest organizations “more hierarchical, more centralized and more formalized than they should be.”103 There is only one good solution according to Mintzberg: reorganize business education alongside work. Remarkably enough, he also argues that it is good to strengthen the theoretical and reflexive parts of curricula. When students are working at the same time, or, have considerable managerial experience, they can easily combine theory with practice. There is no need to make theories themselves more hands-on than they already are. On the contrary, Mintzberg opts for more time spent on creative theories to stimulate critical thinking, false theories to break out of old ideas, discomforting theories to learn to think about difficult issues and descriptive theories to learn to work with empirical information instead of abstractions. Yet, a new theory is not the core point Mintzberg comes up with. He works with what he himself calls “managerial mind-sets”, which he introduces to break through the one-dimensional and functional structure – marketing, finance, strategy, and so on – which dominates business schools.104 Everything an effective manager does, he argues, is sandwiched between the two most obvious mind-sets: (1) action on the ground and (2) reflection in the mind. In between these two positions Mintzberg propounds, three other mind-sets can be distinguished according to him: (3) working together with others, (4) thinking about organizations, and (5) worldly thinking, that is, experience in life combined with sophisticated yet practical thinking. Strangely, this scheme does not match completely with the previously introduced triangle. The art of management (insight) is not mentioned in the managerial mind-sets, while the social aspects are more on the foreground than in the triangle of art, analysis, and experience. How can the business mind-sets be brought to life in the classroom? Mintzberg presupposes students to be participative in the teaching-process. They are not students as in vessels in a classroom waiting to be filled, nor consumers of knowledge, but serious and participative students. He has written about the institutional constitutional prerequisites for his idea of students as participants in the educational process: several universities will likely to cooperate according to him, not in a global way, but in a multicultural way. In fact, his book 103 Mintzberg, Henry, Managers, not MBA’s. A hard look at the soft practice of managing and management development, San Francisco, United States, Berrett-Koehler Publisher, 2004, p.138. 104 Ibid. p. 282. 58 Managers, Not MBA’s was inspired on a cooperation between several universities and is the blueprint for further growth of this international and multi-cultural university model. It is unique and adverse to the identity of many regular MBA’s and most definitely to Dutch business schools. 2 2.2 Goshal: Hidden Values in the Scientific Business Mind-Set Bad management theories are destroying good management practices is a seminal article written by management-scholar Sumatra Goshal (1948-2004).105 As an international-management scholar Goshal has written influential textbooks for educational purposes. Perhaps this has made him extra aware of the formative role business textbooks have in business practices. As the title of his paper suggests, its main point is that standard business theories have had a bad influence in real-world business. That is, business theories have become self-fulfilling prophecies, and this is not to be taken as a compliment according to Goshal.106 The argument of Bad management theories are destroying good management practices runs along two lines: Firstly, Goshal argues that specific theories have inculcated students with what he calls a gloomy vision of human nature. “Gloomy vision” is Goshal’s reference to sociologist A. Hirschman, who used these words for what could be called academic pessimism, or a negative perspective on the intentions and behavior of humans. Goshal argues business students are taught to internalize this pessimistic perspective. Figure 3 is a map made by Goshal that shows how this gloomy vision, in the top right balloon, is related to the rest of Goshal’s ideas. In this gloomy vision, the primary purpose of business theory is one of solving the negative problem of restricting the social costs arising from human imperfections. Secondly, business programs have increasingly embraced a strict positivistic discourse; the pretense of knowledge as Goshal calls it with reference to the Nobel lecture of economist F. von Hayek. Figure 3 shows the pretense of knowledge in the top left balloon. Goshal’s overall claim is that the positivism and pessimism together built the worldview – a set of ideas and assumptions, as Goshal 105 This article is the most cited in Academy of Management & Education. However, Goshal himself never read the last version; it was finalized and published after his death. 106 I think it is no exaggeration to call this specific paper just as influential as Mintzberg’s and Khurana’s bulky monographs. For those who know the work of Mintzberg (discussed in section 2.1) Goshal’s influence is obvious. Khurana (whose work will be the subject of inquiry in section 4.1-4.3) even more clearly follows Goshal’s lines of thought, which Khurana also acknowledges. See: Khurana, Rakesh, From Higher Aims to Hired Arms. The Social Transformation of American Business Schools and the Unfulfilled Promise of Management as a Profession, Princeton University Press, Princeton, United States, Oxford, United Kingdom, 2007, p. 455. 59 calls it – of business students in which there is no space left for morality and ethics. 107 Ideology-based gloomy vision The pretense of knowledge Casual determinism and denial of any role of human choices and intentions Excessive truth-claims based on partial analysis and unbalanced assumptions Negative assumptions about people and institutions Theories influence practice, and managers adopt theorists’ worldview Negative assumptions become real through the process of double hermeneutic Figure 3: Goshal’s management mindset Goshal uses the concept of a “double hermeneutics” (see: figure 1. bottom balloon) to explain how the combination of positivism and pessimism builds the world-view of students during their business studies. Goshal does not elucidate this notion of a double hermeneutics but suggests its basic meaning: social theories can be self-fulfilling and potentially transform or create social realities. In other words, he applies the basic idea of hermeneutics to studying: someone following a business program learns to think in a certain way. And the words and concepts that are used in business schools partly create the business reality that students will later help form. Theories learned during their studies help managers to legitimize actions, delegitimizing others, and generally shaping the context in which decisions are made. However, these theories are taken for granted, rather than empirically correct. And whether right or wrong to begin with, these theories end up being true when managers start acting in accordance with them. This is the self-fulfilling effect, or the double hermeneutics effect of which Goshal speaks. 107 For a typical (updated and expanded) argument in the line of Goshal, dealing with both the arguments of positivism and negativism, see the work of Hühn: Hühn, M., ‘Unenlightened Economism: The Antecedents of Bad Corporate Governance and Ethical Decline.’ in: Journal of Business Ethics 2008, 81:823–835. And: Hühn, M., ‘You Reap what you sow: how MBA programs undermine ethics’, in: Journal of Business Ethics, Volume 121, Issue 4, June 2014, pp. 527-554. 60 To fully understand Goshal’s exact critique it needs to be examined a little further. By positivism he means that business schools teach students to think of the world as ‘determined’ to a large extent by social, economic and psychological laws. Within the threshold of these laws, managers have only a relative freedom to act and think. This has had consequences for ethics: positivism, according to Goshal, “has demanded theorizing based on partialization of analysis, the exclusion of any role for human intentionality or choice, and the use of sharp assumptions and deductive reasoning.”108 Because of this positivism, Goshal argues, moral and ethical considerations are isolated from the reach of business studies as a science. This makes business schools a-moral institutions that teach students to think strictly scientifically of people as opportunistic agents who envision themselves to operate beyond good and evil and distrust common sense. “And, if the association of scholarship with common sense seems like an oxymoron, it is only because of the extremely restrictive definition of the term scholarship that the pretence of knowledge has straight-jacketed us into.”109 Because of the demoralization of business schools, Goshal claims, companies as institutions are delegitimized and are redefined as for-profitonly firms. Parallel to this de-institutionalization of companies, management is no longer seen as a profession, but as a group of profit-seekers. Goshal identifies agency theory, transaction cost theory and generic strategy as the theoretical dogmas underpinning these changes: “In courses on corporate governance grounded in agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) we have taught our students that managers cannot be trusted to do their jobs – which, of course, is to maximize shareholder value – and that to overcome “agency problems,” managers’ interests and incentives must be aligned with those of the shareholders by, for example, making stock options a significant part of their pay. In courses on organization design, grounded in transaction cost economics, we have preached the need for tight monitoring and control of people to prevent “opportunistic behavior” (Williamson, 1975). In strategy courses, we have presented the “five forces” framework (Porter, 1980) to suggest that companies must compete not only with their competitors but also with their suppliers, customers, employees, and regulators.” 110 108 Goshal, Sumatra, ‘Bad Management Theories are Destroying Good Management Practices’, in: Academy of Management Learning & Education, 2005, vol. 4 no. 1, pp. 75-91, p. 76. 109 Ibid. p. 81. 110 Ibid. p. 75. 61 2 Goshal also mentions Milton Friedman’s idea that a manager’s task is to maximize shareholder value. Goshal wonders how Friedman could be so certain about this claim. And how could this claim have had as many advocates as it has had? Goshal further argues that the value created by a company has different sources. Apart from financial capital, he claims, human effort is very important: Why should value distribution only favor shareholders? Why should the mainstream of business theory be premised on maximizing the returns of just one of the contributors of a company? Interestingly, Goshal answers that this bias is necessary for principal-agent models to function: shareholder capitalism enables scientists to work with elegant mathematical models. Vice versa shareholders are empowered with science by adding one more element: the (in)famous efficient market hypothesis. It assumes that labor markets function perfectly, in other words the wages of someone perfectly match the value of his contributions to the company he works for. If this were a mismatch, someone could change jobs without costs. With this assumption of efficiency, the shareholder can be seen as the greater risk-taker, thus making financial capital a more substantial contribution to a company than human capital provided by employees and managers. The efficient market hypothesis and related ideas are proven wrong in many publications, Goshal points out, but they have one strength despite critiques: All these ideas enable quantitative modelling of themes in business research and education. A complex, multidimensional theory “would not readily yield sharp, testable propositions, nor would it provide simple, reductionist prescriptions.”111 Business would no longer be a science as required by the positivistic epistemology scientists have embraced based on their ‘physics envy’.112 Goshal thinks a common sense-based epistemology should be reconsidered. Business theorists like D. McGregor or C. Barnard, who have developed such an epistemology, would not get their work published in influential top journals now, but their work has contributed to the canon of business. In scholarship, Goshal argues, business has lost its taste for pluralism and is disconnected from its own canon. Those with primary interest in the scholarship of integration (synthesis), the scholarship of practice (application), or the scholarship of good teaching (pedagogy) have lost ground in academia. Since the 1970s, primarily those interested in positivistic research were welcomed in faculties of business and economics. Goshal is in favor of re111 Ibid. p. 81 112 Together with Peter Moran, Goshal published a separate article with specific attention to transaction cost theory. Goshal, S. P. Moran, ‘Bad for Practice: A Critique of Transaction Cost Theory’, in: Academy of Management Review, Vol. 21, No.1, Jan 1996, pp. 13-47. 62 legitimizing the generalists over the specialists. Business schools should evolve from the “pretence of knowledge” to “the substance of knowledge”.113 Just another course in ethics will not be enough according to Goshal. The problem of ethics, then, is that its central premises are undermined by the core ideas of mainstream business thought in versions of agency theory, game theory, and transaction cost theory. Business curricula should be substantialized, and ethics can add to this but needs to be complemented by several other fields of knowledge in the core curriculum. 2.3 Moldoveanu and Martin: An Innovation and Creativity Critique In the booklet The Future of the MBA. Designing the Thinker of the Future, Moldoveanu and Martin briefly discuss most of the critiques that are discussed extensively in this chapter, supplemented by their own vision. They proclaim to have written a small monograph on the topic of business studies, because they perceive themselves as “design thinkers” and “pedagogical visionaries” who undertake “the task of articulation, of introducing the new categories and concepts that will be causally relevant and instrumentally useful to the management students and educators of the future.”114 They perceive students as would-be-managers of the highest levels, and they speak of them as “highvalue decision makers”. They clearly operate in the discourse that Mintzberg critically and convincingly relates to the ‘hero-managers’ – managers who are potentially devoid of craftsmanship and may be guilty of narcissism. Moldoveanu and Martin unfortunately overlook this category of Mintzberg (especially odd since they pretend to know his work indicating perhaps that their oversight is not accidental) and therefore are unable to avoid the related pitfalls. Nevertheless, they do have some interesting thoughts on what is required for future business schools to be successful. Moldoveanu and Martin start out by sharply distinguishing the development and selection mechanism of business schools. The business school selection mechanism provides would-be employers with information about the quality of its graduates. Business schools offer them a clear record of followed courses and earned grades. Now, the high entry standards and low admission rates of ‘ivy league’ Anglo-Saxon universities form an important selection value of those universities for would-be employers. Moldoveanu and Martin rightly underscore the importance of the selection value of business schools, without 113 Goshal, Sumatra, ‘Bad Management Theories are Destroying Good Management Practices’, in: Academy of Management Learning & Education, 2005, vol. 4 no. 1, pp. 75-91, p. 87. 114 Moldoveanu, Mihnea, Roger L. Martin, The Future of the MBA. Designing the Thinker of the Future, Oxford University Press, Oxford, United Kingdom, 2008, p. 25. 63 2 ignoring the importance of their development value. That is, the value of the learned theories and skills themselves. Of course, we need to realize that the selection mechanism – or, to put it differently: the direct market-value – of specific business schools is important for both students as well as would-be employers. A significant difference between the situation in the Anglo-Saxon world and the Netherlands, however, is that in the latter university-based business schools ideally live up to their name (and therewith claim) of being universities and thus offer more than just ‘training for managing a business’. Moldoveanu and Martin ignore these ambitions: they merely write about business schools against the background of business itself. At the same time, they think postmodern science can help budding business-men and women to critically think about the way business is organized. So, schools are instrumental for business, but that does not mean there is no role for science and philosophy. On the contrary, they argue that the current postmodern business landscape requires intelligent and informed business-men and women. In this post-modern era, the authors argue, there are no absolutes left and the manager needs to be “competent to internalize the clash among multiple, incommensurable views of the world and resolve this clash productively.”115 Moldoveanu and Martin also denote this as necessary simultaneous engagement in “parallel hermeneutic circles”, a phrase most likely inspired by Goshal, whose work they know and partly reconstruct in their booklet. Not surprisingly, therefore, they argue “that the articulator role of the manager – that of talking the walk and bringing to shared and intelligible experience the relevant raw experiences of the man – is about his or her most important ones.”116 Their first argument relates to the fact that managers working within what they call a ‘postmodern’ business landscape, simply have to be able to deal with differing views of one and the same reality. Therefore, precise and creative language is of the utmost importance when articulating what is exactly at stake in business, seen from different angles. A second, perhaps more surprising argument, is that the managerial task of articulation is gaining importance as more and more activities are dealt with by algorithms and computers. Moldoveanu and Martin seem to be arguing that future managers should be able to tackle nonquantifiable (they mostly speak of non-algorithmic) aspects of business. The most valuable skills of managers “are tacit in the sense that they are not explicit in the same way that the task specific skills [are] [..] they cannot be represented 115 Ibid. p. 27. 116 Ibid. p. 33. 64 by a specified set of rules that can be put together into algorithms that reliably turn available inputs into desired outputs.”117 Now, how to understand tacit skills? Moldoveanu and Martin argue that tacit-knowledge is often identified but not explained. They want to get beyond the current situation in which tacit-knowledge is a secondary phenomenon; a kind of thinking that is not trained and cultivated. For them this is not just a reemphasis on the know-how over the know-what, although that re-emphasis is certainly part of their story. This story, however, also concerns a different theoretical stance and involves several epistemic and ontological choices. These choices are not simply implicit and, with good training, potentially explicable. Their argument constitutes a new consciousness about the different hermeneutic circles effective in business disciplines and business practices. Working with this new consciousness means business schools should “inculcate and develop productive stances and modes of being as opposed to attempting to disseminate knowledge and information structures that remain isolated from lived experience and action.”118 With these notions of ‘stances’ and ‘modes of being’ the authors try to underscore the broadness of the perspective: tacit knowledge is practical- and embodied knowledge which enables managers to have a comprehensive view of many aspects of business and to generate integrative outcomes. The world-view they have in mind does not simply consist of a theory or theoretical meta-position. On the contrary, it is a world-view that covers a responsive and responsible perspective on incommensurable theoretical and practical insights related to business. Then, how does this world-view work in practice? Moldoveanu and Martin give the example of the complex and ambiguous object of “organizations”. In current business schools, organizations are understood in different monoparadigmatic approaches, such as agency theory, neoclassical economics and sociology. In these cases, organizations are understood as ‘market failure’, ‘nexus of contracts’ and ‘hierarchies’. Now Moldoveanu and Martin find this approach of “disciplinary straitjackets” outdated and call it the business school 2.0 perspective.119 In the business school 3.0 perspective, which still lies ahead for most business schools, the multidisciplinary focus of business schools is realized: disciplinary boundaries are crossed but not done injustice; they are thoroughly integrated with the purpose of benefitting real-world businesses. Moldoveanu and Martin use the Aristotelian division of the human mind to 117 Ibid. p. 41. 118 Ibid. p. 47. 119 Ibid. p. 74. 65 2 elucidate their ambition: business schools should go “from episteme through technè and phronèsis to poiesis”. Or, to put it in the Heideggerian terms that these authors also use, “from the questioning of Being to the prototyping of new types of Being.”120 Therewith Moldoveanu and Martin keep arguing that practice and practical thinking should be one of the ‘hermeneutic circles’ which would-be managers should get acquainted with during their studies. 2.4 Carnegie: Liberal Arts to Counter Market-Thinking The Carnegie Foundation for Advancement of Teaching has presented a co-authored monograph on business schools, Re-thinking Undergraduate Business Education. This book offers a new look at the old idea of liberal education for business students. The book is based on interviews with students, literature on business schools, and finds its core inspiration in the traditions of liberal education. The idea is that business students should be equipped with intellectual perspectives that help them to understand their role in the business field within the larger social world. They need “a sense of professionalism grounded in loyalty to the mission of business to enhance public prosperity and well-being.”121 So much for the ideal business school. In practice, the authors found that most business schools primarily teach students to think in “the logic of the marketplace.” That is, students have an instrumental perspective on their own studying activity.122 Typically, students are asked to learn and apply standard business concepts without considering their implications and broader context. During the years they are in a business program, it becomes natural for students to think that “everything is business” and that the business aspect is the most important aspect of any situation.123 They don’t learn to see the other-than-business values represented by, for example, their families, religions, communities and sports. Moreover, business schools lack the professional focus that the authors ascribe to schools for law, medicine, and engineering. Surprisingly, a lot of the universities the authors visited offer a wide range of courses outside the strict business curriculum, in literature, philosophy, history and mathematics. Yet the authors found that the relation between these intellectual courses and the business courses is rarely well articulated 120 Ibid. p. 73. 121 Anne Colby, Thomas Ehrlich, William M. Sullivan, Jonathan R. Dolle, Rethinking Undergraduate Business Education. Liberal Learning for the Professio, San Francisco, United States, Wiley, 2011, p.4. 122 Ibid. p. 40. 123 Ibid. p. 46. 66 or coordinated. Relating to the lack of integration between the different perspectives within business programs – a point of criticism the authors share with Mintzberg (cf. section 2.1) –, they argue that business students often lack a flexible and conscious mind-set: conceptual tools are not always seen as hypotheses to be employed for specific purposes but as simple and complete descriptions of reality. Sometimes students seem to be able to put into perspective certain theories, but only in a questionable way. When students where asked about a pure vision of agency-theory, few of them espoused it, “but they often found it hard to articulate an alternative understanding of business.”124 Re-thinking Undergraduate Business Education suggests that, although intellectual approaches are part of business school programs, they are not presented in such a substantial way that it relates to the image students have of real-world business. As a solution to this set of problems, the authors want to revitalize the importance of integrated and practical knowledge by re-connecting business studies with the tradition of liberal education. They offer four distinctive modes of thinking that are, according to them, typical for liberal education: Analytical Thinking, Multiple Framing, Reflective Exploration of Meaning, and Practical Reasoning. Articulating these ‘modes of thinking’ is, of course, not the same as teaching them, as the authors are well aware of, but at least this helps to envision a better business school. (1) Analytical Thinking translates concrete experience into abstract propositions. These propositions are general in nature and independent of any particular situation. This mode of thinking can, for example, be found in micro-economics, logic and business mathematics. They further assert that while analytical thinking is important, many questions are too complex or ambiguous to approach with strict analytical rigor. (2) Multiple Framing helps students to understand the contingency of any approach – among which the analytical itself – and that they should be able to place that contingency in the broader perspective of history, culture, methodology, ideology etc. The authors refer to research demonstrating that great managers excel at being able to hold several, often conflicting, viewpoints in mind to derive at a new, integrated understanding. This is, of course, an ideal of what teaching in multiple framing brings about. More often it will just give students a dose of healthy relativism about fundamentally different approaches to business problems.125 124 Ibid. p. 49. 125 Ibid. p. 64. 67 2 The difficulty with multiple framing, however, is its tendency to produce intellectual fatigue, skepticism, and nihilism. “Arguing both sides of every issue can lead students to think that ‘it’s all relative’ and therefore all options have equal merit. For some students, this may even seem to justify using immediate self-interest as their primary decision-making criterion.”126 The next mode of thinking, then, is meant to prevent these kinds of misunderstandings. (3) Reflective Exploration of Meaning is concerned with questions of meaning, value, and commitment. The authors understand these questions in rather a personal manner: who am I, how do I engage with the world, and what is my responsibility? This mode of thought is seen as an interpretative mode that has four dimensions: Firstly, it is related to “thinking through stories” and thus narrative in form. It is, for example, known in the so called ‘war stories’ of business practice that are told during business courses. Secondly, students are motivated to ask questions about the narratives told. Thirdly, students are trained to give a verbal or textual presentation about texts. Fourthly, students are motivated to relate and apply insights to practice. This fourth feature inevitably leads to the last mode of thinking. (4) Practical reasoning involves joining formal knowledge with the concrete and value-laden dimensions of professional practice. Practical reasoning contrasts to technical reasoning in which well-defined methods are used to achieve predetermined ends. Moreover, the authors even connect practical reasoning to practical wisdom. With this fourth aspect of thinking, the authors – as they claim – come close to the Aristotelian notion of phronèsis as contextually appropriate action. 2.5 Grey: Making Management Education Self-Critical Christopher Grey is an author working in the paradigm of critical management studies (CMS). This paradigm is often dated to the publication of Alvesson and Willmott’s edited collection of papers bearing that name in 1992. The critical management studies-paradigm stands for the idea that, contrary to the belief in ‘objective’ and ‘true’ science, facts in management are always impregnated with values. Not just the ideal of money-making, but also the ‘neutral’ commitments of efficiency and productivity are value-laden. Yes, according to Grey, even the idea that a managed organization is favored over an unmanaged organization, is a value judgment. Moreover, if we understand management as ‘getting things done through other people’, and people most likely do things they would not do without management, then management 126 Ibid. p. 65. 68 is related to the exercise of power.127 The understanding of power is crucial in the critical management studies-paradigm. In sum, Grey tries to translate and apply the insights of critical management studies to business schools. This has resulted into several papers and even an introductory student text-book.128 This paragraph is based primarily but not solely on Grey’s article Reinventing Business Schools. The Contribution of Critical Management Education. published in Academy of Management Learning & Education (2004). Just as Mintzberg, Grey compares the occupation of management to that of medicine to make his arguments. Grey states that people would rather be helped by a trained than an untrained doctor. However, according to Grey, this does not hold for managers: (1) Most people care little whether their managers have received a business school training. According to Grey, this has nothing to do with the fact that medicine deals with life and death and management with work. Work has a lot of effect on people’s well-being, perhaps even more than most medical treatments. (2) Now, medical treatment is also impregnated with values – namely the idea that cure and alleviation are better than suffering and death – and these medical values are widely acknowledged. Significantly, Grey states that such a value-consensus does not exist in management, although textbooks do suggest it. (3) There is, Grey argues, another aspect that makes management’s position rather weak as a true profession. It is not based on wellestablished and scientifically informed techniques that allow a high degree of probability, if not certainty, about their effects. “Perhaps they [scientifically informed techniques] do not exist at all, because of the context-specificity and almost infinite number of variables that obtain in any real management situation.”129 However, Grey states that business studies are pretending to teach students reliable management techniques. So, Grey stresses business schools are not professional schools, because (1) people generally do not see alumni as professionals. (2) Business schools have little consciousness about their implicit values, let alone cultivate higher aims towards society. Moreover, (3) business schools do not rely on strict scientific knowledge that is exercisable in practice. The latter two arguments are also given by most of the other discussed authors. Nonetheless, when Grey claims business schools are not professional in the way medical schools are, he does not mean they are not socializing: 127 Grey, Christopher, ‘Management as a Technical Practice: Professionalization or Responsibilization.’ In: Systems Practice, Vol. 10, No. 6, 1997, pp. 703-725. 128 Grey, Christopher, A Very Short, Fairy Interesting and Reasonably Cheap Book about Studying Organizations. London, United Kingdom, Sage Publications, 2012. 129 Grey, Christopher, ‘Reinventing Business Schools. The Contribution of Critical Management Education.’, in: Academy of Management Learning and Education, 2004, vol. 3, no. 2, 178-186, p. 181. 69 2 “The point is less the skills and knowledge it [a business school] imparts and more its capacity to develop a certain kind of person deemed suitable for managerial work and enculturated into some version of managerial values. Indeed, it might be that the very willingness to undertake management education stands as a proxy (to employers) for a certain sort of orientation toward the world and commitment to its reproduction: a demonstration of being ‘the right kind of person’. In this sense, management education may be taken as a symbolic indicator of possession of particular sorts of value.”130 According to Grey, business studies should realign with the values and context in which managers will later operate. An important value-bias for Grey is the education for control, literally by commands or subtly by techniques of motivation. Moreover, students should learn to deal with context specific work. Generalizable knowledge is problematic in management, just like models of benchmarking and best-practices are. Students should learn… “…to attend to interpersonal relations, communication, conflicts, feelings, politics and the like. There are no formula here, but a willingness to engage our students with the way they themselves impact upon those around them, and the micro-scale of human interaction which, in fact, make up a manager’s daily life.”131 This is something different from the big questions on strategy so central in business studies, but it comes a lot closer to the business situation in which students will later operate. Grey is an advocate for personal experience in business studies. Too much theories objectify managerial work and lend themselves to an instrumental understanding of management. Grey suggests pre-existing work experience, although he favors in-class experience. Such an approach promotes social awareness, self-awareness and sensitivity for ethical issues. Grey underscores the need for students to learn to recognize their own subjectivity and conclude that others are persons as well, and not to be controlled by others Grey aims to debunk the instrumentality-focus: knowledge should not be subordinated to the production of efficiency.132 Besides, he questions the 130 Grey, Christopher, ‘What are business schools for? On silence and voice in management education.’ In: Journal of Management Education, Oct. 2002; 26, pp. 496-511, p. 499. 131 Ibid. p. 182 132 Fournier, V. Christopher Grey, ‘At the Critical Moment: Conditions and Prospects for Critical Management Studies, in: Human Relations, 53, 1, 2000, pp. 171-194, p. 180. 70 naturalization tendency in business studies. Various contextual developments – such as, globalization, digitalization, competition – are invoked to legitimize a certain managerial action and to suggest that ‘there is no alternative’. Grey argues that we should have an open-ended conversation about the possible alternatives. This is not merely a matter of business ethics for him: it is also a matter of fundamental questions such as ‘what is a human being?’ or ‘what is a good society in this global era?’. Grey is in favor of, for example, addressing issues as ecological well-being, justice, power and sexism in business schools. 2.6 Schleef: The Ideological Problem in Business Studies Managing Elites. Professional Socialization in Law and Business Schools is a lesser known book on business schools, probably because it is written from a critical outsider perspective. The book is guided by the idea that business and law students are socialized into certain quasi-professional groups. The students Schleef has interviewed had chosen their studies by default more than by intrinsic motivation, and Schleef interprets this as a case of typical class continuity. During their studies, lawyers and managers have learned to legitimize their privileged positions in society. As Schleef says: “This book is about how elites-in-training contest, rationalize and ultimately enthusiastically embrace their dominant positions in society.”133 Schleef has based her research on 60 interviews with business students and 54 with law students from Graham University, an elite and private university in Chicago, in the early 1990s. She interviewed the student-groups twice: at the beginning and end of their bachelors. Perhaps the most interesting aspect of her findings, is that she does not present a straight-forward but an ambivalent story of ideological socialization. Her key finding is that students express many contradictory values and goals simultaneously. She explains the ambivalent ethos of students as the typical functioning of ideology as something that requires both accommodation and resistance.134 Students are quick to reject the class room mode operations, but not the ideas behind it, such as meritocracy, individual achievement, and specialized training autonomy. She calls this ambivalent ethos surface cynicism, of which she distinguishes four variants:135 (1) For many business students, she has found, the degree is merely a credential. The business knowledge they have learned is experienced 133 Schleef, Debra, Managing Elites: Professional Socialization in Law and Business Schools, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Oxford, United Kingdom, 2007, p. 4. 134 Schleef thus reconceptualizes the notion of resistance, “not as something that students on the fringe engage in, but as central to elite socialization”, Ibid. p. 9. 135 Ibid. See especially Chapter 4 for these variants of surface cynicism. 71 2 as straight forward common sense, which is rewarded with a certificate. Students even report that too much time is spent on trivial knowledge, making the curriculum boring. (2) Many say classes do not necessarily add anything, you can learn much of the theory by yourself. Group work might be interesting in the first year, but after that you learn to work with the same people in the same division of labor: one student always doing the marketing, the other the financial aspects, and another editing aspects. (3) Students report grades are often subjective and arbitrary. That is, there is a lack of objectivity in testing. (4) Cooperation is preferred over competition. At the same time, students do experience an internal competition: always aiming to get better, with potential burn-outs as a result. Schleef argues students have vocabularies of motive to articulate their own position as a business student. Schleef adopts the managerial motives Nichols defined in his classical study on management types.136 In accordance with his work, her empirical results generate three types (1) 18% is focused on money and shareholder value: These students display a laissez-faire mentality. This group remained the same during the study. During the second interviews, however, up to 28% of the students made comments that fit into the laissez-faire category, despite their self-positioning in the second category. (2) The second category consists of students who seek to further the long-term interest of a company. During the first interviews, this group covered 47% of the students interviewed; during the second round of interviews it grew up to 69%. The third group (3) contains students who think along the lines of social responsibility. At first 35% of the students placed themselves in this category; during the second round of interviews only 10% did so. In sum, students seem to start out more idealistic and end up rather business-wise, albeit with a certain inclination for long-term thinking. Schleef analyzes the elite-ideology without claiming to understand the qualification of students: “I address the skills that students believe they acquire, how they talk about them, and how ideology about skills training relates to professional claims.”137 But she nevertheless notices a surprising confidence among students about their own qualifications. A telling fragment in this context is this student’s remark: 136 Nichols, Theo, Ownership, Ideology and Control, George Allen Unwin, London, United Kingdom, 1969. 137 Ibid. p. 94. 72 “It’s not so much having the tools in your head and being able to recite them, it’s more of saying here are the issues I need to deal with and here are some resources that I can use to deal with them, so if I had a marketing problem I could go to the book and say here’s how we dealt with this in the case … I 2 guess I can’t really recite [the models] right now, but I think I would know how to figure out a problem or where I could go.” What makes it rather difficult to test these students claim, Schleef argues, is that business students learn to feel comfortable with the vague qualities needed to “strategize like a manager”, as Schleef calls it. Schleef shows that many law students have an idea of what it is like to study and practice law, while business students do not have a definite image of what it is to study and practice business. They do often read the Wall Street Journal and have some insight into the ranking of business schools. Schleef discerns three types of students that illustrate different anticipatory socialization strategies: (1) the naïve student, (2) the student who had planned to do an MBA all along, and (3) the student with an established career in which business studies is an afterthought. The interviews revealed that real career students did not feel they lacked business skills but wanted to get the credentials. Naïve students had high expectations of what business studies would bring them with respect to network and knowledge. Schleef illustrates how all students learn to grow into ‘jobs of the least resistance’, i.e. easy but also well-paid jobs. Interestingly, students have a welldefined vision of their future, but Schleef does not believe them. “Students report having done much soul-searching, critically looked at all the options, and ultimately chosen the careers that are right for them.”138 Yet in the language students use, there is often a lack of agency: (‘I knew it had to be something professional’, ‘that’s more what’s making me go’, ‘it just kind of happened’)139 The habitus in which these students live, especially unspoken parental expectations and habits, means these students are implicitly motivated to study business or law and aspire to obtain jobs with the least resistance, for example selling toothpaste or speculating on bond markets. Another aspect of elite socialization, as Schleef argues, is the pretense of adopted ethical values. But the actual incorporation of social responsibility and public service by students, is only superficial according to her. Schleef reports – in line with Mintzberg –that in case-studies students are put in the position of upper-level management focusing on the long-term business 138 Ibid. p. 4. 139 Ibid. p. 45. 73 strategies. She finds, however, that this was not the case for ethics: “When discussing ethical issues, business students were unable to project themselves into senior positions of power where they felt the real business decisions about social responsibility were made.”140 This is a remarkable observation typical for Schleef’s book: the book reveals an ambivalent ‘indoctrination’ of students into a certain managerial class. Words like ‘ideology’, ‘class’ and ‘indoctrination’ are bold but they are the terms in which she analyzes the empirical data. 141 Conclusion In this chapter, paradigmatic critiques of business schools were reconstructed. Let us briefly recapitulate the important insights, organize them, and translate these results into our moral-ethological framework. Moldevanue and Martin affirm the selection function a business school has as preparatory for business. 142 Thus, they think obtaining a business school degree serves as a good entrance into business. The selection function thus works even without regard for the actual content of the programs and solely on the basis that students are admitted. The Carnegie Foundation, on the contrary, argues that such an instrumental-market view of business education is part of the central problem. Still, despite their opposite points of departure, Moldevanue and Martin and the Carnegie Foundation offer comparable and quite radical suggestions to improve business schools. What both plead for, essentially, is a plural idea of knowledge. The work of Goshal and Mintzberg can certainly be read as such a plea as well, though they stress different aspects of pluralism. Goshal argues that business schools are the victim of an ideology of pessimism (the idea that humans tend to behave primarily to their own advantage) and positivism (the idea that science should focus on what is measurable). His main problem with these biases is the neglect of nonacademic knowledge and ethics. More importantly, he is very concerned about the way students learn to understand the world with these biases. He 140 Ibid. p. 145. 141 The type of ‘critical’ analysis done by Grey (cf. section 2.5) and Schleef risks focusing too much on the negative power-side of business, and too little on what management does or does not do. (See: Thompson, Paul, ‘The trouble with HRM’, in: Human Resource Management Journal 21:4, 2011, 355-367.) Nonetheless, this focus enables us to identify the ethos of business students and take steps for improvement, just as much as authors that endorse a standard ‘profit’-perspective on business and do not address topics such as class and power (cf. section 2.3). 142 The other authors (would) agree that this selection function is important but draw different conclusions as to whether business schools offer good selections. Schleef and Grey are skeptical on this point (cf. section 2.5-2.6). 74 thinks positivism and pessimism negatively affect the corporate worlds. He uses the rather philosophical concept of ‘double hermeneutics’ to explain how the combination of positivism and pessimism have self-fulfilling effects. Goshal’s analysis aims to debunk mainstream business school thinking. However, the question arises how to translate Goshal’s analysis into conceptual and concrete suggestions for improvements. The Carnegie Foundation might give the answer. Its authors offer clarifying schemes to improve the interpretation of what constitutes knowledge in business schools. (1) Aside from ‘analytical thinking’ – cultivated in agency theory, business mathematics and statistics etc. – students should become accustomed to what they call (2) ‘multiple framing’. This latter concept comes very close to central suggestions done by Mintzberg and Moldevanue and Martin. The Carnegie Foundation adds to the need for ‘multiple framing’ the need for (3) ‘reflecting on meaning’. Next the Carnegie Foundation stresses the importance of (4) ‘practical thinking’. Most other authors discussed endorse this need, although Mintzberg hesitates on this point. Whereas business-cases, practical experiences and even internships require intensification according to the other authors – rather surprising advice – Mintzberg’s ideal business schools begin with students who are experienced and are working, as well as studying. Business schools themselves, according to Mintzberg, can then remain theoretical in approach. Although this certainly does not mean Mintzberg proposes a mono-scientific view; his book is a plea for different methods and sciences. Moldevanue and Martin seem to be the most business-minded and less academic initially, but they also aim to connect practical thinking with morality and introduce the notion of phronèsis, as opposed to mere know-how. Nevertheless, Moldevanue and Martin, being business authors, close their analysis not with wisdom but rather with creativity and entrepreneurial insight. Grey signals the problematic socialization processes in business schools in which students are not instilled with social ideals. His work is a call for more reflexivity. Grey opts for business curricula with attention to the endeavor they undertake at business schools: Students should be stimulated to reflect on assumptions of models, develop an eye for power relations, and should not confuse theory with reality. More than that, business students should acquire knowledge of the values in their visions and theories, i.e. their normativity. When taken seriously, however, these points would not turn business schools into professional schools, similar to, for instance, medical schools. For Grey, there is eventually no apex of knowledge and skill that would make an academically educated manager better than an informed manager without credentials in business studies. This is a fundamental insight in line with Eliot 75 2 Freidson’s work on professionalism.143 Nonetheless, I display in Chapter 4 that the ambition to professionalize business education was normal at the onset of the study, and – although I agree with Grey that business schools are different from medicine and law – there are nonetheless important lessons in those professional fields that would improve business education. What would Schleef say about this call for more reflexivity (which I think is Grey’s primary contribution to the debate)? Her sociological and empirically informed work reveals that students are not motivated strongly; most merely study for credentials. This means students themselves rate a lot of their studying of business as less relevant than an outsider might think. In a way, Schleef’s book is complementary to the research of the Carnegie Institute. Both are critical of the instrumental stance many students have. It would be a mistake to read Schleef’s book as a critique of students; rather, she criticizes business schools. Students implicitly and explicitly learn that they deserve good career chances and a higher status because of their achievements at university. They come to believe their successes are based on their willingness to work hard. Schleef interprets this by saying business schools uncritically recycle the idea of meritocracy without questioning its premise, namely that the business school she analyzed was an elite institution, which is difficult to get into and pay for. 144 The students themselves told her they want to be achieving students, but when asked, they found it rather difficult to explain why they were studying business in the first place. Schleef interprets this as the societal habit of the mid- and higher classes of sustaining its own position by choosing safe studies. Schleef would most probably be enthusiastic about Grey’s argument for more ‘critical management studies’ in business schools. Schleef would want business students to be confronted with the ideas of meritocracy and capitalism. Allow me to summarize the important problems signaled in this chapter. This summary helps to shed light on the ethos of business students in the Netherlands: 143 Freidson, Eliot, Professionalism. The Third Logic. Polity Press, Oxford, United Kingdom, 2001, p. 180. See the last sections of Chapter 8.3 for a further discussion on why management is not a profession, although I do argue business studies can learn from the organization of professional schools in medicine and law (also see: General Conclusion). 144 I argue with economist Esther Mirjam Sent (see footnote 94) that this situation is different in the Netherlands. One could even argue that the Dutch have no studying culture of meritocracy and risk a culture of minimal effort. 76 A. The general idea of science • Too much mono-scientific thinking. All critics claim a lot of effort is made to inculcate students with a positivistic approach to science. Related skills are deduction, modelling, calculating etc. In this approach, quantification seems to be much more important than being able to conduct empirical research. • Too little practical thinking. Perhaps surprisingly, critics stress the importance of practical thinking in addition to scientific thinking. Most say too little attention is paid to tacit knowledge, know-how, concrete examples, and business-cases. There is, according to all the authors above, a rather large ‘rigor-relevance’ or ‘theory-practice’ gap in business schools. • Too little reflection on and use of different frameworks. All authors stress the need to understand the reach and the limits of models used in business schools. In addition, the authors agree on the need for reflection on the different frameworks or paradigms that exist apart from the strictly scientific one, for example, the need for some ‘technological knowledge’ or the need for ‘artistic insight’, as well as the need for ‘political reflection’ on ideological issues. • The need to integrate, combat fragmentation. The arguments against a mono-scientific approach and in favor of different frameworks can be read as a plea for different sciences – beta, gamma, and alpha. However, authors primarily criticize the already existing fragmentation of curricula of business studies. Thus, all authors seem to argue for integration of the different fields and not so much a further incorporation of different sciences. B. The idea of work and business • Socialization one-sidedly focused on future managerial roles. Most authors agree that business schools socialize students into certain roles, we could call it the role of the ‘would-be-manager’. With Mintzberg, Goshal, Grey (and to a certain degree, Schleef ) one could even speak of a process in which students are accustomed to a role of the CEO or higher managers who gets to decide on most important issues in work. • Profit- and shareholder-value-maximation thinking is prevalent. Students learn to value money, to think in terms of money and to serve the needs of shareholders. There are counter-stories that value ethics, corporate social responsibility and the like, but those are not in balance with the dominant money- and shareholder-thinking. 77 2 C. Identity and morality • Students have a lot of self-confidence. Although much of the authors stress the relatively high expectations inculcated into students – learning to think and act as a CEO –, Schleef reports on some doubts and even cynicism of students. Not all of them take their studies and future careers seriously. With Grey, one could also ask whether students are convinced of their own unique qualities and competences, say, as a doctor, a lawyer, or a psychologist is. Nonetheless, the other authors stress that students learn theories and skills that make students think they know the ‘one best way’. • The need to train practical wisdom. Of the previously discussed authors, only Goshal mentions the need for more ethics. The others instead stress the importance of practical wisdom, which comes close to virtue ethics, and deals with context-related judgment and a feeling for values in work situations. Yet, authors agree that students are currently overly instrumental in their own study-focus. The mind-set of these would-be-manages is one of means-end thinking that should be transformed into more careful consideration of those ends. 145 This list reveals important parts of what I call the business student ethos. In Chapter 3, I proceed with an empirical analysis to see if it applies to the situation in the Netherlands and whether there are other important neglected aspects, or perhaps differentiations. Here, at the end of Chapter 2, I turn to the question what the moral ethological framework could add to the perspectives employed in the discussed literature. This comes down to the understanding of what it is to be human. Theories in business administration presuppose a certain way of understanding our positions as human beings in the world. This is also the case in the theoretical analysis of the discussed authors and in moral ethology itself. Let us explore this a little further to make clear why a moral ethological perspective has something to add. The discussed critics agree in their analysis of the rather individualistic view of human beings prevalent in business theories. At the same time, they signal the presumption of collective action and point to collective values prevalent in 145 The fact that the discipline of ethics is not often mentioned as an improvement of current problems, or simply as a necessary cornerstone of business studies, is related to how we have come to understand ethics. In the Introduction, I already sketched the strong focus on individuals and abstract arguments in today’s analytic ethics, a point I discuss further with the help of MacIntyre in Chapter 5. However, I argue a praxis-informed (or: domain-specific) business ethics is much in line with the suggestions done in the discussed literature here in this Chapter 2. See Chapter 6 (esp. 6.4, and Conclusion) for my suggestions on such concrete ethics, based on my ethological interpretation and application of MacIntyre. 78 business theories. This seems plausible, for much business theory focuses on individuals, e.g. those of finance and economics, while theories in organization presuppose a view of collectives with shared norms. Think, for instance, about the presumption that people are willing to follow the structures of a company and orders of managers. In both models – the individualistic and the sociological – economic interests seem important: increase profits, win market share, activate unused resources, and so on. Critics have an alternative stance. Mintzberg looks at people as members of a company; subscribes to a professional perspective. Moldevanue and Martin have a comparable interest in the real-world of business but embrace a futuristic idea of the corporate world, favoring innovation. Goshal focuses on a general humanistic perspective which enables him to reveal a much smaller idea of human action in business theory. The Carnegie Institute has a more articulated idea on what such a humanistic perspective holds, such as more social and critical awareness. Grey and Schleef, on the contrary, embrace a more skeptical view on human action and doubt crucial aspects of the business student ethos, such as meritocracy, hierarchy, and power structures. Moral ethology also aims to reveal the normativity that Grey and Schleef search for but does not a priori idealize a world without power structures or markets. It comes closer to a combination of the Carnegie Institute analysis and that of Mintzberg, for both help articulate the way business students see the world and relate to it. The Carnegie Institute is optimistic about a broad and intellectual education, counterpoising a strict money-idea of work and business. It risks leaving the core-values in business thinking unquestioned and (only) adding an inspiring dimension to it. A course on Shakespeare will not change the mind-set of business studies if other courses continue to teach in line with the homo economicus model or a sociological variant of it. Mintzberg’s perspective brings in some realism and proposes selecting experienced people and educating them with a focus on business. In moral ethology, the focus is on the pre-theoretical premises in theories and the institutional surroundings in which they are studied. The different authors show their belief in more ‘practical wisdom’ or phronesis, which is also the central category of the mind that Aristotle reserves for the functioning of the good citizen (who he even calls the phronimos). For Aristotle, practical wisdom is not an abstract way of reasoning but a concrete way that presupposes a person being part of a group of people, embedded in an institution, approached in a certain phronetic way, which he then comes to internalize. You ‘raise’ practical wisdom with certain knowledge but especially with training by teachers who operate in a context in which practical wisdom is at home. 79 2 A university may very well be such a ‘phronetic’ environment and the moral ethological perspective helps to become aware of it. This environment itself is partly – but not sufficiently – understood from the combination of individualistic and sociological perspectives prevalent in business studies. What we are searching for, is the normative idea of academic business education – its telos or ‘good’.146 On the one hand, business education’s ‘good’ is that it creates the workforce that the economic system needs, but on the other hand, it transforms its students into ‘educated citizens’ that think independently and reflectively without, losing sight of the larger moral and societal reality they live in. All discussed authors emphasize the importance of plural- and metaperspectives to realize this twofold goal. Perhaps no one would disagree with such (idealistic) advice, but the question is how it can be realized, for it risks ending up in a fragmented curriculum in which ‘hard’ economic ‘facts’ form solid foundation. We need a more integrated view of what studying business means, in the context of business schools, within the economy at large. Moral ethology aims at offering such a comprehensive approach. In Part III, this perspective is used to give depth to the above dimensions A, B, C (in slightly different order): Chapter 6 deals with the purpose of business, chapter 7 with markets as moral and societal mechanisms, chapter 8 with alternative concepts for an enriched type of knowledge and moral identity. Yet, we have not reached the point at which we can conceptually rethink the current business student ethos. First, I make a qualitative analysis of the Dutch situation in Chapter 3 – which differs in some crucial ways from the Anglo-Saxon situation described in the secondary literature – and subsequently analyze it from a cultural-historical (chapter 4) and philosophical angle (chapter 5). 146 In terms of Andreas Reckwitz, moral ethology is a sociological and cultural theory that articulates the normative consensus among a certain group of people and aims to understand the worldview and its symbols. Reckwitz, Andreas, ‘Toward a theory of social practices. A development in cultural theorizing’, in: European Journal of Social Theory, 2002, 5(2), pp. 243-263. 80 2 81 82 Chapter 3: Empirical (Q-)Research: What Students Say 83 3 Introduction This chapter presents the empirical portion of this study that was conducted amongst students of a selection of Dutch business schools. This chapter is all about what students themselves say about their study-program, its values, the attitude it typically stimulates, and the kind of jobs it prepares for. The investigation applies the Q-method, a technique from the social sciences to elicit opinions of a target population and to identify subgroups that exhibit similarities in their opinions. I elaborate on the Q-method in detail in the methodological paragraph of this chapter (3.1). Q-method allows us to take a detailed look at the opinions students themselves have on their ethos (cf. Figure 1, Chapter 1.3, p.25). I identify five sub-types of student ethos which have – as I argue here – some aspects in common (sections 3.3-3.6). When I speak of ‘the general ethos’ I discuss the commonalities between these sub-types. However, before I discuss the types of ethos and the commonalities, I present some preliminary interviewresults that have informed the construction of the Q-research (3.2). 3.1 Methodology: What is Q methodology? Q-methodology is a technique that relies on factor analysis and was developed by psychologist William Stephenson from the 1930s onwards. 147 It entails three steps. First, the researcher collects many statements that should cover all opinions that people in one’s target population might hold about the topic of interest. A suitable strategy to collect these statements is semi-structured interviews that involve open questions and allow for the free expression of thoughts on the topic. 148 Second, all collected statements are inspected for similarities and a subset of statements that covers all relevant aspects is selected for further use in the study, the so called ‘Q-set Third, people of one’s target population are presented with the concourse and are instructed to order them according to their degree of agreement with them. This produces a ranking (‘Q sort’) for each participant. Finally, a factor analysis is conducted to identify roups of opinions with similar rankings and to compute average 147 The main book that developed Q-methodology (inspired by Stephenson; footnote 145) for social research is: Brown, Steven, Political Subjectivity: Application of Q-Methodology in Political Science, Yale University Press, New Haven, United States, 1980. Also see: Brown, Steven, ‘A Primer on Q methodology’, in: Operant Subjectivity, 16, 1993, pp. 91-138. 148 In fact, most Q-research forms its statements in a much different manner, for instance by a selection of statements from newspapers and conversations. I think that the research strategy I have undertaken to formulate the statements is relatively serious compared to the standard. See: Cross, R.M., ‘Exploring attitudes: the case for Q methodology’, in: Health Education Research, vol.20, no. 2, 2005, pp. 206-213. 84 rankings within these groups that can be interpreted as generic types of opinion patterns. In the following, the method and its application to the present setting is explained in more detail. Q-methodology is a technique for the systematic study of subjectivity: the viewpoint, experience, opinion of a person about a certain topic, but also his or her attitude. The core idea is that people are presented with a sample of statements, in this research 45 (See: Appendix). Respondents are asked to rank-order these statements from ‘agree’ to ‘disagree’. They are asked to order them from their perspective – their personal judgment, idea, feeling – about the topics. In the standard handbook for Q-research, Political Subjectivity, Steven Brown says “There is obviously no right or wrong way to provide ‘my point of view’ about anything – health care, the Clarence Thomas nomination, the reasons people commit suicide, why Cleveland can’t field a decent baseball team, or anything else.” 149 Despite this goal of measuring subjectivity, the rankings of statements are subjected to factor analysis, and the resulting factors that arise from the results, indicate different parts of subjectivity and can explain the variance of the different rank-orders given by the students. Some call these segments ‘discourses’, I use the notion of ‘ethos’.150 For Q-research, a concourse is constructed. A ‘concourse’ is the technical term to describe the collection of statements, in this case the statements that help to understand the business student ethos. The concourse should contain all relevant aspects of the business student ethos. It is up to the researcher to collect material – by means of interviewing people, observation, literature, newspapers, and so forth – which should be compressed into a so-called Q-set, which often consists of 40 to 50 statements. Next, the statements are presented to the participants. The Q-set of 45 statements was randomly numbered, each card containing one statement. The respondent is instructed to read the statements carefully and then organize them into three piles: agree, disagree, and neutral or undecided. Next, the respondent is asked to organize all statements from ‘strongly agree’ to ‘strongly disagree’, with scores ranging from -4 to 4. The score an isolated statement receives is important, but more important is the placement of one statement amongst the 45 others, which is why they must be organized in a fixed distribution (see: Figure 4). Participants are invited to elaborate on their choices in the questions that follow the Q-sorting page. 149 Brown, Steven, Political Subjectivity: Application of Q-Methodology in Political Science, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1980, p. 10. Also see: Cross, R.M., ‘Exploring attitudes: the case for Q methodology’, in: Health Education Research, vol.20, no.2, 2005, pp. 206-213. 150 An example of discourse analysis using Q-methodology: Dryzek, J.S., J. Berejikian, ‘Reconstructive Democratic Theory’, in: American Political Science Review 87, 1993, pp. 48–88. 85 3 least agree most agree (statement scores) -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 245797542 (number of statements) Figure 4: Fixed distribution of the Q-set After the Q-sort is laid out, the participant is asked to elaborate on the statements that he or she agrees or disagrees with most strongly. With Q research, one can attempt to identify different types of student ethos, without necessarily having to interview hundreds of people. In fact, the issue of large numbers is relatively unimportant when one is looking for different segments of subjectivity. As economist Job van Exel and social scientist Gjalt de Graaf say: “If each individual will have her/his own specific [ideas], their profiles would not correlate; if, however, significant clusters of correlations exist, they could be factorized, described as common viewpoints (of tastes, preferences, dominant accounts, typologies, etcetera), and individuals could be measured with respect to them.”151 The factors resulting from Q-analysis thus represent segments of subjectivity that are operant, that is, they represent functional rather than merely logical distinctions. The factors are not the interpretations of the researcher but are generated by the research model. 152 Since participants must order the statements from ‘agree’ to ‘disagree’, it is quite important to select statements that differ from one another. That also implies that different researchers would extract different Q-sets from the same concourse. This is not regarded as a problem, because the decisions made by the researcher have the purpose of finding differences between participants. Research by Thomas and Baas on comparative Q-studies 153 suggests that different statements structured in different ways can nonetheless lead to the insight into the same different perspectives as a result. 154 Q-analysis is a type of research, in which items are sorted with unknown 151 Van Exel, De Graaf, Q Methodology: a sneak preview. P.1 (available from: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228574836_Q_Methodology_A_Sneak_Preview). 152 Of course, the researcher does need to decide whether all the statistically-generated factors can be distinguished meaningfully, or that not all generated factors are relevant. I come back to this below. 153 Thomas, D.B., L.R. Baas, ‘The issue of generalization in Q methodology: “reliable schematics’ revisited.’, in: Operant Subjectivity; 16 (1), 1992, pp. 18-36. 154 It is customary to include a question in the Q-research asking whether the respondent thinks all relevant information regarding the research topic was addressed in the statements. 86 reliability. Hence, it has been criticized for its ‘lack of’ reliability and representation.155 However, the basic idea of Q-analysis is that only a limited number of distinct perspectives exists on any topic. “Any well-structured Q-sample,” Van Exel and De Graaf argue, “containing the wide range of existing opinions on the topic, will reveal these perspectives.”156 The result of the Q-research tells us the possible ways students are formed during business studies. This Q-research is representative in the sense that it identifies these different ways. Further research can make this picture more fine-grained in corroborating the percentages of people that subscribe to an ethos, but it is unlikely that new types of ethos will emerge with more research. 3.2 Interview Samples and Derivation of Concourse Statements I conducted in-depth interviews with business students to find statements that form the basis of the Q-research, the ‘concourse’. 157 These interview results are preliminary to the Q-research. 158 I conducted semi-structural interviews, which is useful for a flexible yet guided conversation and the integration of non-anticipated topics. 159 I distilled themes from the interviews that are important in relation to the overall research question.160 I interviewed 12 men and 3 women; they were Dutch and included 2 Moroccan-Dutch, 1 Turkish-Dutch. The students were not randomly selected, which is more usual in qualitative research. Thus, the interviews conducted should not be indicators of distribution in the general population. For acquiring information for a Q-research, this is sufficient. I selected most of the participants by simply asking them. I did not get lists of student names from other universities, despite having asked for this at two institutions, so I was forced to ask them in real life. I met most of the students from other universities in coffee corners, student rooms, libraries, and lecture 155 For an article discussing skepticism of Q analysis, cf. footnote 153. 156 Van Exel, De Graaf, Q Methodology: a sneak preview, p. 3. (see footnote 152) 157 Most Q-researchers select statements more randomly, for instance by reading literature and theories within the field. See: Moen, Frode, Kenneth Myhre, Eleanor Allgood, ‘Views about Knowledge Acquisition for Coaching Practice.’, in: Operant Subjectivity: The International Journal of Q Methodology, 38/3-4, 2016, pp. 1-15, p. 3. 158 The interview-results are not representative for the business student ethos, but they do give some orientation to inform the Q-research. 159 Regarding education, I found inspiration in two books in particular: Managing Elites: Professional Socialization in Law and Business Schools by Debra J. Schleef (cf. Chapter 1.7 for a reconstruction). Also see: Sturdy, Andrew, Michael Brocklehurst, Diana Winstanly, Margaret Littlejohns, ‘Management as a (Self) Confidence Trick: Management Ideas, Education and Identity Work’, in: Organization, vol. 12(6), 2006, pp. 841-860. 160 For thematic qualitative research analysis, see: Braun, V. and V. Clarke, ‘Using thematic analysis in psychology’, in: Qualitative Research in Psychology, 3(2), pp. 77-101, p. 10. 87 3 halls of business faculties. Some I met through others I had previously met. If they agreed (which 70% of them did), we took a walk near the university or sat down in one of those typical campus seats or in a coffee bar. All interviews were taped and transcribed verbatim. I made a thematic analysis, the results of which I show below. During the interviews, I made open-ended queries –, ‘why do you study business?’ and ‘how would you describe the key characteristics of the businesslike way of thinking?’ – and I tried to have a conversation-type of interview in which they could tell me what came to mind. Most students spoke willingly and freely. I tried to address the same topics from different angles, to get the full picture. It was my perception that most participants – including the less motivated students – found it rather interesting to reflect on their studies. To broaden the perspective, I interviewed experts: a director of education from a business faculty, a student-advisor from a business faculty, a professor who established a faculty-program of business studies, a professor involved in curriculum research, and an ethics professor. I refer to the contents of these conversations in the next section. Interviewing experts enlarged the scope of my preliminary research and helped to inform the Q-research. However, these interviews only give a small view on the business student ethos. It would be good to conduct more interviews and speak to professors from different fields, for instance accountancy and strategy, to get a more complete view. I have used the interviews along with the literature review (cf. Chapter 2) to formulate statements that together form the concourse. Those statements are not propositions but meant to be organized in a certain order. Together, the statements build the architecture that helps us define the business student ethos later on. Thus, this section is a preliminary research of how the concourse of statements is informed. It informs us about the background against which the concourse was written. The next section presents interview samples that illustrate the derivation of statements that were selected for the concourse. Mono- or interdisciplinary thinking In chapter 1, we learned that scholars say business studies might be too theory-oriented, mono-scientific. Do students share this view? Or do they have an interdisciplinary view of science? Can they discern different types of validity and truth claims? Students did say that they had to take a lot of quantitative or analytic courses, but most said that business studies are a rather broad program, also including topics such as strategy or HRM. JvB: So, what is HRM about, for instance? 88 Student: [..] you learn about hiring policy. But also about how to choose people. How to keep them interested in your organization. Basically, I think, and this partly holds for all subjects, you are conscious of the fact that you need them. You know that a group, a whole herd of scientists has written something about HRM. So, I can imagine that when you are a manager in a company later in your life, that you think about things in a more balanced way. That you won’t say: HRM, we don’t need that. You know it is a whole 3 area, that at a certain moment you can… JvB: What are important insights from HRM? Student: I find it hard to say something about that. JvB: Perhaps theories you remember … Student: I have to think about this. But… it might say enough that I cannot recall them offhand… Um. No. During the interviews, I discovered that many participants find it difficult to share theories on topics from their study program. This is in line with research on learning in business schools.161 Regarding the issue of science, I also asked students whether they think that different sciences are studied during their studies. They mostly said yes and elaborated on the different fields they thought were present in the program, especially psychology, economics and sociology; some also mentioned ethics. A skill participants often mention, is the capacity of communication, which they consider crucial in business, although it was not necessarily trained often during their studies. I also discovered that some participants had difficulties addressing the general ideas that keep together the different courses in business studies. This led me to the following statements. Due to my studies, I know the need to look scientifically to companies. The facts are important. (#42) Skills in communication are crucial for business people. (#40) I honestly don’t know what typical business thinking would be. (#41) 161 See: Errington, Alison, David Bubna-Litic, ‘Management by Textbook: The Role of Textbooks in Developing Critical Thinking’, in: Journal of Management Education, 2015 vol. 39(6), pp. 774-800, p.776. Also see: Fineman, Stephen, Yianus Gabriel, ‘Paradigms of Organizations: an exploration in Textbook Rhetorics’, in: Organization, vol. 1(2), pp. 375-399, 1994. 89 Typical studying effort Quite a few participants gave the impression that they did not spend much time on their studies. How serious do you have to be to get your bachelor’s in three years? There is reason to think that it is rather easy. Student: […] When I tell people I study business, they reply ‘oh, so you had an easy time’ That’s the general idea about business studies. [..] Of course, business studies are understandable to most people, when you explain it. When somebody is studying a beta-topic, with difficult formulas… then everybody thinks: That’s what you’re learning? I couldn’t manage. That’s a bias though. Studying business is a different way of studying; you need to be able to study six hundred pages. [..] JvB: Did you have books with six hundred pages? Yes, only books like that. Although the question is whether you really need to read them – or whether a summary is enough. JvB: How do you combine this with a three-day study-week? Did you only read summaries? Uhh. For most theoretical courses, I did. Mostly yes. JvB: You scored a 7.6 on average nonetheless? Yes, there were so many multiple-choice exams. JvB: In all three years? Yes, one of my biggest points of criticism is the amount of m.c. exams. Of course, we take so many of these exams because of the magnitude of the study. Uhh. As a teacher, you can hardly correct exams otherwise. […] The student who told me this had started her business studies after much consideration, had much higher than average grades and was able to reflect quite well on business studies. A few things stand out in the fragment above: First, she confirms a general image of business studies as an easy study (‘oh so you had an easy time’). Although this particular student did not take the easy route, she certainly does say things that are ambivalent. On the one hand, she says studying business is not as easy as you might think and does require reading many pages. On the other hand, she confesses that she primarily reads summaries and that tests have a multiple-choice character. This leads me to the following statements: • Honestly, I think business studies is too easy. (#31) • I often speak to fellow students about the low level of my studies. Many of them share my doubts. (#15) • I find it important to add values to my work, but which values exactly, I find a difficult question. (#12) 90 Practical thinking How much attention is paid to practical action, or know-how? Are students able to value know-how aside from scientific knowledge? Which examples from practice (which companies, working contexts, experiences etc.) do students mention when they talk about their curricula? Are they able to close the gap between theory and practice? Do they think this gap exists at all? The students I interviewed generally felt the practical side of business was lacking in their programs. A business professor, one of the architects of business studies at the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, confirmed this. “The academic space for the practical side of business has gotten smaller and smaller. There used to be creative tension between the practical and academic professors. These groups also met under my guidance. That balance has slowly eroded; the focus is now on the academic side. This is also reflected in the appointment of professors. Previously, you had to be promoted and involved in strategic issues in your sector. Later on, you needed a PhD and a lot of international publications. That meant that a business faculty couldn’t get anyone with practical experience anymore. If you are immersed in a business practice, you are not going to publish enough. Within a time period of ten years, this has changed completely. Currently, I am the exception, with a course on the consultancy industry, in which I have worked for decades parallel to my professorship. I remember that only ten years ago, the whole study program was more concrete, with visits to business sites, such as Schiphol, to analyze its logistics, finance and management. All that has tapered off.” A formal student-advisor, from the University of Groningen, says students like practical knowledge. “The interest in theory is small compared to the interest in the application of certain competences. Business students prefer a high grade for a business game over an average grade for mathematical modelling.” Participants suggested that their future role in business wasn’t any concrete skill but a rather general mindset. The study does equip them for this general mind-set, they say. 91 3 This leads me to the following statements: • There are several companies and lines of business that I know. (#42) • There are places where you cannot work when you have done business studies. (#35) • If you have done business studies, you typically oversee things. You can see the bigger picture of companies. (#36) Type of jobs prepared for Much of the literature suggests business studies is strongly focused on management and consultancy. Some authors suggest a bias of the Anglophone model in which the ‘big boss’ gets to decide everything. This was also the idea I got from some of the participants I interviewed: JvB: how many people do you expect you will be able to manage? What is the general idea you picked up during your studies? Student: When you finish university, you should be able to manage twenty people. To keep a business unit going. JvB: What do you mean by ‘to keep it going’? Student: Doing the job you are supposed to do. Following the structure. JvB: Sounds bureaucratic… you follow the rules you have followed for years? Student: Yes. You can decide on many issues. You get a range of methods during your studies. But at work you become a kind of supervising controller [original Dutch: ‘controleur’]. You are going to check on how certain people work. […] JvB: So, what kind of job perspective do you get while studying business? You previously said it was rather vague in the first two years, I presume it did become clearer later on? Student: In business studies, you learn to solve problems. What kind of problem do we have and what can we do about it? In fact, we all want to become managers. That’s what is mentioned in class. If you graduate, you become financial manager, leader, logistic manager, or the like. You are going to guide others – that’s the basic message. What does this fragment tell us? Students can get the impression that they will become generalists who carry the overall responsibility. With their studies, they might expect to be well equipped to oversee companies and to connect the different parts of work into a comprehensive whole. Perhaps students have learned to think that they must take control. This leads me to the following statements. It is longer than the previous lists, for I consider the topic of job-perception of high importance for my research question. 92 • Trusting each other is a good thing. As a manager, however, you are an inspector. (#14) • A manager makes decisions. That’s his job. (#22) • As a businessman, it is my job to make sure others do what they are supposed to do, a kind of task-management. (#25) • I have learned to solve problems. Others come to me with problems and I will help solve them. (#27) • Leading means that the manager decides and that others have to follow (#32) • Working means doing tasks, this also applies to the manager himself. (#34). • I know how to deal with disagreement, but in the end the manager is always right. (#38) • In a company, you find creativity and craftsmanship, as a business manager you can supervise this. (#44) • Managers tend to place their self-interest above the interest of customers or society. (#9) Ethics and social responsibility How much attention is paid to ethics and more specifically, ethics in relation to labor-contexts and relevant locally-sensitive judgment? Are students able to recognize and analyze moral dilemmas and how they are intertwined with business dilemmas such as matters of efficiency? Do students feel a calling to do something important? On these topics, most students were actually ethically and societally aware, although I also spoke to some who were rather skeptical about topics like ethics in their studies. A business ethicist from the Erasmus University of Rotterdam told me he had realistic expectations of what a course in ethics can do. “We organize dilemma meetings with 25 students who then discuss a case three times. I really don’t think people will come away from such a course being angels. There you are, in front of this group, and if you can get through to even one percent of them, or if one out of a thousand decisions is morally influenced by this lecture for the better, I consider this to be a good result. I am happy if I can help someone can resist a temptation.” All students remarked that they had very few courses in ethics, but they did also have courses that dealt with themes such as social corporate responsibility. Although it was difficult for them to articulate what that was actually about, many basically said that you must consider more than just the 93 3 profits, and must also consider the needs of employees, citizens and other stakeholders. This leads me to the following statements. This is a longer list, because I consider this topic of ethics and responsibility to be very important in defining the business student ethos. • For me, it is of high importance that I contribute to society with my work. (#3) • Graduates in business studies know right and wrong and don’t need law and regulations for that. (#6) • In my work, I am prepared to be hard and I see myself firing others, even if there is no immediate cause for that. (#11) • If an instruction from my employer conflicts with my conscience, I will not follow it. (#16) • Philosophy and ethics are of little added value within the curriculum of business studies. (#19) • Sometimes you have to do unethical things for a client. If you don’t do it, a competitor will. (#20) • A businessman should be loyal towards his clients, not towards society. (#23) • As long as it is legal, it is important to do what a client requires. (#33) • I’ve been trained to see moral dilemmas, for example, relating money to power. (#45) Motivation Do students take their business studies seriously? Are they proud of what they accomplish? Do exams test what they know? To whom do students compare themselves, doctors, lawyers, psychologists, et cetera? In the interviews, I was quite surprised by the ambition of some participants and the lack thereof in others. There seemed to be two groups. Moreover, there was not a lot of stimulation of the higher faculties. “On our first day, there was a speech, from the program director or dean, I believe, and the message was something like this: have a good time during your studies. In the end, in business life, it is not so much about what you do at university.” “The student culture may be serious here, but teachers generally don’t really care if you get a 6 or a 7. The message is rather: get through it.” Some other participants also talked about the need to do what is expected, in order to have a career. But only a few students made a very ambitious impression. Although some remarked that, although they did not study very 94 seriously, they expected to become serious employees as soon as they would start work. This leads me to the following statements: • I have a clear picture of the types of jobs I can do with this study. (#30) • In my work, I want to get promotions, grow, and move to better positions. (#4) • Like doctors and lawyers, managers should take a moral oath. (#1) • For me, work enables me to live my life and I take my parents’ careers as an example. (#5) • For a successful career, it is important to do what your employer asks you to do. (#10) • Whether people are successful or not depends on their personal effort. (#13) Motives During the interviews, I discovered that a group of participants want to have a successful career and become wealthy. But an equal number of participants talked about the need to help others and work together with others. Nonetheless, career and money seem central motivations, as the previously quoted student advisor says: “Bildung has a different interpretation in the field of business administration: more business-wise, entrepreneurial, performance-driven, with an international focus. It is about travel and accommodation abroad (not so much culture), about ambition, career, status and good salary.” This leads me to the following statements: • As a businessman, I see it as my duty to watch over the pennies. (#26) • Efficiency is a core-value in business studies. Making things smarter and cheaper. (#28) • The mission of a company is important. But eventually it is, of course, about the money. (#29) • Doing things at the lowest price is often at the expense of good craftsmanship. (#39) • In my work, I want to help others in their personal development. (#8) • Nice colleagues are more important to me than the content of my job. (#7) 95 3 3.3 The Q-analysis and its Results Now that the themes of the preliminary qualitative research are identified, I turn to the Q-research. I visited three classes with respondents at the end of a lecture and explained the idea of Q-research in real life, giving students the possibility to join the research, or to leave. The Q-research was conducted at three places: Radboud University Nijmegen, Wageningen University and Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam. All participants were in their third year of a business studies program. It was rather difficult to find groups of students to participate: general secretaries were hesitant to cooperate, certain teachers had no time, others said they were already in the middle of an evaluation, and so on. Fortunately, some teachers were happy to cooperate. In the case of Wageningen University, the participants were enrolled in a minor with a focus on corporate social responsibility. In the case of Nijmegen University, the participants were in a minor organization theory. In the case of the Vrije Universiteit, participants were in an obligatory ethics class. If further research is done, I suggest including the Erasmus University Rotterdam and University of Amsterdam. However, my preliminary interviews do not suggest that there are many differences between these institutions and the Q-research itself shows little difference between the universities visited.162 The analysis of the 43 Q-sorts, laid out by 43 students, generates five different types of ethos for business students. For each type, an idealized Q-sort is constructed. This idealized Q-sort represents a hypothetical student whose Q-sort matches 100%. These five factors are generated statistically. With the help of the program PQmethod, a centroid factor analysis was done which produced factors, which were then rotated according to the varimax rotation.163 The followed factor loading is calculated with this equation: p<0,05 (2.96x1/√45).164 Where p < 0,05 is the p-value for the determination of the significance, and the number under the square root reflects the number of questions that were used as input for the analysis. I have selected 2.96, since Simon Watts and Paul Stenner used this number in their Q-studies, as well as in the recommendation in the guide that came with the PQmethod.165 The resulting factors characterize significant clusters of correlations of different Q-sorts, and yet the method tries to limit the correlation between the factors. Thus, it tries to capture and explain the variance in the data 162 The business school in Rotterdam has a more ‘market-orientation’ public image, and not a socialethical orientation. Therefore, one could argue that the results (see below, esp. Conclusion) presented here are just as relevant or even more relevant for business students in Rotterdam. 163 Software and manual can be downloaded from http://schmolck.userweb.mwn.de/qmethod/ 164 The more stringent (p <0,01) significance level made the results less clear. 165 Watts, Simon, Paul Stenner, Doing Q Methodology: Theory, Method and Interpretation, in: Qualitative Research in Psychology, 2, 2005, pp. 67-91, see esp. note 8, pp. 88-89. 96 by using these factors. As a result, five factors emerged (Factors: A, B, C, D, E). It is important to realize that Factor A is dominant, representing most participants. The explanatory variance of Factor A is 16%, Factor B 8%, Factor C 10%, Factor D 9%, and Factor E 8%. Together, the (cumulative significance) of these remaining 5 factors is 51%, which is normal in Q-research, and basically means that half of the information generated can be coherently interpreted on statistical grounds. In the following paragraphs, I present tables with statements followed by the idealized Q-sorts and an analysis (see Appendix B for the full overview of the statements). For each statement, the analysis provides a loading on each of the five subtypes, where a positive number indicates that the subtype agrees with this statement and a negative number indicates disagreement. The higher the number, the stronger the agreement or disagreement. When describing the five types of ethos, the focus is on the most salient and discriminating statements. That is, it is crucial how students have organized all 45 statements and it is taken into consideration how different types of students have placed statements in a comparative order. The tables are interpreted with the usage of the asked questions after participants laid out the statements and the statements that students most strongly agree and disagree with are elaborated by comments (below, I refer to these comments in italics). Moreover, students were asked to give a general description of what a good manager should do. This extra information is used to interpret the organization of the statements. Furthermore, respondents were asked if any aspect regarding management and business education which they believed relevant for their opinions was missing in the research. They mostly answered ‘no’, which confirms the validity of the sample.166 3.4 Interpretation of Results: A First Preview of the Different Types of Ethos There are many similarities between the perspectives of business students. In paragraph 3.10, I present all the similarities. Q-research, however, is primarily set-up to find different segments of subjective perspectives. To get an overview – of both the similarities and differences – I will first present an overview, and subsequently stipulate it in small steps in the paragraphs coming. 166 Eeten, Michel J.G., ‘Recasting Intracable Policy Issues: The Wider Implications of The Netherlands Civil Aviation Controversy’, in: Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, vol. 20, no. 3, 2001, pp. 391-414. 97 3 There are roughly two segments. Statistically it can even be discerned into 5 types of factors, which I will also do in the coming pages, but those five factors are describable in terms of the first two. Factor A, which I interpret as the ethos of The Ambitious Do-Good Managers • rather principled in ethical issues • socially responsible • aim for money-making Factor B, which I interpret as the ethos of The Market-Managers • ahead of competition • profit oriented • non-social, less principle in moral issues The other three factors are: Factor C: The Searching Managers, the light version of Factor A. Factor D: The Balanced Managers, combining the Factor A & B. Factor E: The Radical Market Managers, an amplification of Ethos B. There are also similarities between the different types of ethos. During the interviews, which are reported upon in the previous paragraphs, I discovered that most (not all) business students think that business studies is about management and that they will probably become managers. Another popular job is consultancy, often interpreted as a kind of flexible management advisor. By placing the notion of management so central, the type of ethos is defined strongly in relation to the (self )perceived future of students. In the comment sections of the Q-sorts I found no remarks doubting the central focus of the study-program on management and managers. In fact, there were no surprising comments at all in the comment sections, which is an extra support that the Q-research addressed the right topics. Let’s now present a short list of characteristics most students will recognize, typical for all sorts of ethos. This will be interpreted more fine-grained in the coming pages. Generalities of all types of student ethos: • Students are ambitious; • see managerial work as having an overview on work-processes; • perceive themselves as future problem solvers; 98 • are convinced that communication is very important; • have some ethical motivation. I interpret this list of general characteristics in paragraph 3.10. Let us now turn to the specific types of ethos first. The quotes used in the coming paragraphs, come from the clarifications students gave on the statements they (dis)agreed with most strongly. 3 3.5 Type A: The Do-Good-Managers The first (A) ethos is the most social and moral one of all. It contrasts sharply with the following (B). For students with the first ethos, it is of high importance to contribute to society (#3) “Contributing to society is I think very important, also for my own feeling.” (resp. 3) This group affirms that a moral oath might be interesting for managers (#1). “I think that there are enough good managers that derailed. An oath might not be ‘the’ solution, but it is a start.” (resp. 22) This group stands out in its moral conscience (#33, #16). “I don’t want to deny my feelings of moral righteousness in my work because it is part of who I am, in my personal life, and who I want to be, in my professional life.” (resp.24) Moreover, the mission of a company is taken seriously and not interpreted right away in terms of profit (#29). Students say philosophy and ethics have value in the business curriculum. “I think philosophy and ethics have added value to the study of philosophy. Business studies is about people who work in companies, who are employed, and that is why thinking ethically is important.” (resp.15) There is a general idea of the importance of personal and shared responsibility. “Self-governance should be the main target, plus selfresponsibility.” (resp. 10) In a company they find creativity and craftsmanship, as a business manager they envision to supervise this (#44). “You have the insight in someone’s knowledge and skills due to your broad education.” (resp.14) In this ethos there is skepticism towards the view in which the manager has all decision power (#22, #32). “This is the Anglo-Saxon model that should not exist in the Netherlands. Although it, realistically seen, does apply.” (resp. 10) There is nonetheless a strong idea that the world is changing and that business alumni think they can come along and help others (#18). “For me, innovation is something very important. You have to struggle to come along with the rest.” (resp. 19) Regarding the general question of what management is about, many students mentioned both the combination of society, ethics and strict business goals like profit. A good manager: “is able to make money, help society and be a good employer.” (resp. 3); “is enthusiastic, passionate, listens well, works hard, and puts the interests of employees before those of him/herself. A 99 good manager wants to score with the team, not individually.” (resp. 16); “social, involved, ethical responsible, smart.” (resp. 19); “professional and humane. He can look after both the interests of the organization and its employees.” In sum, this group is rather social and ethical in its orientation and has an eye on the general business interests such as the need for innovation and making profit. A B C D E167 3 For me, it is of high importance to contribute to society in my work. 4 -1 0 1 -1 29 The mission of a company is important. But eventually it is, of course, about the money. -2 3 3 -1 -1 33 As long as it is legal, it is important to do what a client requires. -3 2 0 1 1 3.6 Type B: The Market-Managers This group (B) has a different look on life than the former (A) and primarily focuses on markets and serious management, but not so much on society, nor on ethics. Participants fitting this ethos state that the market determines decisions of managers and that competitors should not be underestimated (#24). “The market decides the supply and demand. Managers need to keep an eye on how the market develops in order to maximize profits. Competition is good for a company, it keeps employees focused.” (resp. 41) In this ethos, the mission of a company is important, but in the end, it is about money (#29). “Crucial for a company: you can envision beautiful things, but only when it is in the interest of shareholders and when it can be established in an efficient way.” (resp. 42) Efficiency is crucial (#28) “Business is there to generate money. There are two ways: increase sales or work more efficiently. Business students are educated to think about this.” (resp. 41) “It is good that efficiency is in the study because this is highly relevant in business.” (resp. 14) As long as it is legal, customers are served (#33). Indeed, customers are more important than society at large (#23). “Your client is always right and the reason for your existence in the first place. (resp. 5) Managers are not seen as people who place themselves above society or customers (#9). Again, this doesn’t mean that this group of students aims to contribute society (#3). Colleagues are important but not crucial (#7). “I like nice colleagues but when I don’t like the content of my work, I won’t function well. I am ambitious, inquisitive, and I 167 Eeten, Van, Michel J.G., ‘Recasting Intractable Policy Issues: the Wider Implications of The Netherlands Civil Aviation Controversy’, in: Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 20(3), 2001, pp. 391-414, p. 396. 100 find work fulfilling.” (resp.37) They don’t see a reason why managers should be distrusted: a moral oath is seen as unnecessary by this group. In this ethos there is a remarkable indifference about the need for rules and regulations (#6), which can be interpreted as if they will by-pass them if possible. Students own capacity is generally seen as scientific (#42). “For a business student, validity and testing ideas are very important. Facts to make optimal decisions are very important.” (resp. 23) All of this does not imply that students have a clear picture of the type of jobs they might get (#30). “Exactly knowing what you can become remains very vague within business studies. (resp. 4). “I have no clear picture of it because the study is so broad. (resp. 11) I think you learn a bit from everything, but in sum exactly nothing. We have hundreds of models and rules without knowing what to do with them exactly. It remains so vague and little is actively applied; it is totally unclear what to do with it besides ‘management’. (resp. 38) Business studies is experienced as theoretical, dusty, abstract, and not practical. It doesn’t give insight in what the real world of a business person looks like. (resp. 43) A good manager is defined by one of the correspondents that loads high on this ethos: “A person who has the overview, can direct, and is profit oriented.” (resp. 1) A different student describes a good manager as “A person who leads by motivating and activating employees, who has strategic insight, the courage to make difficult decisions, and who takes interested parties into account while being conscious of one’s (changing) circumstances.” (resp. 37). In sum, this ethos is market orientated: competition, customers and efficiency are important. This ethos is not concerned with topics like corporate social responsibility, nor is there a serious focus on ethics. There is some confidence in facts and theories but within this ethos there is also hesitation about the exact content of the knowledge and skills acquired. A B C D E 1 Just like doctors and lawyers, managers should make a moral oath. 1 -3 -2 -1 -2 23 A business man should be loyal towards clients, not towards society. -2 2 -3 -1 1 24 The market determines the decisions of managers. You should never underestimate the competition. 1 4 2 0 2 29 The mission of a company is important. But eventually it is, of course, about the money. -2 3 3 -1 -1 33 As long as it is legal, it is important to do what a client requires. -3 2 0 1 1 101 3 3.7 Type C: The Searching-Managers Crucial in the ethos of the Searching Manager is that work in business is perceived in terms of communication. Skills in communication are seen as the defining characteristic of a good manager. (#40) However, on other aspects, the students that match with this ethos are rather uncertain about their own capacities; they are on the search. Within this ethos there is no clear idea of the type of jobs students can get later (#37). They have little idea of the actual things that are happening in specific companies or lines of business (#39). They do want to add value, but what kind of value they find a difficult question (#12). They do think that the world changes rapidly and they also think that business is often about money-making (#29). “I think every company works with the idea that it is all about money-making.” (resp. 4) However, they say, this is at the expense of good craftsmanship (#39). They don’t see themselves as people that primarily focus on finance (#26). Their uncertainty about the study and management in general also translates into a negation of the idea that managers are leaders who decide over others (#32). Overall, the students that load on this ethos think their studies are too easy (#31). “It is really easy for me, without much input.” (resp. 31). Asked about their ideas on good management, they answer in line with the general ethos, “strong communicator who knows what happens in an organization, takes decisive action, and listens to opinions and ideas of others.” (resp.4) Another respondent: “someone who has the overview, directs when necessary and makes sure everybody is heading in the same direction.” (resp.9) In sum, this group doubts the study and their future job. It’s closer to the first group of Do-Good-Managers (A), not so much to the Market-Managers (B). This group is less convinced about the study program and can be qualified as wouldbe-managers that search for the right thing to do through communication. A B C D E 12 I find it important to add value with my work, but what kind of value exactly, I find difficult to say. 0 -2 4 1 2 23 A business man should be loyal towards clients, not towards society. -2 2 -3 -1 1 29 The mission of a company is important. But eventually it is, of course, about the money. -2 3 3 -1 -1 31 Honestly, I find business studies too easy. -1 -3 1 -3 -4 37 To be honest, I have no clear idea of the type of job I will do in a few years. -1 -2 3 0 2 102 3.8 Type D: The Balancing-Managers This fourth ethos is close to the general ethos. In a way, it combines groups (A) and (B), in an amplified form. It strongly believes personal effort is important for being successful (#13). More than other factors, students loading on this ethos say to know something about companies and lines of business (#43). Society (#3) and morality (#16) are important to this group which dovetails with good management. They disagree with the statement that they work to live and that they take their parents as an example (#5). With regards to management, respondents disagree with the idea of managerial work as task management (#25). They want to oversee a company as a business student would (#36). “After you gained the whole picture of a company, better decisions can be made at the general level.” (resp. 13). A good manager is “A trustee, who thinks along.” (resp.13); “Somebody who listens to others and helps others to develop, and who places the company above himself.” (resp.14); “Somebody who listens to employees and takes their problems seriously. Employees are the capital of the company, this needs to be taken into consideration when decisions are made.” (resp. 20) In sum, this is the Balanced-Manager, with extra attention for the others, a bit of interest for both society and ethics, and a strong will for accomplishing things with effort and efficiency. A B C D E 5 For me, work enables me to live my life, and I take my parents careers as an example. 0 0 0 -2 1 13 Whether people are successful or not depends on their personal effort. 2 2 2 4 2 25 As a businessman it is my order to make sure others do what they are supposed to do, it’s a kind of taskmanagement. 0 1 -2 -2 1 43 There are several companies and lines of business that I really know. 0 1 -2 2 1 3.9 Type E: The Radical-Market-Managers This fifth group (E) can be seen as an amplified version of (B), the Market Managers. People loading on this ethos have, however, clearly more hesitation about their own capacities (#37) and their own expected added value (#12), although not as much as those of the third ethos (C), the Searching-Managers. This group is highly ambitious (#4). “I want to perform, I am motivated to earn a lot of money, and to move to higher positions.” This group has the ambition to grow into positions within a few years after graduating and supervise 10 people or more (#2). “I have led a group of 25 employees the last years and I think 103 3 I can return to this after graduating. Besides, I think a managerial function suits me well.” (resp. 16) There is general awareness of the need to be successful, or to put it negatively, a fear of not moving forward in society. One student writes (#17). “In the social surroundings of business studies, there is an idea of survival of the fittest. Dressingup one’s CV and building a network is essential to be able to score a work place later on in life.” (resp. 43) Work is important and is characterized by their parents’ work spirit (#5). This group is not focused on the good of society at large and is willing to do things that conflict with their own moral ideals (#16). In this ethos work should nonetheless enable others to personally grow (#8), although work can be understood in terms of tasks and task-management (#34), probably leaving little freedom to each other in how to fulfil a certain job. In sum, this group creates the ambitious manager who is relatively nonsocial, career-orientated and wants to get into leading positions. A B C D E 2 I expect to supervise/manage over 10 people or more within a few years after graduating. 1 1 0 0 3 16 If an instruction of my employer conflicts with my conscience, I will not carry it out. 3 0 0 2 -2 39 The ambition to do things for the lowest price often goes at the expense of good craftsmanship. 2 0 3 0 3 3.10 Similarities Between the Types of Ethos In this paragraph I describe similarities that characterizes all five different types. Again, it is important to realize that these similarities are differentiated into the five factors. To start with an eye-catching insight, business students are ambitious (#4). “I want to continually improve myself and constantly look for the challenge.” (resp. 12) “It is my goal to get a higher position in a company.” (resp. 16) Students say that success depends on personal effort (#13). “If you want something, fight for it as long as you need to reach it; success depends on your own commitment.” (resp.15) However, students won’t necessarily do what the employer wants them to in order to be successful (#10). “In my opinion this is exactly what you should not do. Rather, dare to cross boundaries.” (resp. 7) Moreover, students say they won’t do amoral things in order to be successful, even if competitors will win in that case (#20). “Because I think the difference starts with yourself and you shouldn’t think that you can do it if the rest does so.” (resp. 3) “Unethical things are unjustifiable.” (resp. 5) Or, the less principle variant: “Doing unethical things is bad for the company’s image.” (resp. 14) 104 Students deny that they simply know the difference between good and bad and won’t need laws and rules (#6), although they are quite skeptical about the moral awareness of fellow business students. “I think most business alumni care for money, power, and efficiency. Morality is often forgotten.” (resp. 39) “Unfortunately it often turned out that managers cannot deal with their responsibilities and do wrong things.” (resp. 2) Business students are not particularly trained to see or analyze moral dilemmas (#45). “We only had one course in ethics and ethics was almost not integrated in other courses. (resp. 39) Nonetheless, many students (Ethos A, B, C, D) remark on the need for ethics. Students also care about others (#8) and prefer to trust others (#10) without controlling them. Communication - making contact with employees - is crucial for managers (#40), according to all participants. It is important to realize that most participants have little uncertainty about what business thinking might be (#41) – although we will see in paragraph 2.5 that a specific ethos (Ethos C) does include doubt on the future roles of alumni in business life. All participants say they become problemsolvers (#27). “All courses are set-up around this skill, in the way exam questions are asked and assignments are given, in almost everything.” (resp. 39) Besides being problem solvers, business students say they learn to have an overview. They learn to get the bigger picture of the company. (resp. 36) “This is what business studies is for me, and the reason companies would want to hire business students.” (resp. 37) “In business studies it is about the ‘helicopter view’. No hardspecific knowledge, but skills with which you can make it in every company. You can oversee a company and do what is best. (resp. 42) Working means doing tasks, and this also applies to the manager himself (#34). “I think that a manager at all times has an exemplary function and should have expertise. This will only work when he himself carries out tasks.” (resp. 33) Most students think they can work everywhere (#35). “I think we can have positions in all kinds of companies and institutions. We have learned a lot of general knowledge that is applicable everywhere.” (resp. 26) “I have the preposition that business alumni can do something everywhere.” (resp. 31) As a part of their generalist attitude, students point to the importance of others and the ambition to simulate others to grow in their personal development (#8). The general opinion is not that the level of studies is too low (#15), although this research shows there is no general confidence on the competences, nor a lucid idea on the future role in business. In sum, the general student ethos can be characterized as follows: First, students are ambitious and want to grow into higher positions. Second, they see themselves as problem solvers that —third—have a general overview on a 105 3 company and its employees. Fourth, business students are communicators and value relations with others. They take others seriously and, fifth, see their own job as well as that of others in terms of doing tasks. Sixth, the general business ethos is ethical, although it is not particularly social or ethical towards society as a whole. Many students are rather skeptical about the motivations of other business students and, seventh, mostly think courses in ethics are good and can be intensified to balance the interest in money and power that many students are supposed to have. When I discuss the specific factors in the next pages, the meaning of these seven characteristics will become clearer. A B C D E 4 In my work, I want to get a promotion, grow, and move to better positions. 3 3 1 3 4 13 Whether people are successful or not depends on their personal effort. 2 2 2 4 2 27 I have learned to solve problems. Others come with problems and I will help to solve them. 2 3 1 2 0 28 Efficiency (making things smarter and cheaper) is a core-value in business studies. 0 3 2 3 1 34 Working means doing tasks, this also applies to the manager himself. 1 0 2 3 3 36 If you have done business studies, you typically oversee things. You can get the bigger picture of the company. 3 4 1 2 2 Conclusion The Q-research generates five types of business student ethos. These have quite some similarities, which is why I interpret them as versions of one general ethos. I identified the types of ethos in the following manner: First, I reconstructed and analyzed secondary literature in Chapter 1. As said before, this literature review has more purposes than just the preparation for the Q-research, so we will return to certain conclusions in later parts of this research. Second, I interviewed a group of business students (15 respondents), as well as some experts (5 respondents). Third, 45 statements were distilled and subsequently 43 participants were asked to value those statements. These five types of ethos represent the ways in which one can have an ethos as a business student in the Netherlands. This is, of course, a generalization, for the Q-research was conducted in three groups at three universities. But such a generalization is reasonable and normal in this type of explorative qualitative research. However, a reliable determination of the percentage of students that adhere to each of the five versions of the business school students’ ethos would require additional (quantitative) research. Let me sum-up the main types again: 106 A. Do-Good-Managers This ethos is social and ethical in its orientation and is characterized by general business interests such as the need for innovation and making profit. B. Market-Managers (opposite of A) This ethos is market-oriented: competition, customers and efficiency are important. C. Searching-Managers (weak version of A) This ethos is less convinced of the virtues of the study program and searches for the right thing to do through communication. D. Balancing-Managers (combination of A and B) This ethos shows interest in both society and ethics and a strong desire to accomplish goals with effort and efficiency. E. Radical-Market-Managers (exalted version of B) This ethos creates the ambitious manager who is relatively non-social, career-oriented and wants to get into leading positions. Having already described the content of these types of ethos is the previous sections, I now want to draw some general conclusions, also in relation to Chapter 1. I do so in the next section. 107 3 Evaluation Part I In this section, I take the next step and interpret the results of the Q-research. On close inspection, there are roughly two general types of student ethos: I. The socials. These students find business values like efficiency and money important and combine these with societal and moral values. This holds for ethos A and E. II. The marketers. These students find business values very important and are not inclined to see these values in relation to the common good. This holds for ethos B and E. Some students will experience that they are somewhere in between these two accounts: perhaps out of uncertainty of their ideas (ethos C), perhaps as a synthesis (ethos D). The Q-research suggests that ethos A is more morally motivated and aware than ethos B, although the latter also prescribes following personal mores. However, the various types of ethos do not differ strongly in their perception of future jobs. A typical business student will recognize the following general characteristics: • To be ambitious. • To have oversight of the business. • To get things done in terms of ‘tasks’. • To be a problem-solver. • To make things more efficient. • To communicate and cooperate. Despite the general difference between the Socials and Marketers, this general list of management characteristics fits the latter much better. The official self-perception of many large corporations may be that they work with Do-Good-Managers and Balanced-Managers, hence one might expect these types to quickly gain careers. However, the question rises whether students are well-equipped to really combine the societal-moral view with that of the strict-company-interest. It is unclear how any ethos would deal with dilemma situations, in which something is legal, very profitable yet morally doubtful. I doubt whether any ethos is serious in making less profit or even losses because they have higher social or moral aspirations. This doubt is even stronger regarding social issues, and many moral issues are social. It seems reasonable to think business graduates can deal with personal moral choices, such as gender discrimination in a colleague’s salary. Complications arise, however, when societal discussion is relevant, as in the case of certain investments of a corporation, Shell’s investment in gas resources, for instance, or its influence in Dutch tax policies. 108 The latter examples are likely to be too difficult for students to deal with. (1) Students are minimally equipped to make a sociological and moral argument about ecology and tax-policies. This is not out of a lack of interest: none of the types of ethos opposed the thesis that ethics is relevant and most even said more ethics and philosophy would be welcome. (2) More important to my argument here, is that the basic ethos of students already normatively makes students adopt a ‘thin’ business view: get things done, keep customers happy, be ahead of competitors, think in terms of solutions, not disagreement. The force of this taken-for-granted job-idea in the business ethos is so powerful that it is doubtful whether graduates who do have good ideas and good intentions are well-equipped enough to make a difference. The task inherent in the managerial position, as students learn to understand it, is to realize goals and these goals are mostly given. A fundamental underlying value is that of the search for efficiency. Efficiency can easily be understood as the shortest path towards goals, preferably against the lowest possible costs, putting means to their full use. There is nothing wrong with efficiency per se but becomes problematic when it is aimed for without consideration of the content of the work someone is doing. Efficiency is a formal mechanism and it is valuable if people can relate it to the real-world in which we live and work. Consider the old joke about the business graduate hired as a consultant for a philharmonic orchestra and within weeks downsizes the orchestra to a synthesizer. Although this is a joke, the truth in it is that efficiency is only a value if it optimizes the world without degrading it to something completely different. What complicates the matter considerably, is that efficiency-goals are relatively easily defined in a financial sense, whereas it is more difficult to consider the non-financial values that are concrete to such an extent that they poorly fit into the abstract categories of a balance-sheet. There is little reason to think business students only learn to think in an administrative way, but the question is whether they have other ways of thinking available in which the quality of company processes is done more justice. Another complication is the appreciation students learn to have for managers as those people in companies who ‘have the helicopter view’, while others ‘have their boots on the ground’.168 This dovetails with Mintzberg’s criticism (cf. Chapter 1.1). According to statement #36: ‘If you have done business studies, you typically oversee things. You can get the bigger picture of the company.’ Students expect to be able to fulfil a managerial role due to their studies. This is an important corner stone of the business student ethos: 168 The metaphor of the helicopter is common in business studies (cf. p. 84, resp. 42). I borrow the contrast of helicopter versus boots from J.C. Spender (cf. Chapter 4.1). 109 many students learn to think they can become managers with responsibility and authority over other people. This is also a key observation of Grey (cf. Chapter 1.5). This is not necessarily the impression one gets from official documents about business programs, which focus rather on creating ‘business scientists’ and address issues of future jobs less explicitly. It is in line, however, with business textbooks and business cases that invite the student to think as if he or she is about to make an important managerial decision. Consider the opening words of an often-used international textbook in business studies: “Perhaps, there is no more important area of human activity than management, since its task is that of getting things done through other people.”169 Of course the opening words of text-books should invite the reader to start studying, but this rhetoric risks instilling in students excessively high expectations of their future roles. This is comparable to a study in law that would inculcate all graduates with the idea that they can and will become lawyers, or a study in psychology that guarantees a job as a psychotherapist. A quick calculation would show how unlikely these scenarios are to come true. Many business theories are based on the world of corporations like Shell or Walmart and on the major company-structures these companies work with. This is odd in a country in which most companies are SME’s, start-ups, or simply one-person firms. The problem is, of course, that many theories in business administration only become relevant in the context of big firms in big markets. There is little sense in conducting Porters 5-Forces-Model in an SME. Related to this issue of big corporations, is the tendency in business administration to study internationalization as a factual process, without reflecting on the causes and effects. This is odd when we take into consideration the fierce ethical debates on outsourcing, in the clothing industry, for instance, as well as the political discontent experienced by citizens regarding globalization. In any case, much of business theory and especially the quantitative courses gain relevance when the world is seen as one big market place in which large corporations compete. Thus, the official curriculum may state that students learn to think locally, socially, and ethically, but the implicit message of many courses – strategy, finance, HRM – is that students learn to think big, perhaps even as consultants who oversee very large corporations. The ethos of business students, also part of the curriculum, is that of would-be-managers 169 Koontz, Harold, Cyril O’Donnell, Principles of Management: An Analysis of Managerial Functions. 1955, p. 1. The later versions of this textbook contain comparable remarks. For a systematic analysis, from which this citation is taken, see: Harding, Nancy, The Social Construction of Management. Texts and Identity. Routledge, London, United Kingdom, p. 26. 110 who have helicopter views over large corporations in international markets. It is remarkable that these helicopter views include a narrow individualistic morality, an observation Schleef makes as well (cf. chapter 1.6). Why is it that students are taught to think in such a wide perspective qua business people, while the same level of reflection is almost absent in ethics, sociology, and history? Apart from the problems, there is reason to be optimistic about the general business student ethos: communication is important in the general business ethos (cf. section 3.1). Students want to get from A to B in an efficient way, together with others. Communication is important to such an extent that topdown management does not fit the general business ethos, nor any specific variant. Although some literature research suggests that in important theories in finance and organization, management is seen as a kind of computer function that works with strict plans and definitions, the openness to communication reveals that students are not accustomed to seeing the company as a machine that is controlled by one or a few persons at the top. In this regard, the Dutch situation differs from what Goshal fears (cf. chapter 1.2). This differentiates the picture painted so far and is in line with the cultural identity of business in the Netherlands, to which I come back in Chapter 4. At the same time, it is not clear what communication itself involves for business students. It seems likely that graduates want to work with consensus among colleague managers and employees. Yet, there is little reason to believe that students know how to deal with possible disagreement. They seem to presuppose overall agreement about work issues and if something goes wrong, the general idea is that discussion can solve it. But is this a reasonable presumption in a rapidly changing world in which the direction of change to take is quite often a matter of debate? At this point, the business student ethos has no tool-box to discuss the values and ‘goals’ of activities and instead, the natural orientation point seems to be the outside world: customers in markets, who are also reached for by competitors. I suspect that graduates are inclined to think that this market-logic should simply be followed and that there is no possible disagreement about the outcome. The business graduate is ambitious when it comes to solving problems, having a helicopter view, and seeking economies of scale. If this is what the general business ethos amounts to, what could be the role of social-ethical dilemmas? What complicates the matter, is that managerial ideas can have unintended and unexpected ethical consequences, like in the case of a high-performance culture. In such a culture, moral boundaries can relatively easily be trespassed. The question is whether a good functioning ethical culture should be anchored 111 in the personal motives of people, or that a more general organizational awareness is necessary. 170 In any way, the general business school ethos seems to rest on personal integrity – an individualistic ethics – and not so much on systematic and organizational ideas about common values and awareness of the implicit ethics of an organization. Moreover, students lack helicopter views on a societal level: the perspective of big business is not thoroughly complemented with that of ‘big society’, like it is addressed by, for instance, Karl Marx, Jürgen Habermas, Alasdair MacIntyre, or any other author that could raise the sociological-self-knowledge of students. The university plays a problematic role in the business student ethos. The ideal of objective and independent research and education makes students unaware of the de facto values inherent to the business student ethos. However, Goshal’s thesis that business administration instils in students a positivistic mind-set with a negative perception of other people does not apply to the Dutch situation. Only two types of ethos represent what scholars (in line with Goshal) hold true for most students, namely that business studies “reproduces and sustains the notion that society’s welfare is optimized as a result of individuals acting in their own economic self-interest, and that the only participants in the wealth-creating process that should have their interests maximized are shareholders”.171 However, my results are in line with a subtler line of argument in this literature: that business education, by assuming a value-neutral educational strategy, fails to sufficiently acknowledge and address the fact that instillation of values takes place nonetheless. The implicit message is that students themselves should choose which model they want to believe in, for teachers only introduce the ‘facts’ and the different and conflicting ways one can analyze them. There is little consideration of how students can make such an ethical decision. In fact, students are poorly aware of the existing tension and disagreement about concepts of business and firms. My Q-study shows that business students have an ethical motivation, albeit in varying degrees, but it also suggests the study program itself does little to cultivate this ethical motivation any further. Business studies are rather open ‘scientific’ programs in which students find little structure, nudges, and 170 Ethical research reveals that morality has a strong social, cultural and organizational side. See: Sims, Ronald R., Johannes Brinkman, ‘Enron Ethics (or: Culture Matters More than Codes), in: Journal of Business Ethics, 45, 2003, pp. 243-256. Also see psychological research, for instance: Haidt, Jonathan, The Righteous mind: Why Good People are Divided by Politics and Religion, Pantheon, New York, United States, 2012. 171 Ferguson, John, David Collison, David Power, Lorna Stevenson, ‘Accounting education, socialisation, and the ethics of business’ in: Business Ethics: A European Review, vol. 20, no. 1, Jan. 2011. 112 mentoring. They learn theories, develop skills, but regarding identity formation there is little effect. 172 This is also an unintended consequence of business faculties that hire scholars with Harvard-like research-profiles, perhaps some educational experience, but little time or ambition to mentor students. One could conclude that there is one group, I the Socials, to whom this richer notion of business applies already. This might be the case, but above I have argued that their job-perception itself is at odds with social-ethical ambitions. Hence, it is not simply a matter of courage for graduates to make social-ethical decisions, it goes against the grain of specific aspects of their own ‘professional’ ethos. This is an elementary inconsistency within the ethos of the Socials. For the other types of ethos, the Marketers, the problem is even bigger: they have much more of a single-track mind in which societal issues remain vague or even invisible. In the coming Chapter 4, I analyze how the different types of ethos are a result of a specific history of business education, in which the latter type with its impoverished idea of work and business became dominant. We will find that this outcome is not simply a random historical result but the outcome of some conscious changes in business education that mirror general societal and moral developments. 172 There is, of course, pedagogical research on learning strategies that can inform business schools on how to improve their pedagogies, e.g. on so-called ‘problem-based’ learning (see: Kirchner P., J. Schweller, R. Clark ‘Why minimal guidance during instruction does not work: An analysis of the failure of constructivist, discovery, problem-based, experimental and inquiry-based teaching. Educational Psychologist, 41(2), 75-86). In this research, I do not discuss pedagogical research. From my moral ethological perspective, I focus on the implicit and explicit values inherent in business education and how these values correspond to a certain understanding of business. This view also enables us to provide a normative analysis of the way a grown-up corporation is organized by grown-up people. In future research, it would certainly be interesting to combine this ethological perspective with pedagogical research, on the education of virtues, for instance, but here I focus on the need for character formation in the first place, as well as the relation between education and real-world practices. 113 Part II: The Origins of the Contested Business School Ethos 114 Introduction Part II Part II presents a historical and philosophical reconstruction of the changing self-understanding of business schools and management in recent history. My goal is to trace the turning points in the development of business schools that led to the tension between economic values and societal and ethical considerations in the current business student ethos (cf. Part I, Evaluation). In opening chapter (4), I analyze how the different types of ethos are a result of a specific history of business education, in which the market type ethos with its impoverished idea of work and business became dominant. We find that this outcome is not simply a random historical result but the outcome of some conscious changes in business education that mirror general developments in our society and the economy. In Chapter 5, I relate the current business school ethos to the more general development of modernization. Some crucial aspects of the business student ethos, such as the individualized morality and shortage of societal engagement are no isolated phenomena but are related to how modern science, modern ethics and ‘modern society’ in general have evolved through time. 115 116 Chapter 4: The History of Business Schools 4 117 Introduction Inspired by the seminal historical works of Locke (1984, 1989) and Khurana (2007), one can distinguish three important eras of business education: (1) In the first period (1900-1960) business schools instilled in students a vocationalpractical and professional-social ethos. (2) In the second period (1960-1990), business schools replaced this strategy with the scientific ethos. (3) In the recent and ongoing period (1990-present) we see a focus on shareholders and consumers, and less on managers compared to earlier periods. The focus on science is complemented with one on markets. In this chapter, I describe this threefold development. With references to the work of Van Baalen and Karsten (2010, 2012), I show that this interpretation, that was developed as pertaining to the American context, also applies to the Dutch situation. Furthermore, I argue that the changing business school ethos along these three lines was not only a matter of curriculum content (‘what’ students studied) but also about the form in which they studied (‘how’ they received lectures, received assistance, worked in peer groups, got examination, and so on). Although this is rather a short side-step in the argument made in this chapter (cf. section 4.4), it forms an important ethological insight, for a student ethos is not only the result of the content of official textbooks and visionary documents of universities, and the related history of (business) ideas, but also of the de facto studying culture and organization. Interpreting the work of Fredrick Taylor, I show that this ethos-shift from the professional ethos to the scientific ethos was already visible in the early twentieth century, but that it would take another fifty years before management was redefined in terms of a science. I suspect that this was when the cultural difference between the United States, England and the Continent began to fade. In the final stage of this analysis, I interpret this threefold development in terms of a major shift from Continental to Anglo-Saxon thinking with reference to the debate on ‘varieties of capitalism’. I do not argue against Anglo-Saxon thinking about business and education. Rather, I plead for a conscious adaption of it. Let us now turn to the three-step history of business education. 4.1 Phase I (1900-1960): The Social-Practical Onset of Business Schools Until the end of the nineteenth century, the Dutch economy consisted mostly of small and medium-sized enterprises to which a business graduate could have added little extra value. Businesses were too small, and owners were 118 also managers. The big business that slowly emerged in the late nineteenth and twentieth century – the Netherlands was late, compared to neighboring countries – had different divisions that asked for central management due to their size.173 Planning, control, and financial management were the tasks of one or a few persons who worked under the owner and above regular laborers. These administrators (or: managers) had emerged due to the rise of large corporations, the firms historian Alfred Chandler famously called Multidivisional Firms in his (1977) book The Visible Hand.174 Of course, not everybody worked in a large firm like the large corporate Shell (established 1890) and Philips (established 1891), but the Netherlands did experience an increase in economic growth between 1880 and 1910, which was partly caused by and resulted in, as the Dutch historian Jan Luiten van Zanden describes it, “an increased concentration of workers in large often multidivisional companies.”175 This corporate industrial revolution required new research and education. One century before that period, the classic author of the modern economy Adam Smith focused on how the ‘invisible hand’ of the market organized the economy. Smith acknowledged the need for managerial coordination, but this was certainly not his central interest, which was specialization, economic prosperity and even ethics. Hence, modern business authors have had to devise this managerial aspect of the economy |themselves. It was against this historical and intellectual background of the rise of larger corporations that the first business courses – bedrijfsleer – were given at Delft University, from 1905 onwards. In 1913 the first school of management of the Netherlands was established in Rotterdam.176 It was a university of applied science – Handelshogeschool – and it was rather practical in orientation. As the Dutch scholars in business school history Peter van Baalen and Luchien Karsten remark: “Bedrijfsleer was more or less the Dutch version of the German Betriebswissenschaftslehre (BWL). Bedrijfsleer was an unrestricted and fragmented field of commercial and industrial courses, which lacked an 173 Luiten van Zanden, Jan, The Economic History of the Netherlands, 1914-199: a small open economy in the ‘long’ twentieth century, Routledge, London, United Kingdom, Chapter 3 The Rise of the Managerial Enterprise. 174 Chandler, Alfred, The Visible Hand. The Managerial Revolution in American Business. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, United States, 1977. 175 Luiten van Zanden, Jan, The Economic History of the Netherlands, 1914-199: a small open economy in the ‘long’ twentieth century, Routledge, London, United Kingdom, p. 5. 176 See: Stuijvenberg, Johannes H, De Nederlandse Economische handelshogeschool, 1913-1916, Nijgh en van Ditmar, Rotterdam, the Netherlands, 1963. 119 4 integrating formal object. It was called Kunstleer (like in Germany) instead of a science: a collection of poorly abstracted, loosely coupled topics from scientific management and book keeping with a strong orientation on practice.”177 The practicality of the business study-program can also be found in a textbook by Ernst Heijmans, acknowledged as the first real consultant of the Netherlands.178 In his (1949) book Elements of Applied Organization he says: “The reader should realize that one cannot become a manager ‘out of a book’.”179 There was a general awareness that business was a concrete object of inquiry. This is fully congruent with what happened in the United States. At Wharton School, the first business school of the United States, founded in 1881, business professors “[..] had found most of their curricular material in the business world, not in the universities (in science). Despite their energy and enthusiasm, their scholarship had essentially been an extended form of business journalism.”180 Wharton business school was a typically Anglo-Saxon example in endorsing both a practical and a humanistic-ethical approach to business. The development of business education in Germany was different. The German university was modern in its appraisal of scientific research. Conversely, education in England and the United States emphasized the socialization into “gentlemen, statesmen, and administrators”, whereas German universities were centers for “scholarship and knowledge”.181 American universities have always had a strong normative component that is slightly different from the continent. Liberal education is the name of the general aim of American universities, toward which aim they aspire to transform students into good members of society.182 These liberal arts are often taught in rather small ‘colleges’ with guidance from tutors. Students are under the authority of the liberal tradition in which those tutors operate. Hence, business thinking was part of the humanities. In fact, the British found the idea of a professionally-educated manager odd and preferred to see managers 177 Baalen, van, Peter, Luchien Karsten, ‘The Social Shaping of the early Business Schools in the Netherlands. Professions and the power of abstraction’ in: Journal of Management History, vol. 16, no. 2, 2010, pp. 153-173, p. 160. 178 See: Hijmans, Ernst, Zestig Jaar Organiseren, Nijgh & Van Ditmar, Rotterdam, the Netherlands, 1973. 179 Hijmans, Ernst, Hoofdlijnen der Toegepaste Organisatie, Kluwer, Deventer, the Netherlands, 1949, p. V. 180 Sass, Steven. A, The Pragmatic Imagination, A history of the Wharton School 1881-1981, University of Pennsylvania press, Philadelphia, the United States, 1982, p. 268. 181 Locke, Robert, Management and Higher Education since 1945. The influence of America and Japan on West Germany, Great Britain and France, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom, 1989, p. 59. 182 In Defense of Liberal Education (2015) by Fareed Zakaria is a recent example. 120 as a kind of gifted amateurs, rather than experts, who had a considerable background in the humanities.183 When Joseph Wharton offered to finance the business school that would be named after him, a new department for finance and economy at the University of Pennsylvania, he deliberately chose the liberal arts college: “To provide for young men special means of training and of correct instruction in the knowledge and in the arts of modern finance and economy, both public and private, in order that, being well informed and free from delusions on these important subjects, they either serve the community skillfully as well as faithfully in offices of trust, or remaining in private life, may prudently manage their own affairs and aid in maintaining sound financial morality: in short, to establish means for imparting liberal education in all matters concerning finance and economy.” 184 In Germany, business education was introduced differently. Locke shows that it was introduced parallel to the sciences in special universities of applied sciences – Handelshochschulen – of which the first one was introduced in Leipzig, in 1898.185 Business schools emerged from the tradition of the engineering sciences in which students were not so much focused on science or humanities, but on a third type of knowledge: “[..] Technik to use the untranslatable word German engineers employ to define that unique combination of scientific knowledge and craftsmanship which characterize their subjects.”186 Technik is a combination of knowledge and skills. Yet, in Germany both engineers and business scholars had to work in the structure of science, with its footnotes, articles, books, and dissertations, which led to a combination of educational purposes: acquainting students with scientific inquiry and practical thinking. The beginnings of business studies in Germany were colored by the practical mindset that equipped students with knowledge of specific sectors, products and the technology employed in it. 183 See: Granick, David, The European Executive, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, United Kingdom, 1962. Also see: Wilson, Robbie, Guerriero, ‘The Struggle for management education in Britain: The Urwick Committee and the Office Management Association’, in: Management and Organization History, vol. 6(4), pp. 367-389, p. 368. 184 Quoted in Sass, The Pragmatic Imagination, A history of the Wharton School 1881-1981, University of Pennsylvania press, Philadelphia, Cambridge, United Kingdom, p. 21. 185 Locke, Robert, The End of Practical Man. Entrepreneurship and Higher education in Germany, France, and Great Britain, 1880-1940, Jai press Inc, 1984, London, United Kingdom, Chapter 5 Why not Business Schools? 186 Locke, Robert, Management and Higher Education since 1945. The influence of America and Japan on West Germany, Great Britain and France, Cambridge University Press, 1989, Cambridge, United Kingdom, p. 77. 121 4 The orientation to practice remained uncontested in the United States and the Netherlands up until the 1960s, but business schools always had an odd place within universities, for they did not resemble the classic professions.187 It was unclear to what ‘greater good’ business is devoted. Law is oriented towards justice and medicine towards health as their greater goods. But how can we understand the grand purpose of business as a profession? Well, in the early years of business studies this question was less difficult to answer than it is now: Business was understood as a function of society and as a mechanism to realize prosperity. Recall Wharton’s motivation, quoted above, for establishing a business school: it was partly practical, partly moral. After the Great Crash in 1930, there was much discussion about the lack of morality of business and business schools, but compared to the 1990s the rationale of the curriculum had strong social aspects. 188 The moral-societal focus is also visible in classic business books and textbooks. In his study The Functions of the Executive, Chester Barnard described the functions of the executive as the need to: 1) maintain communication channels, 2) ensure individual contributions and 3) formulate organizational goals. Barnard writes that this executive process is not “intellectual: it is aesthetic and moral, involving a sense of fitness, of appropriateness, of responsibility.”189 Barnard was not the only business scholar to stress the importance of ethics. In the Netherlands, economist Martinus Cobbenhagen codeveloped programs in business at Tilburg University with a clear moral-religious agenda.190 Significantly, a widely used strategy textbook (1969) in the United States was called Business Policy: Text and Cases. In this book the student learns that managerial decisions are related to the total organization of society.191 In the 1970s, this perspective started to change slowly and the term ‘business strategy’ replaced ‘business policy’. This was not merely a change of words but also a different – more narrowly, less socially engaged – perspective on the company. The rich strategy model of business policy (the LCAG-model, an acronym of the names of the authors192) was translated into the more opportunistic SWOT-model, to which I return in chapter 5.2. In the Netherlands, the moral and social side of business 187 Ibid. p. 5. 188 Also see: Bemelmans-Videc, M.L., Economen in Overheidsdienst. Bijdragen van Nederlandse economen aan de vorming van sociaal-economisch beleid, independently published (accessible in Dutch libraries). 189 Barnard, Chester, The Functions of the Executive, Harvard University Press, United States, 1938, p. 257. 190 Cobbenhagen, P. ‘Economische wetmatigheid, economische mogelijkheid en zedelijke eisen’ in: De Economist nr. 82, pp 3-19. 191 Learned, E. P., R. Christensen, K. Andrews, W. Guth, Business Policy: Text and Cases, Homewood, Massachutes, United States, 1965. 192 Ibid. 122 was supported by governmental programs from the end of the war up until the oil crisis of 1979.193 The general idea was that managers had some public role to fulfil in their business affiliation. Khurana states that the moral-social aspect of business had received more attention due to the Second World war. During that war, millions of Americans worked in factories dedicated to the war effort, encompassing extensive bureaucracies with defined authority structures, administrative rules, and predictable career paths. Khurana claims that Americans, who used to be rather skeptical of large organizations, learned to appreciate large scale organizations in the war. And this appreciation of bureaucracy, if we can call it that, dovetailed with a sense of social responsibility. Citing sociologist Philip Selznick, who wrote about industry in 1957, Khurana states: “[..] along with politics and education, in a list of institutions that ‘have become increasingly public in nature’ and were ‘attached to such interests and dealing with such problems as affect the welfare of the entire community.’ Corporate leaders were increasingly described as “statesmen”, responsible not only for the firm’s economic performance but also for its political and social legitimacy. The executive class, in other words, was now considered part of the political leadership of the country.”194 The vindication of management as a modern profession was also emphasized by the fact that business studies was integrated into universities. Business schools were associated with the “moral authority vested in science and the perceived objectivity of the scientific method.”195 The university was the home of the classical professions of law, medicine, and divinity; simply being part of the university confirmed the legitimacy of management. Education soon played a major role in the perceived ‘cognitive exclusiveness’ of management in the public mind. The university embodied non-utilitarian ideals – that were explored in journals and associations – which connected management to broader issues. Hence, management was integrated into a more substantial body of knowledge, in which moral and social questions played a role. 193 Karsten, Luchien, and Kees van Veen, ‘From initiator to consumer: The changing role of the government in the field of Dutch management in the period 1945-95, in: Management Learning, 2005, pp. 237-255, pp. 243-247. 194 Khurana, Rakesh, From Higher Aims to Hired Arms. The Social Transformation of American Business Schools and the Unfulfilled Promise of Management as a Profession, Princeton University Press, Princeton, United States, Oxford, United Kingdom, 2007, p. 201. 195 Ibid. p. 92. 123 4 4.2 Phase II (1960-1990): The Scientific Transformation of Business Schools During and especially after the Second World War, more students enrolled in business programs in the United States, even though this discipline was still relatively new and highly vocational. Two major shifts occurred in a period of three to four decades: 1) Science began to be applied to managerial problems; and 2) Business schools lost sight of their professional-practical ambitions. In a way, these changes are already visible in the work of Fredrick Taylor (1856-1915). Prior to the Second World War, management was mainly based on subjects as anthropology and sociology, and business journalism. Management science had very little to do with deductive theory, hypothesis-driven analysis, or mathematical subtlety. Science was practice-oriented and meant to help control the organization, its purpose was not solely the acquisition of knowledge sec. Its focus was on facts and it attempted to discern patterns in data. However, during the war, an arsenal of quantitative tools was created “such as linear programming, system analysis, computer simulations, network analysis, queuing theory, and cost accounting systems to control and administer the war machine.”196 In addition to the social sciences, the normative ideals underlying the idea of professions were superseded by a technical outlook on management as a science. The manager was now more often described as ‘system designer’, ‘information processor’, or ‘programmer’. In the Netherlands, we see a comparable change, especially due to the work of economists that enabled people to see corporations in the light of a systematic-market approach. Managerial expertise itself was perceived more as a general skill that could be applied irrespectively of function or context. The United Kingdom followed the same path: it remodeled business along the lines of the sciences. This was partly caused by a general (over)appreciation of the sciences – ‘physics envy’.197 More importantly, the American approach to management was perceived as scientific and considered to be successful. This was related to the managerial ‘headache’ of the British after WWII: various sources display that the businesses 196 Ibid. p. 203. 197 See: Thomas, Howard and Robbie, Guerriero, Wilson, ‘‘Physics Envy’, Cognitive Legitimacy or Practical Relevance: Dilemmas in the Evolution of Management Research in the UK.’ In: British Journal of Management, vol. 22, 2011, pp. 443-456. 124 and governments in the United Kingdom had not been very efficient.198 This new scientific paradigm in management was already present in the work of Taylor. It proves insightful to summarize his idea of ‘scientific management’, which the Dutch philosopher of business and economics René ten Bos calls ‘the curse’ of business studies. Taylor’s ideas are obsolete in many ways, often acknowledged in business textbooks, but Ten Bos calls it a curse because the ideas still influence managers strongly.199 Apparently, Taylor has articulated some fundamental premises of management. With The Principles of Scientific Management (1911), Taylor wrote a book that was somewhere in between the old (vocational) and new (scientific) management ethos. The book elevated the manager, for it identified a clear role for him as someone who had to add something to the production process. The manager was praised for being the all-seeing eye of the shop floor, a perspective vindicated in Chandler’s Visible Hand half a century later. In Taylor’s analysis of the production process, good managers worked scientifically. Taylor distinguished this ‘scientific management’ from the managers he perceived as old-fashioned, with their rules-of-thumb. Taylor developed the blueprint of sciences of certain practices (like metal cutting, bricklaying, and so on) aiming to make these practices more efficient. The manager should identify the important steps in any production process and select and instruct the right laborers to fulfil tasks. The craftsman with his cultivated judgment, based on experience, should be replaced by laborers who do exactly what management tells them to do based on profit- and loss accounts and time-motion studies. As Taylor says: “In the past man has been first; in the future the system must be first.”200 Crucial to this system is what Taylor has called task-management. The coherence of tasks, according to Taylor, is not realized through communication but by a system created by managers. The Dutch philosopher Frits Schipper systematically analyzed Taylor’s work and concludes that Taylor purified and de-personalized the knowledge of workers.201 The eventual goal of this managerial strategy was to take control over the system of tasks to 198 Wilson, Robbie, Guerriero, ‘The Loss of Balance Between the Art and management: Observations on the British Experience of Education for Management in the 20th century’, in: Journal of Management Education, vol. 39(I), 2015, pp. 16-35, p. 19. Also see: Tiratsoo, N, ‘‘What you need is a Harvard’, the American influence on British management education, c. 1945-1965’, in: Missionaries and managers: American influences on European management education, 1945-1965, (eds. T.R. Gournvish and N. Tiratsoo), Manchester England, Manchester University Press, 1998, pp. 140-156. 199 Ten Bos, René, Bureaucratie is een inktvis, Boom Uitgeverij, Amsterdam, the Netherlands, 2015 p. 199. 200 Taylor, Fredrick, The Principles of Scientific Management. New York, Northon Library Edition, 1967, p. 2. 201 Schipper, Frits, ‘A philosophical reading of a classic of management and organization: F W Taylor’, in: Philosophy of Management, vol. 6, no. 3, 2008, pp. 23-38. 125 4 gain efficiency, understood as work at the lowest costs with maximal results. Eventually, the goal of management turned out to increase incomes. Scientific management was perceived as a potential peacemaker in the latent conflict between capital and labor. In Taylor’s approach, efficiency was to be the buzz of the shop floor. And, according to Taylor, all financial benefits due to efficiency should be shared among owners, workers, and managers. Thus, in the Taylorian paradigm of the early twentieth century, business thinking, the quest for efficiency was supposed to pacify the conflict between workers and owners. Ultimately, Taylor’s work only shifted the conflict; efficiency was ascribed to the activity of management, which in practice subordinated the workers. Moreover, in the public mind, managers were often identified with owners.202 Still, from the late 19th century well into the 20th century there was a genuine concern for labor violence. It is important to read Taylor against the background of the rise of standardized production lines, like that of Ford automobiles. This context allowed for quantification, a calculative way of approaching business that de facto overshadows human factors and all matters related to judgment, ethics, and artisanship. But his general ideas of task management were also applicable to other types of corporations. The detachment of managerial work from the shop floor (or: daily business activities) increased exponentially due to the growth of firms. In 1929, 15 percent of the largest American companies were diversified into more than 1 businesses; by 1960, 60 percent was transformed into a conglomerate form of organization. The rise of the conglomerate had a profound impact on the number of managers and along the way they organized their work. The chairman of Textron, one of the new conglomerates in this era, described his business as “[..] a pure conglomerate … We have no principle product.”203 The whole idea of management changed with the rise of conglomerates: the orientation to products and industry was replaced by one to profit making. “As a result of this profit-maximizing orientation – and because, in conglomerates such as Textron or Liton, a single executive was often responsible for ten or twelve different businesses – concrete, industry- or firm-specific knowledge and skills were devalued.”204 However, the economist 202 The reception of Taylor’s thought in the public mind was ambivalent. Apart from the described negative aspects (also see footnotes 176 and 182), there was lots of enthusiasm. See: Samuel Haber, Efficiency and Uplift: Scientific Management in the Progressive Era, 1890–1920, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, United States, 1964. 203 Khurana, Rakesh, From Higher Aims to Hired Arms. The Social Transformation of American Business Schools and the Unfulfilled Promise of Management as a Profession, Princeton University Press, Princeton, United States, Oxford, United Kingdom, 2007, p.208. 204 Ibid. p.209. 126 John K. Galbraith argued that the post-war economy was less profit-oriented and avoided risks with the use of managerial planning. Galbraith argued that the managerial revolution of the last century had much more in common with bureaucratic planning than with functioning in market-economies. 205 In anyway, it was Taylor (and his many followers) who legitimized the role of planning as a separate managerial function. Taylor legitimized business schools by offering a scientific approach to management. Yet, at the same time there is an inherent discrepancy between abstract theory and business practice in his theories – a discrepancy that, I propose, was transplanted into business school theory and practice. In a sense, the acquired scientific legitimacy of business schools is also their weakness: its potential isolation of the shop floor. Khurana defines a professional primarily in relation to the greater good – in line with corporate social responsibility – and risks overlooking the problematic connection of business practice and business theory in Taylor’s work and the business school ethos in general. The result is a manager who might be greatly distanced from the actual work processes but at the same time has a more expansive view of society than a strictly economic one. The rapid growth of business schools in the United States after the Second World War made it difficult to continue to instill in students a mentality of social responsibility. The pragmatism of the times demanded that business schools simply ‘worked’. Standardization was the chosen method of offering many students their promised business education. This process of standardization was empowered by the requirements of private organizations. Before the war, Khurana shows, different business schools distinctly perceived themselves as divergent in vision, organization, and context. After the war, business education itself was more organized along uniform Taylorian lines. As Judith Merkle describes in her thorough book on the influences of Taylorism in different societal realms: “From the start scientific managers had an interest in reforming higher education to conform to their own image. Taylor had strong ideas, not only about the inefficiency of colleges, but their impractical overemphasis on theory and their dangerous liberality in the handling of students. Students had too many ‘cuts’, to many electives, drank and partied too much, and were intolerant of business discipline after graduation. These symptoms were all produced by the educational idea that was sarcastically summarized by 205 See: Galbraith, K. John, The New Industrial State, Princeton University Press, Oxford, United Kingdom, 1967. 127 4 Taylor: ‘The child and the young man should be free to develop naturally, like a beautiful plant or flower’. The purpose of higher education in his view was not liberal education, but to feed man power into industry.”206 The focus of business schools on creating a workforce is nonetheless related to societal views, at least in the United States. Khurana argues that not only the government but also private institutions with a philanthropic inclination, prompted by the Cold War to strengthen American society, strongly promoted science in general and business science in particular. The Carnegie Foundation and Ford Foundation are the most substantial of these institutions.207 Khurana argues that their impact on the history of business schools is inestimable. “Leaders at both Carnegie and Ford believed that strengthening democracy in the face of the communist threat was integral to the post-World War II missions of their respective foundations. Support for democracy, in turn, was seen as inextricably linked to support for corporations and management.”208 For this reason, the reform of business education became nearly synonymous with patriotism. These foundations instilled in American business schools a culture that strongly preferred abstract theory over practice, and science over vocation. During the 1950s these ideals were actively advocated: Herbert Simon would later describe his activities as being part of a “revolutionary cell that would forever reshape business education”, which he saw as “a wasteland of vocationalism that needed to be transformed into science-based professionalism.”209 The Ford and Carnegie foundations favored analytical training based on economics and behavioral science over the cultivation of intuition and judgment. The result was that management transformed into a technocratic practice from the mid-1960s onwards, although ‘practice’ is not the right word, because management education was abstract rather than practical.210 As an MBA-graduate remarks to Khurana: “I don’t think I learned anything that was practically useful for me in any of my jobs. But then again, I didn’t learn anything that was harmful. We were a group of bright, 206 Merkle, Judith Management and Ideology. The Legacy of the International Scientific Management Movement, University of California Press, United States, 1980, p. 72. 207 The Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching referred to here is the predecessor of the institute that published the book discussed in Chapter 2.4. Hence, this institute developed from a proponent of strict management-science into an institute that favours plural forms of knowledge. 208 Khurana, Rakesh, From Higher Aims to Hired Arms. The Social Transformation of American Business Schools and the Unfulfilled Promise of Management as a Profession, Princeton University Press, Princeton, United States, Oxford, United Kingdom, 2007, p.239. 209 Quoted in: Ibid. p.254. 210 Ibid. p.272. 128 intelligent people, eager to learn whatever we were taught.” Because so little of the learned theories were grounded in actual business practices, the relevance of these theories diminished rapidly. 211 This led to a situation in which business schools lost interest in the concrete side of scientific management and instead focused on ‘leadership’. Early writers on management used the terms ‘management’ and ‘leadership’ interchangeably, like Selznick. In his (1957) book Leadership in Administration, he linked leadership to the daily, messy workplace in which managerial goals had to be achieved. As Gilmore and Kranz remark in their critical piece on this distinction: “[..] leadership refers to the articulation of a mission, direction setting, vision, and strategic thinking; management becomes the administrative functions of achieving the goals, administering policies and procedures, and monitoring and controlling.”212 Philip Hühn argues that the tendency to heroize is prevalent in today’s MBA education in the United States and Germany and it seems likely that we will find aspects of it in The Netherlands as well. 213 The isolation of management from the rest of the employees is already a presumption in Taylor’s work. To what extent do Dutch business schools follow this development in which practice-oriented knowledge is replaced with science-oriented knowledge? The work of Van Baalen and Karsten shows there are differences. In the 1950s, business schools were criticized for being nursery institutions for specialists (business economists, accountants) and a general business education, including more sociological and psychological thinking was now favored. This movement was supported by the bigger Dutch corporations like Shell and Unilever. It was also influenced by the American interest in interdisciplinary work.214 The difference, however, is that Dutch business schools experienced a broadening of the horizon, whereas American business schools began focusing strongly on science. This would, eventually, also blow over to The Netherlands, with the result that many ‘qualitative’ and ‘human’ topics were analyzed by means of quantitative methodologies. Nevertheless, Van Baalen and Karsten argue that an ecology of different sub-courses and methods characterizes the Dutch situation. The risk is that of ‘being stuck in 211 Alajoutsijärvi, Kimmo, Katharina Juusola, Marjo Siltaoja, ‘The Legitimacy Paradox of Business Schools: Loosing by Gaining?’, in: Academy of Management Learning and Education, 2015, vol. 14, no.2, pp. 277-291, p. 284. 212 Kranz, James, Thomas N. Gilmore, ‘The Splitting of Leadership and Management as a Social Defense’, in Human Relations, vol. 43, no. 2, 1990, pp. 183-204. 213 Hühn, M. P., ‘Unenlightened Economism: The Antecedents of Bad Corporate Governance and Ethical Decline. Journal of Business Ethics, 2008, 81, pp. 823–835. 214 Van Baalen, Peter, Luchien Karsten ‘The Evolution of Management as an interdisciplinary field’, in: Journal of Management History, vol. 18, no2., 2012, pp. 219-237, pp.229-230. 129 4 between’ the different fields of strategy, finance, organization, ethics, and so on. The difference with the situation in the United States, if we follow Khurana, is the stronger focus there on scientific models as the unifying horizon of the different sub courses. 215 However, we see that that management as a separate function (as opposed to an integrated function) surfaces in both cases. 4.3 Phase III (1990-): The Marketization of Business Schools Khurana argues that the scientific approach eventually lost ground in favor of the finance approach as the dominant discipline within business administration. It is worth following this argument, which is also supported by Locke, but we need to keep in mind that the Dutch situation would never fully integrate the finance model. The current situation is one in which different disciplines are important, although finance plays a key role. Another important topic in business curricula would become that of the consumer, for instance in marketing. By the late 1960s, there were growing doubts about the usefulness of the quantitative form of management science. Moreover, public perception of management changed due to the Vietnam War and the role of technocratic leadership, embodied by Robert McNamara, who was president of Ford and later Secretary of Defense. 216 Yet, the academic staff that emerged in the 1970s in the United States had little or no connection to practicing managers outside of the school. Few were motivated in their research to understand the real-world problems managers were facing. Instead they were motivated to solve theoretical and conceptual problems in mathematics, economics, and other quantitative disciplines. This narrow, specialized work was of almost no importance to the practice of management. “For people in that immediate postwar generation, numbers implied objectivity and accuracy. They were led to think, erroneously, that decisions based on numbers would be independent of the observer or of mere opinion. They also thought management could decide rationally and aspire to omniscience. But for most practicing managers not all the variables that effect their decisions and outcomes can be modelled mathematically. At the point where outcomes cannot be modelled, where numbers no longer 215 Curricula in the United Kingdom in the 1960-70s mainly consist out of academic books; there is almost an absence of works by practioners in courses. Smith, Gerry, ‘Key Books in Business and Management Studies: An Analysis of Heavily Used Literature in UK Business Schools’, in: Management Education and Development 8, 1977, pp. 119-130, p. 125. 216 See: Priestland, David, Merchant, Soldier, Sage. A New History of Power. Allen Lane, New York, United States, 2012, P.171. 130 suffice and the managers’ rationality is evidently bounded, there human agency or judgment enters in counterbalance the messages the numbers convey.”217 The process of scientisation of business schools by business professors themselves evolved in a period of economic turmoil. The ‘golden years’ of capitalism that started in the wake of the Second World War were over. The Bretton Woods international monetary agreement, which had made the Dollar into an international stable currency, was abandoned. At the same time, international competition for manufactured goods rose rapidly. The recession of 1981-82 was deep and cut across almost every sector, resulting in unemployment rates of more than 10% in the United States. Large corporations in chemical, steel, and auto industries rapidly lost significance. Corporations disillusioned many workers. The manager as a person was fiercely criticized and mistrusted. An article in Harvard Business Review titled Managing our way to economic decline put the blame of the economic decline on managers, and on the techniques, they learned in business schools: “American Managers [..] have increasingly relied on principles which prize analytical detachment and methodological elegance over insight, based on experience, into the subtleties and complexities of strategic decisions. As a result, maximum short-term financial returns have become the overriding criteria for many companies.”218 This criticism was shared by a group of people favoring a ‘back to basics’strategy for business schools. Locke describes that the Japanese economy and the motivation of its work-force inspired this group.219 This also implied a criticism on modern ‘scientific management’ and the way business schools taught all kinds of abstract and community-less ideas of work. This criticism was part of a large ethos-shift in business schools in which ‘managerial capitalism’ would lose ground and make way for ‘investor capitalism’. This shift was empowered by a second group of critics of the managerial system and business schools. This group consisted mainly of economists and 217 Locke, Robert, John S. Spender, Confronting Managerialism. How the Business elite and their Schools threw our Lives out of Balance. 2011, Zed Books, London New York, 2011, p. xiii. 218 Abernathy, William J., Robert Hayes, ‘Managing our Way to Economic Decline, in: Harvard Business Review, July-august 1980, p. 70 (Quoted in Khurana 2007, p.300) 219 Locke, Robert, Management and Higher Education since 1945. The influence of America and Japan on West Germany, Great Britain and France, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom, 1989, p. 52. 131 4 policymakers, mostly trained at the Chicago School, and they were skeptical of the capacity of managers to reform voluntarily. Moreover, contrary to the first group, they saw the government as part of the problem of economic decline. The Chicago School argued that the US should rely more on markets, both for regulation of the overall economy and for corporate governance. 220 Therefore, the balance of power changed: not corporate executives but financial actors now became the people in charge. As in the era of conglomerates, firms were seen primarily as financial assets, only now the value was to be determined by the market and not by prudent managers. A positive effect of this financial revolution was that inefficient firms and uncompetitive industries were allowed to die, thereby allowing new firms to emerge. Because of the new capitalistic order, however, firms were less seen as institutions with any social responsibility, other than increasing shareholder value. Markets and corporations were no longer seen as institutions complementary to the state but were instead regarded as the most important institutions of society. This eventually resulted in theories like that of new public management that argued that non-economic realms, like that of journalism, culture, and government, should be changed with the use of commercial mechanisms (cf. section 1.1). Citizens had to think more like consumers. This was not an isolated development in management thinking, but part of the liberalization of the Thatcher, Reagan and Lubbers era. Compared to the beginning of the twentieth century, consumption was already considerable, but in the 1990s more emphasis was placed in business studies on branding, marketing, and luxury. This dovetails with the interest in shareholders who wanted the firms in which they invested to reach out to consumers. Whereas the scientific managers of the latter decades focused on efficiency, the new managers focused on customer satisfaction. In the book The New Spirit of Capitalism, Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello show how the term management itself loses attraction in management literature. It is associated with old fashioned hierarchies, whereas the 1990s envision a more flexible type of ‘team leaders’ and ‘coaches’. These authors suggested that the mechanisms of control are still effective and that the management theories of the 1990s still have lots in common with those of the 1960s. 221 In the meanwhile, the interest shifted from management to markets, especially 220 Khurana, Rakesh, From Higher Aims to Hired Arms. The Social Transformation of American Business Schools and the Unfulfilled Promise of Management as a Profession, Princeton University Press, Princeton, United States, Oxford, United Kingdom, 2007, p.302. 221 Boltanski, Luc, Eve Chiapello, The New Spirit of Capitalism, tr. Gregory Elliott, London, United Kingdom, Verso, 2005 (or. Le nouvel esprit du capitalism Editions Gallimard 1991), esp. Part I.1 Management Discourse in the 1990s, pp. 57-102, p. 79 in particular. 132 financial markets would become a very important point of reference in business schools. The field of corporate finance played a pivotal role in the emergence of investor capitalism. The ideas in corporate finance converge in the central theory of the efficient market hypothesis. This theory is based on the idea of man as a homo economicus, a rational, economic man. According to this theory the market is always right. The price someone is willing to pay for a firm or a firm’s stocks reflect the fundamental value of the firm. This idea had consequences for the role of managers: “If capital markets are efficient, then the market value of the firm reflects the present value of the firm’s expected future net cash flows, including cash flows from future investment opportunities. Thus, the efficient market hypothesis has several important implications for corporate finance. First, there is no ambiguity about the firm’s objective function: managers should maximize the current value of the firm. Hence management does not have to choose between maximizing the firm’s current value or its future value, and there is no reason for management to have a time horizon that is too short … This allows scholars to use security returns to estimate the effects of various corporate policies and events on the value of the corporation.”222 These ideas revolutionized business schools from training grounds for general managers to institutions that trained investors. New theories of what a firm is such as Agency Theory and Transaction-Cost Economics would complete this shareholder perspective. As a direct consequence of these theories, managers were motivated and legitimized in being responsible only to shareholders, a group whose composition changed continually, that was focused entirely on short-term gains. Rather than self-disciplined individuals using their expert knowledge for the greater good, managers were now seen as corruptible agents of shareholders. Therefore, graduates increasingly opted for jobs as management consultants, investment bankers and portfolio managers, rather than jobs as managers. During classes in finance they were informed about leverage and stock options to align corporate actions with the aims of shareholders. The resulting notion of firms instilled in students was that of a profit vehicle without any further obligations than serving the interest of shareholders. 222 Khurana, Rakesh, From Higher Aims to Hired Arms. The Social Transformation of American Business Schools and the Unfulfilled Promise of Management as a Profession, Princeton University Press, Princeton, United States, Oxford, United Kingdom, 2007, p.310. 133 4 This neoclassical paradigm of transaction-cost theory, agency theory and the efficient market hypothesis had, according to Khurana, considerable influence in real-world business. Agency theory, for example, excludes from consideration any concept of collective identity and collective responsibility.223 Moreover, it provides economic justification for take-overs, arguing that leveraging companies is the best way to discipline managers into working as efficiently as possible.224 “By reducing managers to minimally trustworthy agents of shareholders, the proponents of agency theory nullified the significance of factors like duty, loyalty or social conscience.”225 Many scholars criticize the shift towards neoclassical/shareholder theory in business, but up until now it is still part of business curricula, also in The Netherlands, mainly due to its applicability to certain quantitative methods. This is an important to realize: shareholder capitalism dovetails with the expectation of students and teachers of what science offers, namely numbers, calculations, clear-cut conclusions, deductions, and so on. There are roughly two versions of the criticism from within the tradition of business studies itself on the new scheme of things: the rise of business ethics and corporate social responsibility. The latter was not new but rather a kind of return to the ‘forgotten’ understanding of business not strictly in terms of accountancy and strategy but also as a matter of business policy. But the theory of corporate social responsibility did not only echo the older idea that business is embedded in society and that management is a type of profession, with its own responsibilities towards society, it also turned into an ethical theory.226 In such an ethical understanding firms ought to accept social responsibility. A similar appeal was made by ethicists that focused on business. Both business ethics and corporate social responsibility are a response to theory of Neoclassical business economics and to the business reality that it mirrored. The problem, however, is that business ethics and corporate social responsibility never reached the center of the business ethos 223 224 225 226 134 Ibid. p.325. Ibid. p.319. Khurana, Rakesh, MBA’s gone wild. American Interest, Jul. vol. 4, no. 6, 2009, pp. 46-54, p. 51. Corporate social responsibility is a widely used term. Sometimes it is instrumentalized and it is meant to describe the economic aspect of interactions between society and business. Sometimes it is understood in an ethical way. See for an overview on different interpretations: Garriga, Elisabet, Domènec Melé, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility Theories: Mapping the Territory’, in: Journal of Business Ethics, Aug. 2004, vol. 53, pp. 51-71. and remained marginal. 227 There are several reasons for this marginal role and an important one is that these subjects are at odds with central messages from other courses. This is in no way unique, for there is also disagreement about what work is between finance and human resource management, and the marginality of business ethics and corporate social responsibility is part of the general problem of the lack of an overall perspective in business administration (I return to this issue in the next chapters). Nonetheless, it is painful for business ethics and corporate social responsibility because they are meant to counterbalance the ‘thin’ morality of the courses in finance and economics. Take for instance virtue ethics, which teaches the ideas of ‘wisdom’, ‘self-control’ and ‘empathy’. The market risk is precisely that these virtues are interpreted, to quote philosopher Pearce, “as virtues for business, that is, for the sake of efficiency, utility and profit.” 228 Despite this risk of a thin or even instrumental interpretation – façade ethics – (cf. section 1.1), the recognition of ethics and social corporate responsibility is still growing, although in small steps. Hence, the focus on shareholders and consumers since the 1990s dovetails with an interest in morality. 4.4 How the Content (the ‘What’) of Business Education affects its Form (the ‘How’) The focus of business administration on shareholders and especially customers dovetailed with a general economic reform that started in the eighties with Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher (and Ruud Lubbers in the Netherlands). In the corporate world, economic survival became the focal point of attention. The government itself was also reorganized. ‘Less government and more market’ became the core message. This is also what happened in academic education itself. The Dutch academic system is, on an institutional level, 227 Apart from these programs within business faculties, Dutch universities tried to develop interdisciplinary courses since the 1950s, mostly in the form of a ‘studium generale’. For an overview of these criticial courses, meant to create more moral awareness for those who are interested, see: Doorsman, Leen, Peter Jan Knegtmans, ‘Studium General: een mislukte doorbraak (1945-1960), in: Universiteit en Samenleving. Universitaire Vormingsidealen. Verloren B.V. 2006, pp. 55-68. 228 Pearce, Colin D., ‘Aristotle and Business: An Inescapable Tension’, in: in: Handbook of the Philosophical Foundations of Business Ethics, ed. C. Luetge, pp. 23-43, p.38. See for an account of virtue ethics for business which considers this risk of instrumentalization, especially: Moore, Geoff, Virtue at Work. Ethics for Individuals, Managers and Organizations, Oxford University Press, Oxford, United Kingdom, 2017, p.31. 135 4 reorganized with quasi-market principles. 229 In this paragraph I illustrate this (quasi-)marketization and its effects on the business student ethos. I do not offer a complete ethnographic account of the rituals of business education but emphasize some elementary ethological aspects of it. Many students are seen – by the faculty and by themselves – as ‘customers of knowledge’ rather than as ‘members of a faculty’. I realize this does not hold for every student – those who seek to be members, connect with associations, committees, etc. – but the empirical research (cf. Chapter 3) suggests that a large group of students identifies only half and others minimally with his or her school. These students do not see education as something that transforms them (cf. Chapter 2, Introduction), but rather as the transference of certain skills and ideas. Of course, this is not only a result of the organization of business schools, but also of the expectations of students, as many of them see no inherent value to education other than preparatory for business. Nonetheless, this ethos is also a result of how teachers approach students and the content of the theories they teach. For instance, it is rather abnormal in Dutch business schools for teachers to know students by name. This is not surprising, considering that a business faculty deals with hundreds of new students yearly. This situation has seemingly been changing for the better in recent years, as participants of my empirical research say, but the picture remains that students go through academic programs relatively anonymously. Yet, the sheer size of business schools makes it difficult to achieve considerable change. When an organization, such as the university, sees itself as a corporation with customers, this is no problem: the more students, the more income. 230 As long as students keep coming and are satisfied, organizations are legitimized in their own activity. It seems unlikely that business students will become dissatisfied. They study the world in terms of markets, businesses and managers every day. Even if business teachers would try to awaken in them an interest in studying as ‘a goal in itself’ to become an ‘educated person’, this would still be a marginal stimulation within a curriculum mostly concerned with the logic of consumption, production and trade. 229 Regarding the Dutch situation, see If you are so smart, why aren’t you rich? Universiteit, Markt en Management. (eds. Chris Lorenz), Boom Uitgeverij, Amsterdam, the Netherlands, 2012, esp. Lorenz, Chris, ‘De universiteiten en het New Public Management’, pp. 165-198; and Boomkens, René, René Gabriëls, ‘Paradoxen van het academisch kapitalisme’, pp. 107-130. 230 University education is financed per student. This incentive partly explains why university departments grow ever larger. See footnote 229. 136 Textbooks give an indication of the comfort offered to students. As stated in a blurb on such a textbook ‘Not overloaded with jargon, easy to follow’.231 There is nothing wrong with enthusing rhetoric on textbooks, but systematic inquiry suggests that many of those books create a lazy rather than an intellectual attitude. In textbooks, students find many lists, examples, and cases, but few lines of argument. These textbooks risk endorsing “a culture of surface and superficial learning”232 in which students are not stimulated to understand and reflect on theories but simply to remember them in terms of lists. Students learn that efficiency is very important; the exams and thesis themselves are also organized efficiently. Much of the courses throughout the bachelors are tested with multiple choice exams. Obviously, tests like these leave little room for testing intellectual capacities such as making arguments, delineating a line of thought, playing with the learned theories, and so on. What is more important, is that this type of test is at odds with lessons from, say, situational ethics or human resource management. You cannot teach students to focus on the situation and the person at hand, when making a managerial decision, but test this insight in a non-situational and non-personal way. This is an extreme example, but it holds true to a certain extent, for much of the examination. From a moral ethological perspective, it is very important to see how the content of books and the way they are taught and tested are interrelated: The business student ethos is not only a result of theory, but also from the context in which it is studied and examined. 233 Another issue is the bachelor thesis. The fact that it is mostly written in standard formats, with predesigned research questions, does not create the open intellectual atmosphere necessary for innovation. The topic of the bachelor thesis can indeed be innovation in business, but on a moral ethological level, students learn to follow the rules, cite the preselected papers, listen to suggestions, and so on. This kind of process – superficial textbooks, multiple choice exams, anonymous lectures, prefabricated bachelor thesis – creates a certain type of ethos. Students are not really challenged and learn to rapidly become accustomed the expectations of the system in which they 231 See: Fineman, Stephen, Yianus Gabriel, ‘Paradigms of Organizations: an exploration in Textbook Rhetorics’, in: Organization, vol. 1(2), 1994, pp.375-399. 232 Errington, Alison, David Bubna-Litic, ‘Management by Textbook: The Role of Textbooks in Developing Critical Thinking’, in: Journal of Management Education, 2015 vol. 39(6), pp. 774-800, p.776. 233 For a further analysis of multiple choice questions, see: Baardewijk, Jelle, ‘Gegoogle met studenten’, in: Onderwijs in Tijden van Digitalisering (eds. Ad Verbrugge, Jelle van Baardewijk), Uitgeverij Boom, Amsterdam, the Netherlands, 2017, pp. 281-301, esp. part 5, pp. 294-297, Meerkeuzetentamens in een meerkeuzecultuur. 137 4 work. Students uncritically follow crash-courses in all types of subjects that help them pass the exam (‘teaching for the test’). Should we be surprised at this? No. When all signs point to efficiency, business schools risk anchoring this value in the ethological layers of the study program. Again, the Q-research has shown that not all types of student-ethos are single-mindedly focused on efficiency, but my interpretation is that it is a dominant and fundamental value – difficult not to uphold – in all types nonetheless (see: Part I, Evaluation). It has become unclear why a teacher could tell a student that he or she should study differently – better, longer, more creatively, and so on. This kind of qualitative expert-judgment seems to be at odds with the quasi-market of education, in which students can follow programs the way they prefer to. The idea that education offers ‘goods’ – such as curiosity, critical thinking power, analytical skills, and so on – that transform students into a different person has become ‘difficult’, for the societal ideal has changed in favor of an individualistic and commercial self-perception in which everyone decides for his or herself what to aim for with their studies. The ‘hidden curriculum’ causes many students to think education is a matter of supply and demand; they are not accustomed to potential transformative ‘goods’ that could make them think differently about themselves (cf. Chapter 8.3). On the contrary, the content and form of business schools provide a role-formation that is market-oriented and in which knowledge is consumed rather than digested. This is something we find in business schools and other mass-studies, such as medicine and psychology. However, programs in business administration especially could reasonably be required to relate to the general tendency in Dutch student culture to think as a ‘consumer of knowledge’. What complicates the form-problem of business schools, is their broadness. Today’s business schools offer a broad curriculum, involving different disciplines, with quite a strong focus on quantitative skills. This broad curriculum is vindicated by the idea that an educated person must have some overview of the different methods and ways in which anyone can analyze the world of business. A compelling vindication. However, the organization of business schools (1) makes it rather difficult for students to grasp the overall unity of the courses and (2) risks stimulating a superficial understanding of the content of individual courses. The risk is that many students become superficial generalists. No single teacher will endorse this, but it can be the unintended and hidden outcome of the study programs in which they work.234 What makes 234 See for instance, Watson, Tony, Motivation: that’s Maslow, isn’t it? In Management Learning 1996, 27, pp. 447-464; moreover, see footnote 46 and 47. 138 this situation particularly odd, is that where teachers are concerned, there has been a reversed process. Most teachers in Dutch academia combine research with education and the logic of research has become dominant. That is, academics are hired for their publication records in international peer-review journals. Where students risk acquiring the ethos of a superficial generalist, their teachers risk developing the ethos of a narrow specialist. It might be true that many students are inspired by some of these teachers, but there also is a large group of students that recognizes the expertise of professors as expertise and not as an integral part of business thinking. This is precisely the risk of business ethics: its goal might be to educate students and to test them, but not to be a relevant corner stone in the whole of the curriculum. Note that teachers of business ethics, like teachers of any other topics, are primarily hired at universities because of their publication track-record. The chance that students will meet a professor who has experience outside publishing – e.g. in real-life business – or has any (ethical) coaching aspirations is rather small. This has not always been the case, but is part of the current scientific organization of business schools, in which education is of secondary importance.235 My main point, however, does not concern ethics as a course but the ethological formation of students throughout their studies. It would be a great improvement if university teachers would agree on the important books, theories and skills that a student should have command of and how students should prove their command of this ‘canon’. However, this suggestion is clearly at odds with the current academic system in which there is (1) either a lack of awareness of the need for such a canon and/or (2) a lack of knowledge about the practical implications for the teaching of it. In any case, the market model, in which the student is left to his or her own devices, proves to be unfit, for it is not merely the student who decides whether a study program reaches its goals, it is for the people teaching and organizing it to determine as well. The ‘criteria of vindication’ that are currently used by faculties and accreditation bodies turn the attention of teachers to the formal side of education. Business schools are nudged by the educational system to understand responsibility for curriculum-organization as the duty to present auditable results. The combination of market-thinking (‘students as consumers’) and bureaucratic-thinking (‘getting the numbers right’) has a strong influence on the organization of universities. Scholars from different 235 Dijstelbloem, Huub, Frank Huisman, Frank Miedema en Wijnand Mijnhardt, ‘Wetenschap in transitie: zeven zorgen over de universiteit.’ In: Waartoe is de Universiteit op aarde? Wat is er mis en hoe kan het beter? eds. Ad Verbrugge, Jelle van Baardewijk, Uitgeverij Boom, Amsterdam, the Netherlands, 2014, pp. 111-124, p. 118. 139 4 fields have criticized this predicament, which may indicate a change at hand in the coming years. 236 Nonetheless, the system remains more or less intact and the question is how it effects the business student ethos. I propose to see it as the institutional empowerment of a dominant trait in the business school ethos: students learn to think about organizations in terms of their overall strategy, balance-sheet and opportunities for increasing efficiency. There is interest in a more open approach to business, even for ethics and corporate social responsibility, but the organization form of the studies enforces the dominant market/ bureaucracy trait in the content even further. 237 4.5 The Dominance of the Anglo-Saxon Model in Today’s Business Schools In the previous sections I have described the history of business schools and parallel to that the history of business itself. Business schools started as practically and socially engaged departments of universities. The work of Fredrick Taylor inaugurated a scientific version of business schools, but it would be a long time before universities replaced the vocational focus with an academic one. The work of Locke and that of Khurana suggest that this happened slowly in the decades after the Second World War. This change mirrored a development in the economy: from ‘managerial capitalism’ to what eventually would become ‘shareholder capitalism’. Along with this change came another development, namely the interest in consumers and therefore in branding, mass consumption and experience. When business studies started, the manager formed the new center of our economic order, but he had to make way for investors on one side and consumers on the other side of business. Another aspect of this overall development is the process of internationalization of the economy, hence of business schools. It was the rise of the Japanese economy in the second half of the twentieth century that made business schools aware that the American model was not necessarily the ‘one best way’.238 Therefore, cultural analysis entered business curricula, but only as a study object, in the sense of describing cultural differences, without actively 236 Ibid. 237 This explorative section can be complemented with praxeological (or: case study) research to develop a more fine-grained perspective. For instance, one could study experiments with testing, thesiswriting, and mentor-support. For the purposes of this research, this section sufficiently displays how the content of the study is (in)forming how students learn to think and relate to the world during their studies. For example-studies, see Schmidt, Robert, Soziologie der Praktiken. Konzeptionelle Studien und empirische Analyzen. Suhrkamp Verlag, Berlin, Germany, 2012. 238 See: Locke, Robert R. The Collapse of the American Management Mystique. Oxford University Press, 1996. 140 cultivating a different (e.g. Dutch) culture. In this section, I explore this thesis further and connect it to the analysis made above, out of which I distill two major developments in the history of business schools. (1) A decoupling of theory and practice due to an intense focus on science by business scholars and business schools. There still is much emphasis on business skills – consultancy tools such as SWOT and the BCG-Matrix, which I will discuss in Chapter 5 – yet the connection to real business became increasingly weak throughout the twentieth century. (2) A lost sense of professionality, in which management was not only seen as simply maximizing income, but as revolving around serving of a greater good. Business schools distanced themselves from this professional ideal in the 1980s and this is a complex development, partly caused by ambitions to be scientific, combined with ambitions to reach economic prosperity. Moreover, one could argue that the lost connection to society was a result of the lost connection to any typical business – hence (1) –, other than finance and consultancy. I argue that these two developments are closely related to the adoption of the Anglo-Saxon model of education in the Netherlands. This thesis has been suggested by several scholars in business education regarding other countries,239 but not or poorly, in relation to Rhinelandic countries. 240 My intention is not to show that Anglo-Saxon theory is inferior or superior to other types of theories, but I do stress that we can make a distinction. To do so, it is necessary to explore the difference between Anglo-Saxon and Continental culture a little further. This distinction can be stretched in order to understand the two dominant types of countries in the whole West. The United States is a typically Anglo-Saxon country, like the United Kingdom. The French economist Michel Albert has written about this difference between the Rhinelandic and Anglo-Saxon countries in his classic book Capitalism vs. Capitalism.241 According to him, continental countries such as the Netherlands, Finland, Germany, and France differ on very fundamental aspects from Anglo-Saxon culture. 239 Juusola, Kateriina, Kertu Kettunen and Kimmo Alajoutsijärvi ‘Accelerating the Americanization of Management Education: Five Responses from Business Schools.’ In: Journal of Management Inquiry. Vol. 24(4), 2015, pp. 347-369. See especially: pp. 350-352, p. 356. Also see: Boyacigiller, Nakiye Avdan, Nancy J. Adler, The Parochial Dinosaur: Organizational Science in a Global Context, in: The Academy of Management Review, Vol. 16, No. 2, Apr.1991), pp. 262-29. 240 Within the Anglo-Saxon countries, there are also differences. In Chapter 4.2 I referred to the influence of the American model on the United Kingdom. And the debate on the dominance of the Anglo-Saxon model leads to discussion in the United Kingdom. See, for instance: Tiratsoo, Nick, ‘The ‘Americanization’ of Management Education in Britain’, in: Journal of Management Inquiry, vol. 13, no. 2, 2004, pp. 118-126. 241 Albert, Michel, Capitalism vs. Capitalism. How America’s Obsession with Individual Achievement and Short-term Profit has led it to the Brink of Collapse, tr. Paul Haviland, Four Wall Eight Windows, New York, United States, 1993. (or. Capitalisme contre Capitalisme 1991). 141 4 How do these countries differ? To begin with what is most obvious, AngloSaxon countries generally have a positive attitude towards markets. The state, on the other hand, is small in these countries, perceived as inefficient and expensive. In Continental countries, conversely, people have a prima facie skepticism towards markets. This is the case, even taking into consideration the recent deregulation in the 1990s-2000s, which was much stronger in the US and UK than it was in continental countries. In Continental countries, the state is supposed to correct the perceived egoism of the marketplace. Yet, the term ‘correction’ has a regulatory connotation, whereas we must ascribe substantial meaning to the role of the state in an economy in Rhinelandic countries. As philosopher and political scientist Haroon Sheikh describes the difference: “Regulatory functions concern the process of the market, whereas substantial functions concern the outcome of the market, intervening to achieve certain social and economic goals.”242 Sheikh shows that Asian countries go to more extreme lengths when it comes to influencing the outcome of markets. However, Rhinelandic countries do this more than Anglo-Saxon countries do. Furthermore, in Rhinelandic countries there is a strong belief in clear social goals, and society is more consensus-oriented. The state is often the entrusted partner to help a society materialize these social goods. One of these ‘social goods’ in Continental countries is affordable education; on every level, in every field. This brings us to the extraordinary fact that reasonably comparable university-based business schools in the Netherlands and the United States respectively charge 2000 and 30,000 euro in student fees annually. The difference Continental/Anglo-Saxon is systematically explored in the book Varieties of Capitalism, edited by Hall and Soskice. 243 In this book, the key differences lie in (1) ownership and finance, (2) the internal governance of firms, (3) the type of skills and the educational system. I will describe these differences and display how they are related to education. I will follow the difference Hall and Soskice identify between the United Kingdom and Germany, as examples of Anglo-Saxon and Continental economies. First, the financial system or corporate governance. In Germany, access to finance is not entirely based on balance-sheet criteria. Investors base their judgment of the company on private or inside information. Companies seek investors with ‘patient capital’. There are “[..] dense networks linking the managers and technical personnel inside a company to their counterparts in 242 Sheikh, Haroon, Embedding Technopolis. Uitgeverij Boom, Amsterdam, the Netherlands, 2017, p. 109. 243 Also see: Whitely, Richard, Divergent Capitalisms, Oxford University Press, Oxford, United Kingdom, 1998, esp. Chapter 2 The Nature of Business Systems and their Institutional Structuring. 142 other firms on terms that provide for the sharing of reliable information about the progress of the firm.”244 In Germany, companies invest in each other’s business and investors are well-connected.245 Reputation is of great importance in these networks. This picture differs from Anglo-Saxon companies: financial markets are much more important there. When something goes wrong in sales, German companies can endure a decline because investors do not necessarily look at today’s profitability. American companies, on the contrary, rely on measurements and are inclined to raise customer prices in order to keep the balance sheets right and keep the share prices the same. Otherwise, there is danger of a hostile takeover. If this picture is right, we must conclude that the Neoclassical paradigm in business studies is predominantly oriented towards the Anglo-Saxon idea of business and at odds with the Continental one. Second, the internal structure of the firm. In a German company, decisionmaking is organized in a horizontal way – ‘codetermination’. Managers “must secure agreement for major decisions from supervisory boards, which include employee representatives as well as major shareholders, and from other managers with entrenched positions as well as major suppliers and customers.”246 Managers are rewarded for the talent of achieving consensus and have long-term contracts. This is quite the opposite from American managers, who are often paid with financial packages, keeping them focused on the finance side of business. The advantage of this focus is that Anglo-Saxon companies are stronger competitors on price, whereas continental companies compete on quality. This aspect sheds light on our empirical research (cf. Chapter 3), for Dutch business students highly value communication and horizontal organization, illustrating that they did not receive an Anglo-Saxon education in this respect. This focus on codetermination is related to a slightly different understanding of management in general in Rhinelandic countries, epitomized in the work of Henri Fayol.247 Fayol understands management as 244 Hall, Peter A., David Soskice, ‘An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism’, in: Varieties of Capitalism. The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage. ed. Peter A. Hall, David Soskice, Oxford, United Kingdom, 2001, pp. 1-68, p.23. 245 Piketty argues that German corporations are less shareholder-driven, which is why their marketvalue is often much lower than the book-value. See: Piketty, Thomas, Capital in the Twenty-First Century, tr. Arthur Goldhammer, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom, 2014, pp. 140-146, esp. 145. (or. Le Capitel au xxie siècle, 2013). 246 Hall, Peter A., David Soskice, ‘An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism’, in: Varieties of Capitalism. The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage. ed. Peter A. Hall, David Soskice, pp. 1-68, p.24. 247 Fayol, Henri, Administration industrielle et générale, Dunod, France, [1916] 1950. See, for instance, Paragraph 40, Esprit de Corps. Also see Fayol’s criticism of abstract, mathematical analysis in business: Chapter 14, General Principles of Management. 143 4 a task, rather than as a separate position, even in industrial contexts with relatively simple production processes. Managerial tasks are distributed in teams, rather than among a few people. Third, continental countries rely on a highly skilled labor force given substantial work autonomy. Moreover, employees are stimulated to share knowledge with others – inside and outside the firm – thus innovating in a collaborative way. In Anglo-Saxon countries, individuals are encouraged to invest in general skills, transferable across firms, rather than company- or even industry-specific skills.248 Continental countries typically use laborers with industry-specific or even firm-specific skills, hence the close relationship between education and business. This is a remarkable difference that explains the close connection between engineering and business studies in Germany – both studies were ideally seen as cultivating Technik, not strict science. Moreover, the decoupling of theory and practice is clearly at odds with this Continental model.249 Of course, countries do not align perfectly with these ideal types. Sheikh situates the Netherlands somewhere in between the Anglo-Saxon and the Rhinelandic countries. It has an open economy, “an internationally oriented banking sector and relatively large stock markets. The state has little influence over companies compared to France and Germany, although there is a large well-fare state.”250 Nevertheless, we can conclude that two important factors in the history of business schools can be interpreted as amounting to a replacement of the Continental model with the Anglo-Saxon model: the influence of theories that prioritize shareholders and the lost connection to practice and even industry-specific knowledge. One could also argue that the Continental tradition of professionals is stronger than the Anglo-Saxon one, for it goes back to the heritage of the guilt society. That is, however, farfetched. Khurana clearly shows that in the United States, business studies began with professional aims at the close of the nineteenth century in the United States as well. 248 Ibid., p.30. 249 Hall and Soskice identify a fourth characteristic, not relevant for the argument made: Fourth, since contracts are typically long-term, it is hard to get new information in a company in Germany. There is a lively exchange of knowledge in inter-company networks to compensate for this. A considerable amount of research is also financed by intra-firm organizations. Innovation is also a relatively controlled affair: companies focus on specific products and niches, whereas Anglo-Saxon companies aim for revolutionary new systems (i.e. disruptive instead of incremental). 250 Sheikh, Haroon, Embedding Technopolis. Uitgeverij Boom, Amsterdam, the Netherlands, 2017, p.139. 144 It is tricky to systematically teach Anglo-Saxon business models in the context of the Netherlands or any other different culture. I identify three risks, inspired by Finnish scholars Kateriina Jusola et al.: 1) The first risk is naive adoption, which would lead to a misunderstanding of the way work functions in reality. More likely is the existence of a combination of Anglo-Saxon and Continental elements: 2) A blend of Anglo-Saxon and local practices in which a balance is sought between potentially conflicting values. This is a difficult but attractive option. 3) A model in which a school superficially implements an extensive number of American business school practices without considering the overall set of ideas and practices that is associated with American institutions. This is an unfavorable option. It leads to a situation in which students are insufficiently equipped with the context and values of the economic reality they will come to work in after graduation. The way Dutch students learn to think about work in terms of communication clearly aligns with the Continental model, but the way they see work in terms of ‘tasks’ and management as ‘task management’ is much more in line with the Anglo-Saxon model. Dutch business schools would be wise to decide to navigate towards the second model, for there are a number of issues in which they come rather close to the naïve model. Aside from the attention given to shareholder capitalism and work framed in terms of ‘tasks’, as well as the lack of concreteness in business studies, there are several other examples. Dutch business schools use a lot of Anglo-Saxon textbooks which are very focused on big corporations. Family firms, SMEs and startups are studied less, whereas most Dutch people work in these ‘marginal’ companies. Furthermore, there is a tendency in Anglo-Saxon culture to heroize out of certain business ‘leaders’ that is clearly at odds with the horizontal Dutch culture. Another example is the lack of consideration of governmental organizations. Culturally speaking, it is strange to leave this consideration to studies in public policy, for it is typically Rhinelandic to understand the interrelatedness of governments and business. A final example is the language of business studies. In 2018, the majority of study programs in business in the Netherlands is in English and it is impossible to follow a business master’s in the Dutch language. We tend to understand language as a neutral instrument to convey thoughts and theories, but that is a superficial understanding that underestimates the process our thinking undergoes in a different language. Empirical research by Urbig et al. proves that business students in the Netherlands are inclined to think more 145 4 egoistically when they are taught in English (compared to Dutch or French). 251 This is no coincidence if we take the results of the ‘varieties in capitalism’ into consideration, for the Anglo-Saxon culture in general is less focused on the common good than Rhinelandic culture. Conclusion In Chapter 4, I reconstructed the history of business schools. I distinguished three periods: the vocational and social period (1900-1960), the scientific period (1960-1990), and the market period (1990-present). Today’s business school focuses on consumers and shareholders, but some of the elements of the earlier periods remain important. It is, for instance, quite surprising that so many students want to become manager, a typical job from the first period. The interest in a scientific approach of business problems originates in the second period. I have argued that today’s focus on science and markets shapes the way students study. Many students (risk) endorsing a ‘consumer of knowledge’ mentality and this is not simply a matter of students’ selfperception; the organization of the curricula, their tests, mentorship, teaching, etc., supports this mentality. I propose seeing the described historical transformation in light of the adoption of the Anglo-Saxon model in The Netherlands. Here, I suggest a specific interpretation of the general difference between the two ideal-types of economic cultures. I think the difference has become smaller, roughly since the end of the twentieth century. On the one hand, certain elements of Rhinelandic countries have become weaker. I propose that this dovetails with – and is partly caused by – the integration of Anglo-Saxon elements. For instance, finance in Germany and the Netherlands have deregulated many types of markets in the past two decades. On the other hand, certain elements in Anglo-Saxon countries have become amplified. In the case of the United States, there always has been an individualistic culture, but as I have demonstrated in the previous sections, there was considerable moral and social awareness in the decades after the Second World War. Thus, tension between individualism and society has increased within Anglo-Saxon culture. 252 In the 251 See: Urbig, Diemo, Vivien Procher, Katrien Muhlfeld, Arjen van Witteloostuijn, ‘Come on and take a free ride: Contributing to public goods in native and foreign language settings’, in: Academy of Management Learning & Education, 2016, vol. 15, no.2, pp. 268-286. 252 On the loss of a sense of culture in Anglo-Saxon universities there are several books, and although these are rather nostalgic, they do describe a process of de-culturalization. See: Bloom, Allan, The Closing of the American Mind, Simon and Schuster, New York, United States, 1987, esp. Part II Nihilism, American Style. Also see: Readings, Bill, The University in Ruins, Cambridge, London, Harvard University Press, 1996, esp. Introduction and Chapter 8, The Posthistorical university. 146 next section I propose this is partly caused by the general development of modernization in the Western world – and to a certain extent everywhere in the world –, which changed our way of living, and weakened some differences between the culture of Anglo-Saxon and Rhinelandic countries. 4 147 148 Chapter 5: Business Schools as Institutions of Modernization 5 149 Introduction The previous chapter reconstructed the history of business schools. This history sheds light on the major changes the business student ethos underwent. I proposed to interpret the history of business schools considering the ‘varieties of capitalism’-debate. In the current chapter, I view this history in light of the broader development of ‘modernization’. To do so, I reconstruct and apply MacIntyre’s philosophical interpretation of modernity. This interpretation shows values and presuppositions implicit in modernization. These also facilitate a deeper understanding of a disconcerting problem of the current business student ethos: its difficulties integrating business values with societal and ethical values (cf. Chapter 3). I conclude this chapter by showing that this problem is an expression of modernity, which MacIntyre interprets as an individualized-bureaucratic culture – or: ‘the culture of emotivism’ – in which managers represent a normative ideal of value-free organization. We will follow MacIntyre in questioning this ideal and demonstrate the need for a different moral ethological understanding of management, organization, and markets, developed in part III. This chapter opens with a short description of modernization, drawing on a range of authors, and Weber’s and Habermas’ influential interpretation of it (5.1). Thereafter (5.2), I introduce MacIntyre’s analysis of modern science and apply it to some influential theories and tools used in business studies. The important characteristic of modern science is that it aims to find objective ‘facts’ and develops theories that explain them. Using MacIntyre, I show that these ‘neutral’ theories are not as value-free as they present themselves to be. Realizing this allows for an unveiling of the values that helped shape the current business student ethos. In the following paragraphs (5.3 and 5.4), I demonstrate how the modern emphasis on objectivity and ‘value-free’ theories influence modern ethics. MacIntyre shows that the grand modern ethical theories (deontology, utilitarianism) try to develop universal frameworks, which obfuscate the ‘cultural bedding’ implied in these theories. MacIntyre develops a sociological interpretation (discussed in 5.5) of ‘modern’ societies as disembedded (or: individualized, emotivistic) that helps demonstrate how individual preferences have – to an extent – replaced communal morality. MacIntyre’s famous criticism of management as a form of social manipulation is reconstructed in 5.5 as an integral part of that sociological interpretation. 150 5.1 Modernization: Weber, Habermas and MacIntyre Modernization is a sociological term for a multi-layered and continuing process of transformation from traditional to ‘modern’ society. Although ‘modern’ is mostly used in a positive sense, sociologists and philosophers generally agree that modernization is a paradoxical process: 253 Positively seen, modernization creates progress, for modern people live more healthily, longer and in greater comfort than people ever did. Moreover, modern people have better education, social mobility and opportunities for self-development and live in more equal societies. However, modern societies and economies also cause trouble. The loss of traditional society, for instance, causes anxiety and stress. In this section I expound some important characteristics of modernization, especially those that are relevant to our understanding of the ethos of business students.254 Thereafter, I reconstruct some influential interpretations of modernization, namely those of Max Weber and Jürgen Habermas. In the remainder, the focus is on MacIntyre’s interpretation of modernization, as it is particularly relevant to the problems in the current business student ethos and will therefore prove helpful in developing a solution to these problems. Social philosopher Gabriel van den Brink provides a description of modernization, which is a helpful starting point for this analysis.255 Van den Brink identifies three classic ‘revolutions’ that define the process of modernization. (1) Modernization begins with the scientific revolution. In the seventeenth century, scientists no longer adhere to the authority of the 253 Philosophers have spent much ink describing this ambivalent aspect of modernization, Marx (on the experience of alienation and appropriation), for instance, and Foucault (on the powerstructures of modern science and institutions). For a sociological overview, see: Loo, Hans van der, en Willem van Reijen, Paradoxen van Modernisering, Coutinho, Muiderberg, the Netherlands, 1993. Also see: Rosa, Hartmut, Social Acceleration. A New Theory of Modernity. transl. Jonathan Trejo-Mathys, Colombia University Press, Colombia, United States, 2013, esp. p. 60. For a social philosophical overview, see Verbrugge, Buijs, Van Baardewijk, Het Goede Leven en de Vrije Markt. Een cultuurfilosofische analyse. Chapter 4, Lemniscaat, 2018. 254 Several theorists speak of ‘postmodernity’ or ‘reflexive modernity’, which I consider manifestations of (late) modernity. This is in line with how, for instance, Zygmunt Bauman characterizes modernity. According to him, late or liquid modernity is something different from early solid modernity, but part of the same process of modernization. (Bauman, Zygmunt, Liquid Modernity, Polity Press, Cambridge United Kingdom, 2000, esp. Foreword.) Ulrich beck et al make a comparable argument regarding early and late ‘reflexive’ modernity. Beck, Ulrich, Wolfgang Bonss, Christoph Lau, ‘The Theory of Reflexive Modernization. Problematic, Hypothesis and Research Programme’, in Theory, Culture & Society vol. 20(2), pp. 1-33. 255 Brink, Gabriel van den, Moral Sentiments in Modern Society, Amsterdam University Press, Amsterdam, the Netherlands, 2016, pp. 39-55 Also see: Van den Brink, Gabriel van den, Moderniteit als opgave. Een antwoord aan relativisme en conservatisme. Sun 2007, Amsterdam, the Netherlands, esp. pp. 21-60. 151 5 church and begin to trust in the power of autonomous reason.256 Van den Brink argues that the scientific revolution is the beginning of a process of rationalization – the application of rational principles to all domains of life. The rise of (scientific) management thinking, with its tendency to understand organizations not in terms of people and their traditions, but as systems defined by protocols and rules, is also part of this process. (2) Van den Brink connects modernization to the political revolutions of the eighteenth century that were meant to empower citizens. These (eventually) led to the instalment of the rule of law to protect the individual citizen. These political revolutions also enabled an organizational development: the creation of large stateled organizations, concerned with, for instance, city planning, tax, care, and education. 257 (3) Finally, Van den Brink points to an industrial revolution that brought innovations – starting in the nineteenth century. The rise of industry due to new technologies systematized the labor process, opened new markets, and ballooned welfare. 258 Importantly, all three revolutions are ongoing developments: we still conduct innovative sciences, democratize institutions, and develop new technologies. The rise of business schools as described in Chapter 4.1 fits this short description of some major aspects of modernity, especially the first and third. One could even say that they have been a catalyst of this process: Business schools focus on objective facts and theories to explain these facts. They helped organize work according to these principles (1). Business studies focus on innovation, and therewith shape the ongoing processes of industrialization (3). In fact, the rise of management was an integral part of the organization of industrialization. In the remainder of this section, I discuss Weber’s and Habermas’ interpretations of modernization and I prepare for MacIntyre’s analysis. Weber argues that the workings of bureaucracy and instrumental rationality 256 Science and religion are not necessarily opposites. In fact, religious practices – those of text interpretation, for instance – led to the scientific revolution. Many great scientists were religious. But the rise of scientific world-views nonetheless relates to the decline of a theist world view. 257 Francis Fukuyama conducted a study on the importance of the organizational (bureaucratic) revolutions in relation to the political and juridical revolutions. Fukuyama, Francis, Political Order and Political Decay. From the Industrial Revolution to the Globalisation of Democracy. Profile Books, London, United Kingdom, 2014. See esp. chapter I.3 on bureaucracy and Chapter I.11 on (Taylorlike) governance failure in the public sector. 258 Deirdre McKloskey argues that the ‘great enrichment’ that was caused by the industrial revolution is not simply a matter of technological progress, but also an underlying ideological change in which bourgeois values were taken much more seriously than in earlier centuries of aristocratic values. McCloskey, Deirdre, Bourgeois Equality. How ideas, not capital or institutions, enriched the world. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, United States, 2016, Part IX, pp. 531-574. 152 are determining characteristics of modernization.259 A bureaucracy is an organization in which tasks are separated and regulations are clear. Weber did not restrict the notion of ‘bureaucracy’ to the modern public sphere, but also attached it to the corporate world. A bureaucracy, like that of a stateinstitute or a large company, should be organized effectively. Managers (or: bureaucrats) are, one could argue with Weber, hired to match means and ends efficiently. This is fully in line with business studies: Its presumption is that it can scientifically analyze this bureaucratic rationality in a morally and socially neutral way. As Weber formulated in Wissenschaft als Beruf, people should make decisions about values for themselves, as individuals, and science cannot help at this level of faith and evaluation.260 Thus, management is deprived of all its morality and claims to deal with the ‘facts’. Weber argues this is in contrast with premodern bureaucracy that was often part of a way of life, which consisted of many other non-technical activities. If Weber is right in these two observations – managers deal with facts, values are personal – the problem that emerges is something like the following. Management is a technical expertise in which moral dilemmas, dirty hands and moral mistakes cannot (or should not) exist. Real management is simply a matter of the adjustments of means to ends through rational calculation. All moral doubt is now ‘internalized’, only part of individual moral deliberation. Such a Weberian interpretation is too black/white to understand what really goes on in today’s organizations, but this interpretation nonetheless clarifies a tendency visible today in which we are inclined to see morals as opinions and management as value-neutral. 261 This situation has led to an impasse. Recall, for instance, the recent investment of Shell in gasoline, which I referred to in the Introduction. Is this morally blameworthy or not? It depends on the view you take. Greenpeace argues against it and it is at odds with public goals about sustainability. However, it fits the ‘free market’ model in which economic prosperity is regarded as the highest good and in 259 Weber, Max, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretative Sociology, Berkeley: University of California Press, United States, 1968, pp. 956-1005 (tr. and ed. Johannes Winckelmann, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Grundriss der Verstehenden Soziologie, J.C.B. Mohr, 1956 [1925]). 260 Weber, Max, ‘Science as a Vocation’, in: From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, ed. and transl. H.H. Gerth, C. Wright Mills, Oxford University Press, New York, United States, 1946 pp. 129-156 (original: ‘Wissenschaft als Beruf ’, in: Gesammelte Aufsätze zu Wissenschaftslehre, Verlag von J C B Mohr, 1922, Tübingen). 261 The works of Weber are usually presented as outdated, as are those of Taylor. But fundamental ideas of those two authors still color the business student ethos (cf. Chapter 4.2). On the presentation of Weber in business school textbooks, see: Cummings, Stephan, Todd Bridgman, ‘The Relevant Past: Why the History of Management Should Be Critical for Our Future’ in: Academy of Management Learning & Education, 2011, vol. 10, no. 1, 77-93. 153 5 which there are high expectations of the market’s ability to facilitate future innovations to help solve the problems created today. In any way, there is no (or: too little) moral agreement about the issue of sustainability; as is the case for many other ethical issues. The common approach is to deal with such impasses is twofold: (1) Experts or scientists judge whether something can be done or not. Thus, matters of value are reinterpreted as matters of fact. This is not always a bad thing, although the question remains who is recognized as an expert and what justifies his or her power to translate values into facts. (2) A procedure, in which all opinions are important, is followed in order to solve the moral dilemma. Of course, this approach is unlikely to usher in a real change, as this – in most cases –results in dissensus (after which experts must decide what needs to be done). As an example, think of the gas-exploitation in the north of the Netherlands: it has clear disadvantages for nature, for the safety of the region and the general well-being of a large number of Dutch citizens. And yet, the NAM/BAM and Shell were able to continue what they were doing. Experts (of privatepublic cooperation) framed the matter in a juridical-bureaucratic way. They translated voices of inhabitants of the affected region into ‘matter of facts’, for example lost value on property. Outcries from inhabitants of the affected region were thereby framed as the voices of stakeholders (which were then weighed against the demands of other stakeholders). This process forewent the moral appeal these outcries implied – that profit cannot simply be weighed against safety and well-being. Considering this moral appeal forces one to make a different assessment: a moral choice. However, this never took place: eventually a judge had to decide that Shell caries more responsibility than it acknowledged. I propose to see this situation as the result of a very specific understanding of (Weberian) science and science-driven institutions (as dealing with facts) and individual morals (as dealing with values). There is no (or: little) common ground left in which values are intersubjective and powerful enough to demand change. Philosopher Habermas might describe this situation as one lacking possibilities for ‘communicative action’. In his book Theory of Communicative Action, Habermas distinguishes between ‘instrumental’ and ‘communicative’ rationality.262 The former type of rationality is typical for all types of organizations in modern societies and is aimed at realizing goals through calculation and organization. By contrast, 262 Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action. Vol. I. Reason and Rationalization of Society. tr. Thomas A. McCarthy, Cambridge Polity Press 1984, Cambridge, United Kingdom, (or. Theorie des Kommunikativen Handelns. Band I. Handlungsrationalität und gesellschaftliche Rationalisierung. Suhrkamp, 1981), see Part I. 154 communicative rationality seeks to reach understanding and consensus through uncoerced dialogue between people. Habermas argues that both types of rationality are valuable: instrumental rationality helps organize the material side of life with governmental and capitalistic institutions; communicative rationality helps to organize what Habermas calls ‘the lifeworld’ and which consists of the private, cultural, and public realm. However, these two rationalities are difficult to balance, and the risk is that instrumental rationality, and therewith the domain of capitalistic companies and bureaucratic organizations, ‘colonize’ the life world.263 Habermas argues that this colonization is already underway and warns against it. Habermas’ colonization analysis can be related to today’s economy in two ways (already mentioned in the Introduction): First, we witness a process of ‘economization’ in which previously non-market domains are now colonized by corporations, as in the case of AirBnB which enables people to rent out their houses or Uber, which enables to use their car as a means of production. Second, the government itself encourages certain sectors to introduce market-principles. This has happened in the media, care, and education, under the name of new public management. Business schools played a double role in this development, for they redefined their own purpose in terms of strategy and loosened their relation to communicative action that, as we saw above, they did cultivate up until the 1960s. This went so far that certain Anglo-Saxon business schools primarily saw themselves as a business – not as schools – selling themselves as marketable commodities.264 In European countries the colonization-process, if we apply the terms Habermas uses, is less black/white but nonetheless recognized by several authors. 265 Education is funded by the state, but its system of funding is based on quasi-market principles, for instance by relating funding to the number of students a university attracts (‘customers’) and publications by academic staff (‘output’). 266 263 Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action. Vol. II. Lifeworld and System A Critique of Functionalist Reason. tr. Thomas A. McCarthy, Cambridge Polity Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom, 1984, (or. Theorie des Kommunikativen Handelns. Band I. Zur Kritik Functionalistischen Vernunft. Suhrkamp 1981), p. 196, p. 375. 264 Khurana, Rakesh, From Higher Aims to Hired Arms. The Social Transformation of American Business Schools and the Unfulfilled Promise of Management as a Profession, Princeton University Press, Princeton, United States, Oxford, United Kingdom, 2007, p. 116. 265 See this Habermasian analysis, for instance: Thompson, John. B., ‘The Metamorphosis of a Crisis’ (chapter 3), in: Aftermath. The Cultures of the Economic Crisis. ed. Manuel Castells, João Caraça, Gustavo Cardosa, Oxford University Press, Oxford, United Kingdom, 2012, pp. 59-81. 266 Lorenz, Chris, ‘De universiteiten en het New Public Management’, in: If you are so smart, why aren’t you rich? Universiteit, Markt en Management (eds. Chris Lorenz), Boom Uitgeverij, Amsterdam, the Netherlands, 2012, esp., pp. 165-198. 155 5 With the use of Habermas’ work, one could defend the right to exist of nonmarket spheres such as that of universities and quality journalism. Common sense says that markets should exist within borders: We find it counterintuitive to buy friendship and even unjust to be able to buy organs.267 However, in domains as education, care and publishing we find it normal that they partly operate on (quasi-)market mechanisms. Few people would strictly separate all cultural and communicative activities from the realm of money and commodities, partly because market-processes do have positive effects in other domains.268 For instance, the liberalization of the telecom markets in the Netherlands led to many innovations in mobile communication at relatively low cost in the 2000s. Another example is the deregulation of finance that led to prosperity in the latter decades, although this example already makes clear that the influence of market mechanisms and forms of organization is ambivalent. Many scientists have argued that the financial crisis of 2008 was a result of deregulated financial markets. 269 Due to that crisis, they argue, it is necessary to rethink the separation of market and non-market realms. Regarding business schools, this is a challenge, because, as discussed above, these came to identify themselves strongly with markets and (managerial) industrialization. So, is this Habermasian argument convincing? Perhaps Habermas is wrong, and the life-world has changed radically: As modern people we have changed our cultural traditions and economic success – including shareholdercapitalism, with its ‘impatient capital’ – has become an integral part of how we understand ‘the good life’. A possible example could be the cooperation between a township and a venture investor to create a new neighborhood, precisely at a location on a scale that the township itself would find too risky without the help of the investor. Such a public-private cooperation is an example of an alternative interpretation of the process of modernity in which so-called ‘free markets’ are understood to be an important counterpart of modern democracies.270 Such a liberal interpretation of modernity emphasizes the positive effects of market mechanisms, especially the liberating and 267 See also: Walzer, Michael, Spheres of Justice. esp. Chapter 4 Money and Communities, Basic Books, New York, United States, 1983 268 Walzer argues for fences, or what he calls “exchange borders”. Ibid. 269 Scientists and public intellectuals do not agree on all causes of the financial crisis of 2008, but deregulation is an important cause to many. For an interesting overview of this debate, see: Lo, Andrew W., ‘Reading About the Financial Crisis: A Twenty-One-Book-Review’, in: Journal of Economic Literature, 50:1, 2012, pp. 151-178. 270 See, for instance: Fukuyama, Francis, The End of History and the Last Man, Penguin Books, London, United Kingdom, 1992. (In Chapter 7 I come back to the interpretation of recognition in the work of Fukuyama). 156 equalizing effects that market forces have on our individual lives. In this interpretation, markets do not colonize the life-world but liberate people from its traditions and reward individual effort and talent. In this contrary perspective, business schools were part of the emancipation of the economy from its old-fashioned traditions – professionalism, practical thinking, Rhinelandic culture – into the era of modernity. Indeed, this seems to be the implicit self-understanding of the business school teachers, which I consider to be right and wrong at the same time. It is right because it partly explains the situation we are currently in, but it is wrong because such an interpretation cannot help us understand the current problems in the business school ethos. Why are so many students not socially engaged? Why do many students still have a shallow (‘profit only’) understanding of business? Why are students ill equipped to understand the sociological, political, historical aspects of their study-objects? Habermas’ conceptual framework does not help us take the next step in understanding the problems business schools face. Alasdair MacIntyre’s approach is more helpful, mainly for three reasons. Here, I formulate these reasons in opposition to the interpretation of modernization by Habermas: (1) Habermas hardly provides any arguments for his idea that the life-world needs strict protection against bureaucratic/capitalistic powers. Is there a plausible theory that could underpin such a claim and show us the need for a ‘communicative’ public debate? MacIntyre’s approach is more useful here. According to MacIntyre, the problem has to do with the narrow Weberian conception of science in modernity, in which normative questions are discarded and considered to be subjective.271 In a similar vein as Weber, Habermas is unable to discuss the ‘good life’ in relation to markets, business, and management, due to his focus on individual deliberation and communication with others. (2) Like other authors of the Frankfurter Schule, Habermas is rather critical about economic and technological thinking – and this criticism could lead to an unhelpful bias in reflecting on the ethos of business schools. MacIntyre is a famous critic of modern management, but I think his work can be adjusted in a way that it does offer the possibility of a synthesis between economic values (money, market-share, luxury) and social-moral values (quality work, social engagement, 271 For a systematic analysis of the absence of ethics (as in the study of ‘the shared good life’) in Habermas’s work and the problems this raises for his evaluative use of the colonization thesis, see: Keat, Russell, ‘Social Criticism and the Exclusion of Ethics’, in: Analyse & Kritik 30/2008, 291-315, pp. 302-305. 157 5 personal flourishing).272 For that purpose, I must adjust MacIntyre’s framework, especially regarding his idea of corporations and management (Chapter 6), markets (Chapter 7) and individual morality (Chapter 8). But we must prepare for those chapters in this Chapter 5 by outlining MacIntyre’s criticism of modernity. (3) MacIntyre offers a fierce criticism of modern ethics that helps to understand why modern business ethics experiences difficulties in getting into the minds and hearts of business studies. The problem of modern science is comparable to the problem of modern ethics, in MacIntyre’s interpretation, for both are abstract and have become detached from the concrete contexts about which they theorize. This is also visible in theories of business education. Business is not studied in its concrete manifestation and morality, but it is studied in fragments: human resource management studies social reality but ignores actual artisanship; finance studies balance-sheets and ignores actual employees. MacIntyre shows that modern ethical systems deliver no serious stance to criticize this abstraction, for these systems themselves presuppose an individualistic concept of human beings, detached from the context of work, its traditions and those with whom we cooperate. This is clearly a reductionist and therefore misleading picture of human moral psychology. I unfold this argument further in the next paragraphs. (4) The enormous interest of business ethicists in Macintyre’s work is also a reason to use his work. MacIntyre is usually type-cast as an author of virtue ethics and widely cited in this tradition (within the major journals of business ethics only Aristotle is referred to more frequently).273 But I think his conceptual framework is done more justice in my moral ethological perspective, for I operationalize the worldly and institutional aspects of his thought,274 while I also include MacIntyre’s philosophical-historical analysis. 275 272 Habermas values the system-world of economy and technology, but generally does not consider it part of the life-world domains of freedom. (see: Breen, Keath, ‘Work and Emancipatory Practice: Towards a Recovery of Human Beings’ Productive Capacities’, in: Res Republica, 13 4, 381-414, p. 69. Also see: Cobben, Paul, ‘Der ontologische Status des Betrieb in den aktualisierten Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts’, in: Socialontologie in der Perspective des Deutschen Idealismus, eds. Stephan Zimmerman, Christian Krijnen, De Gruyter, pp. 141-159, p.156.) 273 See: Ferrero, I. & Sison, A.J., ‘A quantitative analysis of authors, schools and themes in virtue ethics in business ethics and management journals’, in: Business Ethics: A European Review, 23(4), 375-400. 274 Joseph Heath, for instance, ignores the practical-sociological side of MacIntyre’s work. See: Heath, Joseph, Morality, Competition and the Firm: The Market Failure Approach to Ethics. Oxford University Press 2017, Oxford, United Kingdom, esp. pp. 322-344. 275 To use MacIntyre’s framework for a constructive theory of business ethics, one must tackle these three issues. John Dobson has rightly pointed towards the need to address (1) MacIntyre’s critique on capitalism and not solely (2) his critique of management, but there is also a need to address (3) his account of emotivism (and thus his overly heavy account of communitarianism). See: Dobson, Johan, ‘Utopia reconsidered: The Modern Firm as Institutional Ideal’, in: Philosophy of Management, 7 (1) 2008, pp. 77-92, p. 68. 158 5.2 Hidden Values in Scientific Theories and Consultancy Tools of Business Studies MacIntyre has been criticizing the modern pursuit of value-neutral science since the beginning of his career. His thought on science provides valuable insight in the strengths and weakness of abstract scientific theories in business studies. Inspired by MacIntyre, but also going beyond the scope of his arguments, I propose that two things are presupposed in the ethos of business students: (1) There is a socially and (to a certain extent) morally neutral domain of ‘facts’ and managers are qualified to understand this domain. (2) This domain of facts can somehow be described systematically with the use of science. In the twentieth century, many sociologists accepted these presuppositions and committed to a behavioristic account of life (explaining behavior in terms of conditioning, without considering thoughts or feelings) or a positivistic account of life (explaining everything in a strictly scientific way, rejecting other types of knowledge, such as phronesis). Marxists especially endorsed a strictly ‘scientific’ view of life, although other sociologists pursued a determinist social science.276 This also appealed to business scientists and economists. To understand business studies, we must also take into consideration that it has a long tradition of applied theories; these theories cannot be reproached for being positivistic or behavioristic. In fact, I argue theories and tools used in business studies potentially present good alternatives for positivistic and behavioristic models of thinking (cf. Chapter 8). In this section, I briefly look at theories in business studies to emphasize some of the values inherent in it. I refer to the idea of work in human resource management, the Principal-Agent Theory in finance and consultancy theories SWOT (an acronym for strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats) and the BCG-Matrix (BCG being an acronym for the Boston Consultancy Group, which developed it). But before I do so, I distinguish between the value-neutral stance of science and a NeoAristotelian stance, which MacIntyre endorses. A Neo-Aristotelian stance focuses on human action and considers its subjective aspirations, as opposed to a behavioristic analysis of life, which focuses on general laws of life. Such ‘laws’ might describe psychological or sociological causes of behavior or correlations between aspects of behavior of different people. The Neo-Aristotelian position, on the contrary, focuses on why people do things, which intentions they have, how their character is formed. The difference here is the Neo-Aristotelian focus on the subjective 276 See: Lutz, Christopher, Reading Alasdair MacIntyre’s After Virtue, Continuum, 2012, New York, United States, esp. Chapter 1 MacIntyre and Marxism. 159 5 perspective of people, whereas the standard scientific view is more abstract, not taking this perspective into account. The Neo-Aristotelian stance goes beyond the standard scientific approach in its ambition to not only explain behavior but to also understand it. This is roughly the difference between Verstehen (understanding) and Erklären (explaining), which is not only associated with Neo-Aristotelian thinking but also with the works of Dilthey and Heidegger.277 The Neo-Aristotelian and behavioristic standpoint have different views of life, which can be illustrated by how they would theorize the decision of a manager to hire a certain person for a job. In the behavioristic perspective, the manager is ‘caused’ to decide which candidate fits the profile best. This is, for instance, the perspective of Neoclassical economics in which the need for profit-maximization is taken to be so central that alternative ways of decisionmaking, in which ethics is taken into consideration, are secondary or even ignored. These might be added at a later time by a person, but issues of value are not considered in the theoretical explanation. From this behavioristic point of view, people are hired because they have the right experience and credentials and are expected to be productive. There is little regard for the intentions of both employer and employee in this perspective. In a NeoAristotelian perspective, the decision to hire someone would be based on an idea of the ‘good’ that both the company and employees aspire to. The well-being of employees and the quality of the work of the company would be considered. MacIntyre argues that if the modern social sciences aspire to meet the same criteria of validation as the natural sciences, they must ignore “intentions, purposes and reasons for action”.278 When a Neo-Aristotelian scientist speaks of ‘facts’, this would include the values of human beings. In a mechanistic/behavioristic view of humans, on the contrary, ‘facts’ are reinterpreted as being ‘value-free’ and ‘is’ is separated from ‘ought’. The person, who alone is capable of valuing, is taken out of the equation. I do not think many of today’s (business) scientists endorse this aspiration, but for a long time, this was the case and the traces are still visible in today’s curriculum. Its scientific aspiration required the field of business administration not only to abstract from the actual content of its research-object (e.g. the subjective aspirations of employees), but from many other things as well. 277 See for the Verstehen/Erklären dichotomy in Dilthey and Heidegger: Scharff, Robert C., ‘Becoming a Philosopher: What Heidegger Learned from Dilthey, 1919-25’, in: British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 21:1, pp. 122-142. 278 MacIntyre, Alasdair, After Virtue. A Study in Moral Theory, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, United States, 1984, third edition 2007, p. 83. 160 First, students learn theories about very general things, such as ‘management’, or a whole industry or business, foregoing any particularities. The quality of abstraction naturally differs per subfield. Human resource management can be concrete in its focus on employees. Still, it has little awareness of the fact that employees possibly work in a certain tradition of craftsmanship, such as the semi-public sector or in high-tech. Second, students learn theories that are formalistic, such as those of mathematics, statistics and finance. This high level of abstraction and the formalistic nature of theories brings forth a particularly problematic aspect of the business student ethos: Students overestimate the value of the abstract balance-side of business over the workside of labor. This then causes them to overestimate their own role as well. I will now illustrate the problems in current business thinking using three exemplary models respectively used in (1) human resource management, (2) finance and (3) strategy. These examples serve to articulate hidden values in business studies. (1) In the field of human resource management, an often-used definition of management is ‘getting things done through other people’. 279 The more precise and strictly-scientific version of this definition also found in business studies is: ‘rational decision making about other people’s activity’. The difference between these two definitions is that the first is open to the meaningful practice in which people work creatively. The second definition risks firmly rooting managerial work in the head of the decision makers, abstracted from work-life, and isolated from colleagues. I suspect that managers who have learned to speak about their work in terms of rational decisions are inclined to be less sensitive to day-to-day changes and the all-round chaos of many businesses. In fact, if we strictly follow this rational decision theory of human resource management, such insensitivity itself must be perceived as rational. The empirical results, presented in Chapter 3, suggest that students know about both of these theories: ‘action through other people’ and ‘rational decision making’. On the one hand, they see management as a job in which relations and communication are of the utmost importance and they are averse to hierarchy. They do, however, tend to be task-oriented when it comes to the types of work to be done in a company, an orientation that fits the rational decision perspective rather well. We also see both theoretical perspectives in textbooks: It is not uncommon for textbooks to explicitly 279 See: Locke, Robert, The Collapse of the American Management Mystique, Oxford University Press, Oxford New York, 1996, p. 1. For a problematization of this definition and the question of power (cf. Chapter 2.5), see: Grey, Christopher, A very short, fairly interesting and reasonably cheap book about studying organizations. Sage Publications, London, United Kingdom, 2012, esp. pp. 42-44. 161 5 mention that managers should be hesitant in employing practical knowledge from experienced workers; instead, they should prefer the use of statistical knowledge.280 As managers are the ones who produce or work with this knowledge, this effectively teaches students to distrust the implicit knowledge of experienced employees. My point here is not that students should return to the use of anecdotal knowledge. Rather, students should learn how to base decisions on different kinds of knowledge. To do so, they must learn to deal with these kinds of knowledge. (2) Principal-Agent theory serves as a further example of presumptions of the abstract models used in business studies. It works with a conception of humans as (a) being more-or-less rational, (b) wanting to realize preferences and (c) maximize them. This theory does not leave room for the messy reality of business, in which managers sometimes might hire someone not because of his prospective productivity alone, but because he expects that this person might contribute to a good team-spirit or simply because she or he knows him or her. In this sort of scenario, people stop maximizing preferences. This behavior cannot be described as part of a perfect and stable market.281 Principal Agent Theory therefore presupposes a world in which this behavior simply does not take place and ignores any other interest, whether social, personal, or even business-related.282 This theory is therefore clearly at odds with our common-sense idea about business, in which we hire someone on the basis of a CV and conversation, not on the sole basis of numbers and prospective profitability. There is a hidden normative presupposition that ‘the numbers speak for themselves’ and we do not need managers to judge situations and people – instead, they can just take a look at the figures.283 (3) There is a large set of consultancy tools in strategy – such as SWOT and the BCG-Matrix – that seem to have no pretention of being scientific at all in the sense of the natural sciences. This type of business theory/tool leaves room for managers to act in response to the unpredictability of human affairs. 280 For instance, Noe, Raymond, John Hollenbeck, Barry Gerhart, Patrick Wright, Human Resource Management. Gaining a competitive advantage. New York (McGraw-Hill), 2003, p. 179 and further. 281 See for the anthropology behind Principal Agent Theory, Michael C. Jensen, and William H. Meckling, ‘The Nature of Man’, in: Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 1994, V.7, NO.2, pp. 4-19. See for a philosophical analysis of this anthropology: Krijnen, Christian, ‘Values and the Limits of Economic Rationality: Critical Remarks on ‘Economic Imperialism’, ed. Peter Koslowski, in: Elements of a Philosophy of Management and Organization, 2009, pp. 111-136. 282 See for a defense of the Principal Agent Theory: Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling, ‘theory of the firm: managerial behaviour, agency costs, and ownership structure’, in: Journal of Financial Economics, 1967, 3(4), 305-60. 283 Spender, John C., Business Strategy: Managing Uncertainty, Opportunity, and Enterprise, Oxford University Press, Oxford, United Kingdom, 2015, p.115. 162 Together, these tools form a judgement-based theory of management that is at odds with the data-and-theory driven theory of management. SWOT was developed in the 1960s by a consultant working in academia. It was a fierce critique of the rational planning theories that centralized decision making and highlighted data-driven and numbers-oriented research. “In spite of its simplicity, SWOT is a tool of considerable sophistication because its focus is the judgments the strategist makes about their external and internal situation, and their resources.”284 SWOT basically helps a company identify itself in a certain business and respond to certain business trends; strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats in relation to the company are identified. It is widely used by consultants “to generate discussion and then listen to the client to pick up those judgments the client’s management has put in place, and to surface, critique, and improve on them.”285 On the one hand, this tool seems to be rather old-fashioned in that it does not even pretend to be explanatory; rather, it is meant for orientation and influencing action. On the other hand, it is designed especially for people who change jobs often and become managers in companies that they do not know very well and is an ideal ‘mirror’ for business studies alumni who are parachuted into a relatively large company in an unknown business. The BCG-Matrix, positions the student in the role of senior manager/CEO that oversees the full portfolio of a company. Its goal is awareness of the development of the profitability of products over time. It ties the portfolio together as a cycle, presenting products in their mature phases into the development phase of younger, so-called ‘question marks’. The BCG-Matrix is a judgment tool, not a theory. It presupposes generalities in the relationship between profits and market share, but like SWOT, it depends on how students use the model and interpret types of products and markets. All in all, the SWOT analysis and the BCG Matrix (and other tools, like Porters-5-forces or Ansoff, not discussed here), although not abstract and value-free, do instill in students the idea that managers can relatively easily extract information from a company they do not know yet. This might seem unproblematic at first sight, but it is at odds with the classical way of learning to understand organizations in which people start at the shop-floor and grow into managerial positions, gradually getting to know the whole company. Even if it is not as superficial as a judgment based merely on numbers, it is still questionable whether there is room in this approach to perceive the values that drive work in a certain team or company. 284 Ibid. p.52. 285 Ibid. p.54. 163 5 Combined with the presuppositions which we demonstrated in the second example – that students learn to make decisions based on number alone – it becomes clear that students are taught they can get to know a company in a short time, either by looking at numbers or by doing a tool-lead scan of the company. In neither scenario, students learn how to base decisions on inherent values of companies or their workers, for theories and tools position students in an abstract relation to traditions of work, branches and industries. As we found in relation to the first example, developing more sensitivity for the concrete situations in which students end up working, they must learn to employ different kinds of knowledge. In addition, they need to get an overview of these different types and consciously learn to decide when and how which theory or tool is best used. Of course, business schools do train these concrete skills. They do so with the use of case-studies. A closer look at these casestudies provides a deeper understanding of how the presuppositions which were just uncovered in different theories and tools take shape over the course of a business study. Case-studies introduce students to business situations and on the basis of these introductions, students learn to use tools. More generally speaking, they become acquainted with phenomena such as ‘decision making’, ‘leadership’ and ‘taking responsibility’, but also train more general capabilities, such as identifying management problems and spotting dilemmas. There are all sorts of critiques of case-studies. Duff McDonald writes in The Golden Passport, a history of ideas of Harvard Business School, which puts much emphasis on case-studies: “Because companies have veto power over any cases that are written about them, the majority suffer from positive bias, among other things, including an overestimation of the importance of individuals in complex organizations, a tendency to allow corporate executives to claim foresight when it did not exist, and the infiltration of public relations into shaping of cases.”286 This means that the selected case-studies used in Dutch business schools are most probably biased as well. Nonetheless, they are widely used. In fact, most business textbooks have sections with cases.287 286 McDonald, Duff, The Golden Passport. Harper Collins Publishers, New York, United States, 2017, p. 47. 287 See: Anne Mesny, ‘Taking Stock of the Century-long Utilization of the Case method in Management Education’, in: Canadian Journal of Administrative Sciences, 30, 2013, pp. 56-66. Also see: Liang, Neng, Wang, Jiaqian Wang, ‘Implicit Mental Models in teaching Cases: An empirical Study of Popular MBA cases in the United States and China’, in Academy of Management Learning and Education, 2004, vol. 3, no. 4, 397-413. 164 Another problem in the current use of case-studies is its focus on big business. The information and experience students obtain from dealing with these cases does not teach them much about their future work environment. In their future jobs, it is unlikely they will have to deal with strategic decisions of global players. Furthermore, well-defined cases will be scarce, as knowledge about consumers, competitors and technological developments will be less readily available than students generally assume when using tools like SWOT and BCG. The proper usage of these tools presupposes research-qualities that need training. For instance, knowledge of a certain business, its sector, its challenges, competitors, history and so on must first be obtained, which requires skill and training. The actual usage of consultancy tools is rather easy compared to getting and mapping that information. In conclusion, the current use of case-studies in business studies does not prepare students for the vicissitudes, the messiness, of business. As we saw in the three examples above, business studies offer a number of models that come close to a Neo-Aristotelian perspective on the world, and in which the practical, motivational side of work is taken into consideration. Nevertheless, theories and tools used in business studies presuppose that it is possible to obtain an overview of a business or a sector relatively easily, by looking at numbers or conducting a short tool-lead scan. The actual challenge of identifying values and helping shape them is neither properly theorized nor part of the training. In the current situation, students might become accustomed to the idea that others bring information, define the problem and dilemma, after which they can deduce the ‘right’ decision. I propose that students must develop a sensitivity for the values inherent in business and work, and must develop the skill to make well thought-out, practical decisions on these matters that recognize their normative character (cf. Chapter 8). 5.3 MacIntyre on the Hidden Cultural Values in Modern Ethics The challenges described in the section 5.2 demonstrate that business theories do not take into account the values inherent in business. In section 5.1, we showed that the basic theoretical framework of current business studies can be understood as an integral part of modernization. MacIntyre’s analysis of modernization explains why these modern theories do not address the normative dimension of business. According to MacIntyre, this is caused by the individualization of ethics in modernity, which is a thesis I reconstruct in the current section and the next. In the current section, I explain MacIntyre’s view of modern ethics. 165 5 MacIntyre contrasts modern thinking on ethics with that of Aristotle.288 Aristotle did not separate facts from values as modern science and ethics does. In Aristotle’s teleological philosophy, every human strives for the fulfilment of his or her essence. His ethical thought presupposes an aristocratic society with a strong shared morality among the men in power (cf. Chapter 8). MacIntyre shows that modern ethics, in contrast, presupposes that ethics deals with universal principles that apply to individuals. The two major modern ethical systems of modernity – the ‘Enlightenment project’, as he calls it – are Kant’s deontology and Mill’s utilitarianism (the latter is inspired by Bentham and Hume). MacIntyre is critical of both these systems, for these wrongly presuppose that the realm of morality is one of law-like generalizations, whereas MacIntyre thinks – following Nietzsche – that these generalizations can only work in a bourgeois Christian culture that no longer exists. The only ethical truth of secular modernity, MacIntyre argues, is that people should decide for themselves how they want to be moral, if they want to at all. This is an unsatisfying conclusion for MacIntyre, who thus reintroduces a (premodern) Neo-Aristotelian ethics in After Virtue, to which I turn in Part III. We will now have a closer look at the two major moral systems of modernity to understand their shortcomings. We will do so by exploring MacIntyre’s interpretation and criticism of modern ethics, which focuses on utilitarianism and Kantian deontology. It is not our purpose to provide a full-blown description and analysis of these two systems, as this would fall beyond the scope of our research. 289 In his book An Introduction of the Principles of Morals and Legislation, Jeremy Bentham articulates his famous account of utilitarianism. He argues that the fundamental human motivations are attraction to pleasure and aversion to pain. They are the “sovereign masters” of humans, according to Bentham.290 Bentham poses as highest ethical principle that one should strive for the greatest happiness and the least pain for the greatest number of people. We ought to always perform that action which yields the most pleasure and the smallest possible amount of pain. John Stuart Mill made some considerable improvements to utilitarianism, such as a distinction between higher and lower pleasures. Still, Macintyre finds utilitarianism unconvincing. 288 MacIntyre, Alasdair, After Virtue. A Study in Moral Theory, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, United States, 1984, third edition 2007, p. 82. 289 There are plenty of textbooks reconstructing these arguments. See, for instance, the Dutch textbook: Hartogh, Govert den, Frans Jacobs, Theo van Willigenburg, Wijsgerige Ethiek. Hoofdvragen, discussies en inzichten, Budel: Damon, Eindhoven, the Netherlands, 2013. 290 Mill, John S., An Introduction of the Principles of Morals and Legislation, Dover Publications Inc. 2007 [1789], London, United Kingdom, Introduction, p.1. 166 “If someone suggests to us, in the spirit of Bentham and Mill, that we should guide our own choices by the prospects of our own future pleasure or happiness, the appropriate retort is to inquire ‘but which pleasure, which happiness ought to guide me?’ For there are too many different kinds of enjoyable activity, too many different modes in which happiness is achieved.” MacIntyre criticizes utilitarian ethical thinking because it reduces the plurality of goods to one value: pleasure. With respect to different types of goods (or: pleasures, happiness), MacIntyre argues: “there are no scales of quality or quantity to weigh them.”291 The exact content of ‘pleasure’ is always unclear. That is why, so MacIntyre continues, utilitarianism can easily be employed in “a variety of ideological uses.”292 He advises that if utilitarian arguments are used, we should always ask what actual motives these conceal. There is another argument to be made against utilitarianism: It risks coming too close to straightforward economic thinking about moral issues. This is illustrated by the famous Ford Pinto case. While testing this new affordable car in the 1960s, it became apparent that the car was unsafe, because the gas tank could explode in case of even a small crash. The necessary improvements to make the Ford Pinto safer would increase costs. Ford preferred to deliver the Pinto without necessary improvements, because the company estimated that the costs of the car crashes and the loss of human lives would be lower than the costs of changing every single Ford Pinto. If Ford had decided to take safety measures, at least ten people would not have died in crashes with their new cars. The ethical lapses in this case are related to our intuition of the value of every single life, which is difficult to account for within the utilitarian framework. The Ford Pinto case could even be vindicated by way of this type of (somewhat shallow) calculative ethics. Deontological ethics, which is based on the work of the famous German philosopher Immanuel Kant, forms an alternative to and critique of utilitarianism. In the conception of Kant, utilitarianism neglects the dignity of men, because it promotes listening to our bodily inclinations, making us unfree. Kant does not ignore the fact that pleasure and pain are important experiences, but in his vision, morality is related to thought. In Kant’s system, “the objectivity of moral rules is precisely that authority and objectivity which belongs to the exercise of reason.”293 A moral agent should, in Kant’s 291 MacIntyre, Alasdair, After Virtue. A Study in Moral Theory, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, United States, 1984, third edition 2007, p. 64. 292 Ibid. p. 64 293 Ibid. p. 66. 167 5 view, ensure that his motivations are not ‘heterogeneous’ and partly or wholly motivated by pain, pleasure, greed, fun or well-being. Kant attempted to formulate non-empirical and purely rational universal moral laws – ‘maxims’ –– that covered issues such as truth-telling, lying and suicide. According to Kant, these maxims must be obeyed out of pure reverence for the ethical law. In fact, Kant goes as far as to claim that acting morally is always universal and a matter of duty to any human. For Kant, Morality has nothing to do with one’s personal inclinations (Neigungen) and should be a matter of duty (Pflicht), derived from the universal moral law.294 Kant even claims that we only know for sure that our actions are good, when our actions oppose our natural inclinations. Hence, we do what is good when we must suppress our inclination to do something else. Kant himself presented his account of morality as universal, but we must accept the existence of maxims and the way they function first. MacIntyre argues that the content of the maxims comes rather close to a Lutheran way of living, with its focus on self-discipline, contemplation, hard labor, and thrift.295 This is also the point at which MacIntyre introduces Nietzsche as a critic of Kant. MacIntyre sees Nietzsche as a critic of a hollowed-out bourgeois-Christian culture. Nietzsche is often viewed as a critic of all morality. 296 According to MacIntyre, Nietzsche did not claim to unmask all ethics. Instead, he argues that Nietzsche should be read as a typical post-Enlightenment philosopher who acknowledges the implicit problems of the philosophies of the Enlightenment, like those of Hume and Kant, namely the tacit acceptance of the Christian belief and the absolute dignity of human life.297 That is, Nietzsche observed that the theoretical architecture of many of the Enlightened philosophies implicitly depended on the Christian-bourgeois belief. That is why the attempt of Enlightenment philosophers to find an alternative foundation of ethics in rationality failed. Crucial guiding principles for Christian people, such as a sense of duty and individual integrity, had eroded, along with the belief in God. With secularization, the ethics of Kant has become less convincing and compelling, and Nietzsche saw that this was highly problematic for the modern world-view. Before Nietzsche, Hegel made a similar argument, demonstrating that Kant’s maxims claim universal applicability, but at the same time presupposes certain societal mores. For instance, Kant claims that one should not steal. 294 295 296 297 168 Ibid. p. 149. Ibid. p. 43-44. Ibid. p. 55. Ibid. p. 55. The categorical imperative to always act according to maxims that you could want as a universal rule, suggests the following: you should not steal, for if you do so, you deny someone possession in order to enrich yourself. However, if the maxim of this act would be a general rule, everyone could deny everyone his or her possession, making it impossible to own something. This would make the act of stealing useless, as it would not lead to enrichment, which presupposes the possibility of possession. Therefore, someone who steals cannot want the maxim of his act to be a general rule. Hegel (and later Marx) points out that the idea of possession is only ethically relevant in a certain type of (bourgeois-Christian) society. He asks: ‘Why is possession something good in the first place?’298 In Kant’s abstract approach, this question is neither posed nor answered, which is problematic to MacIntyre. MacIntyre argues that this is a general problem of abstract modern ethical systems. Both Kant’s deontology and utilitarianism present themselves as rational systems. MacIntyre notes that these systems are incompatible, which to him is a sign that their general claim does not hold true. Of course, this could also mean that only one of these systems is wrong or indeed another rational ethical system could have a valid claim to universal applicability. MacIntyre argues that the real problem is rather that these systems necessarily imply a certain cultural order, within which they can claim universal authority. For MacIntyre, such a homogeneous cultural order no longer exists in the modern world. This means that ethics has become a matter of personal choice. In the modern world, everyone must decide for themselves which ethical system they want to follow, if any at all. 5.4 MacIntyre on Today’s Ethics of Emotivism/Expressivism In After Virtue, MacIntyre presents emotivism as the ethical ‘theory’ of our age. Although contemporary philosophy does not consider it a serious ethical theory, MacIntyre argues that many people endorse it. This theory, to MacIntyre, can teach us something about how modern people treat ethical matters. In Ethics in the Conflicts of Modernity, he describes a form of emotivism which he sometimes calls expressivism. Strictly speaking, emotivism/expressivism is a meta-ethical theory that analyzes the nature of ethical statements. Emotivism deals with the meaning of sentences like ‘It is good to …’ or ‘It is good that …’. Such judgments are related to personal convictions, preferences, endorsements, etc. MacIntyre uses the following definition of emotivism: It is 298 See: Hegel, Georg W.F., The Phenomenology of Spirit, Part CV. C.c. Reason as Judge of Laws. tr. Michael Inwood, Oxford University Press, Oxford, United Kingdom, 2010 (or. Phänomenologie des Geistes. Suhrkamp, 1986 [1807]. 169 5 “[…] the doctrine that all evaluative judgments and more specifically all moral judgments are nothing but expressions of preference, expressions of attitude or feeling, insofar as they are evaluative in character.”299 Applied to an example, this means that if someone makes a moral statement, such as ‘this is a good thing to do’, it roughly means the same as ‘hurrah for us’, ‘this makes me feel good’ or ‘this is what I find important’. MacIntyre stretches this definition of emotivism into two directions. First, he labels certain philosophers as emotivistic who we generally would not classify as such. Consider, for instance, Nietzsche, who interpreted the pretense of making objective moral judgments as the mask behind which the Wille zur Macht (desire of power) resides. With such a claim, for MacIntyre, Nietzsche is one of the first spokespeople for emotivism. Second, MacIntyre says emotivism/expressivism is not just a theory, but also a lived culture, to which I return soon (section 5.5). Crucial to any ethical disagreement, when seen through the lens of emotivism/ expressivism, is that it cannot be settled easily: Disagreements about what is in ‘fact’ the case, can be settled by appeal to experience. Disagreements about ethical matters, however, must be dealt with by every individual in his or her own way. For MacIntyre, the basic idea of emotivism/ expressivism is that people have no “authoritative standard, external to and independent of an agent’s feelings, concerns, commitments, and attitudes to which appeal may be made.”300 If an agent does appeal to such a standard, it is only because he acknowledges it as authoritative. This is, MacIntyre suggests, how ethics functions in the work of contemporary philosopher Harry Frankfurt. Frankfurt says that people have ‘first-’ and ‘second order concerns’. We do not only have first order concerns, such as being hungry, we also have ‘second order concerns’, such as being healthy. This second order concern might cause us not to eat a chocolate bar even though that could take away our hunger, but instead cause us to wait for the opportunity to eat something healthy instead. Frankfurt does not claim that our second order concerns are strictly rational or judgmental. 301 According to Frankfurt, second order concerns have normative authority for us because we wholeheartedly endorse them. 302 What MacIntyre attempts to 299 MacIntyre, Alasdair, After Virtue. A Study in Moral Theory, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, United States, 1984, third edition 2007, p. 11, 12. 300 MacIntyre, Alasdair, Ethics in the Conflicts of Modernity: An essay on Desire, Practical Reasoning and Narrative, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United States, 2016, p. 23. 301 See: Frankfurt, Harry G., in: Contours of Agency. Essays on themes from Harry Frankfurt The MIT Press. Cambridge, United States, 2002, p. 161. 302 Frankfurt, Harry G., ‘Identification and Wholeheartedness’, in: The Importance of What We Care About, Cambridge University Press, 1988, Cambridge, United States, pp. 159–176. 170 illustrate with reference to Frankfurt, is that ethics can often be reduced to affect and personal choice. Frankfurt suggests that morality does not always override non-moral issues, such as taste, business, or fun. Whether or not morality is overriding for an individual in a situation, MacIntyre argues, “will depend on what that individual cares about and on her or his rank ordering of her or his cares and desires. Individuals will differ in the outcomes of their practical reasoning just as they do and because they do in their affective commitments.”303 MacIntyre argues that what holds for Frankfurt, is typical for all modern ethics. Perhaps a person might decide to be Kantian or utilitarian and justify this rationally, but the choice to do so precedes this rationalization. MacIntyre’s criticism of modern ethical systems and theories is supported by research in moral psychology which shows that taking a moral stance can hardly be explained in terms of rational deliberation leading to reasoned conviction, which explains why taking a moral stance is rather experienced as a matter of blunt choice. 304 Moreover, people are much more ‘groupish’ and dependent on their social background than the strongly individualistic modern theories of ‘right moral action’ presuppose. 305 Nevertheless, I argue that MacIntyre is overly negative about the individual motivation of people to be moral, for he reduces it to arbitrary personal decisions. With Frankfurt – and with modern social psychological theory – one could interpret this motivation more positively. Frankfurt uses the concept of ‘first order concerns’ not in the sense of values, but as in what one really identifies with as a person. I will further develop this approach in Chapter 8. In the coming section, I turn to a more general sociological diagnosis of our modern time which contextualizes MacIntyre’s thought on modern ethics by showing how – in modernity – communal forms have been replaced by a general focus on the individual. In that section, I will also focus on the role of management. 5.5 MacIntyre on Modern Society and the Role of Management MacIntyre’s criticism of modern science (cf. section 5.2) and modern ethics (cf. section 5.3 and 5.4) culminates in his social philosophical analysis of modern society, to which I turn here. He analyzes modern ‘emotivistic society’ 303 MacIntyre, Alasdair, Ethics in the Conflicts of Modernity: An essay on Desire, Practical Reasoning and Narrative, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United States, 2016, p. 45. 304 Haidt, Jonathan, ‘The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail.’, in: Psychological Review 108 (4), 2001, pp. 814-834. 305 Haidt, Jonathan, The righteous mind: Why good people are divided by politics and religion, Pantheon, New York, United States, 2012. 171 5 in terms of ‘bureaucratic individualism’. 306 MacIntyre argues that managers – as amoral social technicians – are typical representatives for this society. To fully understand MacIntyre’s management criticism, which I consider highly relevant for our research question, we also need to understand his characterization of therapists and aesthetes as characters of that same society of (1) individualization and (2) bureaucracy. (1) The modern individual or ‘emotivist self’ is an isolated subject – “in and for itself nothing” – and lacks a traditional or rational history.307 The modern self is “able to stand back from any and every situation in which one is involved, from any and every characteristic that one may possess, and to pass judgment from a purely universal and abstract point of view that is totally detached from all social particularity.” 308 Individuals look at society and see no rational and institutional continuity but only the collective affirmation of individual preferences, for there are no authoritative grounds left, other than individual preferences. 309 (2) However important the individual life experience of modern people, MacIntyre – following Weber (cf. section 5.1) – shows we live in a bureaucratic society in which protocols, rules and systems determine how we live to a large extent. Hence, moral values are personal, but we organize matters of fact on the basis of means-end-thinking. MacIntyre combines these analyses of individualism and bureaucracy and pitches them as complementary aspects of modern society. “[...] there are only two alternative modes of social life open to us, one in which the free and arbitrary choices of individuals are sovereign and one in which the bureaucracy is sovereign, precisely so that it may limit the free and arbitrary choices of individuals. [...] Thus the society in which we live is one in which bureaucracy and individualism are partners as well as antagonists. And it is in the cultural climate of this bureaucratic individualism that the emotivist self is naturally at home.”310 306 MacIntyre, Alasdair, After Virtue. A Study in Moral Theory, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, United States, 1984, third edition 2007, p. 35. 307 Ibid. p.32. 308 Ibid. pp. 31-32. 309 On emotivism as an interpretation of individualization, see: Morgan, Seirol, ‘Moral Philosophy, Moral Identity and Moral Cacophony: On MacIntyre on the Modern Self ’, in: Analyse & Kritik, 30/2008, pp. 157-175. 310 MacIntyre, Alasdair, After Virtue. A Study in Moral Theory, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, United States, 1984, third edition 2007, p. 35. 172 For MacIntyre, the emotivist self is either determined by his individual choices or by bureaucracy. To understand the relation between these two, we must introduce another of MacIntyre’s concepts, namely that of ‘characters’. Characters are moral representatives of a culture. The public-school head in Victorian England and the professor in Wilhelmine Germany are examples of such characters in other eras. MacIntyre sees three such characters in our emotivist culture: The manager, the rich aesthete, and the therapist. MacIntyre describes characters as follows: “A character is an object of regard by the members of the culture generally or by some significant segment of them. He furnishes them with a cultural and moral ideal. Hence, the demand is that in this type of case role and personality be fused. Social type and psychological type are required to coincide. The character morally legitimates a mode of social existence.” 311 For MacIntyre, characters embody a societal moral ideal, with which they psychologically coincide, thereby morally legitimating a way of living. I think the most convincing character MacIntyre mentions – in the sense that it really embodies his account of the emotivist/expressivist ‘mode of existence’ – is that of the manager. This is also the character most relevant for our study. MacIntyre writes: “Managers themselves and most writers about management conceive of themselves as morally neutral characters whose skills enable them to devise the most efficient means of achieving whatever end is proposed.” 312 In other words, managers are typical organizers of a bureaucracy in which rational formalities (protocols, guidelines) structure work based on ‘scientifically discovered facts’. Morality is discarded as a personal matter: “[Managers] are seen by themselves, and by those who see them with the same eyes as their own, as uncontested figures, who purport to restrict themselves to the realms in which rational agreement is possible – that is, of course from their point of view to the realm of fact, the realm of means, the realm of measurable effectiveness.” 313 311 Ibid. p.29. 312 Ibid. p.74. 313 Ibid. p.30. 173 5 MacIntyre claims that managers restrict themselves to the realm of facts and operate strictly bureaucratically. At the same time, however, MacIntyre notes that managers are the ones who lead by example and represent a moral ideal. This ideal is precisely that morality is subjective, and that collective organization is about means-ends only, beyond matters of right and wrong. MacIntyre criticizes the character of the manager on multiple levels: 1. The objective knowledge of business which managers claim to employ does not exist. Therefore, their role as ‘science-driven expert’ is false. 2. Managers focus solely on means. Ends and values are deemed personal and not relevant to the organization of society. 3. Managers do not follow a substantial idea of ‘the good life’. They are typical characters of an emotivistic culture in which the realization and maximation of personal preferences is the only criterium by which to judge behavior. 4. Managers are manipulative, because their faux-objectivity enables them to push their personal ends and values. At the same time, they claim ordinary employees are not equipped to make managerial judgments. Some argue that management is less value-laden than MacIntyre thinks, and that managers spend a considerable amount of time, effort, and money on topics such as social corporate responsibility, values and even ethics. 314 However, it is good to realize that much of MacIntyre’s criticism is at least recognizable and in line with other critical literature. Business theorist Mangham summarizes MacIntyre’s argument and emphasizes what is convincing about it. 315 “There appears to be a measure of support for some of MacIntyre’s assertions: managers are central to our society (perhaps more central than the distinguished philosopher thought); there is evidence that they treat others and are treated themselves as means rather than ends – that they manipulate and are manipulated; there is evidence that – at least at the time Macintyre was writing – some of them claim to be following law-like 314 See, for instance: Dobson, John, ‘Alasdair MacIntyre’s Aristotelian Business Ethics: A Critique’, in: Journal of Business Ethics 2009, 86: pp. 43-50, p. 47. 315 Many other readers of MacIntyre agree with Mangham. Philosopher Matthew Sinnicks, for instance, argues that the literature on leadership is even more emotivistic than literature on older Weberian/bureaucratic forms of management. He points out that leadership theories generally accept that leaders work with inspiration and emotions to influence processes. See: Sinnicks, Matthew, ‘Leadership After Virtue: MacIntyre’s Critique of Management Reconsidered’, in: Journal of Business Ethics, pp. 736-746, p. 739. 174 generalizations which will enhance efficiency; there is evidence that they (or some who write, as it were, on their behalf ) claim moral neutrality for much of their action; there is evidence that the manager separates his/her self from his/her professional role; and there is some evidence that when managers do indulge in moral argument they may become confused and may experience stress. Some of this evidence is thin but, overall, MacIntyre does not appear to have been too far out in making his claims.”316 The other characters MacIntyre identifies in our “individualized bureaucracies” help us to further understand his analysis and criticism of emotivistic culture and management. Just like the manager, MacIntyre argues, the therapist also treats ends as given, as beyond his or her scope of activity. The therapist is concerned with transforming psychic problems into directed energy, converting people with problematic behavior into well-adjusted people. According to MacIntyre, neither managers nor therapists are able to doubt the morality of their jobs. They are seen by themselves and others as people who restrict themselves to realms in which rational agreement is possible – the realm of facts and measurable effectiveness. Like a lawyer, MacIntyre’s therapist should help a client deal with a divorce but is not supposed to question the divorce itself as an act that is potentially immoral. Or, to take a different example: The therapist can help you deal with a burn-out, but can he or she also help you articulate why certain things in your work are morally questionable? MacIntyre denies this: therapy is meant to cure your illness and not to help you articulate why your work mentality or business is immoral. You must learn to deal with your own life – govern it, manipulate it – and set your own preferences, a (cliché) therapist helps you get rid of the obstacles on the road to individualization. The only ethics in the therapeutic practice is the liberal/emotivist idea that everyone is an individual in need of the relief from anxiety. That there might be an ethical task in becoming a good person and that a certain pain and frustration may accompany this learning process is not the issue. Perhaps there are therapists who would want to take moral issues into consideration, issues that might clearly come to mind when he or she acts as a friend, parent or even citizen, but MacIntyre’s point is that the role of therapist neutralizes our moral deliberation. The same thing has happened to management: we have isolated it from other social domains and 316 Mangham, Lain L., ‘MacIntyre and the Manager’, Organization 2(2):181-204, 1995, pp. 181-204, p. 195. 175 5 pretend that only matters of fact count in this ‘silo’ of human endeavor. 317 The remaining therapeutic goal is to live life as happily as possible. But can therapy really be value-neutral if health is obviously not a value-neutral concept? This is a matter of facts, not of morality. Even so: we know that health itself is a normative category. The idea of a healthy person is a value-laden concept. Therapy can therefore never be morally neutral. 318 MacIntyre’s discussion of the final character, the rich aesthete, further develops his understanding of individualism in our individualized bureaucratic culture. The rich aesthete closely resembles the stereotypical ignorant consumer. Consider a consumer looking for fun at festivals, without questioning the ecological or social consequences of his or her enjoyment. In the late nineteenth century, MacIntyre argues, we already met this consumer type of person in the books of Henry James, for instance in The Portrait of a Young Lady, which describes “what it means to be a consumer of persons, and of what it means to be a person consumed”. In James’ times, this aesthetic way of living was only affordable for the rich. MacIntyre relates it to today’s mainstream, in which many share the attitudes of the rich and seek to model their lives to theirs, focusing on luxury, comfort and entertainment. 319 In this aesthetic lifestyle, he argues, people are preoccupied with the idea that society is only the sum of individual wills, “each with its own set of attitudes and preferences and who understand that world solely as an arena for the achievement of their own satisfaction, who interpret reality as a series of opportunities for their enjoyment and for whom the last enemy is boredom.” 320 This cultural diagnosis explains the background of MacIntyre’s management critique (3): just like the rich aesthete, the manager thinks he lives in a culture in which individuals have no sense of tradition or coherent rational life-story. There is no shared idea of the good life left. MacIntyre argues that what James illustrated in literature, Kierkegaard 317 In a later stage of the argument, MacIntyre argues against this perspective – with the concept of narrative identity (cf. Chapter 6.2). He contends that people should look at work activities with the mindset of a private person and vice versa more often to gain more continuity in our identity as moral agents. I now continue describing the characters that exemplify the culture of bureaucratic individualism. 318 MacIntyre describes the manager and therapist as different characters of the same culture, but one could argue that the terminology of ‘coaches’ hints at an in-between character, ‘the therapeutic manager’. See on managers as coaches and the implicit control powers in ‘management as coaching’ literature: Boltanski, Luc, Eve Chiapello, The New Spirit of Capitalism, tr. Gregory Elliott, Verso, London, United Kingdom, 2005 (or. Le nouvel esprit du capitalism Editions Gallimard 1991), esp. Part I.1 Management Discourse in the 1990s, pp. 57-102. 319 MacIntyre, Alasdair, After Virtue. A Study in Moral Theory, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, Indiana, 1984, third edition 2007, p. 25. 320 Ibid. p. 25. 176 shows in his own way in philosophy. In his Seducer’s Diary – a small book that is part of the larger book Either/Or – Kierkegaard describes how a person has what he calls an ‘aesthetic world-view’ in which he enjoys the immediate life and its satisfaction. For this person, life is a game and an experiment. This aesthetic person, however, becomes bored and art is presented to battle his boredom and cultivate his immediate experiences. A girl is seduced and consequently cast aside. The core of the story is the tension of seduction and how it comes about. The main character is bored and plays with her. Kierkegaard shows us, in the terms of MacIntyre, that the difference between manipulation and non-manipulation erodes when a person understands himor herself solely as a center of experience. In contrast to the position of the seducer, Kierkegaard introduces an ethical account. This account is crystallized in the second book of Enter/Eller and introduces the reader to judge Wilhelm. Judge Wilhelm tries to convince the young aesthete of the value of a moral life of marriage and responsibility. The young aesthete, however, finds a moral life rather boring and continues his love affairs. What Kierkegaard shows us, in the interpretation of MacIntyre, is that two types of life are available: a moral and an aesthetic one. Which of the two we choose is up the individual. MacIntyre himself seems to be a type of judge Wilhelm and does not really understand the appeal of the aesthetic life. 321 MacIntyre’s view of the culture of emotivism lacks nuance, and thus he has not much positive to say about therapy, aesthetic life, or management. With my moral ethological approach, I take his criticism into consideration, but in Part III, I also try to see management more positively along the following (cf. MacIntyre’s management criticism in four points above): 1. Regarding objective knowledge, there is still much to be done for business studies to develop more scientific awareness about the relative objectivity of the ‘business mindset’. There is some literature that could help students, the textbook of Grey (cf. Part I, Chapter 2.5), for instance and this PhDresearch itself. 321 MacIntyre’s interpretation of Kierkegaard is contested. This suggestion to identify MacIntyre with the ethical position is in line with the literature on MacIntyre’s interpretation of Kierkegaard. See: Davenport, J. J. ‘The Meaning of Kierkegaard’s Choice between the Aesthetic and the Ethical: A Response to MacIntyre’, in: Kierkegaard After MacIntyre, Davenport and Rudd, 2001, pp. 75–112. 177 5 2. Courses in business ethics can help future business practitioners focus on social motives to balance the means of profit and shareholder value. There is more to say about emotivism to support this expectation, namely that education can cultivate individual morality, which I elaborate on in Chapter 8. Moreover, I propose to see business ethics in relation to the practical world of business; much more in line with Aristotle than that of the universalistic systems of deontology or utilism. I come back to this issue of corporate morality in Chapter 6. 3. I propose seeing business studies in relation to a larger social-historical trend in which business in general is part of an understanding of ‘the good life’ – especially in relation to the fulfilment of individual freedom. I touched upon this in Chapter 4; and I come back to this issue more elaborately in Chapter 7. Hence, business studies are not essentially emotivistic in the sense that they are detached from any tradition or morality; this detachment itself is historical and temporary. 4. MacIntyre’s thesis of emotivism implies the obscuration of the difference between manipulative and non-manipulative behavior. In fact, management itself might risk being manipulative when it claims that – due to its own objective knowledge – other people are not able to rationally judge managerial situations. As a consequence, ordinary employees risk losing their autonomy, because managers think they know better. This is a thought-provoking insight. I argue students must gain more awareness about the normativity inherent in management and part of this is self-awareness about the perception of other people and their vision on work. I return to this in Chapter 6. Conclusion This chapter opened with a brief description of the process of modernization. There are three aspects of modernization that are particularly relevant to understand the business school ethos: rationalization, bureaucratization, and modern individualized morality. In the rest of this chapter, I followed MacIntyre’s critical analysis of modernity. First, I reconstructed his analysis of modern science and applied it to business studies. Second, I discussed his analysis of modern morality in which he uses the ethical meta-theory of emotivism/expressivism to demonstrate the shortcomings of deontology and utilism. Third, I showed that this analysis is part of MacIntyre’s broader cultural diagnosis in which he interprets modernity as an ‘emotivist culture’ organized in a ‘bureaucratic individualistic’ way, giving special attention to the manager as an exemplary figure of this culture. In this section, I shortly recapitulate these three themes. 178 I. Business studies and (hidden) values in theories and models. In MacIntyre’s (Weberian) analysis, modern science deals with ‘facts’ and does not concern itself with ethics; it cannot define higher, i.e. moral, or even social aims or goals. This limitation of modern science is mirrored in the field of business administration that takes goals for granted and focuses on the organization of means. In MacIntyre’s words: It prepares students, if we apply MacIntyre, for a strict managerial role in modern ‘individualistic bureaucracies’. I criticized MacIntyre’s vision on social science for being little nuanced. Less than he realizes, scholars in business are interested in finding ‘the laws’ governing human behavior; they endorse a pluralistic idea of science (cf. section 5.2). MacIntyre seems to be right in signaling a scientization of business in which the object of inquiry – be it employees, management, or consumers – is understood overly abstractly. I demonstrated this regarding theories and tools used in business studies today. For instance, human resource management focuses on human relations, not on the embeddedness of these relations in the traditions of work. This gives an incomplete picture of the ethos of work. The content of social interaction is mostly ignored, and the focus is solely on process, not content. This implies that students learn to think they can understand all types of organization, since all types hire people, but this is an abstraction from concrete workplaces and their moralities. There is a difference between people in the public and the private realm: the moral identity of a police officer differs from that of a banker. 322 Can human resource management theories account for the differences between professionals, civil servants, entrepreneurs, and artisans? The abstraction is amplified in other theories – like those of finance and micro-economics – which leads to a picture of work that is drawn from the board-room table. The result is disembedded management, possibly even corrupting in a narrow balance sheet perspective – dehumanized management – that not only abstracts from the actual work but also from the people doing it. I also drew attention to some often-used consultancy tools – SWOT, BCGMatrix – that presuppose the stance of general managers or even CEO’s. In the secondary literature on business education (cf. Part I, Chapter 2) I signal little attention for these tools and their openness to human activity; there is nothing behavioristic or positivistic about these tools. When a student is asked to make a BCG-analysis, this implies taking in a judgmental stance in which many aspects of an organization and its environment must be taken 322 Regarding the Dutch context, see: Graaf, Gjalt, Zeger van der Wel, ‘On Value Differences Experienced by Sector Switches’, in: Administration & Society, 2008, 40 79, pp. 79-103. This is also a topic in continental philosophy, for instance in Hegel (cf. Chapter 7.3-7.4). 179 5 into consideration. Such an analysis is not simply right or wrong, but – as I illustrated with the help of Spender – clarifying the situation and the selfunderstanding of the student within the confines of the case-study. Students learn to define their ‘situation’ within a business. Yet, they certainly hold values, and these are fully in line with the results of Chapter 3: students have difficulties concretizing the situation, because they have little knowledge of the standards, norms, and particularities of certain businesses. At the same time, they do have very general knowledge about, for instance, people’s motivation, thus they have a distanced and abstracted understanding of a work situation. If there are many different theories and tools in business administration – which all share an abstracted relation to reality – the next question is, when to apply which theory? This is a difficult question in a study program that is relatively broad and risks educating ‘superficial generalists’, as I argued at the end of Chapter 4. What happens is, that graduates themselves must decide which theory to follow, or tool to use in a situation. The problem that arises here is that certain theories would legitimize the notion that it is not them, but ‘the theory’ that stipulates a certain path of change. This may look scientific and dovetails with basic characteristics of science in general, as delineate processes in parts, focus on the facts and theories, not on values, and so on. But behind the ‘rationale’ of managerial decision and judgment, and without necessarily noticing it, graduates may manipulate things in accordance to their own preferences. Even if students are aware of the choice they must make about which theory or tool to use and how to interpret its results, there is potential arbitrariness in this choice. We should ask ourselves: Are students educated to understand the pre-theoretical and meta-theoretical choices they make, for instance when they use SWOT or Agency-Theory, for instance in case of a decision about salaries of employees? Part of the (not necessarily conscious) choice students learn to make during their studies, is the implicit claim that managers have objective knowledge on work-situations, whereas ordinary employees lack this knowledge. The typical manager, MacIntyre argues, implicitly undermines the autonomy of employees by claiming the objectivity of his or her own scientificallyinformed perspective. Hence, there is a manipulative aspect in the core of managerial activities, if we follow MacIntyre, because managers disempower employees and ignore their possibly correct idea on a certain situation. This delegitimating of the non-manager itself relies on the scientific claim by managers that they have true, objective knowledge. 180 II. The criticism of MacIntyre regarding modern ethics. MacIntyre claims that the field of ethics developed in a similar way to science in general: it acknowledges the value of individual preferences while at the same time seeking to define abstract (or: scientific) moral principles, such as Kant’s categorical imperative, or Mill’s utilitarian calculus. The result of our scientific and ethical ambitions is an abstraction from the concrete contexts in which we live and work. This was already signaled by Nietzsche, and even by Hegel, who argue that the morality of Kant presupposes a Christianbourgeois culture. This explains why the universalistic and rationalistic systems of ethics are not convincing in a secularized society, but instead, lead the way to ethics becoming a matter of subjective choice. MacIntyre’s criticism of modernity is apt on this point, although he values emotivism/ expressivism too negatively, as I pointed out with the help of Frankfurt (and which I develop further in Chapter 8). MacIntyre is right in demonstrating that morality is not a straightforward rational affair, let alone a universalistic one. It is rather emotionally charged. Moreover, morality is not individualistic, but to an important extent, it is socially constituted. III. MacIntyre’s criticism of modern society and management. MacIntyre’s analysis of modern science and ethics culminates in his social and cultural diagnoses of the culture of emotivism (or: ‘bureaucratic individualism’). Managers are important representatives of this culture, just as therapists and rich aesthetes. This is the (very short version of the) criticism MacIntyre has on management: (1) management pretends to be value neutral; (2) management is guilty of sec means-end-thinking; (3) management mirrors a highly individualized society; (4) management is unable to discern influencing from manipulating. MacIntyre argues that managers are not alone in this; rich aesthetes and therapists are like managers. Rich aesthetes, who we meet in the literature of James and who resemble today’s hedonistic customers, resemble managers in that they find it hard to morally reflect on their self-focused behavior; these types of people are hardly aware that they manipulate the world for their own fun and advantage. The same holds for therapists: they help you to let you feel good without morally questioning your life-style. These schematizations of management, aesthetes and therapists are not fully convincing stereotypes, but do help to focus on the potentially negative effects of these ‘types’. 181 Evaluation Part II Part II described the historical background of the current business school ethos. The analysis of this background uncovered that it is unsurprising that many business students see themselves as would-be-managers (cf. Q-research, Chapter 3). The first programs of business studies were an answer to the need for academically trained managers. At the same time, it sought vindication for the existence of managers, which they found in universities, as centers of objective and independent research. The aspiration to become a manager is not only based on job-opportunities but is also kindled in universities. The fact that business administration is a university-based study also explains two major shifts in the way it organizes its curriculum: (A) Business schools stand at a distance from real-world business, its branches and especially SME companies. It focuses on large corporations and even has a bias towards the ‘helicopter views’ of consultancy, strategy, marketing, and finance. (B) The decoupling of business from real-world business (other than the very big business) dovetails with an abstraction from society at large. Whereas the early business schools tried to inculcate students with a civic ethos, we now find a market ethos. Business is social and moral in certain courses, not throughout the curriculum. This is the background against which two major types of ethos exist – the Socials and the Marketers (cf. Chapter 3) – that have a completely different approach to business in general but do have a comparable elementary self-understanding of management (decision-making, efficiency, problem solution, etc.). Part II showed that the dynamic behind this whole development is a cultural shift towards the Anglo-Saxon model, for both (A) the decoupling of practices and (B) society are in line with this model. Moreover, the AngloSaxon model obviously favors the English over the Dutch language, which Dutch business schools marginalize. The changing ethos is also in line with the process of modernization. Modernization is a multi-layered process, three aspects of which are relevant for our research-question: rationalization, bureaucratization, and modern ethics. The process of modernization explains why not only the Anglo-Saxon countries, but also the Rhinelandic countries focus on markets and managers. There are ethical theories that are typically modern, but they risk the same problems of modern science in general, according to MacIntyre: modern ethics presupposes an abstract view of the world and as soon as graduates have their ‘boots on the ground’, it is hard to apply this view. Ethical theories such as deontology, utilism and virtue ethics do not change this perspective, for they focus on the individual and his or her moral dilemmas. In MacIntyre’s 182 interpretation, these ethical theories come down to individual commitments (or: preferences, choices) about whether one wants to be ethical in the first place and if so, aided by which theory. Graduates are insufficiently aware of the need for consideration of these concrete contexts and learn to prefer to see them in terms of procedures or even balance-sheets. At the same time, it is unclear whether they can detect the subjectivity and therewith arbitrariness of the use of certain theories and tools. If this analysis is right, one would expect business schools to start offering courses in ethical deliberation – ‘ethical boot camps’ – that help students really understand and embody ethics and not only study it in abstraction. This is an idea I develop further in Chapter 8. Already in the coming Chapters 6 and Chapter 7, I propose to understand ethics in a more practical sense of the word, in line with certain business practices, and develop a theoretical foundation for such a practice. Students have learned to speak the language of science, but there are hidden values they are insufficiently aware of. Much of the theory and skills of business schools simply presupposes the managerial outlook. Consider cases in strategy and finance that invite students to make decisions on issues like joint-ventures between the companies Philips and Apple. The business of such great companies enables much of theory to be relevant. Taylor is (still) crucial to understanding the business school ethos, for he already described how managers use ‘scientific’ frames like that of the identification of tasks, the measurement of work and the need for separate managers. Taylor himself did not reflect on the fundamental categories he used. Efficiency – which is also a value today’s students esteem highly (cf. Chapter 3) – is an example of something Taylor accepts as an unproblematic corner stone of managerial thinking. The business student ethos still is Taylorian, for it also accepts basic managerial purposes as ‘given’ and is unable to question the values inherent in them. I think the situation would already improve greatly if business students would receive more ethical, social philosophical and historical education. For that purpose, we must take MacIntyre’s modernity and management criticism into consideration, which I do in Part III by arguing ‘with MacIntyre against MacIntyre’. 183 Part III: Towards an Enriched Business Student Ethos 184 Introduction Part III In the previous parts, I described the current business school ethos and showed how it emerged as a part of a larger history. I situated this history within the process of modernization and analyzed it with the help of MacIntyre. His ambivalence about modernization is not unique but fits in a longer and larger sociological and philosophical tradition. In Part III, I turn the tables – from problem analysis to conceptual solutions – and argue with Macintyre, Hegel, and Aristotle for a different approach towards the business school ethos. The moral ethological framework stipulated in the Introduction is enriched here with the help of these philosophers and applied to relevant questions for business education. With respect to moral ethology, we can distinguish the following formative elements of an ideal business student ethos: • Students have situational awareness. What does a company look like, what are its economic, social, and ethical values and how do you find your managerial role in it? • Students have social, hence political awareness. What does the larger threshold of society look like and what is the role of business therein? • Students have an ethical understanding of the economy. How can we understand management, business, and markets in relation to the question of the good life? • Students realize life is earthly, locally, and nationally bound. How can we ‘shrink down’ the focus on international markets onto the cities, regions, and the nation states? • Students have a cultivated professional attitude and relevant knowledge. What types of knowledge are necessary to help students develop the above aspects? Part III elaborates on this ethos in three steps: Chapter 6 deals with the questions ‘What is the purpose of a good corporation?’ and ‘What is the role of good management?’. As shown in Chapter 2 and 3, business students tend to endorse a rather abstract idea of management: they are accustomed to think about big business, prefer to think about work in terms of tasks, expect to be problem-solvers and want to get things done efficiently. In Chapter 6, I explore alternative answers to these questions. In order to do so, I develop a conceptual framework with the help of MacIntyre, that concretizes the business student ethos and puts more emphasis on morality. Much more than MacIntyre, I emphasize the possibility of moral management and moral business. I suggest adjustments to his philosophical framework in line with the commentaries of Russell Keat, Ron Beadle, Geoff Moore, Ad Verbrugge and David Miller. 185 Although MacIntyre’s conceptual framework helps us answer the questions about the ethical purpose of corporations and management, it has disadvantages. MacIntyre is overly critical of the market economy. For MacIntyre, institutions such as corporations and governmental bureaucracies are ‘necessary evils’. To think more positively about the economy and institutions, I turn to the work of Hegel in Chapter 7. There, I reconstruct Hegel’s idea of markets and the role of consumption and production therein. In the current situation, many students endorse a liberal or one-sided, freedom-focused perspective on markets (cf. Chapter 3). Referring to Hegel’s account of the ‘good’ market, I argue that liberal values like customer choice or freedom of trade always presuppose social, cultural, and institutional values. This is in line with the conviction of the social types of ethos I distinguished with the Q-research and offers a deeper underpinning of this conviction. The combined insights of Chapter 6 on MacIntyre and Chapter 7 on Hegel present an alternative vision on the role of managers in organizations that operate in markets in which substantial (not only infrastructural) interference of the state is vindicated. This has important implications for the way businesses relate to society, and relate to political structures, including, for instance, regulation on tax morale and mergers and acquisitions of large companies. In Chapter 8, I change focus from organization and markets towards the personal development of business students. The question here is what kind of self-perception a well-developed business student might have, especially concerning knowledge and customs. In the work of MacIntyre, morality is a function of the context in which we operate: A virtuous (i.e. honest, courageous and just) person realizes the ‘goods’ inherent in a practice he shares with peers. With Aristotle, I argue that we should understand the good of life in a wider sense of ‘human flourishing’, which is not only a common (or: praxis) affair but also a personal one. Aristotle identifies practical wisdom (phronèsis) – an intellectual virtue – as the necessary condition for realizing a virtuous and flourishing life. This Aristotelian perspective articulates the structure of ethical virtues, which explains its popularity in the business school debate and beyond. Yet, I interpret practical wisdom as part of a broader intellectual virtue in which practical thinking – in Greek: not only phronèsis but also technè – is just as important for business students. I do so by following Schön, Sennett, Polanyi, and Heidegger. Furthermore, I actualize Aristotle’s framework with the help of that of Charles Taylor, which focuses on the idea of moral identity (or: personal ethos). This is also the place where I return to the thesis of emotivism/expressivism in a more positive way than MacIntyre. 186 187 188 Chapter 6: A Moral Ethological Analysis of Business (With MacIntyre Beyond MacIntyre) 6 189 Introduction In the first two sections of this chapter, I reconstruct MacIntyre’s thinking on ‘practices’. This notion is central in his anthropology and sociology, which is quite different from the (mostly) individualistic ideas dominant in business studies. Section 6.1 deals with the general notions of ‘practices/institutions’ and ‘internal/external goods’ that help to understand in what way people in specific contexts can jointly follow a certain morality, understood in terms of virtues. Section 6.2 complements these concepts with the idea of ‘traditions’ and ‘life-narratives’. Thereafter, I apply and adjust this framework of MacIntyre: In section 6.3, I reconstruct a ‘thin’ economistic idea of the purpose of business (‘making profit’, ‘maximizing shareholder value’) which I enrich in paragraph 6.4 with the concepts of internal goods and practices. In section 6.5, I also show the potential negative effects of internal goods and practices - something MacIntyre is less aware of, but which I consider very relevant to understanding the dynamics of organizations, whether they are businesses or business schools. 6.1 MacIntyre’s Virtues-Goods-Practice-Institution Schema I already briefly described that MacIntyre favors a neo-Aristotelean perspective on life (and science) in Chapter 5.1. In this section, MacIntyre’s perspective is reconstructed in more detail. One could argue that MacIntyre applies Aristotle’s teleological ontology (in which man strives towards the fulfilment of his essence, just like a tree or any other aspect of reality) to the sociological realm of ‘practices’. MacIntyre reintroduces an Aristotelian idea of virtues as excellent habits in practical reasoning and human action. The virtues make us better persons because they enable us to achieve the ‘goods’ inherent to the practices we live in. MacIntyre works with the following definition of practices, in which an entire philosophical system reverberates: “By a ‘practice’ I am going to mean any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human activity through which goods internal to practices are realized in the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result that human powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are systematically extended.” 323 (italics are mine) 323 MacIntyre, Alasdair, After Virtue. A Study in Moral Theory, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, United States, 1984, third edition 2007, p. 187. 190 MacIntyre argues that not all activities count as practices. MacIntyre mentions – amongst other examples – architecture, philosophy, portrait painting and soccer. Tic-tac-toe is not complex enough to count as a practice. It is not ‘coherent and complex’ and ‘established’ enough. Neither is throwing a ball. Bricklaying could be, but only as part of the wider context of architecture. MacIntyre’s definition of practice is quite a bit more exclusive than other prominent theories on practices. Robert Schmitt, for example, states in the Soziologie der Praktiken, that queuing is a practice.324 According to MacIntyre, queuing for a metro could be analyzed as a social institute in which rules are followed. But it is surely not a practice. Neither are shaving or riding a bike. These activities are too simple and require relatively little training and context, compared to say, playing the violin in an orchestra or chairing the board of an opera. Let us return to his definition by discussing the terms I italicized. MacIntyre characterizes practices as ‘social’. Hence, an individual breakfast or personal study ritual is not a practice. The value of this social aspect does not lie in the communality of it as such – MacIntyre is not a communitarian philosopher. 325 In order to be practices, social actions must relate to goods, which MacIntyre also calls teloi, meaning ‘end’ or ‘purpose’. Importantly, those goods cannot lie outside of the practice – they are ‘internal’, not external. MacIntyre’s use of this dichotomy is different from the usage in business studies, where it roughly means personal or intrinsic motivation versus financial or career incentives. To be sure, internal goods can be experienced by members of practices as a motivation, but there is more to them. Internal goods are defined in relation to shared ‘standards of excellence’ and hence have a shared and objective meaning which partly overlaps with the idea of personal satisfaction in work, hobby, or art, but also reaches beyond it into the realm of shared goals. External goods, in MacIntyre’s interpretation, are goods people strive for, like money, fame and power. These are goods for which the practice may be instrumental, but they are not definitive for the practice. Internal goods always characterize a practice: goods that are intrinsic to the practice. Playing good chess is part of the practice of playing in a chess club, writing eloquently and informatively is part of the practice of essay-writing for an intellectual journal, whereas playing soccer elegantly and effectively is the good of a soccer team. Performing well according to certain standards of excellence – irrespective 324 Schmitt, Robert Soziologie der Praktiken. Konzeptionelle Studien und empirische Analysen. Suhrkamp Taschenbuch, Berlin, Germany, 2012, pp. 9-11. 325 MacIntyre, Alasdair, After Virtue. A Study in Moral Theory, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, United States, 1984, third edition 2007, esp. Prologue. After Virtue after a quarter of a century. p. xiv. 191 6 whether this results in the gain of external goods like money – is an internal good of the practice. It is a good that has intrinsic value (related to a certain practice), it is never an instrumental good. At this point, MacIntyre introduces an example of a chess playing child: An intelligent child who learns to play chess to win candy has no intrinsic motivation and might be vulnerable to cheating if that helps to win more candy. When the child learns to play for the sake of the goods in the game of chess, that might lie “in the achievement of a certain highly particular kind of analytical skill, strategic imagination and competitive intensity”, the child has a different motivation. 326 The child does not simply want to win the game and get the candy but tries to excel in whatever ways the game of chess demands. 327 According to MacIntyre, practices should not be confused with institutions, which are concerned with external goods, acquiring money, prestige, material goods, etc. MacIntyre does not distinguish business institutions from bureaucratic organizations and assumes both follow comparable patterns of organizations (I problematize this in sections 6.3 and 6.4). 328 It is difficult to make a clear separation between practices and institutions, however: hockey needs a club, academia needs a university, classical music needs an ensemble, a building, and an organization. MacIntyre does not take this into account enough and chooses to emphasize the risk that institutions corrupt practices. “Indeed so intimate is the relationship of practices to institutions and consequently of the goods external to the goods internal to that practices in question – that institutions and practices characteristically form a single causal order in which the ideals and the creativity of the practice are always vulnerable to the acquisitiveness of the institution, in which the cooperative care for the common goods of the practice is always vulnerable to the competitiveness of the institution.” 329 326 Ibid. p.188. 327 In MacIntyre’s definition, a practice evolves around itself. Hence, MacIntyre (oddly) states in an interview with philosopher Joseph Dunne, that education is not a practice, for its purpose is not internal to education, but preparatory for functioning in other social realms. (Dunne, Joseph, ‘Alasdair MacIntyre on Education. In Dialogue with Joseph Dunne, in: Journal of Philosophy of Education, vol. 36, no. 1, 2002, pp. 1-19.) Philosopher Richard Davies convincingly argues in line with Dunne that MacIntyre has an overly thin idea of education, in which he obscures the non-external and rather intrinsic societal value of education. (Davies, Richard, ‘After Higgins and Dunne: Imagining School Teaching as a Multi-Practice Activity, in: Journal of Philosophy of Education, vol. 47, no.3, 2013, pp. 475-490.). In section 6.5, I discuss some more shortcomings of the notion of practice, especially its relation to society at large. 328 MacIntyre, Alasdair, After Virtue. A Study in Moral Theory, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, United States, 1984, third edition 2007, P.25. 329 Ibid. p. 194. 192 MacIntyre presupposes here that institutions deal with scarcity and that 330 external goods always generate win-lose situations. At the same time, he has a rather romantic vision of practices, which he takes to foster cooperation and create win-win situations (I problematize this in section 6.5). There is a point to make to this extent: Internal goods are non-negotiable, and they do not add up like external goods do. Money and fame are perceived to make you ever happier as you acquire more of them. Internal goods are realized as goals in themselves and an increase in the quantity of goods cannot exist at the expense of the quality. For instance, the painting of Vermeer had a positive contribution to the practice of painting as such. This contribution would not be more valuable, had he painted hundreds of paintings or had his paintings sold better during his lifetime. Nevertheless, the difficulty in MacIntyre’s argument, is that he fails to see how internal and external goods are not always exclusive. That might even be regarded a good thing. Vermeer was of course also oriented at consumers who appreciated his work and wanted to pay for it. The mediation between himself and the world of his customers and peers is of course partly enabled via the necessity to arrange for external goods. At certain occasions MacIntyre seems to be aware of the positivity of external goods, in fostering internal goods. In fact, he speaks of money as an external good, not as an external ‘bad’. “I need to emphasize at this point that external goods genuinely are goods. Not only are they characteristic objects of human desire [...] but no one can despise them altogether without a certain hypocrisy.” 331 This is one of the rare comments MacIntyre makes of the positive role of external goods. He mostly discusses them as opposites of internal goods, which is not fruitful to understand the functioning of the economy, because internal and external goods are closely related. Philosopher Russell Keat shows so regarding consumption. “[T]he value of consumer goods is typically realized not through their purchase or acquisition as such, but through their deployment by their purchasers to achieve certain purposes which they value.” 332 Although buying products and services is a strict market transaction, the usage of those goods is part of non-market aspects, such as family life, enjoyment, and practices. Consider, for instance, the procurement of a Vermeer postcard that you 333 send to a friend, who might use the postcard to exercise his painting skills. 330 Ibid. p. 190. 331 MacIntyre, Alasdair, After Virtue. A Study in Moral Theory, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, United States, 1984, third edition 2007, p.196. 332 Keat, Russell, Cultural Goods and the Limits of the Market, Palgrave MacMillan, London, United Kingdom, 2001, p. 153. Also see: Keat, Russell ‘Ethics, Markets, and MacIntyre’, Analyse & Kritik, 2008, 30/, pp. 243-257, p. 248. 333 For a MacIntyrean reading of virtuous consumption, continuing the line of Keat (cf. note 331), see: Garcia-Ruiz, Pablo, Rodriguez-Lluesma, Carlos, ‘Consumption Practices: A Virtue Ethics Approach’, in: Business Ethics Quaterly, 24:4 2014, pp. 509-53, p. 517. 193 6 An ideal organization embodies the internal goods of practices and at the same time has a well governed infrastructure of external goods like money, prestige, and power relations. A ‘good’ museum has a fine art collection and a fine eye – or: ‘a practiced eye’ – for its finances. But MacIntyre hints only a few times at this synergic ideal-type in After Virtue and refers more often to the black/white contrast between practices and institutions. At the same time, he has high expectations of self-organizing practices that avoid the institutional interest in external goods. Yet, MacIntyre’s disregard of external goods does not stem from him being old-fashioned. He is not only skeptical on, for example, technological thinking, as we see, for instance, in Habermas’ work. As philosopher Keith Breen argues in his article on Habermas and MacIntyre: “The point of introducing the internal-external good distinction is not, then to privilege internal ends over external ends or to underplay purposeful activity [...]. MacIntyre “undermines Habermas’ distinction between communicative and instrumental action by incorporating technique and skill under a broader conception of praxis that is prerogative of ordinary practitioners […].” 334 Here Breen makes an important remark. I agree with him that there is conceptual space in MacIntyre’s framework to address a positive idea of instrumental action, and I think technology as well, in relation to practices. Goods as ‘that for the sake of which we act’ cannot easily be described from an external perspective, one needs to be accustomed to the practice for which the goods are definitive. Interestingly, those customs are relatively hard to grasp, in MacIntyre’s opinion; he describes them in terms of standards of excellence that are only fully understandable to experts in a certain practice. When we are part of a practice, we aim to realize a good. Not because we like it more, but because we experience purpose in being in alignment with the relevant standard of excellence, which are the shared quality norms of practitioners. Macintyre uses the notion of ‘excellence’, inspired by Aristotle’s notion of arête, mostly translated with ‘excellent’ or as ‘virtuous’. The notion of ‘standards of excellence’ has substantial heuristic power and allows MacIntyre to relate practices to ethics: We need to be virtuous to handle or deliver work that meets a relevant standard of excellence. Still, for MacIntyre, a virtue is different from meeting a standard of excellence: “A virtue is an acquired human quality the possession and exercise of which tends to enable us to achieve those goods which are internal to practices and the lack of which effectively prevents us from achieving any 334 Breen, ‘Work and Emancipatory Practice: Towards a Recovery of Human Beings’ Productive Capacities’, in: Res Republica, 13 4, 381-414, P. 69. 194 such goods.” 335 Virtues are habits, acquired in practices, that help to realize the goods of a practice. Indeed, virtues are necessary to acquire those goods and at the same time are a goal in themselves. MacIntyre distinguishes justice, courage, and honesty. These have a general meaning but should always be understood in relation to the concrete practice at hand. Thus, courage means something different in the battlefield than it does in sports; honesty in friendship is different from honesty in psychotherapy; justice is something different in a family context than in work life or an educational setting.336 Or, take the example of patience: “Patience is the virtue of waiting attentively without complaint, but not of waiting thus for anything at all. To treat patience as a virtue presupposes some adequate answer to the question: waiting for what?”337 The patience of the car-maker regarding a dysfunctional motor block is different from the patience of a school teacher with a lazy pupil, or a business man in negotiations. Patience is not the same in all contexts and it never a goal but cultivated in relation to the goods inherent to a practice. 338 For MacIntyre, one could hardly define requirements of justice in the form of any specific principle or value. A just distribution of goods depends on the practice in which people operate.339 The important question for MacIntyre is not so much that of distribution, but how virtues help in the tension between practices and institutions. MacIntyre writes, “without justice, courage and truthfulness, practices could not resist the corrupting power of institutions.”340 Hence, MacIntyre presents justice, courage, and truthfulness as virtues without which a practice cannot hold. We need to be just in the sense that we recognize different people within a practice and their place within the shared activities. We need to be courageous in defending ourselves when we, having internalized the standards of excellence, have a difference of opinion with somebody inside or outside the practice. In addition, we must be honest about ourselves because we make mistakes and we need to learn from them. 335 MacIntyre, Alasdair, After Virtue. A Study in Moral Theory, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, Indiana, 1984, third edition 2007, p.191. 336 Ibid. p. 202. 337 Ibid. p. 202. 338 The philosopher Jan Vorstenbosch attempts to differentiate MacIntyre’s scheme of virtues in order to make it more fit to understand different types of excellences, for instance for a Formula 1 driver, a care professional, or simply for a private person regarding his or her own life. See: Vorstenbosch, Jan, ‘A day in the practical life. Toward a taxonomy of social practices’ (unpublished). 339 For a systematic communitarian account on justice, Michael Walzer offers a refined argument. MacIntyre helps to clarify how a practice functions (in relation to an institution), but his work is less relevant than that of Walzer for issues regarding distributive justice. See: Walzer, Michael, Spheres of Justice. Basic Books, 1983. 340 MacIntyre, Alasdair, After Virtue. A Study in Moral Theory, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, United States, 1984, third edition 2007, p.194. 195 6 Philosopher Robert Solomon, who is also strongly influenced by Aristotle, argues that “corporations are real communities, neither ideal nor idealized, and therefore the perfect place to start understanding the nature of virtues.” 341 But MacIntyre would disagree with this statement, for he argues that companies are bureaucratic and do not offer the integral experience in which one can educate oneself in becoming a virtuous practitioner. Solomon seems right in his positive account of businesses as communities that can foster virtues, but we do need to consider MacIntyre’s well-argued hesitation, which I do in the coming section. What is important in MacIntyre’s argument on practices, is that he stresses the importance of masters. Practices are more elitist (or: meritocratic) than democratic. To enter a practice, is to accept those goods and the standards of excellence related to them. “It is to subject my own attitudes, choices, preferences and tastes to the standards which currently and partially define the practice.”342 Therefore, one needs to overcome one’s own ideas and learn to think from the perspective of the practice. Of course, this does not mean that standards remain the same over time and cannot be criticized, but MacIntyre thinks we do have to accept them first, to be able to really understand and follow them practically. Thus, you cannot decide on the virtuousness of a person from a personal perspective; someone’s virtues and vices are defined in relation to the practices in which he or she operates. 6.2 MacIntyre’s Ideas of the Narrative Identity and Traditions However important one’s identification with practices is in MacIntyre’s philosophy, you take that experience with you beyond the practices in which you enroll. Accordingly, every human being needs to synthesize beyond the borders of specific roles. In MacIntyre’s book Dependent Rational Animals. Why Human Beings Need the Virtues? he puts this as follows: “To be excellent at achieving the goods of this or that particular practice is to be good qua member of a fishing crew or qua mother of a family or qua chess player or soccer player. It is to value and make available goods that are worthwhile for their own sake. Yet for each individual there is the question of whether it is good for him or her that the goods of this or that particular practice should have this or that place in her or his life.” 343 341 Solomon, Robert, ‘Corporate Roles, Personal Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach to Business Ethics’, in: Business Ethics Quarterly, 2, pp. 317-339, p. 325. 342 MacIntyre, Alasdair, After Virtue. A Study in Moral Theory, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, United States, 1984, third edition 2007, p. 190. 343 MacIntyre, Alasdair, Dependent Rational Animals. Why Human Beings Need the Virtues?, Open Court Publishing Company, Chicago, United States, 1999, p. 66. 196 MacIntyre points to the fact that people participate in a variety of practices and must synthesize the different virtues and decide which place they should have in his or her life. Sports requires a different state of mind than friendship, fatherhood, work, and so forth. Therefore, people need to create a unity in life that encompasses multiple practices, but also extends well beyond them, because this unity has to do with their individual life, which is always embedded but nonetheless their life. MacIntyre uses the notion of a life narrative to understand the way people experience or create unity throughout their activities. The problem of the modern, emotivistic world is that life is compartmentalized and has lost continuity. Nonetheless, according to MacIntyre, there is more continuity than the emotivist people can and want to acknowledge and stories help to articulate it. Stories help us write and rewrite our own lives, so up to a certain point, people can take responsibility for their lives. MacIntyre stresses the teleological structure of those stories; the stories we live in and are subjected to continuous re- and over-writing, direct us in a certain direction. In contrast to the French philosopher Paul Ricoeur, for whom stories seem constitutive for our identity, 344 MacIntyre pays more attention to the pre-narrative unity that needs to be articulated. “Stories are lived before they are told.” 345 As persons with a life story that runs from one’s birth to one’s death, MacIntyre expects us to be accountable for the actions and experiences undertaken. 346 Others can ask me what I did and how I experienced certain things. Conversely, I can ask others for an account of their behavior as well. For MacIntyre, it is crucial for individuals to have an overall story about their identity, about the different practices in which they operate, the different people they know, the roads taken and passed by, and so forth. When I ask, ‘What is good for me?’ or ‘What is good for you?’, this comes down to the question ‘How do I live out the unity of my life and bring it to completion?’. 347 Typically, there is a direction to a life story, there is a telos to be articulated about it. MacIntyre does not say that we have a ready-made answer to these questions, he is saying we should try to find and articulate one – we are on an ongoing quest. “The unity of a human life is the unity of a narrative quest.” We are on a quest for the good in general and the life of 344 Ricoeur, Paul, Oneself as another, tr. Kathleen Blamey. the University of Chicago Press, Chicago, United States, 1992 (or. Soi-même comme un autre, 1990, p.157). 345 MacIntyre, Alasdair, After Virtue. A Study in Moral Theory, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, United States, 1984, third edition 2007, p. 212. 346 Ibid p. 218. 347 Ibid. p. 218. Also see: MacIntyre, Alasdair, Ethics in the Conflicts of Modernity: An essay on Desire, Practical Reasoning and Narrative, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United States, 2016, p. 241. 197 6 ourselves in particular. This quest is intelligible; story telling itself is an intelligible activity and MacIntyre relates the intelligibility of our identity to our capacity for accountability. In this way, the story is an important part of our identity, not just existentially but also in an ethical sense. The story is related to the idea of what is right and wrong. Now that we have introduced the first two central aspects of identity according to MacIntyre – we operate in (1) practices and (2) form a life narrative encompassing all our activities – it is time to introduce his account of (3) traditions. The idea is rather basic, namely that people are always part of something larger than their individual lives. We live in different social milieus and experience ourselves in a variety of roles. “I am someone’s son or daughter, someone else’s cousin or uncle; I am a citizen of this or that city, a member of this or that guild or profession; I belong to this clan, that tribe, this nation. Hence what is good for me has to be the good for one who inhabits these roles. As such, I inherit from the past of my family, my city, my tribe, my nation, a variety of debts, inheritances, rightful expectations and obligations. These constitute the given of my life, my moral starting point. 348 This is in part what gives my life its own moral particularity.” In this quote, MacIntyre clearly plays the communitarian card that stands for the idea that a person is always situated within relations and institutions. This thought is almost alien to and differs from the standpoint of the culture of emotivism. At different times, we have a different understanding of the surroundings of our lives, and it is typical for our modern times that many prefer to detach themselves from their specific and unique histories. For MacIntyre, the unity of life is something different for the Athenian Gentleman (for whom it entails being ‘a good state member’) than it is for a 19th century reader of Jane Austin (for whom it is ‘constancy’). This also holds for practices themselves: oil painting is a historic practice and Rembrandt was outstanding because he understood its internal goods and was able to expand them to the advantage of later painters. But our own ideas of our life narratives, just as our ideas on practices, vary over time depending on social traditions. Rembrandt clearly paints with a Christian background. Contrary to conservative authors like Edmund Burke or Roger Scruton, MacIntyre does not understand tradition 348 MacIntyre, Alasdair, After Virtue. A Study in Moral Theory, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, United States, 1984, third edition 2007, p. 220. 198 349 as something frozen , in contrast to reason or identified with stability. 350 For MacIntyre, vital traditions are always informed and legitimized by solid argumentation. Traditions, when vital, embody conflict and battle just as much as consensus. Traditions are lived and told: “[...] the history of a practice in our time is generally and characteristically embedded in and made intelligible in terms of the larger and longer history of the tradition through which the practice in its present form was conveyed to us; the history of each of our own lives is generally and characteristically embedded in and made intelligible in terms of the larger and longer histories of a number of traditions. I have to say ‘generally and characteristically, rather than always, for traditions decay, disintegrate and disappear.” 351 What then, weakens or sustains traditions? The general answer MacIntyre provides is that people change their (meta-)virtues throughout history. Hence the traditions of Greece, Rome and the Middle Ages are completely different from ours. What counts as a virtue in one tradition may be a vice in another. For MacIntyre, the Greek appreciation of megalopsuchia, ‘great souledness’ or ‘pride’, for instance, conflicts with the virtue of humility in Christian traditions. Another example is the Athenian vice of pleonexia, wanting to have more and more. Gordon Gekko famously stated that ‘greed is good’ in the movie Wall Street, which comes close to what Plato and Aristotle would despise as pleonexia. MacIntyre is inspired by the philosophical framework underlying Greek virtues, even if he believes that these values are no longer values in our tradition. This framework distinguishes between man-as-he-happensto-be and man-as-he-could-be-if-he-realized-his-essential-nature. 352 This teleological inspiration – that MacIntyre applies to practices and life narratives – brings us to the second reason, according to MacIntyre, why traditions increase or decrease and flourish or decay. Namely the exercise or lack of exercise of virtues that help to realize the goods of practices and give people a satisfying sense of life. At this point, MacIntyre himself seems 349 See this short illustrative example regarding culture and education: Scruton, Roger, Culture Counts, Faith and Feeling in a World Besieged, Encounter Books, London, United Kingdom, 2007. 350 MacIntyre wrote a book on the complexity of the relation between rationality and tradition. MacIntyre, Alisdair, Whose Justice, Which Rationality? University of Notre Dame Press, 1988, esp. XVIII The Rationality of Traditions. 351 MacIntyre, Alasdair, After Virtue. A Study in Moral Theory, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, United States, 1984, third edition 2007, p. 222. 352 Ibid., p. 52. 199 6 to be somewhat conservative and against societal change. Consider classical music, for instance, in which the overall quality has arguably not declined, although the practice has lost participants and its attraction throughout over the decades. Should this be analyzed in terms of the ability to play virtuously and with virtuosity? Or do we have to acknowledge that traditions come and go, and hence, that we are, for instance, not so enthusiastic about oil painting or classical music as we were in 1800, but we have taken up new practices, like soccer and movie making? It is time for a short overview of MacIntyre’s ideas on practice, so we can understand the interrelatedness of the different aspects that have been discussed. As explained above, practices are social activities organized to realize goods along the lines of standards of excellence that require virtues. We all acquire several practices: sports, family life, arts, science, work, and so forth. We identify with those roles and integrate them at a personal level, in our life narrative. This narrative is part of other narratives and histories that come together in a tradition. Higgins has visualized this interrelatedness, see Figure 5. 353 Tradition (epochal, cultural, Ethical horizons) Individual life narratives person person person Practice A Practice B person person Practice C Practice D person person Practice E Practice F Figure 5: the forms of interdependence in ethical life in MacIntyre’s work This depiction arguably is helpful for understanding MacIntyre, although Higgins emphasizes the role of the personal life narrative a bit too much by centralizing it. At the same time, in this visualization MacIntyre’s philosophy 353 Higgins, C. ‘Worlds of practice: MacIntyre’s challenge to applied ethics’, in: Journal of Philosophy of Education, 44 (2–3), 2010, 237–273. 200 seems most tolerant of an individualistic culture in which tradition is often experienced as a choice (or: preference). A more fundamental view, also in MacIntyre’s work, would place an over-individualized and emotivistic culture in the upper row of tradition. One could perhaps even remove the upper row and understand people as individuals active in different practices. However, that would contradict with a deep intuition in MacIntyre’s work, namely the traditions that implicitly and explicitly influence our thinking and acting, such as that of Protestantism.354 What I like about MacIntyre’s view, nicely captured by Higgins, is that it helps us to look constructively at the relation between individuals and the practices in which they live, placed against the background of influence from a wider world-view. Now that MacIntyre’s general conceptual framework is reconstructed, I turn to more specific questions regarding business. While developing and answering those questions, I apply and adjust central concepts from MacIntyre. 6.3 What is the Purpose of a Firm? The ‘Thin’ Answer What is the purpose of a firm? The results of my Q-study suggest there are different, sometimes even contradictory, answers to this rather straightforward question (cf. Chapter 5.2). I do not think this is a coincidence, given that different sub-disciplines in business studies endorse different definitions of the fundamental concepts they employ, which are not always clearly articulated. What complicates the question ‘What is a firm for?’, is its direct relation to the questions ‘What is the purpose of management?’ and ‘What are markets for?’. The question what a firm is, cannot be answered without looking at the context in which modern firms operate: the market economy. In this section I want to explore these fundamental questions with the help of MacIntyre, although this endeavor also pushes us beyond his central categories. If we endorse MacIntyre’s line of thought, we must see the market economy as inherently antithetical to practices. The fact that a business creates products and services for others with a view to making profit conflicts with the idea that practices revolve around internal goods. Yet, as I have shown in the previous section, the issue seems to be more ambiguous. MacIntyre’s distinction between internal and external goods is helpful but does not have to imply that every consideration of external goods upsets the possibility for virtuous behavior (recall the Vermeer example, pp. 162-163). I argue that firms and the market economy can be understood in an ethical way. To understand this, we 354 See Sheikh’s analysis of cultural traditions (‘forms of embeddedness’) in today’s societies (‘technopolis’) Sheikh, Haroon, Embedding Technopolis, Uitgeverij Boom, Amsterdam, the Netherlands, 2017. 201 6 must analyze the market’s role in society. This means seeing it in relation to the state. MacIntyre is not only critical of the market economy. In After Virtue he is also critical of bureaucracy and therefore the idea of modern politics. MacIntyre is skeptical of liberal-democracy and of our political organization in nation-states. As his thinking has a lot to offer for our understanding of the social-institutional order in which we live and work, I will reconstruct his critical analysis in the remainder of this chapter and integrate parts of it into my moral ethological perspective. Let me commence my argument with a sketch of how the market is supposed to operate in a simplified version of neoclassical economic theory. Remember that this theory is not paradigmatic for all types of ethos identified in Chapter 3 (it is so only for the Market types B and E (cf. Chapter 3.6 and 3.9)). The reason I open with it is that it might not be the only image of the role of firms, markets, and management in business studies, but it is certainly the dominant one in important subjects like finance, accounting, and microeconomics. If one would answer what a firms, markets and management are for in a strictly (Neoclassical) economic way, one might conclude the following: the purpose of a firm is its service to customers by providing them with relevant products and services at competitive prices. The larger the firm is, the likelier it is that it also aims to increase its shareholder value. A customer is free to choose between firms, and if they are unsatisfied with their products or services, they will go to a competing firm. Management should change and develop their companies and product lines to meet the wants of customers and shareholders. Management should also keep a keen eye on potential new markets and rival parties in both existing and new markets. In theories on management, sometimes it is framed as mere ‘decision making’; sometimes it is much more broadly and more humanely defined as ‘realizing a shared goal’. Another idea is that of financial management ‘getting the balance sheet right’. Yet, all these definitions, consider the overall idea of a company in relation to customer and shareholder satisfaction goals. A normative element which is often presupposed in this strictly economic (neoclassical) vision of business and the market, is that it is a better way of organizing our resources than a state- or professional-controlled system. This concurs with the standard curricula of the fields of economics that have received much criticism in recent years for insufficiently or not explicitly 202 acknowledging their theoretical presumptions and their shortcomings. 355 In the case of the market, a related normative presumption is that markets are not only best (i.e. most efficient) at organizing resources but are also seen as the mechanisms that help maximize our preference satisfaction. Preference increasement is supposed to bring the ‘growth’ of the total sum of income for all people on an aggregate level of GDP. 356 It is rather unclear how we can understand people’s preferences, but from a strictly economic point of view that is not an interesting question. It depends entirely on what reasons customers might have for certain preferences and what supports those preferences. This idea of preferences is clearly an example of an emotivistic (or: expressivist) account of what human life can look like. A consumer might have ethical considerations in choosing a means of transportation – for instance, whether it is good to buy an electric car, a diesel or to travel by train – but this is all seen as subjective deliberation about one’s preferences. A textbook business economist has little to say about this deliberation. It is all understood in terms of a customer and his or her ‘demand’. 357 In neoclassical economics, there is an odd understanding of firms. In his seminal and still relevant 1937 paper The Nature of the Firm, Ronald Coase argues that there is no evident rational explanation for the existence of the firm. 358 In Coase’s neoclassical understanding of the economy, it is rather unclear why people would cooperate in firms to maximize profits, other than perhaps due to the lower production costs in cooperation. Seen from the perspective of Coase, the market economy comes much closer to its raison d’être now that platforms like AirBnB and Uber enable people to do business directly, peer to peer. This picture of a firm by Coase is complementary to that in the organizational and management literature, which assumes firms exist and that there are typical market-mechanisms of organization. However, from a neoclassical perspective 355 This is a continuing discussion in economics. (See: Keen, Steve, Debunking Economics, Zed Books, London, United Kingdom, 2011) A recent report by Rethinking Economics NL shows there is still a necessary transition to make from a Neoclassical to a heterodox perspective. See: Tieleman, J., S. de Muijnck, M. Kavelaars, F. Ostermeijer, Thinking like an Economist? A quantitative analysis of economics bachelor curricula in the Netherlands. May 2018 Download: http://www.rethinkingeconomics.nl/uploads/5/3/2/2/53228883/thinking_like_an_economist. pdf 356 See: Keat, Russell, Cultural Goods and the Limits of the Market, Palgrave MacMillan, London, United Kingdom, 2001, p. 150. Also see: ‘Market Boundaries and Human Good’, in: Philosophy and Public Affairs, ed. J. Haldane, Cambridge University press, 2000, pp. 23-36. 357 See: Sheffrin, S. ‘Habermas, Depoliticization and Consumer Theory’, in: Journal of Economic Issues, 7, 1978, pp. 785–97. 358 Coase, Ronald H., ‘The Nature of the firm’, in: The Nature of the Firm: Origins Evolution and Development. eds. O.E. Williamson and S. G. Winter, New York Oxford University Press, 1991 [1937], pp. 34-47. 203 6 on markets, it is not as clear why people work at firms. Neoclassical economics presupposes that markets are characterized by perfect competition, market transparency and homogeneous goods. The idea that a cooperation would smoothen a market and lower transaction costs is odd in this perspective due to its supposed inefficiency. There are other theories of the firm and most share the idea of a ‘contract’ between employees, managers, and owners, such as that of Jensen and Meckling and Williamson. 359 There is also the literature on ‘stakeholders’ that can largely be positioned as an extension to this tradition of theories of the firm. in Agency Theory. 361 360 Hill and Jones integrate the concept of stakeholder Muel Kaptein and Johan Wempe integrate stakeholder theory in a social-contract theory of the firm. 362 All of these theories presuppose a liberal idea of firms as organizations isolated from society. The philosophical framework of MacIntyre helps to develop a broader (communitarian) understanding of markets, firms, and management. 363 Yet, MacIntyre himself has formulated this framework partly in opposition to an idea of the economy that comes close to that outlined above. Marx strongly influenced his vision of how the economy functions and this influence – ironically – entails similarities with the neoclassical account. For instance, MacIntyre writes about the dynamic of markets: “The needs of capital formation impose upon capitalists and on those who manage their enterprises a need to extract from the work of their employees a surplus which is at the future disposal of capital and not of labor.” 364 In this interpretation of the economy by MacIntyre, it is hard to make a distinction between markets and corporations. As the philosopher Ron Beadle remarks: For MacIntyre “the enterprise (the business) is the manifest institutional mode of capitalism.” 365 Hence, MacIntyre seems to have just as much difficulty in answering the question ‘What is the nature of the firm?’ as Coase does. We have seen in previous sections that firms 359 For an overview, see: Spender, J.C., Business Strategy: Managing Uncertainty, Opportunity, and Enterprise, Oxford University Press, Oxford, United Kingdom, 2015, Chapter 3. 360 For an overview on stakeholder theory in relation to the work of Freeman, see: Laplume, André, Karan Sonpar, Reginald Litz, ‘Stakeholder Theory: Reviewing a Theory That Moves Us’, in: Journal of Management. 34 (6), 2008 pp. 1152–1189. 361 Hill, C.W.L, T.M. Jones ‘Stakeholder-agency theory’, in: Journal of Management Studies, 2, p. 132. 362 Kaptein, Muel, Johan Wempe, The Balanced Company. A Theory of Corporate Integrity. Oxford University Press, Oxford, United Kingdom, 2002. 363 There are accounts of markets that are somewhere in between the liberal and communitarian perspective. See: Bruni, Luigino and Robert Sugden, ‘Reclaiming Virtue Ethics for Economics’, in: Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 27, no. 4., Fall 2013, pp. 141-164, p. 153. 364 A. MacIntyre, ‘Three Perspectives on Marxism: 1953, 1968, 1995’, in: Ethics and Politics, selected essays, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United States, 2006, pp. 145-158, p.148. 365 Beadle, Ron, ‘Why business cannot be a practice’ in: Analyse & Kritik, Lucius & Lucius Stuttgart, 30/2008, pp.229-241. 204 have something to do with external goods, especially with money, and here MacIntyre’s idea of the economy resembles that of Milton Friedman, namely that “the only responsibility of firms is to maximize shareholder wealth.” 366 MacIntyre would not characterize this definition as a value-judgment, whereas Friedman would – Friedman interprets shareholder capitalism as an institute creating human freedom – but presumably they would agree that firms de facto aim at profit-maximization; and if that were not the case yet, they should in order to become more capitalistic. Such an empirical claim can be tested and therefore falsified. And yes, we have already seen that this ‘thin’ description of the goal of a firm is not normal in Rhinelandic economies (cf. Chapter 4.4). MacIntyre is critical of the neoclassical science of economics, for it largely assumes that economies can be studied in abstraction from the moral, social, political, and cultural order. 367 Yet it is questionable whether he manages to give a more empirically-informed account of how companies function within markets coordinated by managers. 368 At the same time, I think MacIntyre offers categories that can help to develop a much more concrete idea of the economy, which results in a convincing moral account of markets, firms, and managers. MacIntyre himself has taken some first steps in this direction by distinguishing two types of markets: a modern and a premodern market. We already know that he is critical of the modern market and this criticism finds more relief when we ponder the next quote from After Virtue. “One of the key moments in the creation of modernity occurs when production moves outside the household. So long as productive work occurs within the structure of households, it is easy and right to understand that work as part of the sustaining of the community of the household and of those wider forms of community which the household in turn sustains. As, and to the extent that, work moves outside the household and is put to the service of impersonal capital, the realm of work tends to become separated from everything but the service of biological survival and the reproduction of the labor force, on the one hand, and that of institutionalized acquisitiveness at the other.” 369 366 Friedman, Milton. “The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits.” New York Times Magazine, September, September 13, 1970. 367 MacIntyre, Alasdair, Ethics in the Conflicts of Modernity: An essay on Desire, Practical Reasoning and Narrative, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom, 2016, p. 105. 368 Philosopher Moore makes a comparable point: Moore, Geoff, ‘Humanizing Business: A modern virtue ethics approach’, in: Business Ethics Quaterly vol. 15, no. 2, 2015, pp. 237-255, pp. 239-240. 369 MacIntyre, Alasdair, After Virtue. A Study in Moral Theory, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, United States, 1984, third edition 2007, p. 227. 205 6 In this citation, MacIntyre follows the historical line of what Michael Polanyi called ‘the great transformation’, in a book carrying that same title, from premarket to market economies. 370 Polanyi’s idea is that modern markets are disembedded from the practices in which people live. The market is no longer an instrument of the society of which it is part and it has been segregated from this society. 371 The work of Polanyi is influential among economic historians and intellectuals in general, but it is not uncontested. 372 Economic historian Deirdre McCloskey, for instance, agrees that markets are embedded in societies and also acknowledges that this relation changes in modern times. 373 However, McCloskey would not say that modern market economies are completely autonomous, nor would she say that the relative autonomy must be interpreted as moral decline. In her account of the history of the economy, the prosperity of modern societies is partly based on a shared morality that created a situation in which individual lives and works were experienced as most important. 374 McCloskey endorses modernity for better or worse, but as we have seen above MacIntyre is a sceptic. As I argue in this and the coming sections, as well as in Chapter 7, both are partly right. MacIntyre follows Polanyi in his ‘disembedding thesis’ in the history of the economy and combines it with his own ‘disembedding thesis’ in the field of philosophy, which he claims dovetails with the emergence of emotivistic/expressivist culture. 375 MacIntyre does not argue that all pre-modern societies were homogenous in that every individual lived with the same preferences that were not questioned. Indeed, MacIntyre shows in After Virtue that Homer, Aristotle, Thomas, and Benjamin Franklin had radically different ideas on virtues. 376 We do not need to reconstruct MacIntyre’s lengthy discussion of these accounts to see his argument that there is a similarity between them that is at the same time the central characteristic of the culture of emotivism. In the works of Homer, a virtue helps people conform to their social role. In the work of Aristotle, it is already more complex, for he says that a virtue helps people 370 See for MacIntyre’s discussion of Polanyi: A. MacIntyre, ‘After Virtue and Marxism: A Response to Wartofsky’, in: Inquiry, vol. 27, Nos. 2-3, July 1984, esp. p. 253. 371 Polanyi, Michael, The Great Transformation, Farrar & Rinehart, New York, United States, 1944. 372 See for an overview of Polanyi’s school of thought: Booth, William James, ‘On the Idea of the Moral Economy’, in American Political Science Review, vol. 88, no.3, 1994. 373 McCloskey, Deirdre, Bourgeois Equality. How ideas, not capital or institutions, enriched the world. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, United States, 2016, Part IX, pp. 531-574. 374 Ibid. Exordium. 375 See for a discussion on Polanyi and MacIntyre: McMylor, Peter, Alisdair MacIntyre. Critic of Modernity, Routledge, London New York, 1994, esp. Part II Markets, Managers and the Virtues. 376 MacIntyre, Alasdair, After Virtue. A Study in Moral Theory, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, Indiana, 1984, third edition 2007, ch. 10-14. 206 realize their human telos, which presumes a certain polis in which people play different roles, but also goes beyond those roles in the realization of one’s intellectual capacities. In Thomas, the virtue is part of a greater religious devotion, accessible to all humans, not just (as in the Polis) to the aristocrats. For Thomas, life is also full of ‘combat’ within one’s own soul to lead the good life and ignore the bad, whereas Aristotle argues a good person always knows what is best and has no serious hesitation regarding the right action. In the works of Franklin, a virtue is a quasi-utilitarian way in which it helps people realize worldly and heavenly success. Now, despite the major differences between these accounts of a virtuous life, MacIntyre argues that there is a core element to be found in all of them. This is the rather basic idea that the philosophers/authors MacIntyre has selected presuppose a social and cultural convention on what a good life is in a certain realm of society that people accept as part of their substantial ethical nature. The difference between pre-modern and modern society is marked by the erosion of this shared morality. Society is no longer an ethical entity and has become a mere aggregate of individuals, according to MacIntyre. Those individuals have a morality that is emotivistic/expressivist and when they operate in the realm of the economy, they think with a disembedded economic mindset, i.e. without making a connection to the common good. In this context, business is re-framed in a strict economic (‘disembedded’) way. The risk is that business (and bureaucracy) closes off people from the possibility to function within practices and to learn how to become independent as practitioners in relation to society. 6.4 What is the Purpose of Business and Management? A ‘Thick’ Answer For MacIntyre, the difference between pre-market and market economies is not simply historical, it is also a different mode of organization in today’s world, just as he thinks one can also be a Neo-Aristotelian philosopher currently. Here, his thinking becomes highly relevant for business studies; although not without its shortcomings, as I show below. The basic framework of pre-market economies is now translated by MacIntyre into what he calls productive crafts. Business in productive crafts, can be understood as practices, like farming, fishing, architecture, and construction. “The aim to such productive crafts, when they are in good order, is never only to catch fish, or to produce beef or milk, or to build houses. It is to do so in a manner consonant with the excellences of craft, so that there is not 207 6 only a good product, but the craftsman is perfected through and in her or his activity.” 377 Does this also imply that the whole of business can be interpreted as practice? Philosopher George Moore, who has written a lot on business ethics in line with MacIntyre’s concepts, argues that business itself can indeed be a practice. 378 But the term ‘business’ encompasses a lot more than ‘productive crafts’. Banks, insurances, retail are indeed businesses, but MacIntyre would call them institutions, not practices. That is why business ethicist Ron Beadle wrote a response to Moore, Why Business Cannot be a Practice? – which even convinced Moore to nuance his argument, as I show below. But it is worth reconstructing MacIntyre’s analysis of the productive crafts a little further before we come back to Moore’s ideas on business as a potential practice. In response to the paper bundle with the playful title After MacIntyre, MacIntyre wrote an article in which he elaborates on his idea of practices using the example of a fishing crew. He distinguishes to types of crews, one that I call the ‘practice fishing crew’ and one I call the ‘commercial fish crew’. In the latter, external goods motivate workers and managers, whereas the previous is intrinsically motivated to follow the standards of excellence of their work. Please keep in mind that this opposition is theoretical; MacIntyre realizes most organizations will be somewhere in the middle of these two rather extreme examples. This is MacIntyre’s description of the ‘fish business crew’: “A fishing crew may be organized and understood as a purely technical and economic means to a productive end, whose aim is only or over-ridingly to satisfy as profitably as possible some market’s demand for fish. Just as those managing its organization aim at a high level of profits, so also the individual crew members aim at a high level of reward. Not only the skills, but also the qualities of character valued by those who manage the organization, will be those well designed to achieve a high level of profitability.” 379 And here is Macintyre’s description of the ‘practice crew’. 377 MacIntyre, Alasdair, ‘A partial response to my critics’, in: After MacIntyre. J. Horton and S. Mendus eds., 283-304 Cambridge Polity, Cambridge, United Kingdom, pp. 283-304, p. 284. 378 See: Moore, Geoff, Virtue at Work. Ethics for Individuals, Managers, and Organizations, Oxford University Press, 2017, Chapter 8 Virtue Ethics in Business Organizations. 379 MacIntyre, Alasdair, ‘a partial response to my critics’, in: After MacIntyre. J. Horton and S. Mendus eds., 283-304 Cambridge Polity, pp. 283-304, p. 284-285. 208 “Consider by contrast a crew whose members may well have initially joined for the sake of their wage or other share of the catch, but who have acquired from the rest of the crew an understanding of and devotion to excellence in fishing and to excellence in playing one’s part as a member of such a crew. Excellence of the requisite kind is a matter of skills and qualities of character required both for the fishing and for achievement of the goods of the common life of such a crew.” 380 MacIntyre insists that, when the fishing business declines, the ‘practice crew’ will respond differently from the ‘business crew’, because the first will be in fishing for the money and for its practice and hence will be prepared to make financial sacrifices. “... the goods to be achieved in attaining excellence in the activities of fishing and in one’s role within the crew will, for as long as possible, outweigh the economic hardships of low wages and periods of bad catches or low prices for fish. Of course, no fishing crew can ever completely ignore the economic dimensions of their enterprise. But we have enough experience of members of crews preferring to endure the hardships of economic bad times in their trade, when they could have earned far higher wages elsewhere, for us to know that the subordination of economic goods to the goods of practice can be a rewarding reality.” 381 MacIntyre clearly criticizes the commercial fish crew and hence AngloSaxon capitalism. He is in favor of the other type, the ‘practice fish crew’, for their work is not a means to external goods “but constitutes a way of life, the sustaining of which is itself an end”. 382 This is the type of capitalism that is under threat because of the dynamics of our market-economy in which pricecompetition and customer-persuasion are ever more important. 383 Note that these quotes also make clear that MacIntyre is no Marxist or communist, since the difference is not about how to distribute money or wealth in a just way, but whether one finds them more important than realizing the 380 Ibid. 381 Ibid. pp. 285-286. 382 MacIntyre, Alasdair, Ethics in the Conflicts of Modernity: An essay on Desire, Practical Reasoning and Narrative, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom, 2016, p. 179 383 This argument is inspired on that of Russell Keat, who made a similar argument on the AngloAmerican concept of capitalism that MacIntyre presupposes, although I have a slightly different reading of what the Rhinelandic culture entails (cf. Chapter 4). See: Keat, Russell, ‘Practices, Firms and Varieties of Capitalism’, in: Philosophy of Management, 7 (1) 2008, pp. 77-92. 209 6 internal goods of practices. MacIntyre makes an important point about the political dimension inherent to the ‘practice fish crew’; there is a large shared responsibility there, which is much smaller in the commercial-fish-crew. There is a shared and organized care for the common good. It would be an unfortunate misinterpretation, which would nonetheless be in line with neoclassical economics, to see its focus on the improvement on standards of excellence as ineffectiveness or its solidarity as something that obstructs growth. The crews have radically different concepts of growth, competition, efficiency, management and profits, and these differences can hardly be addressed in the standard repertoire of economics. 384 Here again, we must not follow MacIntyre in identifying values such as these with a narrow-minded (‘shareholder satisfaction and maximation’) view on business. Commentators Dawson and Bartholomew argue business can very well see these values of business as subordinate ends, which are part of a wider ‘goal’: “These organisations will still strive for financial health, innovation and flexible working places, but they will give equal precedence to the security, health and well-being of their community. Indeed, this represents a shift in power that business people will promote. Organisation will support these changes through their educations role, a role that they will take seriously, giving people the development that they need whether it is central to their work. Indeed, organizations will see the benefit in promoting concepts of the good that emphasize virtues that are environmental, professional and spiritual in nature alongside those of the practice of a business.” 385 In this quote Dawson and Bartholomew present an argument in line with the perspective of Rhinelandic economies: an ideal business is somewhere in the middle, in between the commercial and the practice-fishing crew. But even in the Rhinelandic countries the ‘market force’ in capitalism represented by the commercial-fishing-crew has become dominant and makes it hard to understand business as a practice. That is why these countries traditionally acknowledge the need to politically curb these market forces. In slightly adjusted MacIntyrean terminology, the Rhinelandic economy is traditionally structured in a way that internal goods in practices are protected against the forces of external goods. This protection structure is ideally found in the 384 MacIntyre, Alasdair, Ethics in the Conflicts of Modernity: An essay on Desire, Practical Reasoning and Narrative, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom, 2016, p. 181. 385 Dawson, David, Craig Bartholomew, ‘Virtues, Managers and Business People: Finding a Place for MacIntyre in a Business Context, in: Journal of Business Ethics, 48, 2003, pp.127-138, p. 136. 210 economy, in companies and inside the managerial tool-box. To integrate this new picture of markets protected by governments into MacIntyre’s framework, it needs some additional adjustments. Before I present these, let me flesh out MacIntyre’s categories of the commercial-fishing-crew and practice-fishingcrew with the help of a re-interpretation of his idea of what a practice is. It would be a simplification to say a business has nothing to do with a practice, since it will often (perhaps even always) presuppose non-institutional elements that can be understood in terms of practices. Many sorts of business are evidently embedded in practices, like the business of fishing, retailing, publishing, music production, and so on. This even seems to be the case in corporate law and accountancy, in which one can develop craftsmanship very well. Although these ‘crafts’ work with the money as their ‘material’, it is not necessarily the case that they do this for the money. Regarded from the perspective of consumption (instead of production) there is also much reason to see the economy as embedded in practices. The purchase of a lunch might, strictly speaking, be economical, but the consumption of lunch is not. Think of the consumption of a lunch with a colleague, an activity with evident social ‘goods’ in it. There are also ‘goods’ to be found in the consumption of equipment, such as a drill, screws, or a computer. The ‘consumption’ of those goods is part of a practice, for instance that of making a garden playhouse for kids by following a plan downloaded from the internet. 386 Some aspects of institutions themselves can be seen as practices; and why would this not be the case for logistics or even strategy? Are these activities – which belong to the core of business schools – not in themselves worth studying? Moreover, are its key goals, like prudent organization and transparency, not internal goods? 387 This seems to be a plausible interpretation, although the difficulty lays in the general interpretation of the market space in which companies and their underlying practices operate. If the gravity of those market spaces brings all into a fierce competition for external goods, which seems to be MacIntyre’s presumption, then it will be difficult to keep framing essential aspects of organizations as practices. I revisit these topics – consumption as part of a practice and protection against excessive competition – in Chapter 7 on Hegel. In After Virtue, MacIntyre makes a comment that seems to support the interpretation of institutional care as a practice. “The making and sustaining of forms of human community – and therefore of institutions – itself has all 386 Keat, Russell, Cultural Goods and the Limits of the Market, Palgrave MacMillan, London, 2001. 387 This argument is comparable to that of Moore: Moore, Geoff, Virtue at Work. Ethics for Individuals, Managers, and Organizations, Oxford University Press, Oxford, United States, 2017, p. 67. 211 6 the characteristics of a practice, and moreover of a practice which stands in a peculiarly close relationship to the exercise of the virtues.” 388 The business ethicist Moore interprets this remark by MacIntyre as follows: [...] there is a second practice involved in any practice-institution combination – the practice of making and sustaining an institution.” 389 The basic insight of Moore is not simply to see business as a practice, but to see that a good business has the ability to balance internal- with external goods and hence managers should “move from manipulators to participants”. 390 Moore calls such a balanced organization a ‘virtuous organization’, of which he describes seven (partly overlapping) characteristics, which I summarize: 391 (1) Management should deal with means, but also with the (good) purposes of a company. (2) Management should be concerned with the practice at the core of the practice-institution combination. (3) Nonetheless, there should be sufficient managerial attention for external goods. (4) Managers should organize a company in such a way as to strengthen and normalize the virtues of workers. (5) This implies that the company organizes a formal power balance between internal and external goods, as well as systems and processes that enable critical rational dialogue. (6) Management should stimulate people by stimulating and supporting character development and assessment. (7) There is a need for an overall culture of virtuous behavior and support thereof on the highest organizational level. This picture of an ideal-type of management by Moore is a constructive implementation of MacIntyre’s concepts: a blue print for virtuous management in virtuous organizations. One could argue that this is overly idealistic – with overly high expectations of management – but in a way, it is rather realistic in its acknowledgement of the differences and ambiguities in management. It would be an idealistic case if we reframe management as such as a practice. Philosopher Kathryn Balstad Brewer argues that there are three aspects of management, which could be interpreted as internal management goals. 392 If she is right in this, we would have an account of business-as-a-practice. (1) Communication, for instance, is seen as a crucial aspect of management and could be interpreted as a goal in itself. With meetings, e-mails and 388 MacIntyre, Alasdair, After Virtue. A Study in Moral Theory, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, Indiana, 1984, third edition 2007, p. 194. 389 Moore, G. ‘Re-imagagining the Morality of Management: A Modern Virtue Ethics Approach’ in: Business Ethics Quaterly, 2008, 18(4): 483-511, p. 23. 390 Ibid., p. 31. 391 Ibid., p. 29-30. 392 Balstad Brewer, K, ‘Management as a Practice: A Response to Alasdair MacIntyre’, in: Journal of Business Ethics, 16: 825-833, 1997, 825-833, p. 830. 212 conversations, managers and employees articulate their shared means and goals in a business. (2) Another aspect of management is helping and enabling employees to find their role within a company or team. (3) Regarding the environment of a company, one could argue that stakeholder theory also addresses company-goals that go well-beyond the direct financial purposes of a company. However important, these three aspects of management – communication, enabling others and stakeholder theory – are mostly part of an economic goal. Perhaps we can make an exception for NGO’s and even certain type of do-good companies, like some green- and social energy and banking initiatives, but this is not the case of most businesses and especially not that of the big offices and consultancy firms that we find in business textbooks. It appears more reasonable to identify aspects – communication, enabling people and stakeholder awareness – of management as typical in between internal and external goods. That is, market and social issues are mostly inextricably bound together and with the help of MacIntyre we could argue that we need to teach students to think in terms of both internal and external goods, i.e. in two types of reasoning that are often identifiable in a good managerial judgment. I discuss the structure of this judgment in Chapter 8. A way to combine internal and external goods is presented by Ad Verbrugge. He proposes to understand management in line with sports management. 393 The basic idea in sport is that its leaders – ‘the playing captains’ – know the standards of excellence inherent to the relevant games. At the same time, they are accustomed to think in terms of external goods. Since the internal and external goods are often closely related and difficult to separate, there is a good reason to work with managers that know the relevant ‘practices’. In the (MacIntyrean) words of philosopher Gregory Beabout: management must be a domain-relative practice. 394 The sports comparison made above is in line with what happens in many crafts and SME’s: people work in teams with ‘master craftsmen’ (or: ‘foremen’). This suggestion by Verbrugge dovetails with those of Moore. Overall, these suggestions are in line with the ‘classic’ understanding of business in which senior managers started as juniors on the shop-floor and worked their ways up to the board rooms; and during their careers they got to know the different departments of a company. 393 Verbrugge, Ad, ‘Geschonden Beroepseer’, in: Beroepszeer. Waarom Nederland niet goed werkt, ed. Brink, Gabriel, Thijs Jansen, Dorien Pessers. Boom Uitgeverij, Amsterdam, the Netherlands, 2005, pp. 108-13. 394 Beabout, Gregory, ‘Management as a Domain-Relative Practice that Requires and Develops Practical Wisdom’, in: Business Ethics Quaterly, 22:2 2012, pp. 405-432. 213 6 This is not the context of today’s flexible economy, but the idea of the ‘playing captain’ or ‘master craftsman’ does provide an alternative, wider view on business than the strict market perspective. This perspective is more ethical, for instance because of the room it leaves for the codetermination of goals, but it is not per se more democratic, due to its focus on the shared standards and not per se on the opinions of employees. Here my line of argument differs from that of Sinnick, who also argues (‘with MacIntyre against MacIntyre’) that there is a possibility for good business management, which he calls “servant leadership”, which is based on the idea that “a leader’s first priority ought to be to serve others.” 395 Compared to bureaucratic ideas about management, this approach emphasizes the people side of management, but such a focus on it obscures the accordance of managerial work with certain standards. Perhaps the notion of ‘mastery’ better pronounces this aspect than that of ‘leadership’. The notion of servant leadership also suggests a cooperative view of work in contrast to an Anglo-American competitive way of work that is not fully in line with my MacIntyrian argument. We need to oppose a thin market idea of competition – as in competing for finite resources in a zero-sum game – but we do need to acknowledge some kind of competition. The sports analogy provides a helpful understanding of this: Competition as emulation. “In emulative competition the aim is to excel, in terms of the practice’s standards”, as Keat writes in his commentary on MacIntyre, “and excellent performance by one’s rivals prompts both genuine admiration and the attempt to do even better, or at least as well, oneself.” 396 The concept of emulation clarifies that practices are not without risks: a practice-based organization is not free of, for instance, stress or egoism related to one’s quality of work. In the next section, I return to the inherent risks of the practice-side of work and management as a balancing of internal and external goods. Let me conclude this elaboration on a thick view of management with a proviso: Of course, not all firms can be easily reframed in terms of internal and external goods. There are many firms that – on a scale of practices and institutions – are more on the one side, while others are at the other end. For instance, it would be rather odd if we reframe Goldman Sachs as a practice-institution combination, a company that is so clearly interested in its shareholder value and whose core business it is to increase that of the companies that they advise and invest in. Thus, some firms are simply 395 Sinnicks, Matthew, ‘Leadership After Virtue: MacIntyre’s Critique of Management Reconsidered’, in: Journal of Business Ethics, pp. 736-746, p. 743. 396 Keat, Russell, “Practices, Firms and Varieties of Capitalism”, in: Philosophy of Management vol. 7 no 1 2008, pp. 77-91, p. 85. 214 institutions and although MacIntyre is rather pessimistic about the goodness of those firms, he nonetheless frames their goals in terms of external goods and not ‘bads’. The goal of my interpretation is not to remodel the economy entirely, but to provide a way to understand what is going on. If we are aware that a firm like Goldman Sacks is totally on the institution-side, at least we could identify possible dangers of this and perhaps install regulations to guard against them. 397 I come back to this topic in chapter 7 which deals with the role of the market place in general in relation to the common good. For now, we will stick with the discussion of practices. In the next section I will analyze their relation to the common good. 6.5 Make Practice-Institutions Purposeful with Citizen Involvement. The last few sections focused on the relation between internal and external goods. Here I take a closer look at the practice side, ignoring the institution side for a moment. This focus helps to give us new arguments for the need for institutions and especially ‘the market’ in general and the role of ‘consumers’ therein. Following philosopher David Miller’s commentary on MacIntyre, I first enrich the notion of practice regarding its embedding in society. Then I work out two examples – from the care-practice and science-practice – that teach us that practices are not holy and in fact create bureaucratic effects – an output focus – that fits category of external goods. I argue that too much focus on ‘virtuous’ practices threaten their flourishing; there is a need to balance practices with institutions. Customers and citizens (and socially aware managers) are necessary to keep practices balanced. I end this section with the example of Shell, showing that those customers and citizens must also correct an overly strong focus on institutions. Where the practices of care and science are overly practice-minded, those of the oil-industry are rather institutional minded. Let me start with Miller’s adjustment of MacIntyre’s concept of practice. Miller says MacIntyre’s understanding of practices can be improved by making a distinction between two types of practices: “[...] practices whose raison d’être consists entirely in the internal goods achieved by participants and the contemplation of those achievements by others (I shall refer to those practices as ‘self-contained’) and practices 397 One can nonetheless argue that even Goldman Sachs mentions honesty and integrity in their business principles. Therefore, one could (try) to define this company in terms of a practice. See: Graafland, Johan J., Bert W. van de Ven, ‘The Credit Crisis and the Moral Responsibility of Professionals in Finance’, European Banking Center Discussion Paper N. 2011-012, pp. 1-19, p.7. 215 6 which exist to serve social ends beyond themselves (I shall refer to these as ‘purposive’).”398 Examples of the self-contained practices are sports and games; examples of purposive practices are farming and architecture. In response to Miller, MacIntyre claims that his framework already covers this idea. MacIntyre says that it is never the exclusive aim of practices “to catch fish, or to produce beef and milk or to build houses”399 and hence to cultivate the ‘goods’ that are realized in these activities. It is always also something that helps to develop “the goods of an individual life and of those of a community”.400 In one way, MacIntyre is right in this response, for he indeed presents practices as consonant to communities at large and open for individual development. The question is, however, whether MacIntyre keeps open the option that practices isolate themselves from the community at large, possibly driven by external goods but perhaps solely due to internal goods. I argue that Miller’s adjustment to MacIntyre’s framework helps to understand this problem. In addition, it helps to understand another important aspect: Macintyre ignores the possibility that somebody alien to a practice – a non-expert – might nonetheless be capable of influencing the quality of the practice itself. In the scheme of MacIntyre, this option seems to come too close to the market economy in which the quality of end products is judged by consumers in their purchases, or of their choice to go to a competing company. But on a closer look, we need to question whether an outsider judgment or even consumerlike perspective is really that problematic, or that it perhaps can be understood as complementary or even as necessary to make sure that practices continue to realize goods internal to practices.401 Such an outside judgment on the practice must be done considering the telos that a certain practice has. In many cases, such a telos is relatively easy to define from an outsider perspective and it is odd that MacIntyre ignores this possibility. MacIntyre seems to presuppose that one can only judge the telos of a practice if one masters its standards of excellence. It can nonetheless be a source of information to ask what relative outsiders think of a practice. Miller refers to medical practices as an example where non-experts have an important constructive role to play. 398 Miller, David, ‘Virtues, Practices and Justice’, in: After MacIntyre, ed. J. Horton, S. Mendus, Polity Press, Malden USA, 1994, pp. 245-264, p. 250. 399 MacIntyre, Alasdair, ‘A Partial Response to my Critics’, in: After MacIntyre, pp. 283-304, p. 284. 400 Idem. p. 286. 401 This argument – inspired by Keat – is in line with Miller’s. Keat also follows and expands and nuances Miller. See: Keat, Russell, Cultural Goods and the Limits of the Market, Palgrave MacMillan, London, 2001, p. 128. 216 Below I reconstruct (A) his analysis of a medical practice and develop it further. I also sketch parallel cases that bring us closer to our research topic: (B) the practice of science and (C) the business ‘practice’ of Shell. (A) Miller’s suggestion is that an educated outsider to medical treatment should be able to understand a comparison between for example Chinese and Western medicine with regard to their effectiveness of caring for people and curing them. And if we decide to keep working with Western medicine, the question is: Are doctors themselves the only judge of their activities in reference to the internal goods that they try to achieve and which they enjoy achieving? In case of purposive practices, it is not clear why a patient could not carry out a critical assessment. Is the patient unable to judge its own health and well-being or the way she was spoken to? Patients are certainly not able to see whether a doctor has removed a tumor fully. But they can estimate whether a doctor took their complaint seriously, explained their options clearly and whether he managed to heal them. Consider another dimension of healthcare: The costs of over-treatment of serious illnesses like cancer. Surely, many citizens want to explore all possible treatments, even if these give little hope for cure, and the role of financial incentives for hospitals and insurances will also increase the amount of treatments. Perhaps practices of doctors do not cause the problem of overtreatment, but it is not mute to the mix of motives that causes it either. It is unclear why outsiders or ex-patients should not be able to co-govern relevant policies here. Hence, (1) an outsider can partly judge activities with an eye on the goods inherent to those activities; (2) he or she can also help to analyze the coming together of internal and external goods in those activities. The case of medicine seems to display the need for such a ‘customer judgment’. Perhaps not all people have such a judgmental power. Moreover, perhaps we need to organize a training for people exercising and cultivating it. But it is reasonable to think many non-specialists in medicine can nonetheless judge the quality of medical treatment and the organization of the care-system up to a certain degree. (B) Another example might be that of academic research. In modern universities, the quality of a researcher is measured by the number of publications in international peer-review journals he or she has. Why should the practice of academic scholarship be organized in this way? Most successful professors, i.e. those who publish in these journals, think they legitimately do so. But why are they the only ones to decide whether they can isolate their practices into circles of experts? Academia is clearly a purposeful practice and hence citizens and politicians should also be involved in judging whether 217 6 academics function well or simply fulfil the self-imposed criteria. Those citizens and politicians could plea for more openness of academic publications (open access, less technical vocabulary, accessibly written publications, fostering public debate, etc.) and they could also plea for more societal relevance. Why, for instance, is an academic publication in English worth so much more than one in Dutch? The argument that the international community of researchers uses English as its lingua franca is less convincing when one defines the goal – or the common ‘good’ – of science regarding the social world in which it is (and perhaps: should be) embedded. Thus, it would not only be rational to keep an option open to present research to a wider Dutch public in the Dutch language, it should even be a duty of scientists, due to the inherent relation of science towards the society that creates possibilities for scientists to work. This idea is shared by many journalists, intellectuals, ordinary citizens and even a fair number of scientists, but their opinions up until now have not curbed the rise of English in Dutch academia.402 Again, this is partly a matter of the organization and evaluation of ‘goods’ internal and external to the organization of academia. It is rather unclear why non-academics are not involved in this organization and evaluation. Indeed, it is unclear why academia is an “Ivory Tower” in the first place and not more tolerant for nonscientists to do scientific work. Simply asking this question already brings us to the stints of the idea of a practice, for a practice is defined in a rather introverted way.403 Note that practice as a descriptive concept has quite some explanatory power. We have already shown that this idea is very fruitful for an ethical definition of business. However, we need to acknowledge its shortcomings as a normative concept too. Many critics of the health care system and academia signal a problem in marketization, often called neoliberalism, but the problem they signal is not fully explained with such a criticism. When we consider care and science as a practice, we can frame their organizational problems in a different way, focusing on the shortcomings of ‘expertise’ when they are too enthusiastic about their own standards of excellence and forget about the prudency of their organization. What the examples of medical and academic practices make clear, is that these practices – when their organization and purpose is left to their practitioners – are not necessarily understood with an eye on the common good. There seems sufficient reason to organize the evaluation of purposive practices like those of care and education outside those practices. One of the possibilities 402 See: Verbrugge, Ad, Het Groot Manifest der Nederlandse Taal, in: NRC Handelsblad, jun. 27. 2015. 403 See: Willem Halfman, ‘De Universiteit als Kennismeent’ in: Waartoe is de universiteit op aarde? eds Ad Verbrugge, Jelle van Baardewijk, Uitgeverij Boom, Amsterdam, the Netherlands, 2014 218 is a group of people representing the different relevant practices, another is a more independent operating and state-funded institution, yet another are the end-users or consumers. MacIntyre himself seems to be critical about all these options – but is that reasonable? I think it is not: there is enough reason to expect qualitative improvements of practices based on evaluation by people that are not directly involved in those practices. However, inspired by MacIntyre, we should be wary of a bureaucratic and managerial understanding of such evaluations. There is an organizational reflex in both commercial and public organizations to think that evaluation is the same as counting, measuring, and controlling every single move people make. Of course, truly evaluating the purpose of an organization involves more than such accounting. We deal with evaluation of the activities of a practice or institution considering general purposes that they are taken to or ought to fulfil. MacIntyre’s concepts of practices/institutions and internal/external can help to articulate such an evaluation. But in a way the issue is more complex than MacIntyre can acknowledge, for reasons I already identified above and which I want to recall now in relation to the word ‘accountability’. For MacIntyre, accountability has a strong ethical meaning. It means something akin to responsibility: A person needs to develop an ‘account’, a view of life which makes him or her responsible. MacIntyre advises us, as I explained in section 6.2, to write our own life-narratives that can be boiled down to such an account of the good life. When we try to coherently tell ourselves and others where we come from and where we are going – what quest we are on – we can identify what we aspire to be and hence develop criteria to judge the situation we are in. I expand on this theme further in chapter 8. For now, I simply want to relate this to practices: being an accountable practitioner means one has a story about what one is doing, what the goods are one is aspiring to together with others while following standards of excellence, and how this connects and conflicts with the goods external to a practice, and so on. The crucial difference between this understanding of accountability and an understanding of accountability in the organization of care and science is that these refer to the duty to present auditable results.404 Here we see two different concepts of accountability: ‘taking responsibility’ or ‘being answerable to’ at the one side; having an ‘auditable system’ at the other. One could argue that ‘taking responsibility’ is clearly something we see in practices, whereas audits are done by institutions, but such a division seems 404 This distinction between an ethical and administrative idea of accountability is inspired by an unpublished article by Bruce Gharton; he speaks of a general and a technical meaning of the word. Gharton, Bruce, ‘Audit, accountability, quality and all that: the growth of managerial technologies in UK Universities.’ See: Biesta, Gert, “Education, Accountability, and the Ethical Demand: can the Democratic Potential of Accountability be Regained?”, in: Educational Theory, vol. 54, no. 3, 2004. 219 6 to be wrong for it idealizes practices and is overly pessimistic about the intentions of the people organizing institutions. In MacIntyre’s framework, external goods are related to money, power, and fame - and not so much to bureaucracy. We should stretch that category of external goods: All that is measurable – mostly money, but output in general might be a more encompassing term – seems to potentially ‘count’ as a ‘good’ in the ‘institutions-practices’ we work. (C) I want to return to the topic of practices once again. The previous two examples – care and science – are clearly practices, and as far as they are institutionalized, they are organized according to a professional logic, i.e. relatively autonomously compared to organizations of regular business or government. Whether practices like care and science are indeed less vulnerable for the external goods as money, power, and prestige – and output – because of this, is not certain. In any case, I think that commercial firms can be analyzed in a comparable way. Consider, for instance, the business of firms in energy, like Shell. This Dutch-English company continues to invest in fossil energy, which is clearly at odds with the climate goals the Netherlands and the United Kingdom have set, as well as with those of the European Union (cf. Chapter 1.2). Seen from the logic of the market place, as perceived through the lens of (a shallow market understanding of ) business studies, Shell needs to keep increasing its market share and profits, which explains why its continued involvement in fossil energy seems to be rational. But this ‘rationality’ of the external goods is not necessarily what helps to improve the energy market, nor is the best for customers. Note that I employ strict economic terms like ‘market’ and ‘customer’ and therewith prepare an argument immanent to the discourse of business studies. I think we fundamentally misunderstand the market place (although in line with the standard textbook interpretation of both neoclassical and standard business-tools like the BCG-Matrix) when the only way companies listen to customers is by taking their buying decisions seriously. Why should customers not also be actively involved in the process of developing the business of energy? Why should customers not be better informed and protected against a short-sighted perspective on mobility (driving outdated diesel cars)? These types of questions are clearly more at home in a Rhinelandic view on the economy in which the logic of the market-place aligns with what can be called the logic of citizenship, although I am inclined to say this whole picture can be framed in market terms. 405 I do not argue that the Rhinelandic economies are always better than the 405 This argument is in line with that of Dobson. An important difference, however, is that his argument to balance practices with institutions does not involve society at large. He does not follow the argument Miller makes on purposeful practices, as I do. See: Dobson, John, ‘The Corrupting Power of Practices’, in: Handbook of Virtue Ethics in Business and Management ed. A.J.G. Sison, Springer, Dordrecht, the Netherlands, 2017. 220 Anglophonic; both have advantages and disadvantages. However, mainly due to the logic of globalization and hence fierce international competition, even classical examples of the Rhinelandic economy can fall prey to short-sighted and moral misbehavior. A recent case is Dieselgate, in which Volkswagen was part of a systematically organized fraud in the manufacturing of cars. As research journalists have shown, the capitalistic incentives of growth, market share and profit clearly led to the fraud, despite (or perhaps: due to) the Rhinelandic culture of Volkswagen. The question, however, is whether this is simply a matter of external goods, or whether internal goods are also a part of the problem. After all, it was Volkswagen’s invention to create so-called ‘clean diesels’ and this invention was not just a simple product but nourished as a piece of craftsmanship and collective innovation. The missing link between companies like Shell and Volkswagen on the one side, and society at large at the other side, is that this relation is too distanced and only made concrete when it suits these major companies’ capitalistic incentives. With MacIntyre, one can argue that they are too much directed towards the side of institutions on the slippery slope between practices and institutions. But why is this tolerated? The answer to this question is related to a specific liberal idea of the economy which is understood as the realm of personal freedom. We need to explore the possibilities for a wider and more ethical definition of the economy and hence of companies. Specifically, we should require certain companies to redefine their business much more in between the internal external goods on the one side and the ambitions of a society at the other. Such a redefinition of certain companies can be ethically vindicated with the help of the adjusted framework of MacIntyre in which both the market and the state are taken more seriously in their cultural and ethical meaning. I do not think we necessarily have to speak about a ‘society’ at this point of the argument. We can stick to business vocabulary: As joined customers there is reason to think that practices need outside control, potentially customercontrol. Furthermore, it is questionable whether customers should let businesses decide about customer-preferences as something that is strictly interpreted as customers-spending-money. (1) Such a shallow interpretation of customer satisfaction is at odds with the development of practices and their internal goods, which are related to the common good, and presupposed in consumption. Think of a family driving a car, going on holidays, visiting friends – such activities cross roles of customer, father, friend, and so on. Seen from this perspective, it is good for customers when Shell would innovate more and be less short-sighted. (2) It is questionable whether companies should be able to frame their own activities in terms of institutions only – ‘we primarily serve 221 6 shareholders’ or ‘we obey the law’ – when they de facto presuppose and are part of practices and hence are a combination of practices/institutions. Conclusion In this chapter we have seen that MacIntyre helps us to understand the economy with his concept of practices. I argued he falsely presupposes a ‘thin’ (neoclassical/Marxist) idea of the economy in his overall conceptual framework, although this presupposition does enable him to formulate an alternative idea of economic order. For MacIntyre himself, this alternative idea of economic order is at odds with the capitalistic predicament. However, seen in the light of the ‘varieties of capitalism’ debate, what MacIntyre presents comes close to a systematic account of a Rhinelandic view on the marketeconomy. I have argued that this account presents several problems, to which I also formulated solutions. Regarding MacIntyre’s idea of firms and management, I reconstructed complementary ideas of Beadle, Moore, Keat, Verbrugge and Miller, which resulted in the next two definitions. (1) A business is an institution that rests on a practice as its productive core and hence is a combination of both. MacIntyre himself thinks that only productive crafts count as ‘good’ business, but this understanding of business is too small to offer an understanding of many non-craft types of business. (2) Due to the corrosive powers of the external goods typical for institutions, a good manager must be able to protect the relevant internal goods against the forces of inside and outside external goods. One could call an internal competition over prestigious management positions external-goods that are rooted inside the company. When fierce market competition leads to the need for economic policy, one could speak of outside external goods. This combination (1&2) requires the right judgment by managers and organization of the company with a certain balance of powers in companies in between the authorities of practice, who embody the standards of excellence, and the managers on the side of the balance-sheet. However, this picture of a good business and its management is still incomplete. It seems that MacIntyre underestimates the tendency of practices to segregate from society, so it is not necessarily the institution side of a company that isolates an organization. Therefore, I suggest that we see this risk in current debates in care, academic research and in the commercial oil industry. One can see that the current discussion on audits – for instance, citation indexes in academia and the administrative burden in care – is an example of problems that arise due to internal goods and the combination of internal and external goods. We can already make concrete some of the insights from this chapter as 222 building block for an improved business school ethos. Business students should be enabled to: • recognize the internal goods in the practices that they are likely to work with. • recognize dilemmas between internal goods and external goods within and outside an organization. • recognize dilemmas in between internal/external goods of an organization in contrast to the values of society at large. • being able to question the identity of organizations as mere practices or mere institutions: Is Shell only a for-profit company? Is science only an expert activity? • being able to develop an account of one’s different activities – i.e. tell one’s ‘life-story’ and the way it integrates the (possibly conflicting) goods of relevant practices, institutions, and roles one participates in. The conceptual scheme of MacIntyre (and my adjustments to it) cannot help us with all problems. Moral ethologically speaking, it has the following problems: 1) MacIntyre is overly negative about corporations and political organization and sees them as necessary evil. 2) His concept of ‘practices’ has heuristic value but risks to eclipse the value of individual deliberation and freedom. In the Chapter 7, I turn to Hegel’s conceptualization of markets to solve these two problems. Hegel sees markets as domains that help people realize their individuality and he identifies the community and state as necessary aspects of modern market economy. Furthermore, I argue Hegel’s concept of recognition can help to improve our understanding of the difference between internal and external goods. 223 6 224 Chapter 7: A Moral Ethological Analysis of Markets (the relevance of Hegel) 7 225 Introduction In this chapter, I continue to develop concepts to envisage an improved business school ethos. With Hegel, I articulate the elementary relationship between individuals and society. He helps us to see markets as domains in which individuals can realize individual freedom. In contrast to liberal authors, such as Dworkin, who also emphasize this in their defenses of marketization, 406 Hegel manages to elucidate how markets can nevertheless be understood in relation to society and states. Without markets, there can be no individual freedom, but without states, Hegel explains, there can be no free markets. Hegel helps us to understand what markets are and in what sense they presuppose social and state institutions. Students in business studies – as I made clear in Part I – often lack sufficient understanding of the elementary relationship between individuals and society and of the role of markets therein. With Hegel, this lack could be repaired. Hegel’s understanding of markets complements the ideas on business and virtues developed in the previous chapter 6. In this chapter I articulate an alternative ethical understanding of the economy based on these lines of thought. I will not go into a systematic discussion of Hegel’s practical philosophical thoughts, as I present them here, and his philosophical system. Instead, I turn to a very specific part of his practical philosophy, namely the relation between the individual, the collective and institutions. These are part of what Hegel calls the philosophy of the ‘objective spirit’, which is presented in his Elements of the Philosophy of Law. This book elaborates on core concepts of the social and political world. To state it in non-Hegelian terms: law, morality and culture. Hegel’s basic premise is that these dimensions of human life should be understood as pertaining to the realization of freedom. When we combine the insights of MacIntyre and Hegel, an important alternative interpretation of the market emerges that is well worth considering by contemporary business schools that aim to realign themselves and their curricula with societal needs and want to curb the hegemony of Anglo-Saxon interpretations of the free market. Section 7.1 presents Hegel’s idea of the relation between individuals in terms of recognition. This analysis helps to clarify the way people interrelate in social contexts. Section 7.2 deals with Hegel’s ideas on consumption and production. MacIntyre focuses much on the production (or: creation) side of the economy, whereas Hegel helps to 406 Dworkin, Ronald, ‘liberalism’, in: A matter of Principle. Chapter eight, Oxford University Press, pp. 181-204. 226 understand the consumption side as well and does so in a non-naturalistic way. Section 7.3 focuses on Hegel’s ideas of the state-market nexus. Section 7.4 summarizes Hegel’s political philosophy, in as far as it is relevant for our research. In the last section (7.5), I present an ethical understanding of the economy as a whole from a moral ethological perspective. To do so, I consider recent developments like globalization and financialization, of which Hegel was obviously unaware. Here I make use of Karl Marx’ analysis, as well as recent commentaries on Hegel’s work. 7.1 Hegel’s Attempt to Unite Individuality with the Common Good Hegel writes his philosophy at the transition between the Enlightenment period and the Romantic period. He is one of the first critics of the philosophy of the Enlightenment. Hegel understood the enlightenment ideal of a free subject but was also aware of problems surrounding the emancipation of the individual in modernity. He is critical about what he calls the ‘subjectivation’ of culture and philosophy. Hegel realized that subjectivation can make people follow their own feelings and opinions, instead of a shared morality. We have seen this criticism before, as I discussed MacIntyre’s critique of Enlightenment philosophy (Chapter 5.1, 5.3). Hegel argued that the process of subjectivation was inherent to modern life and deemed it necessary for people to develop a more personal consciousness. In the end, it is in the individual mind that people can grasp the way reality functions. MacIntyre’s conceptual scheme leaves less room for individual freedom and emphasizes the collective (‘practices’) instead. What Hegel tries to combine in the Elements of the Philosophy of Law, is the Aristotelian idea of the human being as a zooion politikon with that of the free modern individual. The concept of a zooion politikon is conceptually connected to Aristotle’s anthropological premise that a good life can only be led in the context of a polis in which one is raised and educated. The Aristotelian polis is also aristocratic. The zooion politikon is a gentleman and privileged, not only because of his merit, but also because of his birth (cf. Chapter 8). Hegel rejects this latter aspect of Aristotle’s ideal, as he wants to do justice to the modern development of subjectivation that frees the individual from the collective realms.407 This is where the market comes into play, as it is the preeminent realm in which humans can live out their freedom.408 But before we turn to 407 Hegel, Georg. W. F., Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, tr. T.M. Knox, Oxford University Press, 1942 (or. Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts oder Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft in Grundrisse, Suhrkamp 1986 [1821]), §260. 408 This marks an important difference between Hegel and MacIntyre. MacIntyre would never acknowledge the importance of markets as they revolve around external goods. 227 7 his idea of the market, I turn to the more fundamental social relation among individuals. Hegel does not believe the social should be thought of as rooting either in individuals (such as Hobbes or Rawls) or in the collective (such as MacIntyre) alone but shows that individuals and collectives can only be thought in relation to one another. He does not interpret individual freedom in the negative sense as freedom from disturbances but understands true freedom to only be realizable in relation to other people. True freedom is what Hegel calls the recognition of myself by others and vice versa. 409 I am only free as a person in as far as another recognizes me as a person. Examples of this can be found in friendship, love, patriotism, and religion. Recognition is not always evident and can be violated: If somebody else manipulates me, offends me, or even robs me, my freedom as a person is misrecognized and violated. Now these examples are roughly in line with the liberal concept of freedom that is ensured through a juridical system and its enforcement, which protect my freedom from the interference of others. Yet, Hegel’s further analysis goes well beyond this liberal account of (negative) freedom, as we will see in due course. The basic idea of recognition can be analyzed with an example, which I borrow from Ad Verbrugge, that brings us from the realm of rights into that of culture. 410 Imagine you meet an acquaintance in the street. You are not obliged to say something and might not even have something to talk about, but you still make small talk because you feel that it is normal to do so. With your words of greeting you express a positive intention towards the other person, for you see the other and recognize him as a unique person. You do so in freedom. In this case, however, the uniqueness and worthiness of the other person are recognized in the context of a shared habit that is rather general. With Hegel one could say that it is this shared ethos – greeting with words, small talk, certain symbolic gestures – that enables your acquaintance and yourself to be recognized mutually, albeit on a rudimentary level in this example. The point is that recognition, on any level, can only take place in the context of a shared ethos. This might seem contradictory, but everyone who has visited other cultures might have experienced situations in which you try to express your appreciation for someone only to find that the difference in culture makes such a personal connection difficult of even impossible. Only if 409 Commentators have different interpretations of this basic Hegelian insight. Cobben has written an analysis of recognition in which he also discusses various accounts, such as that of Honneth and Siep. See: Cobben, Paul, The Paradigm of Recognition. Freedom as Overcoming the Fear of Death, Critical Studies in German Idealism, Leiden Brill, 2012. 410 Verbrugge, Ad, ‘De idee van de vrijheid in Hegels staatsfilosofie’, in: Hegel. Een inleiding, eds. Arie Leijen, Ad Verbrugge, Boom Uitgeverij, Amsterdam, the Netherlands, 2002, pp. 118-158. 228 you share, for example, a greeting habit, can you surpass the point of meeting someone as someone with different customs. Hegel points out that the greeting ritual is characterized by a strong codependency. You can only be ‘successful’ if the other person recognizes you. If the greeting is not returned, you might feel bad about that person and perhaps about yourself; you are ignored and misrecognized. If the other did see you, but simply did not reply to your greetings, this leads to the strange experience of a break between you and the other. If this would happen often, you would be unfree in the Hegelian sense of the word. You would feel alienated from society. A greeting in the street is a co-realization of freedom in which two people realize themselves as persons in and throughout a shared custom. This is a reciprocal movement that comes back in all human affairs: in work, in friendship, family life, and so on. Humans need others to realize their true humanity. Hegel’s idea of recognition helps us to understand the functioning of what MacIntyre calls ‘standards of excellence’. What happens when two people meet, is that they do not meet directly but through the shared forms of greetings. In the case of standards of excellence, this is even more so. Consider, for instance, a manager and an employee that speak to each other, for instance in a performance review. This authority relation can only work when the manager judges about the functioning of the employee with the standards of excellence in mind, apart from external goods that might also play a role. Now if the manager fails to do so in a balanced way, he fails to recognize the employee and therewith he fails to realize freedom. This is exactly the situation we risk bringing business students in: ignorance of the self-understanding of employees in and through their working by certain standards. However, we should realize that recognition can be part of the workings of external goods as well. Being able to make profit, receive a salary, become famous, and so on, are also issues of recognition. Philosopher Keat Russell, who thinks in the line of MacIntyre, proposes to see recognition neither as a purely internal good, nor as a purely external good, but rather as mediating these two.411 How can we make this suggestion concrete? Perhaps in the following way: Recognition is not something independent of the specific nature of practices and its standards, so it cannot be obtained by potentially any means, such as money, attention, or products. Recognition can only be distributed with the confirmation of others who are competent. Recognition is primarily a matter of informed judgments of peers. 411 Keat, Russell, Cultural Goods and the Limits of the Market, Palgrave, London, United Kingdom, p. 181, note 16. 229 7 At the same time, the recognition needs translation in external goods, such as money and prestige. Without the infrastructure and reward of those external goods, there is little room for recognition either. However, recognition in terms of external goods – working according to the official process, earning a lot, being famous – does not imply real recognition by people who have a well-informed judgment. I return to this issue later. Hegel articulates the relation between individual and collective further in his Phenomenology of Spirit. There, Hegel defines recognition as the ‘doubling of the self-consciousness’, which he explains as the “I which is we, and the we which is I.”412 Applied to our example of a greeting, this means that the acquaintance and I can only be ourselves if someone recognizes us as an individual. This is only possible if there is a shared habit in which we can do so. The collective at the same time can only be a collective if we as individuals choose its habits as our way of life. In every greeting we affirm the habit and we are affirmed in the context of it. Hegel understands our togetherness not solely as two-individuals-connected, but as two individuals who in the same culture or, to be more precise, the same ‘objective spirit’, realize their freedom. In the case of a work situation, two persons meet each other in their roles, partly defined by the standards of excellence. Hegel distinguishes this objective spirit into three realms: the nuclear family, the economy and the state.413 The first ethical (sittliche) realm of life is the nuclear family in which we grow up. Here, people are clearly united in one larger whole than that of the individual person. It is no coincidence that a married man and women (translated to today: two persons) are even interpreted as ‘one’ person by the law and in Hegel’s system. What binds this realm together is, of course, the love between man and woman as well as that between parents and their children. The kids are not individualized yet and the parents need to enable them to do so in a later stage of life. It is only in the second ethical realm, which Hegel calls the bürgerliche Gesellschaft, the ‘market society’, that people can freely act as individuals with particular wants.414 412 Hegel, Georg, W. F., Phenomenologie des Geites, Felix Meiner Verlag, 1952 [1807], (my translation), p. 140. 413 In Hegel’s philosophy, those three realms correspond to the threefold structure of the world: generality, particularity, and singularity. 414 Today we understand ‘bürgerliche Geselschaft’ as the non-governmental and non-market aspects of society, for instance, churches or NGO’s. Hegel has a different, rather economic definition that is perhaps better named ‘market society’ than ‘civil society’, so that is also the term I use as a translation. 230 7.2 Hegel on Consumption, Production and Bildung In Hegel’s technical terms, the realm of the market society is distinguished in three parts. (1) ‘The system of needs’ analyzes our wants. It is called ‘a system’ because our needs are socialized and not immediate. For instance, I might be hungry, and this can mean that I have appetite for a sandwich; such an appetite is part of a wider economy and not a ‘natural’ thing we simply ‘have’. The (2) ‘administration of justice’ and the (3) ‘police and corporations’ are institutions that structure the market of production and consumption. Now, I will focus on Hegel’s analysis of the system of needs. Hegel discusses a wide range of themes in the chapter of the Philosophy or Right that is devoted to the ‘system of needs’. His analysis opens with the obvious but essential observation that human beings have needs (e.g. for food and shelter) that are satisfied externally (e.g. with bread and housing). Hegel says that because of this externality, man must do something to satisfy his need. He calls this: labor. Hegel follows Adam Smith’s view on economics, in which value is not based on precious metals (as in mercantilist views) nor on agriculture or land (as in the physiocratic views) but on bare labor power.415 Hegel then discerns two aspects of human needs: first, in contrast to animals, human need and satisfaction, fundamentally exceed the natural connection to the life. Human needs and satisfaction are thus endless. We multiply our needs all the time. I have more jeans than strictly necessary, and I have refined my wants throughout the years, which was not necessary from a biological perspective. Second, and complementary to the first aspect, human needs are shared and socially cultivated in hypes, fashion and habitual practices. Taken together, the endless character and social distribution of human needs transform the needs from natural needs into man-made needs, which, according to Hegel, implies an element of freeing from natural determination.416 With this analysis Hegel shows that the realization of our wants in the economy as consumers is not just a matter of satisfaction of needs sec, but of the development of human freedom. 417 Many animals are directly embedded in a certain natural environment and could not develop their needs for communication into, say, a smartphone. The smartphone is the satisfaction of a human need that is essentially cultural. We think we need a smartphone, probably even favoring one brand over another, and it is partly our thoughts or opinions about these products that are satisfied in 415 Hegel, Georg. W. F., Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, tr. T.M. Knox, Oxford University Press, 1942 (or. Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts oder Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft in Grundrisse, Suhrkamp 1986 [1821]), Berlin, Germany, § 189. 416 Ibid. § 194. 417 Ibid. § 194. 231 7 our usage of a certain smartphone.418 This type of consumption is brought to a further level of acculturalization when we consume fair trade smartphones, for then one is satisfying ideas about the world even more. In fact, these ‘reflexive ideas’ critically concern the fact that we continuously develop and cultivate our consumption patterns. The market place is clearly the realm in which people are free to follow and satisfy their particular needs and therefore a crucial part of Hegel’s system of needs.419 In order to satisfy one’s particular needs, labor is necessary, and this implies a relation to other people and their particularities. Laboring to satisfy all of one’s needs implies working for the needs of others as well. Thanks to the emerging division of labor, Hegel argues, people become more closely connected to each other in their needs and labor. In work, people need to focus on the needs of others and therefore need to be socialized into the habit of creating wanted products and providing wanted services. Now due to the development of human needs in our economy – people continue to expand and refine their needs – the labor market requires more and more from its producers. Hegel states that labor changes human behavior on a reflexive mental level, by the development of practical skills and allied theoretical insights. For instance, it requires much more skills and knowledge to develop a smartphone than a pair of jeans. Because the laborer needs to focus on his work (and the standards of excellence to produce it, to use MacIntyre’s words), Hegel argues that people develop a relation of freedom in regard to their own particular needs. Hegel introduces the concept of Bildung as man’s ability to ignore his direct inner experiences and focus on what needs to be done. Seen in this way, a Hegelian panacea to the emotivistic/expressivist culture is to let people work, for then they learn to ignore their own inner self (feelings, preferences, inclinations) and focus on the outside world of standards. This is the paradox of work: (1) We realize freedom because we learn to control the outer world. For instance, I recognize my own activity and even my signature in the way we have organized certain work at my university. (2) We realize freedom because we learn to distance ourselves from our subjective experience because we need to turn our attention outward. This might feel uneasy (‘I am hungry, but I need to finish work.’), but it results in the capacity of patience that enables people to take control of their life. This experience of freedom over something else and ourselves, is something which Hegel calls Bildung.420 It is quite remarkable that Hegel chooses this word – and not, for 418 Ibid. § 190; 195. 419 Ibid. § 185. 420 Ibid. § 187. 232 instance, ‘craftsmanship’ or ‘mastery’ – that we tend to associate with literature rather than practical judgment. 421 At the same time, it is understandable and in line with the argument developed in the coming Chapter 8.3, where the theory/knowledge distinction is questioned. Hegel’s practical understanding is, however, also the result of the societal context in which general education was not yet institutionalized and universities in particular were small and elitist.422 All in all, the market society is the place for the individual to follow his own will. However, in our individuality we see many interferences with society as a whole. When you go to the market place to buy products or services, other have also aligned their work to your needs. We are socialized in our needs both as consumers and as producers. Hegel endorses Smith’s idea that there is some type of logic in the arbitrary processes of consumption and production: “When men are thus dependent on one another and reciprocally related to one another in their work and the satisfaction of their needs, subjective self-seeking turns into a contribution to the satisfaction of the needs for everyone else. That is to say, by a dialectical advance, subjective self-seeking turns into the mediation of the particular through the universal, with the result that each man is earning, producing, and enjoying on his own account is eo ipse producing and earning for the enjoyment of everyone else.” 423 On the level of the ‘system of needs’, people are connected, albeit only on the level of reciprocal relations of needs and satisfaction of needs; not yet as mutual recognition within a ‘way of life’, as is the case in the immediate unity of the family or mediate unity of the state. People just recognize each other for their reciprocal usefulness. This reciprocal movement in which people need each other resembles the idea of the ‘invisible hand’. But Hegel claims that a collective living along the lines of each other’s needs is not enough to create an experience of togetherness. A need for a new source for cohesive collective strength arises, one that is fulfilled by social estates that humanize the amorphous market place. 421 Richard Sennett has famously analyzed artisanship and mastery, coming close to a Hegelian analysis. See for Sennett’s attempt to actualize Hegel: Sennett, Richard, Authority, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1980, esp. part two, Recognition. 422 For a detailed analysis of Bildung in the economy and a proposal to enrich Hegel’s educational ideas by placing them outside the economy, see: Cobben, Paul, ‘Hegel’s concept of education’, in: Institutions of Education. Then and Today. The Legacy of German Idealism. Ed. Paul Cobben, pp. 65-82, see pp.78-80. 423 Hegel, Georg. W. F., Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, tr. T.M. Knox, Oxford University Press, 1942 (or. Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts oder Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft in Grundrisse, Suhrkamp 1986 [1821]), § 199. 233 7 7.3 Hegel on Social and Political Organization of the Market Hegel’s ‘system of needs’ resembles a liberal account on a collective harmony of particular interests. But as I mentioned at the beginning of the previous section, this is only part of Hegel’s account of the market society. Far from being a liberal, Hegel thinks that the sum of individuals is organized through social layers, so called estates (‘Stände’). Hegel identifies three estates that constitute the ethical order of the market, each with its own ethical ‘Gesinnung’ - that is: an outlook or a way of life. (1) The substantial or agricultural estates are disposed to tradition and family life; they value individuality and diversity less than (2) the urban estates, those who through their work fulfil a producing, industrial or trading function; and (3) the civil service estates, which work for the social whole as such.424 Hegel argues that modern people are free to join and change estates, although contingent factors such as talents, experience and education can limit this freedom. Hegel does not conceptualize estates as suppressing or exploiting social entities. Rather, estates help the individual to form a shared and personal identity. In addition, the estates also shelter its members for unemployment or bad luck, like the loss of one’s partner. For Hegel, the urban estates are of a specific value for modern society and he envisions them to be organized in so-called corporations, i.e. some kind of fellowships or unions, that (1) secure and develop the specific interests of certain groups of individuals with (2) a clear eye on the common good of society as such. Remarkably, corporations were rapidly abolished in Hegel’s age, because they were sometimes rather striving for the needs of members than the good for society as a whole. But for Hegel that does not mean society should abolish the corporation-structures all together. He rather wants the corrupted corporations to be restructured, and morally revitalized by the state. Hegel sees two important roles for the corporations within the market society425: (1) Firstly, once individuals join the corporations as full members, it indicates the individual is a ‘somebody’ who has gained rank and dignity. 426 This dignity is earned through the development of skills, the passing of educational tracks and the embodiment of ‘a way of life’ – all of which is partly made possible by the corporation. For Hegel, the corporation provides a context that facilitates recognition, as philosopher John O’ Neill argues, “precisely because it maintains a link between recognition and the possession of a set of competencies 424 Ibid. §33. 425 Ibid. §273. 426 Ibid. §253. 234 one has in practice.”427 So, for Hegel, people do not solely labor for financial compensation, but also out of an intrinsic motivation in performing the working activity. With this idea of corporations, Hegel was both very modern and very old-fashioned. The idea is outdated because much labor in today’s economy is organized in a flexible way. If there is no work in one sector, we are can (often) find work in another. Another crucial difference is that we have deconstructed jobs into packages of tasks.428 Within modern economics, people can switch jobs more easily due to this deconstruction. What makes Hegel’s idea of work rather modern, is that he emphasis the experience of meaningful work.429 Hegel warns for the modern market-economy in which a work stands alone: “Unless he is a member of an authorized corporation [..] an individual is without rank or dignity, his isolation reduces his business to mere selfseeking […]. Consequently, he has to try to gain recognition for himself by giving external proofs of his success in his business, and to these proofs no limits can be set.” 430 What Hegel addresses here, is that one cannot simply expect recognition as an individual laborer. We need a social surrounding in which standards are cultivated that we can use as a criterium for quality. As soon as we operate outside a corporation, we risk lowering our expectations and we simply look for a confirmation in terms of money or appreciation. This might make us very happy (being appreciated, rich, getting attention, and so on) but seen through a Hegelian lens there is no real in-depth recognition at hand.431 Hegel seems to have seen the emptiness of this modern happiness in terms of money and appreciation very early. 427 O’Neill, John, The Market. Ethics, knowledge, and Politics. Routledge., London, United Kingdom, 1998, p. 107. 428 Richard Sennett also criticizes the flexible economy precisely because it is not helping to realize individual freedom in the sense of ‘recognition’ for ones earned expertise. See: Sennett, Richard, The New Culture of Capitalism, Yale University Press, New Haven, United States, 2006. 429 The identity perspective on work is a hot topic. Much attention is paid to the misrecognition of employees; a growing literature exists on ways to improve the experience on meaningfulness, partly understood as increasing recognition of labour, more than just paying salary. See: Lepisto, Douglas A., Michael G. Pratt, ‘Meaningful work as realization and justification: toward a dual conceptualization.’ In: Organizational Psychology Review. pp. 99-121. 430 Hegel, Georg. W. F., Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, tr. T.M. Knox, Oxford University Press, 1942 (or. Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts oder Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft in Grundrisse, Suhrkamp 1986 [1821]), § 253. 431 This is a topic Francis Fukuyama did not address in his famous defence of the modern market as the sphere in which individuals receive proper freedom. Hegel develops a deeper understanding of recognition than simply the desire to be noticed; much more in the MacIntyrean sense of the confirmation of one’s excellences. 235 7 (2) Secondly, the ‘corporate spirit’ of an estate provides the mediation between the sphere of the state and the common good.432 This is where the state enters the market not as an alien or absolute power but as the social and legal authority which maintains the orderly relationship between its constituent groups. Then, according to Hegel, corporations recognize and cultivate an idea of the shared good of a state, and precisely because they are organized bottom up from within the market place, all sorts of state activities – so, not just financial, such as taxing, but also social goal setting – are experienced as ‘representational’ for its members. This is one of the reasons why Hegel thinks that economic security is also better organized within the corporations than on a collective level. In sum, according to Hegel, there is an essential intermediate role for corporations, one that bridges the gap between the self-interest-driven behavior in the market place and state life that is orientated at the common good. 7.4 Hegel’s ‘Statism’ in between Communitarianism and Liberalism In Hegel’s philosophy, the state is situated on several levels of life. The state is not the opposite of the market society, but the encompassing horizon that forms the societal unity to which both the market society and family live are subordinate. Critics have argued that Hegel makes some kind of ‘super-subject’ out of the state, an organic whole to which individuals are mere accidents. Such an interpretation, which can be found in the work of Karl Popper, misses a crucial dimension of Hegel’s organic interpretation of the state, which leaves room for individual freedom.433 Hegel develops a multi-level notion of the state that is both liberal-individualistic and communitarian. Even if Hegel thinks the state can be an embodiment of a way of life, the role of markets and individual liberty is still of the utmost importance to him. 434 From the perspective of the market society, people (as customers and producers) are mutually dependent in their needs and the market logic of the ‘invisible hand’ makes sure everyone gets what he wants. Any interference from the state can feel like an outside disturbance. Hegel argues that this 432 Hegel, Georg. W. F., Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, tr. T.M. Knox, Oxford University Press, 1942 (or. Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts oder Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft in Grundrisse, Suhrkamp 1986 [1821]), § 289. 433 Popper, Karl, The Open Society and its enemies. Vol. II The High Tides of Prophecy: Hegel, Marx and the Aftermath. London Routledge, 1944. 434 Cobben, Paul, ‘Der ontologische Status des Betrieb in den aktualisierten Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts’, in: Socialontologie in der Perspective des Deutschen Idealismus (eds. Stephan Zimmerman, Christian Krijnen), De Gruyter, pp. 141-159, esp. section 2, Der freie Markt und das gute Leben. 236 is a misunderstanding, for those same people (as citizens) presuppose a communal life in their consumption and production. (1) Hegel argues that if people want to restrict their perspective to that of the market society, they should at least acknowledge the need for a ‘state of necessity’ (Notstaat) that ensures everyone is safe and establishes a rule of law in which everyone has basic rights. Only in such a ‘state of necessity’ can everyone pursue his or her own life goals without the interference of others. To Hegel, these rights are to be complemented by the organization of commons, like streets, streetlights, cleaning of public spaces, and so on. Hegel also wants the state to prevent economic risks, like a lack of certain basic products, a lack possibly caused in the chaotic dynamic of consumption and production, due to specialization and internationalization of the production process.435 (2) This minimal or liberal conception of the state is needed, but it is not enough for Hegel. When people see themselves as citizens – and not merely as consumers and producers –, Hegel argues they (should) see the state as immanent to their goals. We can interpret this in two ways: liberal and communitarian. Axel Honneth interprets Hegel’s philosophical aim in the Elements of Right as follows: “[…] eine normative Theorie gesellschaftlicher Gerechtigkeit ..., die in Form einer Rekonstruktion von notwendigen Bedingungen der individuellen Autonomie zu begründen versucht, welche sozialen Sphären eine moderne Gesellschaft umfassen ... muß, um allen ihren Mitgliedern die Chance einer Verwirklichung ihrer Selbstbestimmung zu gewähren.”436 In this interpretation, especially in the last sentence, Hegel is integrated in the liberal tradition. In this case the state should facilitate all sorts of arrangements – care, sports, education, and so on – in order to offer citizens possibilities to fulfil their lives as they want to. I think such an interpretation is in line with Hegel’s philosophy. Hegel describes how the market society does not offer work for everyone. Unemployment can occur and create poverty.437 Hence, the government should guarantee the possibility of economic welfare.438 But Hegel develops his notion of the state one step further and 435 Hegel, Georg. W. F., Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, tr. T.M. Knox, Oxford University Press, 1942 (or. Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts oder Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft in Grundrisse, Suhrkamp 1986 [1821]), §185. 436 Honneth, A, Leiden an Unbestimmtheit: eine Reaktualisierung der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie. Reclam, Stuttgart, Germany, 2001. (quoted in De Boer, p.; see footnote 438) 437 Hegel, Georg. W. F., Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, tr. T.M. Knox, Oxford University Press, 1942 (or. Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts oder Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft in Grundrisse, Suhrkamp 1986 [1821]), § 240, 243. 438 Ibid. §183. 237 7 beyond the liberal account that Honneth ascribes to him.439 (3) Hegel integrates the communitarian perspective in his philosophy: the state represents an idea of the good life, and therefore the ‘substantive state’ is not morally neutral. It is an embodiment of the objective spirit and its rationality. If we see the state only as instrumental (basic facilities) and complementary (well-fare state) to the market society, it is not seen itself as the embodiment of freedom. In a market society, freedom is one-sidedly interpreted as the freedom to choose for one’s arbitrary needs.440 The real freedom, as Hegel understands it, has integrated the relation of individuals to the common good; it is the state that enables this. Hegel thinks that the state should be organized in a way that the market-society has its own place within the realm of society as such. Hence, Hegel would reject the strict liberal idea that governments should act in a morally neutral way and he would endorse a view in which they act informed by ethical judgments in their policies and actions. Ethics, however, is always in line with the living culture and norms in Hegel’s philosophy.441 Hegel does not, like MacIntyre, yearn back for a premodern world in which the market was not developed fully. He is impressed by the ethical unity of the ancient polis, but he is also critical about the lack of individual freedom in it. “The right of the subject’s particularity, his right to be satisfied, or in other words the right of subjective freedom, is the pivot and centre of the difference between antiquity and modern times.”442 It is pre-eminently in de modern economy that people can fulfil the ‘subjective freedom’ that was still alien for the inhabitants of Ancient Greece. When we are on the market place, we are seen as individuals and it does not matter whether we are German, Dutch, Protestant or Muslim.443 At the same time, Hegel argues, we should interpret both the state and the market society as a part of the objective spirit or general culture. Citizens implicitly live by the mores of the state and market, for instance, in accepting property rights, pay taxes, trust each other and keep one’s promises. This culture often goes unnoticed, Hegel says. “Men trust in the stability of the state, and suppose that in it only the 439 Boer, Karen, de, ‘De verwikkeling van markt en staat in het licht van Hegels Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts. In: Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor de Wijsbegeerte, jaargang 105, nr. 2, mei 2013, pp.70-87, p. 77. 440 Hegel, Georg. W. F., Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, tr. T.M. Knox, Oxford University Press, 1942 (or. Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts oder Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft in Grundrisse, Suhrkamp 1986 [1821]), § 258. 441 Peperzak, Adriaan, ‘The Foundations of Ethics according to Hegel’, in: International Philosophical Quaterly, 23(4), 1983, pp. 349-365. 442 Hegel, Georg. W. F., Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, tr. T.M. Knox, Oxford University Press, 1942 (or. Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts oder Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft in Grundrisse, Suhrkamp 1986 [1821]), § 112. 443 Ibid. § 209. 238 particular interest can come into being. But custom makes invisible that on which our whole existence turns. If anyone goes safe through the streets at night, it does not occur to him that it could be otherwise. The habit of feeling secure has become a second nature, and we do not reflect that it is first brought about by the agency of special institutions. Often it is imagined that force holds the state together, but the binding cord is nothing else than the deep-seated feeling of order, which is possessed by all.”444 This example of a safe street symbolizes a more general feeling people share with each other in a state, a perceptible sense of collective belonging which shines through, and is supported by, families, market society, government and civil society. Humans can only realize their potential in and through this implicit web of shared customs. For Hegel, we do not merely share our customs on the general level of being citizens in the same spirit. This Hegelian insight, which is typically Rhinelandic (cf. Chapter 4.5), teaches us that the realm of the market is not separated from that of culture and politics. Ideally, this connectedness makes a manager socially aware while doing business. Hence, one could argue with Hegel that the failures of the current market system – financialization, marketization, environmental concerns – should also be of concern to corporations and their managers. In this Hegelian view, it is rather odd to accept an institutional division of labor in which business continues to make profits, while politicians are expected to create better rules, so that profit-seeking does not harm society. Such an argument might be in line with the depolitized tradition of mainstream economics, but it is at odds with Hegel’s rather social understanding of the market.445 In sum, it is the family, the corporation and the state that together form the community in which people live. Within this community there is much space for the individual fulfilment of life through the processes of the market place; but even in these processes people are related to others and presuppose different sorts of non-market mechanisms. Karl Marx famously criticized this scenario by showing that Hegel does not acknowledge the role of the laborer in his economy as a member of any estate or corporation.446 The laborer belongs to the mob and has little income and little recognition in Hegel’s ‘bourgeois’ philosophy. This criticism (see below) is convincing but Hegel’s 444 Hegel, Georg. W. F., Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, S.W. Dyda, London George Bell and Sons, 1896 (or. Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts oder Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft in Grundrisse, Suhrkamp 1986 [1821]), §268, Zusätze/remarks 445 I thank Lisa Herzog for her comments on this section. 446 See: Cobben, Paul, Value in Capitalist Society. Rethinking Marx’s Criticism of Capitalism, Critical Studies in German Idealism, no. 13, Brill, Leiden, the Netherlands, 2015. 239 7 basic exploration of the state-market-nexus continues to be relevant. 7.5 Hegel and the Modern Economy – An Evaluation Hegel’s idea of the market society differs from the modern economy in several ways. (1) Hegel endorses a modernized version of a guilt-economy in which members of occupations rather than consumers or managers control work. Philosopher Lisa Herzog writes: “There is no hint in the Philosophy of Right or the lectures that Hegel adopted the idea of the market price ‘gravitating’ towards an adjustment of supply and demand through the adaptive behavior of individuals.”447 She is right: In Hegel’s view of the market society, there are always corporations in between customers and producers. This makes Hegel’s view typical Rhinelandic and at odds with the Anglo-Saxon analysis of the market. A crucial element of Hegel’s analysis - one that is of continuing importance - is the idea of work in which one realizes freedom. Work enables people to become somebody and receive recognition. The same holds, although to a lesser degree, for consumption. Work and consumption are related to our identity and are hence much more than simply matters of the satisfaction of preferences. (2) Hegel is often interpreted as offering a vindication of the market – most famously by Francis Fukuyama448 – because he argues that markets offer a possibility for individual recognition, as well as for our need for food, shelter, and work. This interpretation is right to an extent, but it misses very important aspects of Hegel’s thinking on recognition. It is right because many people experience the possibilities to be noticed in modern market societies: through your work, discipline and even consumption. We can imagine that self-worth was less available in aristocratic pre-market economies, as Fukuyama argues. Nonetheless, there is a deeper understanding of recognition in relation to human activities, like those in markets, that plays no role in the work of Fukuyama. Recognition is something a person can get when you meet the standards that are relatively independent of one’s subjectivity. In the market place you can buy a good look (perhaps that of an intellectual: nice shoes, a newspaper, many books, and so on) but whether one is an intellectual is not solely dependent on one’s life-style but also of the judgment of what other intellectuals think of your ideas, work, and activities. The crucial Hegelian point, fully in line with MacIntyre, is that true recognition needs this relative objectivity. Perhaps this is best illustrated by the modern wish for recognition itself. In our modern times, people tend to isolate recognition from a context. ‘I want 447 Herzog, Lisa, Inventing the Market: Smith, Hegel and Political Theory, Oxford 2013, p.56. 448 Fukuyama, Francis, The End of History and the Last Man, London Penguin Books, 1992. 240 to become famous’ has become a plausible statement, that does not need further specification. In the (MacIntyre-inspired) words of Keith Russell, it is all too easy, “to become more concerned about gaining ‘a favorable opinion’ than whether this is merited in terms of the practice’s standards: any means will do.”449 Of course, a practitioner (or: a member of a Hegelian corporation) needs applause and some fame, but its achievement is not the direct or sole aim of the person involved. With Hegel one must say that recognition is strongly related to the content of one’s activities and existence. Somehow, recognition mediates between what MacIntyre calls internal and external goods. Salary, for instance, is a form of recognition when it is in alignment with the qualities of work delivered. (3) Hegel lacks a discussion of what Marx would famously analyze a few decades later, as the role of capital in the modern market and the ability of some groups to accumulate it fast. 450 This is unmodern in a way, although the focus on production and work and the little attention for the financial system can also be an indication of a different understanding of the economy in the Rhinelandic tradition (cf. Chapter 4.5). The most central difference between Hegel’s idea of the market and the modern market as we know it, encompasses all the differences that were mentioned so far: its relation to the state. For Hegel, the market society should not be understood in opposition to the state but as subordinate to it. Still, Hegel’s account endorses a free-market economy; it is not a state-led economy. I want to expand a little further on this idea of the state. What Hegel did and could not foresee in 1821, when he published the Elements of the Philosophy of Right, was the rise of the nation state in which the process of individual and economic freedom would increase further. As philosopher Ad Verbrugge describes this process: “Status-class and free choice exclude one another. [...] The world that was rising had shown its face in the French Revolution: it was the rise of the nationstate of citizens and the end of the status-class state that Hegel tried to cling un to.”451 The nation state would form the new cultural unity in which the good life was organized. This unity would consist of citizens that experienced a nationally shared form of belonging and would be educated into that experience. However, this experience would only characterize Western Europe between the middle of the nineteenth century and the end of the Second World War. With the decline of the experience of nationalism, the trust in the state also 449 Keat, Russell, Cultural Goods and the Limits of the Market, Palgrave MacMillan, London, 2001, p. 84. 450 For a systematic confrontation of Hegel and Marx see: Cobben, Paul, Value in Capitalist Society. Rethinking Marx’s Criticism of Capitalism, Critical Studies in German Idealism, no. 13, Boston Leiden Brill, 2015. 451 Verbrugge, ‘Culture of Education’, in: Institutions of Education: then and today ed. Paul Cobben, pp. 117-140, p. 132. 241 7 declined and the process of globalization slowly but steadily unfolded. In this process, states would increasingly restrict their roles in society and leave as much as possible to the mechanisms of the ‘free market’ (cf. Chapter 4). From a Hegelian perspective, it is not so strange that the notions of ‘freedom’ and ‘market’ are related to each other in today’s world. Yet, the freedom that is at stake in modern markets is that of the individual and the corporations he works in. Hegel argues that this freedom needs to be made concrete by letting people be part of a larger community in which they experience the recognition and protection of each other’s existence. Is such a Hegel-inspired call for more ‘sense of community’ realistic in the current situation? This is a matter of debate, but the argument developed at least helps us to overcome a simplistic idea of markets as the embodiment of personal freedom and any structuring of that market as a restriction of that freedom and hence as ‘coercion’. The complete market sphere has empowered individuals, something Polanyi or MacIntyre underestimate (cf. Chapter 6.3-6.5), but it certainly also shows a tendency to become a goal in itself at the expense of the lives of people. Perhaps the solution to this paradox of freedom regarding the market – setting people free, but in an abstract sense and hence also unfree – can be found in a reconsideration of the common good. Such an idea of the common good may not exist now, as Polanyi and MacIntyre think it existed in premodern times, but they may be too pessimistic. One could argue that notions of a common good do exist in countries, regions, and cities. Here we find the pre-market mechanisms of culture on which we can build alternative economies that match our general ideas of what notions of the good life may consist of. It is nonetheless questionable whether alternative experiences of community to that of nationhood – like the city, region, or international unions – help to organize the economy. Hegel delivers a substantial account of the state that would vindicate a role of political re-organization of markets. A crucial argument in line with his work, would be to require corporations to have a shared interest in the communities they work in. Such a demand already stands at odds with the current market view on the economy in which the highest bidder can buy a corporation. This is rational from a market perspective, but economically seen, markets are part of society at large and states can demand the people working in corporate life to cultivate relations with the direct surrounding of society. The state, as the embodiment of shared culture, can in theory require companies to organize certain work and consumption within its own territory. Consider, for instance, the major investments of Dutch pension funds. It would be a mistake to think these companies are simply commercial institutions. The fact that they are big in the first place, is a result of the obligation of citizens to build up a pension. 242 One could ask them to invest (for instance, 5% of their portfolio) in the Dutch economy; such an investment would be at the expense of profits they could make abroad but would support the national economy, for instance to make it more ecological, socially inclusive, or more innovative.452 Robert Solomon makes a similar argument regarding citizenship of corporations. He argues that people who work at corporations are in fact “citizens of two communities at once”. 453 Solomon argues that business ethicists must clarify this ‘dual citizenship’. With my Hegelian argument one could argue that dual citizenship is delicate, for it cannot be allowed to form a commercial state within a state pursuing goals that are opposite of those of the state and lack legitimacy. As Solomon argues in his book Ethics and Excellence, the societal purpose of business is that it promotes prosperity and provides essential goods. 454 With Hegel one could deepen this argument by emphasizing the realization of individual freedom through markets. However, this should not be at the expense of the community, which I have interpreted as the community that people share within certain (national) political borders. In today’s Dutch economic policies there is much attention for the creativity of citizens that more-or-less autonomously try to change the world for the better: civil society initiatives of churches, neighborhoods, share-economy, and so on. The existence of these initiatives dovetails with the idea of stakeholders in business literature that should be listened to by corporations to a certain degree. 455 Now, seen from the perspective of Hegel, it is good that such ideas like stakeholder-theory or civil-society theory enable us to see corporations as a mechanism within the larger societal environment. These help us to realize that corporations have their ‘license to operate’ within this environment, because they are supposed to create shared value. However important, these citizens, stakeholders and bottom-up initiatives are too small 452 In 2014, the Dutch investment fund NLII commenced and it recently stopped. In other countries, such as Norway, these type of institutions, or sovereign wealth funds, are normal. (See for more info: https://www.nlii.nl/) The NLII was never meant to create more economic activity in the Netherlands, it was rather a last option if normal banks or investors did not want to invest. Now that the financial crisis of 2008 lays far behind, the NLII argues, there are no vacant investment opportunities left – and there is no direct need for such a fund. One could argue, however, that they presuppose a thin market economy perspective, while ignoring the second and third order effects (regarding productivity, innovation, employability) of more investments in the Netherlands, for instance in creating a more sustainable economy and meeting the demands of the Paris Agreement. 453 Solomon, Robert, ‘Corporate Roles, Personal Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach to Business Ethics’, in: Business Ethics Quarterly, 1992 no. 2, pp. 317-339, p. 323. 454 Ibid. p. 323. 455 However, in the field of corporate responsibility the awareness for (and discussion about) the need for state governments is growing. See for an overview: Schrempf-Stirling, Judith, ‘State Power: Rethinking the Role of the State in Political Corporate Social Responsibility’, in: Journal of Business Ethics 150, pp. 1-14. 243 7 and too ill equipped to seriously disagree with corporations. The state remains necessary to protect people from the power of the very large corporations and to initiate important changes, for example in sustainability issues. 456 This is especially necessary now that our society faces difficult challenges, like those addressed in the introduction of this book: the largeness and fragility of the financial world, the process of marketization and the growth-focused economy. These are challenges that require political and hence state influence in the economy, because dealing with these challenges will be good for society but bad for certain corporations. This is not an issue of agreement and communication, but of making painful decisions that cost jobs, breaks aspiration, diminishes shareholder value, and so on. Now state-interference led to enormous trouble in the past – in which the state subsidized old-dated industries, such as mining – but those mistakes are in themselves not an argument against substantial state interference. If today’s society is in need of an energy transition, as well as of a protection of its major corporations from foreign investors, then Hegel’s analysis of the market-state nexus gives us a theoretical vindication for it. Hegel shows that the economy must be organized – from within and from above – to give it its deserved place within the whole culture (‘objective spirit’) of which it is part. Again, Hegel did not foresee the coming of nation states, nor its draw-back since the 1980s (and the current re-emergence of national-thinking) but this is how his argument could be applied. One could very well claim that the European Union is a better candidate for the political organization of the economy. Now, this potential is stifled, as the European Union endorses a ‘free market’ perspective on its economic space, with still too little room for substantial ideas of governmental interference, though this is an issue of fierce discussion between EU politicians and might change in future. 456 Most business ethicist avoid to speak of the need of governmental influence in the economy; they rather speak of the need of social engement and social reason. See, for instance: Donaldson, Thomas, James P. Walsh, ‘Toward a Theory of Business’, in: Research in Organizational Behavior, 35, 2015, pp. 181-207. 244 Conclusion In the previous section, Hegel’s insights were interpreted in the light of today’s economic discussions. Here I shortly translate the insights discussed in this chapter into building block for an improved business school ethos. Business students should be able to… • understand how preferences are culturally determined and not ‘given’. This also implies the need for an active social and institutional support of such a cultivation. • understand that people live and work together and that this is not simply a matter of exchange but also of ‘recognition’. • understand that recognition is not simply a matter of confirmation of one’s existence, but the appreciation of one’s activities as far as they confirm to certain standards. • analyze professions, companies and industries in terms of modern ‘corporations’ and not simply as market actors. • understand that markets help to create things (work, consumption, trade, experience, knowledge, skills, and so on) we consider to be part of the realization of the good life. • analyze how the market-realm sets people free but that market-boundaries are not simply a coercion but part of what makes markets good. 245 7 246 Chapter 8: Towards a new Business Mindset 8 247 Introduction Part III sets out to elucidate aspects for a possible new business student ethos. So far, in Chapters 6 and 7, I focused on concepts that can enrich the business student ethos primarily by elucidating the role and context of business and its managers within the threshold of society. We have yet to focus on the ethos of future managers themselves. How can their moral identity be shaped? What kinds of knowledge should they cultivate? This Chapter 8 addresses these questions. Chapter 6 ended with a list of MacIntyrean insights as cornerstones of a new business student ethos, for instance the competence of distinguishing and balancing internal- and external goods. Chapter 7 also ended with insights central to the envisaged new business student ethos, mainly regarding the relation between the economy, society, and state. The question now is, how students can develop these competences and insights. To develop an account of this we need to shift focus from MacIntyre’s more sociological and Hegel’s political philosophical focus to a theory on personal flourishing and judgment. An especially helpful account for this purpose can be found in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. I do not argue that Aristotle’s analysis can be copied one-to-one to today’s business schools, although it does open a perspective on how things can improve, especially when we complement and actualize it with more recent scholarship. The first section of this chapter elaborates the elementary scheme of Aristotle’s ethics – from which I also borrow the notion of ‘ethos’ (cf. Chapter 1). Its basic idea is that – applied to our research question – a business student does not become virtuous due to theoretical education only. A person needs to be accustomed to and habituated in a certain role and learn to relate to and act and speak about situations pertaining to it. This habituation takes place in any case, even if we do not want it to happen. A child learns from the habits of his or her parents, such as leading an inactive life, even if they are contradictory to their articulate upbringing in which sports and reading are praised as virtuous. Even if business schools do not try to actively shape the identities of students, they nonetheless instill habits in them. I argue it would already be an improvement if business schools would come to realize the factual hidden processes of identity formation. More specifically, how the content of business studies (the ‘what’) – such as Agency Theory and SWOT – together with the way they are thought (the ‘how’), have hidden effects on how students come to perceive and act in business, management, and markets. The next step would be an active cultivation of processes of identity formation. It would be a mistake if we think such a formation can only take 248 place in courses of ethics. Students learn how to be good (or not) throughout their studies and they do so because they meet virtuous teachers that work in well-functioning structures of organizations (including functional exams and lecture halls and a student secretary that support the identity formation). I describe three forms of knowledge that Aristotle regards important in a well-functioning ethos: science (episteme), craft (techne) and practical wisdom (phronesis). The latter has received quit some attention in business studies literature (cf. Chapter 2), philosophy of education457 and public debate458, and with good reason, as we shall see in section 8.1. In section 8.2, I argue that the current business student ethos needs a revival of techne. I reconstruct the ideas of more recent philosophers – Polanyi, Schön, Sennett and Heidegger – and describe this competence in terms of ‘practical understanding’. In the final section 8.3, I turn to moral reflection with the help of Taylor. His (NeoAristotelian) concept of ‘strong evaluation’ helps us to stipulate how personal moral judgment can take place. I argue business students must learn to discover and articulate their judgments about life in general to be moral business people. We have yet to focus on how future managers might be taught to do this. How can their moral craft and identity be shaped? What kinds of knowledge should they cultivate? Here I think students can learn from business ethics in combination with business humanities, i.e. the studying of works of art to train their moral judgment. 8 8.1 Aristotle on a Cultivated Ethos and Different Types of Knowledge Aristotle’s ethics can be summarized in three central theses: (1) People acquire an ethos in a certain context. (2) An ethos consists of intellectual virtues (mainly phronesis) and ethical virtues (like courage). Deliberation about the good life is a matter of habit and therewith feeling. Knowledge is important in our lives as good people, but not more important than the disposition of character. (3) An ethos is (both for Aristotle and in the definition, I used thus far) a sustained disposition the fulfilment of which is a goal. Other than modern systems of ethics – with their focus on rules –, the good person is attentive to the particularities and always aims to do the right thing, which is somewhere in between too little and too much. I begin this chapter by elaborating these 457 See for a systematic analysis of phronesis: Noel, Jana, ‘On the Varieties of Phronesis’, in: Educational Philosophy and Theory, vol. 31, no. 3, 1999, pp. 273-289. Also see: Cooke, Sandra, David Carr, ‘Virtue, practical wisdom and character in teaching’, British Journal of Educational Studies, vol. 62, no.2, June 2014, pp. 91-110. 458 Swartz, Barry, Kenneth Sharp, Practical Wisdom. The right way to do the right thing. River Head Books, New York, United States, 2010, see esp. pp.25-26. 249 central elements further. Thereafter I reflect on the differences of the context in which Aristotle lived and our current context and what these differences imply for our account of ethos. In his Nichomachean Ethics, Aristotle understands ethics as part of the general pursuit of the good life, which is the same as the happy life (eudaimonia). Happiness is not understood here as a hedonistic feeling (‘I feel good’) but related to a sense of well-being within the self in the context of a fulfilled life with one’s friends and family within the threshold of the ancient city state. Eudaimonia means ‘happiness’ and ‘well-being’ as a result and in the context of a ‘flourishing’ life. Although happiness is central to Aristotle’s ideas on ethics, he is not a hedonist. He thought people need to look for the right pleasure which is always part of the good life in general realized, not just of personal pleasure. The good life is a fulfilled life, lived within the realm of a city state (polis). A person can only become good in the context of this city state and his household (oikos), for “someone presumably does not have a good of his own without participation in the management of a household and without a polity.”459 Without the practical context of the city state, a person is unable to become a good person for Aristotle. One of the goals of ones’ goodness is precisely to sustain the city state. Aristotle’s ethics is part of his famous teleology which holds that everything in nature strives towards the realization of its telos. Aristotle articulates two ideal types of life: the active life (bios politikos; vita activa) of the politician and the theoretical life (bios theoretikos; vita contemplativa) of the philosopher. His ethics is mainly devoted to a description of the good life through a virtuous attitude that both a politician and a philosopher/scientist should embody. Through this virtuous attitude, a person that lives in a certain state, in a certain household and with a certain type of life, can strive towards the realization of his essence or telos. That which is typical for humans – as opposed to animals – is that humans are rational and can hence act rationally (zooion logon echon). Part of the human telos is to fulfil precisely this characteristic of humanity, i.e. humans become humans in and through their actions. The good life is realized when one acts in conformity with the virtues (aretai) which, as Aristotle argues, is only possible when one is accustomed to these virtues, that is, when one is a true adult because of the right upbringing and education.460 In Aristotle’s 459 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, tr. W.D. Ross, Generic NL Freebook Publisher, 2000, 1142a9-10. 460 Ibid. 1142a12-16. 250 anthropology, the soul of man has a striving part (consisting of the will, wishes, demands etc.) which can abide to reason. This striving part of the soul is dealt with in terms of the ethical virtues (discussed in Books II through V of the Nicomachean Ethics). There are also intellectual virtues which deal with the reasonable part of the human soul (that Aristotle discusses in part VI of the Nicomachean Ethics). There is a third part of the human soul, the vegetative part, that deals with the blood circulation and digestion, but this part has no virtues for Aristotle. The good and happy person can act in accordance with both the intellectual and ethical virtues, having incorporated them into his ethos through habit. The intellectual virtues are divided into those that deal with theory and those that deal with practice. Here, we are primarily interested in the latter – which consist of techne and phronesis – but it proves insightful to also mention the main virtue of theory, episteme. (Aristotle also discerns the nous or theoretical insight and sophia or wisdom, but we will not consider them here.) Episteme is scientific knowledge and deals with universal and contextindependent insight. For Aristotle, science (episteme) has no role to play in acting as a good man, as morality is always context-related. Morality is also not production-orientated nor instrumental rationality in which one tries to be as efficient as possible like techne. The intellectual faculty relevant for ethics is phronesis. It deals with action and encourages a person to do the right thing. It is translated as prudence, practical wisdom, practical judgment, or common sense. When I use a translation in this book, it will be ‘practical judgment’ from now on. Phronèsis is comparable to techne in that it is practical, but unlike the latter there is no means-end-structure in the instrumental sense. It requires technè to build a stringed instrument that one can play, and with which one can entertain others. Although technè involves judgment, it is not about moral values and its goals do not lie in the activity itself. The goal of the lyre builder lies beyond its activity and this is different to the functioning of phronèsis in general life. With phronèsis, the goal resides in the activity itself. The good person brings forth the good life and this ‘forth bringing’ is essentially circular. Aristotle says: “We may grasp the nature of prudence (phronesis) if we consider what sort of people we call prudent. Well, it is thought to be a benchmark of a prudent man to be able to deliberate rightly about what is good and advantageous… So … prudence cannot be a science or art; not science (episteme) because what can be done is a variable (it may be done in different ways, or not done at all), and not art (techne) because action and production are 251 8 generally different. For production aims at an end other than itself; but this is impossible in the case of action, because the end is merely doing well. What remains, then, is that it is a true state, reasoned, and capable of action with regard to things that are good or bad for man. … We consider that this quality belongs to those who understand the management of households or states.” 461 For Aristotle, the telos of a good life is goodness or well-being itself, which should be sustained. Aristotle found that every noble man should be able to balance his intellectual virtues. Phronèsis is the virtue of right moral judgment and therefore central to the good life. As such it is at least as important as techne and episteme in the successful functioning of individual and collective life. Today, we tend to see both our personal lives and collective endeavors as governed by technology and science, which is indeed the case compared to the distinctly low-tech and traditional organization of the Greek polis. But it is questionable whether we can effectively capture the domains of ethics with scientific and technological understanding, or that we still work with a faculty of understanding that Aristotle named phronèsis. I think we do, although we prefer to speak of phronèsis in terms of practical wisdom or perhaps prudence or perhaps educated intuition. So much for the intellectual virtues for now, let us introduce the ethical virtues. Ethical virtues are endeavors to do things in the right way, like being courageous, friendly, or patient. To be virtuous, one must have acquired the disposition (hexis) that provides the right orientation in life. Experiences, feelings, and emotions inform such a disposition. The virtuous person has acquired the right mentality to do what is necessary in each circumstance, for how long, with what intensity, and so forth. This sensitivity also implies that a virtuous person enjoys doing certain things and dislikes doing others, but this sensitivity is part of a larger disposition towards the greater good. Hence, Aristotle would disagree with the utilitarian idea that people are eventually directed by their feelings of pleasure and pain. Pleasure and pain are experienced relative to one’s disposition; one has a cultivated relationship towards one’s emotions. A disposition is the habit that filters emotions. 462 This Aristotelian insight comes close to (and probably inspired) Frankfurt’s conceptual framework in which people rank-order their emotions (cf. Chapter 5.4 and 8.3). Someone’s ethos, to stay with our own Neo-Aristotelian 461 Ibid. 1140a24-b-12. 462 This Aristotelian insight comes very close to how Frankfurt understands the working of first- and second-order concerns (cf. section 8.3). 252 terminology, stands between inner experiences, and filters our perception of others, who we like or dislike, compare ourselves to, find important, and so on. Thus, we are conditioned to have appropriate feelings. This holds not only for moral virtues, like shame and guilt, but for a broad range of feelings, which the virtuous person has “at the right times, with reference to the right objects, towards the right people, with the right motive, and in the right way.”463Aristotle even goes as far as to say that a good person feels the right emotions in specific activities. When my courageousness is combined with inner emotions that run contrary to this virtue, I am less virtuous than a person whose feelings and actions are in harmony. In her commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, Martha Nussbaum concurs with this. “[...] We might say that a person of practical insight will cultivate emotional openness and responsiveness in approaching a new situation. Frequently, it will be her passionate response, rather than detached thinking, that will guide her to appropriate recognitions. ‘Here is a case were a friend needs my help’: this will often be ‘seen’ first by the feelings that are constituent parts of friendship, rather than by pure intellect. Intellect will often want to consult these feelings to get information about the true nature of the situation. Without them, its approach to a new situation would be blind and obtuse. And even where correct choice is reached in the absence of feeling and emotional response, Aristotle will insist that it is less virtuous than choice that is emotional. If I help a friend unfeelingly, I am less praiseworthy than when I do so with appropriate love and sympathy.”464 Aristotle’s approach to ethics leaves ample room for emotions and feelings, just as to personal considerations. But all of this is structured through our character, which helps us to look truthfully (alethe) at the facts in any situation, both with feelings and intellect. This Aristotelian insight is in line with recent psychological research which points to the importance of our trained intuitions in taking important (moral) decisions.465 Rather than acting strictly rational, people better trust their own experience and expertise. However, psychological and management research does not (easily) support a framing of our experienced judgment in terms of virtues. In this (predominantly situationist) literature, it is common to analyze moral behavior 463 Ibid. 1106b9-1106b35. 464 Nussbaum, Martha, Love’s knowledge, Oxford University Press, Oxford, United Kingdom, 1990, p. 79. 465 Dijksterhuis, A., ‘Think different: The merits of unconscious thought in preference development and decision making, in: Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 87, 2004, 586-98. 253 8 in terms of social circumstances and social experience or expert training, rather than in terms of character traits or virtues. As ethicist Miguel Alzola argues, this literature does not consider that virtues are relatively rare: they need training and nourishment.466 Moreover, Alzola argues in Aristotle’s vein that virtues are part of the whole span of a human life, not just realized in an isolated action. Nonetheless, psychological arguments that show that human action is partly a response to the situations we find ourselves in, is also right. Our ethos, i.e. sustained disposition, also defines our relation to the outer world and vice versa. Translated to today: Seen from an Aristotelian perspective, it is dependent on the person; a powerful CEO has different virtues and vices than a regular manager. As Ad Verbrugge formulates it in his commentary on Aristotle (my translation): “In his way of relating to the world, a person cares for something, things matter: some are important to him, others are not, some things are highly esteemed by him, others he despises, he loves certain people, others he hates, et cetera.467 The courageous manager can balance his or her personal values with the reality of the business world. If he or she can say ‘no’ to demands or tasks at work, without neglecting his/her responsibilities, such an action does not stand in isolation but is part of an ethos in which one has organized one’s work and can leave certain things to others, thus taking responsibility in the private realm. A virtuous person can see when to do something, in which situation, and for what period. The Nicomachean Ethics offers insight into the structure of what is at hand when one acts virtuously. Importantly, being virtuous is not an instrumental relation but a goal in itself; the courageous person wants to be courageous, the friendly person wants to be friendly, the calm person wants to be calm. Someone’s disposition is an expression of what that person finds important. It is important to realize that in Aristotle’s account of eudaimonia, a person has its own ideas on how to live well. There is thus no claim that all virtuous people live the same lives in which the same things matter with the same intensity. The general structure is that a virtue is always somewhere between to ‘too little’ and ‘too much’.468 The courageous person, for instance, considers 466 Alzola, Miguel, ‘The Empirics of Virtue Theory: What Can Psychology Tell Us About Moral Character?’, in: Handbook of the Philosophical Foundations of Business Ethics. Ed. C. Luetge, Springer, Dordrecht, the Netherlands, pp. 89-107. 467 Original: “In de wijze van ingesteld-zijn laat iemand zich op een bepaalde wijze aan iets gelegen zijn: bepaalde zaken vindt hij belangrijk, andere niet, sommige dingen acht hij hoog, andere verafschuwt hij, van bepaalde mensen houdt hij, aan anderen heeft hij juist een hekel, enz.” See: Verbrugge, Ad, Verwaarlozing van het Zijnde, Sun, Nijmegen, the Netherlands, p.156 468 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, tr. W.D. Ross, Generic NL Freebook Publisher, 2000, 1106a26-b28. 254 some problems as worth facing and others not. Aristotle argues that he can experience how to react appropriately, which is usually somewhere in between the two extremes. The coward flees every danger, and the rash person takes on problems too large to handle. The courageous person should usually be in the middle (‘the golden mean’) of being a coward and being rash. Aristotle claims that this scheme applies to every ethical virtue: a virtue is in the middle between excess and deficiency. Aristotle’s ethics of the mean, however, is a very general idea, because the mean is different in different circumstances. Being courageous in battle is, for instance, different from being courageous in family situations, and differs from courage at work.469 Sometimes, we need strong feelings like anger and at other times, they would be inappropriate and not motivate us to do the right thing. People who are virtuous have cultivated the right ethos, so that they experience the right motivation and feeling at the right time. This ethos implies that a person integrates various virtues; a courageous person also needs to be patient, to do the right thing in a specific situation at the right time. The overall virtue for Aristotle is that of justice (dikaiosunè) that encompasses all others.470 With ‘justice’ Aristotle refers to the need to seek the right balance between the various virtues, the most ideal integration. Such a balance will differ per person and per situation. For instance, a generous act is something very different for a rich man than for a poor man, and the same holds for courage, and all other virtues. Aristotle defines a range of virtues that are the mean of two extremes, like temperance, courage, justice, and so forth. Apart from these ethical virtues that one needs to embody, one needs to be able to reason about one’s actions. In this respect, Aristotle introduces the idea of a practical syllogism, which consist of a major premise, which is some good that one strives for, and a minor premise on some situation. Consider for instance a friendship you value highly (the major premise) and the situation-at-hand in which your friend’s birthday falls on an evening on which you would prefer to work, to meet your work deadline. The syllogistic structure of our reasoning (the euboulia) about our actions always presupposes our ideas on a good life, which are not themselves deduced from reason. The integrity of our character makes us want to do the right thing, our reasoning is meant to help us get there.471 It is also by the virtue of our character, that we can recognize that attaining our goals is within our reach. Those who lack good character might be clever and perfectly able to achieve certain things, but often their ends are not noble. The cause of this 469 Ibid. 1106a36-b7. 470 Ibid. 1129b17-30. 471 Ibid. 1144a7–8. 255 8 failure lies not in their reasoning, but in their habitual formation that causes them to fail to feel and see the right thing as the right end to strive for. Aristotle himself states that his ethics is not an ethics for everyone but is rather elitist; doing the right thing means not just being able to follow phronèsis, but also implies one is already accustomed to a certain way of life. When I worry about whether I am courageous enough, I have already learnt, through my upbringing, education, and friends, to be courageous. I am already habituated by the social circumstances. It requires quite a strong attitude to be virtuous in every situation and not adapt to it completely. That is again a sign of the elitist (or: rare) character of this ethics: not everyone is able to train a strong virtuous attitude and stay strong in different situations.472 How can we translate these ideas to the current business ethos? Let me make three suggestions. I will elaborate on the first two more elaborately in 8.3 and on the third in 8.2. (1) We need to train moral judgment. For Aristotle, I can only trust my own moral judgment when this judgment is trained and cultivated as a part of a moral character. Such a sound moral character derives from growing up in a household (oikos) and especially a good city-state (polis). In a commercial society like ours – with its text-messages, slogans, and other stimuli – Aristotle would probably have doubted that the context for the development of the right virtuous attitude is still present. Our desires are constantly being triggered. Therefore, we must be critical towards our own desires and moral judgments and question their authenticity. We need an education of needs, i.e. an education of our judgments. We cannot cover this with abstract education, but we need to exercise, discuss, and test our evaluations, which is in fact an all-round training of our personality and professional identity. (2) We need to discover what is important. Aristotle acknowledges the importance of wealth, money, possession, or attention only when it is integrated in an excellent way-of-life of which it is a by-product. In modernity, it is less straight-forward what a good life is, and the acquisition of external goods has become an integral part of our overall search for the good life. This means that we must search for the good life, whereas this was already given (for certain elites) in the polis of Athens. MacIntyre even uses the notion of ‘a quest’ to describe the uncertainty we meet in our own (modern) collective lives (cf. Chapter 6.2). We lack the shelter of the polis and the certainty of the aristocrats that ruled them. We are all on a search in our lives. What is this search aiming for? We do not know the answer in advance, but we do know 472 Ibid. 1144a7–8. 256 that if we do not deliberately explore life, there is enough ‘market force’ in our lives to keep us mute and happy consuming and pursuing a career. We need to learn to become aware of this possibility of exploration. At this point, an economist would probably suggest that we need to find our preferences and see how we can maximize the satisfaction of these preferences. However, as Irene van Staveren explains – in her criticism of (Neoclassical) economics (cf. Chapter 6.3) – “Aristotle argues that human beings have commitments, rather than preferences”.473 The crucial difference is that one cannot easily (or: not at all) trade-off commitments, for one has decided that these are of utmost importance.474 The notion of ‘commitment’, however, still is rather individualistic and with Aristotle one could argue that the real ethical question is not only ‘What am I committed to? but also ‘What do I presuppose in my way of living?’. (3) Practical (moral) deliberation is both general and concrete. Aristotle shows that the practical syllogism the good person uses, implies a focus on general ideas and the concrete situation at hand. Translated to management, this implies that managerial judgment needs to apply general guidelines to concrete situations skillfully. General managerial knowledge has little or no value when it is not applied to the real-worlds of business in a way that takes the vicissitudes of this world into account. Hence, a graduate interested in human resource management needs to understand workplace level situations. This understanding requires more than a general interest for ‘communication’. In a human resource management function, one needs to be sensitive to the details of a situation, understand what values are at stake in it and have the ability to make judgments about them. How does performance management work in a certain organization? How intense is the work that is being performed? What do sickness and absence mean? What motivates workers? What is important to them about their work? Are there manipulative mechanisms in place? Are workers alienated from the final product or not? Being able to answer these questions is not enough, for a professional human resource manager also needs training in organization theory, economics, and business ethics. But it is only this combination of general knowledge and concrete facts – social facts, that are never really without values – that fuels the possibility of managerial judgment (cf. Chapter 6.4). On the one hand, this is in line with what students can learn with specific business cases. On the other hand, these businesses 473 Van Staveren, Irene, The Values of Economics. An Aristotelian Perspective Routlege, London and New York, 2001, p.6, also see: pp12-14. 474 Frankfurt has also written about this topic: the difference between commitments (or: concerns) and preferences. See: Willigenburg, Theo, ‘Reasons, Concerns and Necessity’, European Journal of Analytic Philosophy, vol.1 no. 1, 2005. 257 8 cases are already very much situated in envisioned boardrooms where people make ‘decisions’, whereas the category of ‘judgment’, the faculty of human thinking, is often rather neglected. I proceed this analysis of judgment in the next section with the help of Polanyi, Heidegger, and others. 8.2 What is Practical Understanding? (Polanyi, Schön, Sennett, Heidegger) Throughout the twentieth century, universities increasingly focused on a theoretical understanding of the world. The formal methods of economics, econometrics and mathematics gained popularity, while practical experience was deemed less important. This also applies to business schools (cf. Chapter 4.2). Many participants of the Q-study (cf. Chapter 3) are critical about the lack of concreteness of their study programs, a lack also signaled in the discussed secondary literature (for instance, by Moldoveanu and Martin, cf. Chapter 2.3). This agreement, so far, seems not to have had any significant effect on the curricula of Dutch business studies. I have already noted that this might be because there is no convincing alternative to the idea of science as an abstract, formal representation of the world. Moral ethologically speaking, business studies aim to be the theoretical underpinning of the ‘practice-institution’ of business (cf. Chapter 6.4), but for this purpose they need to focus on more types of knowledge than episteme alone. In this section, I further articulate the practical kind of knowledge required of business student with the help of Freidson, Schön, Polanyi, Sennett, and Heidegger. What does it mean to skillfully understand something? My argument opens with a problematization of the difference between theoretical and practical thinking. We will see that when people practically judge a certain situation, they are both reflective and practical. In the second step of the argument, I show how the practical thinking transforms our relation to the world and is not simply an epistemic but ethological matter. When a student uses consultancy tools, he opens a way of relating to the world. Hence, practical understanding is not simply a matter of means-end-thinking, it is a way of seeing the world and relating to it. After I have explored this, I conclude this section elaborating on the idea that business schools would improve if they could see themselves as a professional school (like in medicine, or law), although I also conclude that business management is – even if their practicality should grow and receives theoretical vindication below – not a true profession (which is not problematic as such, but something we need to be aware of ). 258 There is an old distinction between mental and manual labor, knowledge, and skills, that is a helpful starting point for our reflection, but also misleading in the following ways: (1) It might make it plausible to distinguish between two types of workers: those who lead and plan (i.e. business studies alumni) and those who execute. 475 Or it can make us distinguish ‘leaders’ in the headquarters that set financial targets for all divisions from ‘middle management’ which is then compelled to meet them. (2) It might also lead to a misunderstanding of both the nature of theory and that of skills, for both concepts connect more closely. The sociologist Eliot Freidson distinguishes non-skilled and skilled labor, which he calls mechanical and discretionary specialization. The former is a way of organizing labor with minimal personal judgment involved. This is the type of specialization famously described by Adam Smith in which he praised specialization, for it increased prosperity. 476 It was developed further by Fredrick Taylor, who aimed to depersonalize the production process (cf. Chapter 4.2). Today much work has indeed been reorganized with machines and computers. Now Freidson argues that besides mechanical specialization, there is discretionary specialization, of which we can say that it is difficult if not impossible to replace it with machines and computers. It involves tasks that “however narrow, minute, detailed or ‘specialized’ the range, are tasks in which discretion or fresh judgment must often be exercised if they are to be performed successfully.”477 Any normal person can specialize in the mechanical sense of the word, but it requires a lot of training and study to develop the discretionary or professional judgment. A major result of such training is that a professional person can not only do the work that needs to be done but can also decide what work is necessary in the first place, and which goals are to be strived for in doing it. In a discretionary judgment we do not only solve problems by finding the right means for the set ends, but we also define the problems. In his book on practical thinking The Reflective Practitioner Manfred Schön says: “But with this emphasis on problem solving, we ignore problem setting, the process by which we define the decision to be made, the ends to be achieved, the means which may be chosen. In real-world practice, problems do not solve themselves to the practitioner as givens. They must be constructed 475 See: Khurana, Rakesh, From Higher Aims to Hired Arms. The Social Transformation of American Business Schools and the Unfulfilled Promise of Management as a Profession, Princeton University Press, Princeton, United States, Oxford, United Kingdom, 2007, p.93. 476 Freidson, Eliot, Professionalism. The Third Logic. Polity Press, New York, United States, 2001, p.23. 477 Ibid. p.23 259 8 from the materials of problematic situations which are puzzling, troubling and uncertain.”478 Problem setting is not itself a technical problem, but part of understanding and framing the situation in which one finds oneself. Perhaps we can call this framing the ‘balanced grasp’ of the internal and external goods of our situation. Thinking from the epistemology of Aristotle, discretionary judgment brings us to the sides of techne and close to phronesis, for we cross the borders of a strict means-end thinking. What do we need to know for such discretionary specialization? It involves both theory and skills. A person needs to be skilled in the sense of being able to accomplish a task, but he also needs to know what the processes involved mean. For instance, to solve a difficult logistic problem as a consultant, one must have a skillful command over mathematics and statistics. This command involves the capacity to work with numbers, which is a (theoretical) skill. 479 In addition, we also need to be able to connect (or: translate) the numbers to the reality of a business, which might for instance exist in the delivery of large amounts of consumer goods. The consultant also needs (theoretical) reflection on the situation, for instance, on what customers want, how to reorganize the value-chain, arrange appropriate financing within the company, evaluate whether previous sales estimations were realistic, and so on. How can we acquire skills? The philosopher Michael Polanyi (the brother of Karl Polanyi who wrote The Great Transformation, referred to in Chapter 6) famously described the functioning of skills. He distinguished between skills that are formal in character and those that are tacit. Formal skills can be written down in textbooks, protocols, and spreadsheets. Systematically, they can be studied. Most study programs at the university level are full of formal skills. One could argue that in business studies, perhaps even more than in other studies, students learn to register formal knowledge. This is the topic we addressed in Chapter 6.5 in terms of ‘audits’ and ‘output registration’. Tacit skills cannot be written down so easily, Polanyi argues. Tacit are to a large extent unverbalizable, even for those who really master them. This is already the case with relative simple examples, such as bike riding or cooking. You can hardly learn and develop such activities from a book. Polanyi suggests that even theoretical skills, such as that of writing a scientific dissertation, consists 478 Schön, Donald, The Reflective Practitioner, Basic Books, London, United Kingdom, 1983, p. 40. 479 Verbrugge, Ad, ‘Wie weet hier de weg? Over kunde en onkunde door digitalisering van het onderwijs.’ In: Onderwijs in Tijden van Digitalisering. ed. Ad Verbrugge, Jelle van Baardewijk, Uitgeverij Boom, Amsterdam, the Netherlands, pp. 191-241, esp. 196-202. 260 of tacit knowledge. Of course, the articulate contents of scientific research itself can be read all over the world by any intelligent person willing to do so; but spreading the “unspecifiable art of scientific research” is a lot more difficult.480 The same holds for many classic and modern professions, from dentists to computer programmers. If you want to acquire tacit expertise, you need to train, and you need to have a mentor, according to Polanyi. “By watching the master and emulating his efforts in the presence of his example, the apprentice unconsciously picks up the rules of the art, including those which are not explicitly known to the master himself. These hidden rules can be assimilated only by a person who surrenders himself to that extent uncritically to the imitation of another.”481 Now this idea of acquiring skills might seem old fashioned at first sight, but it holds true to a certain extent for many modern practices. The large amount of time students in biology spent in laboratories and students in medicine in practical courses shows how greatly these sciences rely on the ‘real world’ in which people discover things that cannot be communicated in terms of theory or data. We need to learn to skillfully do and skillfully understand things. Such a type of learning is almost the opposite of scientific understanding something ‘objectively’. We need to get involved in the laboratories, hospitals, and courts of the world to see and learn how our society functions. The right instrument for such observation is not a detached and scientific attitude but an observational and practicing engagement with the situation and therewith its ethos. If such an enrolment is difficult or irresponsible to organize, we tend to copy real-world situations, such as moot courts, take interviews and ideally organize internships. This an unquestioned aspect of the studyprograms in medicine and law; so why would it not be in business studies? Even after graduation, alumni in law and medicine follow learning-on-thejob trajectories of years before they eventually receive recognition as fully capable professionals. The sociologist Richard Sennett studies what he calls ‘craftsmanship’, which comes close to the idea of a very skillful person, like a doctor, artist, dentist, or scientist. He emphasizes the role of obsessional focus in skill acquisition. Developing skill implies that one observes, exercises, repetitively trains, and so 480 Polanyi, Personal Knowledge. Towards a Post-critical Philosophy, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, United States, 1954, p. 53. 481 Ibid. p. 53. 261 8 on.482 Sennett also describes how time-consuming and boring this apprentice phase can be. But submitting to a practice and absorbing its techniques eventually ends in a proficiency in these techniques and therefore with the whole organization to which they belong. Once a person is skilled, Sennett shows, agility takes over and one can intuitively and smoothly observe certain situations, make things, and solve problems. The ‘problem’ at this point is that a master-craftsmen acquired this capacity in a certain area – perhaps that of administration or strategy – and that it is relatively difficult to use that expertise in other domains. Psychological research shows that the capacity of craftsmanship has a focus area and hence is not a general skill. An excellent chess player can intuitively see playing patterns, but that does not imply he is a good strategist in consultancy. Expertise and practical understanding, in other words, is domain relative. “No matter how widely skilled people may be”, educational researcher Hirsch writes, “as soon as they confront unfamiliar content their skill degenerates.”483 This also holds for learning itself. This is what (2006) The Cambridge Handbook of Expertise and Expert performance says about the subject: “Research clearly rejects the classical views on human cognition in which general abilities such as learning, reasoning, problem solving, and concept formation correspond to capacities and abilities that can be studied independently of the content domains.” 484 Hence, a craft is related to a certain field. To gain further insight into the relation between the proficiency in a craft and the larger practice of life, we can turn to the illuminating ideas of Martin Heidegger. When we use an instrument in a skillful and conscious way, Heidegger says, we see it in relation to the context in which we are. In our approach to the world we must not objectify this world and abstract from it but rather get attuned to it and see and use the possibilities to do so. Take, for instance, a hammer, which is not a simple ‘object’ but is related to a larger organization of a workplace. When all functions well in a workplace, we let all the different tools function in-order-to … make, repair, reconstruct etc. something else. The tools themselves are always part of a larger structure of tools that is meaningfully embedded in life: my hammer is in my garage, on my workbench, close to my pincers, and so on. I use it to repair the chair which fits the rest of my furniture. 482 Sennett, The Craftsman, Penguin Books, London, United Kingdom, 2008, p. 38. 483 Hirsch, E.D., Why Knowledge Matters. Rescuing our Children from Educational Theories, Harvard Education Press, Cambridge, United States, 2016. 484 Feltovich, Paul, J., Michael J. Prietula, K. Anders Ericsson, “Studies of Expertise from Psychological Perspectives”, in: The Cambridge Handbook of Expertise and Expert performance, eds. K. Anders Ericsson, Neil Charness, Paul, J. Feltovich, Robert J. Hoffman, Cambridge University Press. pp. 41-68, pp.48-49. 262 For Heidegger, it is of crucial importance that we realize that we as humans are ourselves also interwoven in this structure of technological artefacts in our togetherness with others. This also means that humans are not simply ‘subjects’ opposed to the ‘objects’ of reality. No, we are embedded in a large organization of tools, things, and structures; when we act in a certain way, we do so in accordance with this whole structure. When all functions well, we are not isolated from our tool-world, but we think and act through it. When we are competent in using our tools, they feel like a kind of extension of our hands and feet. In the words of Polanyi, we have a general awareness of the feeling in the palm of our hands which merges with an extended, focal awareness of my driving in the nail with the hammer on the workbench.485 The result is that we in a way think and act from within the total organization of tools. An odd aspect of our focal awareness is that is a matter of disciplined attention rather than articulate knowledge (too much awareness of what we ‘actually’ do might even get in the way and results in a loss of flow). Heidegger takes an important step further than Polanyi in his analysis, noting that tools cannot be adequately understood from an instrumental stance only, as tools change who we are and the society we live in. 486 Thanks to the invention of the hammer we can not only change the ways we use our hands, it has also created new kinds of jobs, like that of carpenter. Heidegger argues that the hammer is still a simple example, but with modern tools like cars and computers the whole picture changes. A car is not simply a mode of transport, it transforms the whole of society and has all kinds of side-effects. Due to the invention of cars a whole industry came into existence, with inventors, designers, mechanics, laborers, and so on. Those people could, for the first time in history, live relatively far away from family and work and nonetheless stay connected. The car also spurred the emergence of a new way of shopping and changed the way cities look and are experienced. It also created a new way of radio broadcasting. 487 Thus, the economic and technological invention of affordable cars is not simply an instrument, but has changed the way society functions. The ethos of people, their way of relating to the world, transforms with the introduction of new technologies. We enter a new way-of-life, with 485 Polanyi, Personal Knowledge. Towards a Post-critical Philosophy. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, United Kingdom, 1957, p. 55. 486 Heidegger, Martin, ‘The Question Concerning Technology’, in: The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, tr. William Lovitt, New York. Harper and Row, 1977, pp. 3-35 (original stems from 1954; publication in Gesamtausgabe, book 7, Vorträge und Aufsätze. Frankfurt Klosterman, 2000), p. 3. 487 Bakker, Sjoerd. From Luxury to Necessity. What the railways, electricity and automobile teach us about the IT revolution, Boom Uitgeverij, Amsterdam, the Netherlands, 2017. 263 8 new ways of relating to things and other people. Now Heidegger argues that such a new world is not simply a technological extension of our existing lives, but also part of what we consider to be meaningful. Empirical studies on the meaningfulness of work show that people - especially those with professional jobs, for example in care or law - experience a ‘calling’ in exercising their discretionary judgment.488 This means that people do not only operate within a certain world due to their capacity of practical understanding, they also experience an inherent value in doing so. Work, thus understood, is not simply a means to make a living. The question is whether business alumni experience a calling like law and medicine students. The work-for-money incentive seems to be much stronger among business students. I propose that business studies might do well to change their attitude towards practical knowledge. Below I summarize the main characteristics of the ‘practical understanding’ developed in this section and translate them to a possible business school ethos. 1. The distinction between theory and skills is not always sharp. A theoretical approach (such as in mathematics or strategy) involves theoretical reasoning, but also (theoretical) skills. 2. Some skills are mechanical, but others are discretionary. Discretionary skills (such as those of a carpenter, doctor, or consultant) are hard to represent in theories and even harder to learn from books. 3. Applied or professional studies, such as medicine and law, put lots of effort in the practice of discretionary judgment. 4. The enrolment in practical situations trains people to focus on particularities, instead of just having a general overview. Skills are domain-relative. 5. People need training by experts to raise levels of discretionary judgment. This also increases our awareness. We learn to ‘think’ through the material by imitation. 6. A discretionary judgment is not simply a technological asset but is part of the skills needed, given the ongoing transformation of society in which new jobs and new roles emerge. We are only accustomed to a certain field or task when we master a skill. 7. Those who ‘master’ a certain practical understanding, do so with intrinsic motivation and not simply for the money. They experience a calling. 488 Freidson, Eliot, Professionalism. The Third Logic. Polity Press, New York, United States, 2001, Chapter 5, Ideologies. 264 How can we apply these insights to the business school ethos? This is my proposal: 1. Business schools offer a lot of models that are ‘in between’ theory and skills, such as SWOT, BCG, Ansoff, and so on (cf. Chapter 5.2). Therefore, there is reason to belief the business mindset (at least partly) involves discretionary judgment. 2. Business schools would probably agree to see the typical business mindset as discretionary, but – and this is the problem – there is a tendency to see the work of others in terms of ‘tasks’, or: mechanical skills (cf. Chapter 3). 3. Compared to studies in law and medicine, business departments do little to bring students in real-work situations (cf. Chapter 4). Business cases and self-organized work and internships must compensate for years or structured traineeships in those other fields. 4. The generalized mindset or ‘helicopter view’ is supposed to be typical for the business student ethos (cf. Chapter 3). This is a missed opportunity, for the combination of general knowledge with particularities (from businesses, branches, economies, and so on) is crucial. Business studies need to differentiate subfields to enable students to specialize and to get an understanding of the specialization of real experts. 5. There is attention for consultancy tools and case-studies, but senior experts are not recruited to train students (cf. Chapter 5.2). 6. Business theories and consultancy tools convey a certain view of the world (a kind of managerial mind-set) that enables people to function within the total organization of companies, with its business units, productivity reports, commercial partners, meetings, competitors, and so on. The business school ethos is part of this larger business world, to which it attunes and which it vindicates (cf. Chapter 4). 7. It is rather uncommon to see business studies as a program to follow one’s higher calling. Many students see it as a means-end study that brings one into a means-end job. But this certainly does not hold for all types of student ethos (cf. Chapter 3). Even if we follow these suggestions, and a new business ethos would be installed, I do not think business studies would be a professional school like medicine and law schools. (1) Business schools have no monopoly over the labor market. People consider good management to be a trainable talent, but the fact that so much real-world managers have no business school credentials, 265 8 shows that management is not regarded as a separate profession. 489 (2) What complicates the matter further, is that business studies still need to work on a coherent idea of what good management entails qua theoretical and practical understanding. (3) Apart from that, there is an ideological omission among a large group of students. 490 Professions have a devotion in serving higher goods, often at the expense of economic reward, while the Q-research shows that many business students endorse an ethos in which such higher goods are secondary at best and irrelevant at worst. Nonetheless, a redefinition of management in relation to practices – management as something that is domain-specific (cf. Chapter 5.4) – would be a step towards professionalization. In this section I argued that this implies a reconsideration and vindication of practical understanding: (1) understand the practical thinking of people in specific domains. (2) Try to develop the business mindset itself into a way of practical thinking. The balancing of internal- and external goods is one of the important parameters in such judgment. 8.3 Cultivate the Moral Identity of Students (Taylor, Frankfurt, Nussbaum) In the context of our modern society it is unlikely that people agree on what is good - on ‘how things ought to be done’. This is not in itself problematic. I do not think it is possible to discover ‘the’ moral truths of life (cf. Chapter 5.3). There is no ‘right’ spot in between a ‘too much’ or a ‘too little’ in our modern lives. Problems arise when there is no cultivated ‘moral space’, both on a personal and collective level. For Aristotle, it would always be relatively clear how to navigate morally (cf. Chapter 8.1), but in our times we need a more pluralistic view in which many and contrasting aspects can be right on an individual or collective level. An education into the ‘goods’ of life should make us aware of the fact that we need to think about goods and might need to mediate different points of view. In this section, I explore how to develop moral considerations, and what such a modern moral identity might look like. I follow the work of MacIntyre and especially Taylor and adjust it, referring to the work of Frankfurt and Nussbaum. MacIntyre commenced to develop an argument in Ethics of the Conflicts of Modernity that helps us evaluate our desires. In a somewhat different way, 489 This is fully in line with Grey’s argument on why management is not a profession (cf. section 2.5). 490 Freidson describes a full account of a profession: knowledge, skills, ideal-driven, controlled labour markets, and controlled education. See: Freidson, Eliot, Professionalism. The Third Logic. Polity Press, New York, United States, 2001, p.180. 266 this is a reasonable starting point for business students, who generally like to think about desires and their fulfilment. MacIntyre takes an ethical angle, rather than a marketing angle: “To be reflective about one’s desires is to ask whether one has sufficiently good reasons for desiring whatever it is that one presently desires. To have a good reason for desiring something – when that desire is not an idle wish – is to have a good reason for acting in a particular way.”491 What MacIntyre is describing here, comes close to what Taylor has called ‘strong evaluations’. In such evaluations people make decisions about certain aspects of their lives regarding what he calls hypergoods. These ‘hypergoods’ are more abstract than MacIntyre’s internal goods and are not immanent to practices but rather to the identity of people. 492 “That is, we acknowledge second-order qualitative distinctions which define higher goods, on the basis of which we discriminate among other goods, attribute differential worth or importance to them, or determine when and if to follow them. Let me call higher-order goods of this kind ‘hypergoods’, i.e. goods which not only morally are incomparably more important than others but provide the standpoint from which these must be weighed, judged, decided about.”493 8 In other words, hypergoods are very important background concerns – such as an interest in personal and intellectual development, engagement in society or the wish to become famous – that people have developed in their lives and on which they orient when they make decisions. The need to make strong evaluations in which one judges something regarding hypergoods is especially clear in a difficult situation. Consider, for instance, the choice for a certain study, a mid-career switch or a decision to continue with a certain friendship. These are difficult decisions in which it is helpful to try to articulate the ‘hypergoods’ involved in the different options. Charles Taylor says in The 491 MacIntyre, Alastair, Ethics in the Conflict of Modernity: An essay on Desire, Practical Reasoning and Narrative, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom, 2016, p. 8. 492 Taylor follows Frankfurt in this definition. Frankfurt speaks of ‘concerns’ (or: ‘first order concerns’), where Taylor speaks of ‘hypergoods’. The difference seems small: Frankfurt is not, as Taylor, strongly focussed on the social nature of ‘concerns’ and hence argues more individualistic/ liberal. 493 Taylor, Charles, Sources of the Self, The Making of the Modern Identity, Cambridge University Press, 1989, p.63. 267 Sources of the Self, that we have difficulty in articulating our hypergoods.494 In other words, it is difficult to have a serious degree of self-knowledge and be articulate about ‘what drives us’. If Aristotle, MacIntyre and Taylor teach us anything about the discovery of what we find important, it is that it is (1) something that is valuable for its own sake and (2) something that we already most probably presuppose in our activities but often find difficult to articulate. Because of this difficulty, we cannot fully grasp our hypergoods in terms of ‘preferences’, ‘commitments’ or that which we find ‘choiceworthy’. MacIntyre advices us to look in the concrete situations we are already involved in, for instance the factual situation at home – I am a father of two kids, a husband, a son, a friend, and so on – and this already implies a way of living, with a certain organization, with values, duties, and so on. This family realm is an important anchor of my identity and a good starting point for an evaluation. Another anchor can be found in what MacIntyre calls the practices in which people operate (cf. picture 5, section 6.1). If we make a strong evaluation, we often orient on the hypergoods we find in the worlds in which we are interwoven, like family life and practices. Let me elaborate this with two situations: consumption in private and managing at work. Consider a situation in which a consumer is confronted with his or her rank-order, for instance regarding buying an expensive car. This doubt can be framed in a personal (emotivistic) way as the question: ‘What is it that I care mostly about?’ Perhaps it is indeed a car, but perhaps I only want to buy it after I have saved enough money to do so without a loan. Perhaps the evaluative judgment is formulated regarding those who are close to me as: ‘Is this purchase helping me to further the well-being of those I care for?’ These questions undoubtedly help our deliberation about buying a new car, but they are still formulated from the perspective of the individual. A moral agent could also deliberate with an eye on the larger context. That is, when we are in doubt about some large event in our lives, or about the question whether something is small or large and hence requires a strong instead of a weak evaluation, we should ask ‘What is it that we presuppose?’ and not only ‘What is it that I am committed to?’ What we presuppose is not always obvious and it requires quite some consciousness and sociological awareness. This is both a matter of the right intuition and of the right reasoning, not of straightforward reasoning alone. We also need to realize that there is less free agency on this deep level of morality than we might expect. Frankfurt argues that the factual things we care about precede our normative ideas about what we think we 494 Ibid., Part I.4 Ethics of Inarticulacy, pp. 53-90. 268 should do. That is, we are already involved in certain situations about which we care and this must not be the result of a conscious decision, it can be a ‘brute fact’. 495 An essential aspect of sociological awareness, I propose, is awareness about the dominance of consumption in our culture. It is no coincidence that people aspire to consume increasingly and want to study consumption. In a culture in which consumption – of products, experiences, web content – is dominant, there is no evident standpoint from which to question our desires. Instead, the societal evidences are precisely that consumption is normal and should be maximized and refined. There is a tendency in the economy to blindly follow desires and use our capacity to reason to do it as effectively as possible. In the logic of consumption, this seems to be no problem (although it certainly can become one if one thinks about issues like debt, pollution, and obesity). But if we deal with bigger issues – like the choice of a study, career or friendship – our ‘choices’ involve much more than just refinement or maximation. We deal with the quality of life, with that which makes us happy in the Aristotelian/ MacIntyrean sense of ‘that for the sake of which I live’. Discovering our ‘strong evaluations’ is something difficult in isolation from other people, for these other people are always already part of them. That is why MacIntyre and Taylor emphasize the need for communication over contemplation. They analyze accountability as the capacity to share and discuss reasons for doing what we do and especially for not doing what is taken to be normal. Let me elaborate on this with an example from the world of management. It is not enough when students are (emotivist) managers that announce: ‘This is my decision, I know/feel it is the right thing to do.’ Managers are accountable for their actions and need to be able to explain decisions, i.e. involve others in their reasoning. This is clearly at odds with a technocratic or bureaucratic response of managers: ‘I took this decision, for this is what the data indicates and the protocol obliges us to do, while we are not in conflict with the company credo.’ A good announcement, in which a manager proves accountable, would rather involve the description of the general goods involved in a case, the way they might be realized or perhaps violated, followed by a description of the ends that are served and why this is necessary. Note that I am not saying that accountability is taking certain clear-cut decisions. It is about the capacity to make decisions about the overall goods (or: concerns) in a certain business and the capacity to communicate about the deliberation that precedes this decision. 495 Frankfurt, Harry G., The Reasons of Love, Princeton University Press, Princeton, United States, 2004, pp. 27-28. 269 8 As people we are confronted with the premises of our actions in both relatively simple purchases, like that of a car, and complex life choices, like what study to take up. We need to be able to formulate what we are committed to and we also need to be aware of what we presuppose in the way we want our personal lives to be organized. The same holds true when we are in a professional situation and work as managers. What complicates this picture is that we cannot simply start reasoning. We must discover what we commit to and what we presuppose already. This discovery is not a clear-cut matter of formulating the reasons we have for a certain desire or even life choice. That might be the case, but it is often a rockier road than that. Perhaps we find the reasons for desiring something because they are frustrated or not fulfilled. In failing to accomplish what one desires, like the deadline for a certain paper, one learns to acknowledge the importance of good planning but also the relative controllability of creative and intellectual crafts. Evaluative reasoning itself might be understood parallel to this writing example. We need to find out how to develop a strong evaluation about life in which one can articulate its goods and hypergoods. Mistaken purchases, wrong decisions and embarrassing situations might very well serve as an important experience to discover and articulate our hypergoods. Why can such a negative experience be important in revealing or discovering what one finds important? Apparently, we can be confronted with the actual weight of certain goods when we ignore or forget about them and later ask ourselves ‘how could I have (not) done this or that?’. For MacIntyre, failures are “occasions for learning”, in which we get to know what our personal goods are.496 If we are impressed by such insights, we can respond constructively and develop our identity in a more fully and ethically colored way. In doing so, there is quite a difference in the line of reasoning of the emotivist and that of a MacIntyrean or Taylorian inspired person. Do we only reflect on what we care about and how we have come to care about this, for instance, a certain job, friendship, or hobby? Or do we have a richer understanding of ourselves in which we incorporate our failures into our identity, as well as our evolved evaluations on those desires? In MacIntyre’s view, a normal person will learn to discover, articulate, and eventually take into account his or her goods. This is easier said than done, for one might need to change one’s habits before one’s desires will be transformed. In an emotivistic/expressivist account of ethics, such a transformation will 496 MacIntyre, Alastair, Ethics in the Conflict of Modernity: An essay on Desire, Practical Reasoning and Narrative, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom, 2016, p.40. 270 always remain difficult. It remains unclear why a person should listen to his evaluative judgments in the first place, let alone judgments that require a change of desire. However, here we must acknowledge that MacIntyre’s interpretation of any personal ethics as a variant of emotivism, is black/white and requires nuance. Reasoning like Frankfurt, there is a clear difference between background concerns and normal values. Caring for something differs from simply valuing it, for caring (or: being concerned) about something really means we identify with it. Frankfurt speaks of ‘volitional commitment’ in this regard. We experience a wholehearted authority of our concerns, which makes it difficult not to follow them. 497 This line of reasoning comes much closer to that of MacIntyre than he is willing to accept, caused by his aversion to forms of non-communitarian ethics. Of course, all people have difficulty following their rank-order of goods, but MacIntyre thinks that we will eventually have to follow this order; he thinks it is typically human to do so. He does believe that humans can design their own lives to a certain extent. The problem remains that such a design – the evaluative judgment of our desires – is not as controllable as modern people often think. We must get accustomed to identifying what we find important in life. That is, we need to learn throughout our lives – during our upbringing and education and while making life decisions and mistakes – that we can evaluate life and hence develop self-knowledge. This does not mean that discovering our hypergoods and learning to make strong-evaluations (or: rank-orders), is something unnatural to do. On the contrary, it is typically human although we need to remember this reflective dimension exists; we must search for it and therewith take responsibility for our life, how we consume, work, and so on. If we agree that ‘strong evaluations’ are an inherent part to a complete life, then it is reasonable to help people develop them: (1) It is necessary to facilitate and train shared deliberation about what hypergoods are. This seems especially necessary in collective situations, like those in study or work, for the hypergoods in these situations are more-or-less ‘given’ in the contexts. Due to communication, debate and disagreement, the ethical dimension of life comes to the light. Business ethicist Mary Gentile argues that such shared deliberation is important and insists that it should focus on clear good/wrong issues. The problem is that many moral dilemmas are less clear-cut, but her suggestion to actively discuss it in business and business schools is inspiring. This is especially the case since many business students need to get beyond an amoral (‘neutralized’) perspective of 497 Frankfurt, Harry G., ‘Identification and Wholeheartedness’, in: The Importance of What We Care About, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom,1988, 159–176. 271 8 life, into a moral one which helps students to act on their tacit values. For such movement, Gentiles good/wrong-approach fits rather well. 498 (2) Even so, shared deliberation can easily derail in a systematic exchange of opinions instead of an informed shared deliberation and that is why we need to orient on the shared norms and standards of excellence. We risk taking our moral intuitions and emotions too seriously in the way that they seemingly ‘authentically’ come to us. The training of our morality – our feeling and reasoning about it – can succeed only if we accept some vulnerability. That is why people arguably need a ‘moral space’ in which they can speak out and communicate. This is related to another point, namely that the formation of ones (moral) account of work, is not simply some insight into principles, but it is itself a type of craft that needs training. It is not just a cognitive task but a skillful craft that needs development. Such a training helps us to develop moral self-knowledge about what we tend to understand as good and what requires improvements. (3) We nonetheless live in an individualized society and hence it seems reasonable to provide content that reflects this individualization. Literature and film (perhaps even arts in general, including music) provide example narratives in which people learn to identify with other individuals developing their ‘strong evaluations’. Business students can also learn from these narratives – a line of reasoning we also find in the work of the Carnegie Foundation (cf. section 2.4). The philosopher Martha Nussbaum has described how the arts in general (music, film, dance, etc.) help to shape our understanding of the world around us by making us more emphatically. 499 She points to the importance of the training of imagination with the help of arts. With business ethicist Joseph Badaracco, I propose to include (auto)biographies in this list of arts. Literature can ‘awaken’ the reader and therewith (start to) morally transform his or her desires. Therefore, I propose to deepen courses in business ethics with ‘business humanities’ in which the arts play a role in the awakening of moral consciousness. 500 This is arguably the strategy Kierkegaard (cf. section 5.4) follows in his work: he positions the reader to understand the life of the 498 Gentile, Mary, Giving Voice to Values: How to Speak Your Mind When You Know What’s Right. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010. Also see: Painter-Morland, Mollie, Rosa Slegers, ‘Strengthening “Giving Voice to Values” in Business Schools by Reconsidering the “Invisible Hand” Metaphor’, in: Journal of Business Ethics, 2017, 147, pp. 807-819, esp. pp. 815-816. 499 Nussbaum, Martha, Cultivating Humanity. A classical Defense of Reform in Liberal Education, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachutes, London, England, 1997, esp. Chapter 3, The Narrative Imagination. 500 I borrow the notion of business humanities from: Beabout, Gregory, The Character of the Manager. From Office Executive to Wise Steward. The Palgrave MacMillan, London, United Kingdom, 2013. 272 aesthete, ethicist (Judge Wilhelm) and pastor. Hence, Kierkegaard helps his readers to identify with people thinking respectively amoral, moral, and religious.501 The step from amoral-hedonistic reasoning to moral reasoning is highly relevant for business students, although Kierkegaard’s prose is perhaps too difficult.502 Fortunately, there are many novels and films exploring this theme, such as The Remains of the Day by Nobel-prize winner (2017) Kazuo Ishiguro. The novel poses the memoirs of a butler, Mr. Stevens, who tells the reader what a professional butler is. There are more similarities between a butler and a consultant than one would perhaps think. The questions the novel explores are: Is being a butler a strictly serving profession, or should a butler also morally speak out? For instance, should a butler do everything asked for (workhours, types of work, etc.), should he argue against his employer in case of injustice (when noticing a crime or in a war context), should a butler give up his private life for work purposes (when in love, for family, etc.)? The Remains of the Day is a story about the difficulty to be autonomous and morally responsible and not to hide behind one’s professional role. Of course, most students will have experience with difficult ethical situations in their own lives and literature helps to understand such situations better by showing how fictional others deal with them. Perhaps surprisingly for business students, there are many books that deal with ethical dilemmas and life decisions relevant for would-be-managers, such as those of the Dutch writer Elsschot or the American novelist Dave Eggers. Let me succinctly mention what literature might bring to business courses: • Recognize your personal and shared moral space. Literature often portrays the difference between an amoral and a moral perspective on life, mostly related to the tension between personal and work values. This helps students to signal moral dilemmas and prevents them from demoralizing situations (in business ethics also known as ‘moral disengagement’ or ‘moral neutralization’). 503 • Learn from others how to be morally good. Literature involves students to the subjective side of moral deliberation. How do other people discover their 501 See for a recent analysis of Kierkegaard in relation to literature: Den Dulk, Allard, Existentialist Engagement in Wallace, Eggers and Foer, esp. Chapter 2 Endless Irony. Bloomsbury Academic, London, United Kingdom, 2014. 502 Gregory Beabout nonetheless tries to introduce Kierkegaard as a source for business ethics, also discussing MacIntyre’s false interpretation: Beabout, Gregory, The Character of the Manager. From Office Executive to Wise Steward. The Palgrave MacMillan, 2013, p. 155-156. 503 On moral normalization/disengagement in business, see for instance: Donaldson, T. (2012). ‘Three ethical roots of the economic crisis.’ in: Journal of Business Ethics, 106(1), 5–8. 273 8 moral concerns? How do others experience difficulties in following certain hypergoods? In these cases, looking through someone else’s eyes helps to develop one’s own values. 504 • Develop empathy for different people and ideas. Literature helps to identify with other people following other thought patterns, and courses of action, which one learns to identify with.505 In sum, literature helps to uncover one’s capacity for moral reasoning, both in relation to oneself and to others. In doing so, it can also raise our levels of self-reflection from ‘understanding one’s hypergoods’ to ‘transforming one’s hypergoods’. This is an important capacity when one faces life-decisions, but it also helps with relatively small decisions in daily work and consumption. In all such situations we need to be able to reflect on our needs and this reflection is not only a rational matter, but also intuitive. It is through reflection, discussion, and imagination – done in relation to the practice and institutions we are part of – that we can develop such reflection. Conclusion Let me wrap up the insights from this chapter. It started with a reconstruction of the ethical theory of Aristotle, which is also the base of the moral ethological framework employed in this research. On a close account, the theory of ethics of Aristotle is not a theory in the modern theoretical sense of the word. Rather, Aristotle describes how the good life of a person is the life within a certain institutional and social context, in which someone acquires and sustains a character. This character makes sure someone relates well to the world, can do what is necessary, which is always the ‘golden mean’ between an excess and shortage. One does not acquire the right character through study alone, but mostly through the accustoming of the right dispositions in the right environment. In fact, Aristotle displays that moral deliberation is a matter of practical wisdom (phronèsis) rather than science (episteme). However, for Aristotle the good life is lived in either politics or intellectual life, not in practical affairs of business. In the previous chapter (7) on Hegel, I describe how economics and business can nonetheless be understood in relation to 504 Business ethicist Badaracco follows this argument, using both examples from fiction and nonfiction. See: Badaracco, Joseph, Defining Moments, Harvard Business School Press, Boston Massachutes, 1997. 505 Nussbaum emphasizes the help literature offers in becoming more empathic with other people and other views on life. See: Nussbaum, Martha, Cultivating Humanity. A Classical Defense of Reform in Liberal Education, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachutes, London, England, 1997, esp. Chapter 3, The Narrative Imagination. 274 the good life. We simply do not live in the context of the ancient city-state anymore and we must be weary of copying all Aristotelian ideas to ours. It makes little sense to speak about the virtues Aristotle describes, without including the necessary context in which one acquires these. That is why the notion of ethos is more apt than that of virtues, for it includes an idea of context and locality in which we live and the goods we aspire. When we want to teach students to be good managers and good citizens, this implies a consideration of the context in which they live and the goods implied in this living. Inspired by Aristotle, and with the help of other philosophers, I described two types of judgments that I consider relevant for a good business student ethos: The capacity of ‘practical understanding’ (cf. section 8.2) and that of ‘moral judgment’ (cf. section 8.3). Chapter 4 described how business schools have lost touch with the practices of business. To reconnect with those practices, we need a different, more applied mindset than strict academic thinking. I reconstructed the main aspects of ‘practical understanding’, as other philosophers have described this type of judgment. Obviously, a would-be-manager is not the same type of student as a would-be-dentist, but there are crucial lessons for business studies if we nonetheless look in the mirror of professional artisans. Business thinking is practical and hence employs a typical discretionary judgment, while planning, delegating, strategizing, and so on. If we want to improve this discretionary judgment of business people, we need to train it with more attention for the details of practice, mentorship, and case-studies. Moral ethologically speaking, it would be a mistake to think such ‘managerial judgment’ would only be ‘a’ new tool in the toolbox of business students. Rather, such judgment is part of the world in which students come to operate and hence it helps to cultivate this world: it enables the student to function in, and codevelop, the commercial world of organization, investment, and innovation. Perhaps it is a conceptual ‘stretch’ to reframe business studies as a professional study – for it lacks a full-fledged professional ideology and the skill-base – but it certainly needs a reframing as an applied study. The (standard) academic self-understanding values practical understanding poorly, for it is less formal and explicable as theoretical knowledge, but it would be unacademic to not recognize this different type of knowledge. A good business student ethos consists of more ‘practical judgmental power’ but is also in need of an increase of ‘moral deliberation power’. Business schools can only partly influence this deliberation, for it is not a matter of education in the first place – but of a way of life –, but nonetheless they can help students to become informed about one’s deliberation. Following 275 8 Taylor, such deliberation involves the discovery of one’s commitments and the concerns one presupposes in the shared lives with others. Students need to have time to train this discovery and cultivation; a ‘moral space’ with discussion and attention for the work traditions we have. With the help of arts – fiction, biographies, movies, music – students can become more aware of their lives. Through the identification with other (fictional) people, students can learn to acquire reflection on their lives and empathize with others. Let me concretize the key insights from this chapter as building blocks for the ideal business student ethos. Business students should be enabled to… • articulate the ‘goods’ one strives for in life and which (although they might very well be ambitious) are directed as in the sense of ‘goals in itself’. • oversee the different types of knowledge relevant in life: apart from scientific thinking, especially practical wisdom, and practical understanding. • analyze the particularities of some concrete business and sector. The focus on theory, models and tools does not release us from the need to study reality in its concreteness, including its morale. • analyze one’s deliberations (practical syllogism) about evaluations in our minds and the concrete situations and values we need to deal with. • Learn to be attentive to concrete situations, receptive to what is at hand rather than actively planning. • acquire the language of virtues to redefine one’s behavior. Although Aristotle’s virtues might not all be relevant, his language and examples bring clarity. • articulate what one wants (chooses for, commits to) and what is presupposed in such wants, personally, socially, institutionally, traditionally. 276 Evaluation Part III Part I displayed the problematic business student ethos. Part II unveiled the historical and philosophical origins of these problems. In Part III, I turned the table and developed the elementary concepts of an enriched business student ethos. In this evaluation, I outline the improved ethos, reserving the application of its results – as elements of a blueprint for an alternative business school – to the Conclusion. Chapter 6 provided a reconstruction of MacIntyre’s answer to the problems of modernity. These problems were analyzed previously in chapter 5 and related to shortcomings of modern ethics: the stark focus on the individualistic and rational-universalistic reasoning. There we saw how MacIntyre pairs this theoretical diagnosis with a sociological critique of the manager and the manager’s claim to have objective-scientific and value-neutral knowledge. MacIntyre’s answer to these problems, as discussed in chapter 6, revolves around the distinctions internal/external goods and practice/institution. These distinctions proved to be of great value to articulate the normative dimension of managerial work in business. A business is an institution that rests on a practice as its productive core. MacIntyre himself thinks that only productive crafts can constitute ‘good’ business. But his understanding of business is too small to offer an understanding of many non-craft types of business. Due to the corrosive powers of the external goods typical for institutions, a good manager must be able to protect the relevant internals goods against the forces of inside and outside external goods. Often, as illustrated with the case of Shell, this may lead to the question ‘What is our purpose?’ and this even might turn out to be more practice-related than people dare to acknowledge. In contrast with MacIntyre, I argued that there is more practice in business than he can acknowledge (due to his one-sided Marxist/Neoclassical understanding of the economy). At the same time, the concept of practice – despite its heuristic powers – also carries risks, much more than MacIntyre acknowledges. I illustrated this with the help of the practice of care and science, which many consider to be overly introvert. This effects business schools: Teachers need to educate students, but at the same time the academic practice privileges publishing over teaching. I do not claim this holds for every teacher and every student, but it is a tendency, which universities need to be aware of. This tendency has a lot to do with the shadow-side of internal goods, for instance with the strong emulation between scholars. Emulation is different from economic competition. Likewise, the race for more publications and prestigious awards is different from the social 277 longing of fame. Arguing with MacIntyre against MacIntyre, we need to realize that both internal and external goods have their problems when isolated from each other. It is on this point that Hegel gains relevance. With Hegel, discussed in Chapter 7, one could object to MacIntyre that he clings to a Gemeinschaft-type of reasoning that ignores the importance of the emancipation of the individual from the family- and state-led economies. With Hegel I articulated an account of the market economy in which it is an expression of a shared idea of the good life. Arguably, it is exactly the market economy that has created the practices that interest MacIntyre so much. Sports, arts, and crafts are partly a result of the capacity of humans to refine and expand their needs, a capacity that could flourish to a much greater extent in modern society than it could in the ancient polis of Athens. The cultivation and growth of practices within society – from science, care, education to chess and soccer – presupposes a large modern economy. Therefore, I argued that Hegel’s insights help to balance those of MacIntyre. Hegel attempts to show that our individual lives are part of a web of people and institutions, but the individual does not eclipse in his philosophy, as is the tendency in that of MacIntyre. Now MacIntyre argues that the process of modernity erodes the experience of a shared belonging among citizens, so the question is whether we need an ethical defense of the importance of individuals. I argued we need both: (1) Today we tend to take the cultural-social-institutional web for granted in which we live and can realize individual freedom. We need to be more aware of it and cultivate it, especially in institutions of education. (2) At the same time, we modern people realize that individual freedom is important. In fact, it is the market realm that – apart from bringing prosperity – helps the individual to realize his or her potentials beyond the realms of the state and family. For Hegel, work, consumption, and trade are not simply market-economical phenomena, but these are part of our social functioning. Transactions are always part of relations of recognition in which persons stand to one another. Recognition implies functioning according to certain habits and standards and is hence not something easily earned. With MacIntyre, one could argue the ‘real’ recognition means following certain standards of excellence, which other experts then recognize. One could, however, say that there are more relations of recognition, such as selling your products to customers, receiving a salary, greeting an acquaintance on the streets. This MacIntyrean/Hegelian line of thought, sheds light on the business student ethos. It is no coincidence that business schools inculcate students with an ethos in which society and especially states are not self-evident aspects of business. This understanding of the economy turns out to be a 278 neoclassical understanding in which state, culture and practices are opposite to the market. It is strictly liberal, in that the market is the embodiment of individual freedom. Such an understanding is right, but also rather naïve in its ignorance of the cultural, social, and institutional aspects of economies. The dominance of this market-economy model in the hearts and minds of many students and in society in general, is partly a consequence of business curricula. These emphasize individualism over a shared understanding of life and business. Instead of understanding market-economies in relation to both individuals and society at large, they one-sidedly choose for the individualistic perspective. Business schools ‘add’ some social orientation to the understanding of economies later in the curriculum, via a course in ethics or social corporate responsibility, but before that moment the curriculum has reduced business to a vehicle for profit and individual prosperity. The problem of today’s economy is that we are in need for more discussion about its goods and bads. We can reasonably expect especially business schools to inform the public debate on the market economy. The current shallow or abstract understanding of business, management and markets is not helping business schools to inform this debate. Chapters 6 and 7 introduced elementary concept to deepen our understanding of business, management, and markets in relation to the good life. Chapter 8 focused on the personal side of the ideal business student ethos. The conceptual framework of MacIntyre results in a call for taking phronesis – practical wisdom – more serious as a faculty of mind. Whether we are a teacher, playing captain or supervisor, MacIntyre proposes that we need to have practical wisdom and be wise stewards. I argued with Aristotle that phronesis is indeed an important faculty of mind but that we should not risk overestimating its power. Aristotle clearly shows that a good ethos is the result of the right upbringing, education, and context. Wisdom is needed, but we also need to have the right habits that match with our environments. The eventual environment of business graduates will be that of the corporate world and hence we need to develop sensitiveness for understanding that world. It is not simply practical wisdom but just as much practical skills that will be necessary to do so. Business schools should realize that discretionary judgment and practical wisdom must be ‘awakened’ and trained in the minds and hands of students. Not only should the ethos of business students – the sustained disposition that makes them relate to the world, see it, and talk about it –comprise such discretionary judgment, just as important is that they recognize it when others possess it. The works of Polanyi, Schön and Sennett show that there is 279 nothing un-academic about being a craftsman. In fact, there is artisanship in much of our theorizing, especially in the goals students set with tools like the SWOT-analysis and BCG-matrix. After I discussed practical judgment, I reintroduced moral judgment with the help of Taylor. Taylor addresses the individual process of norm-development. The point of moral development is not only that we make certain ‘choices’, but that we learn to discover what we already presuppose qua citizen, student, friend, family member, and so on. We need to articulate the given morality in the contexts in which we live. I realize this perspective comes very close to the communitarian ideal in which all people preferably act in accordance to shared norms. Yet, I proposed to see it subtler: we need to discover and articulate our own goods in our own and shared lives. The individual needs the collective to realize his own identity. You do not help students to become critical and free by presupposing they already are free; they need to acquire freedom and hence they need to be able to relate to others and understand others. Therefore, I plead for more humanities or Bildung in business education. It is through the involvement and understanding of the arts, that one gets to understand one’s own ‘(hyper)goods’ much better and train the ‘strong evaluations’ necessary to discover and follow them. With this Taylorian-inspired line of thought, we are still close to MacIntyre, but there are crucial differences too. (1) MacIntyre thinks about society at large in terms of local communities and their practices. If we follow his ethical and sociological analysis, we risk throwing away the baby (‘modern-people’) with the bathwater and end-up with a communitarian idea of society in which the individual is nothing but a community-member. Ethics is also a matter of a relation of a person to oneself – ‘Who do I aspire to be?’ – and this is not simply a matter of emotivism. (2) Emotivism, as described and analyzed in Chapter 5, reduces morality to a matter of arbitrary personal choice: Value judgments are expressions of a personal idea or will, for which no rational justification exists, unless we agree beforehand that we accept certain criteria of justification. MacIntyre is overly simplistic on this point, for we can base moral decisions on emotions in a consistent, non-arbitrary and non-manipulative way. Aristotle already shows that ethics is certainly also a matter of the right feeling, as a part of a certain ethos. This is also in line with modern psychological insights in ethics, as well as the ethical arguments of Nussbaum and Frankfurt. MacIntyre is right in his focus on the social aspects of morality, but obscurants the personal aspects that are nonetheless important. 280 281 General Conclusion In this dissertation, I investigated business studies in the Netherlands. The academic literature on business studies raises doubts about the ability of students to reflect meaningfully on the role of business in society (cf. Chapter 2). This gives cause for concern, given the many business-related challenges our society faces. Scholarship on business studies usually lacks a substantiated normative framework from which to propose improvements. In this study, I have presented a moral ethological analysis of business schools, which – as I hope to have demonstrated – provides such a framework by focusing on the shared dispositions and ways of relating to the world (which I call ‘ethos’) both implicitly and explicitly conveyed to business students. Inspired by the work of Aristotle, I distinguish between four aspects of ethos (cf. Chapter 1): (1) An ethos encompasses – to name but a few fields - economic, societal, professional and, most importantly, ethical values. (2) The notion ethos can be used in an ethical manner in the sense that it describes how people understand ‘the good life’. Most ethicists focus on the question of ‘the right’ way and generally presuppose an individualistic-liberal perspective on society. An ethos, however, is both determined by the ‘goods’ that people, possibly implicitly and intuitively, aspire to in the way they relate to the world and how a community organizes its activities so as to realize these goods. (3) People share an ethos, although it cannot exist without individuals participating in it. In fact, I have argued it is important for an ethos to empower individuals in the way they relate to the world in a constructive way. (4) The practical side of life – rituals, rules, systems, etc. – codetermine the context in which an ethos and its goods exist. This specific context is related to the earthly locality, regionality and nationality of people. To really understand the content of the different types of current businessstudent ethos, I used a qualitative sociological research methodology called Q-research, the results of which I interpreted from a moral ethological standpoint (cf. Chapter 3). The Q-research-results are based on an explorative research of 43 participants at three universities. Prior to doing so, I conducted interviews with 20 other people, mainly students, as well as professors and educational staff, about their experiences in business school, as well as their views and perceptions of their study, business, and the economy. I used Q-research to analyze the different ways in which business schools can function as the ‘nurseries’ of our economy, that is, to identify ways in which their students view and relate to the world. This Q-research revealed that there is not ‘one way’ to proceed through the curricula. In fact, there are five 282 types of ethos, which symbolize ideal-types, on which participants load in a factor analysis: A. Ambitious Do-Good Managers. Students who have this ethos are relatively principled in ethical issues, socially responsible, and do not aim only at money-making. B. Market-Managers. Students who have this ethos are ahead of the competition, profit-orientated, non-social, and less principled in moral issues (this ethos is the opposite of A). C. Searching-Managers (this ethos is the ‘light’ version of A). D. Balancing-Managers (this ethos aims at combining A and B). E. Radical Market-Manager (this ethos is an amplification of B). The results show that A and B are the most common types. In addition, C, D and E are clearly variants of A and B. Therefore, one could also say that this Q-research reveals there are roughly two type of business students – the Socials (Ethos A, C, D) and the Marketers (Ethos B, E). Based on the explorative nature of this study, we cannot conclude much about the exact ratio between the different types of ethos. While it would be interesting to know this ratio between the types of ethos, the Q-research undertaken has at least revealed the possible types of ethos and it is unlikely that new research would identify new types. Furthermore, the students in this research study at business schools which display a relatively strong societal identity. Hence, I expect that my analysis of the problematic centrality of managerial and market values (see below) in all types of ethos, will be even more relevant in the context of business schools in Rotterdam and Groningen, for these have a less socially-engaged public image than Wageningen, Amsterdam and Nijmegen. I nonetheless encourage further empirical research – especially using quantitative methodologies – to help test and corroborate this research. Such research would offer a more fine-grained perspective. Another empirical route to corroborating this research, could be a (Q-)research among stakeholders; a systematic review of the vision of teachers, parents, future employees, and alumni would certainly improve our understanding of the business student ethos (cf. Chapter 1.3). The empirical results also revealed that there are general characteristics that most business students – covering all types of ethos – recognize as typical of their ethos: being ambitious, having an overview of the business, getting things done in terms of ‘tasks’, being a problem-solver, making things more efficient, and being communicative and cooperative. I raised the question of 283 whether students, despite this rather pragmatic orientation, can still reflect on the moral dimension of their actions. Even for students who conform to ethos A – The-Ambitious-Do-Good-Managers – I doubt whether they have enough argumentative and habitual, behavioral power to make a case against, for instance, a profitable investment that is morally questionable. Business students learn to think in terms of efficiency (the means) without much evaluation of the various consequences of activities (the ends). Even so, moral ethology is about much more than this economics/ethics tension. It is also about the extent to which students are sensitive to specific contexts, within the ambiance of Dutch society and its work traditions. I argued on the basis of the Q-results that business students often lack sufficient sensitivity. Or, to put it the other way around, they are relatively unaware of the normativity in their own mind-set, seriously risking an unreceptive ethos regarding the work and visions of other people in teams and companies. This situation is at odds with the content of courses in social corporate responsibility and ethics that aim to inculcate an ethical and social frame of mind. I draw the conclusion that business schools need to become aware of the continuing dominance of economic and managerial values at the core of their study programs. This research shows that students are relatively untrained in balancing such values as efficiency, money-making, market-shares, and those we associate with the common good, such as paying taxes, personal integrity, practical wisdom and dealing honestly and fairly with disagreement. The inconsistency in the different types of business ethos is precisely that there is a lack of consensus as to what integrates the mind-set of a business student and hence future business person. This is not only about knowledge, but also about skills and identity. It is indeed about ethos. So far, it seems that business schools have tried to address these issues by providing business ethics and social corporate responsibility courses. The problem is that these are rather isolated from the rest of the curriculum. Business schools should increase their cultivation of the ideas and concepts that simultaneously link the courses and the often conflicting values. I deliberately use the word ‘simultaneously’ because I did not argue against profits, market-share, hierarchy, or any of those corporate aspects of business. However, I opposed a view in which those corporate aspects are all too often isolated from ethics and the common good, and the notion that a few courses in ethics and social corporate responsibility can bridge the gap. I argue for a more integrated view. A more substantial and interdisciplinary course in philosophy of morals and economy could form a cornerstone of business curricula and attract the attention of ethics within the other courses that together form these curricula. 284 To better the current situation, we must also understand how it came about. In Chapter 4, I placed the current situation, as presented in Chapter 3, in a historical context and traced the origins of business schools to the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when large corporations started to arise. The earliest business schools provided larger corporations with skilled managers and an academic vindication of the role of business in society. I described how business studies have changed since then: (1) they loosened their connection to the practices of work, (2) distanced themselves from society and (3) embraced shareholder and consumer thinking. I argued that this threefold development is part of the replacement of the Rhinelandic model with the Anglo-Saxon model in Dutch business schools. The key differences between these two cultural models of the economy lie in (1) ownership and finance, (2) the internal governance of firms, (3) the type of skills and the educational system. I then interpreted the attention paid by business education to financial markets, management as a separate role (instead of a mere task), and the loosened relationship between education and real-world business, as following an Anglo-Saxon pattern. However, I also argued that clear elements of the Rhinelandic model remain, such as the high value placed on communication and consensus in the Dutch economy and among business students (cf. Chapter 4.6). Another aspect is that business schools are state-financed in the Netherlands and therefore supposed to serve the public interest at least partly, not only educating business people but also ethical and informed citizens (cf. Chapter 2). I argued that alongside the adoption of Anglo-Saxon motives, certain aspects of the broader societal development of modernization involving rationalization, bureaucratization, and the development of a new (abstract) ethics (cf. Chapter 5.1), can also help us understand the current situation. It is typically modern and regarded as ‘scientific’ to think that universities should focus on value-free theories and discard morality as subjective. Even if officially, business studies are involved in this modern idea of an objective and theoretical approach to business, students still develop an ethos. They learn to appreciate things, relate to the world, speak about it in a certain way. Seen in the historical context I have just outlined, this ethos appears to be the product of a typically modern detached or decontextualized understanding of the functioning of business (cf. Chapter 5.2, 5.5). Students learn to focus on large corporations in which managers set tasks for others in a communicative manner. The abstractness of business administration as a science – the focus on numbers, data-sets, and abstract theory – has distanced its students from the work places, specific occupations, and industries. Rather than 285 encouraging students to aspire to gain knowledge of and insight into a certain industry, business studies teach them to focus on general processes, conveying a ‘spread-sheet mentality’. With this mentality, workers are at risk of becoming mere ‘human resource’, and the knowledge required to enforce broader ‘standards of excellence’ is replaced with abstract models that focus on efficiency and effectivity. Indeed, in finance specializations, students still all too often learn to ignore the people-side of business altogether. The focus on so-called value-free science seriously risks turning out to be a disembedded and even dehumanized perspective of business and management. This problem also pertains to modern theoretical ethics, which is also overly abstract, with a focus on humans qua individuals (‘moral agents’), instead of addressing the embeddedness of people in relations, institutions, markets and nation states (cf. Chapter 5.3). In the context of modernization, the focus of ethics on notions of the ‘good life’ has been replaced by a procedural analysis about what every individual deserves to have and on what principles a just society should be based. Due to its abstractness, this kind of ethics can relatively easily be instrumentalized for the purposes of a manager or business in general. An ethical code can easily be integrated into a business mind-set in which it is simply one of the boxes to check-off. This sheds light on the awkward reality that most graduates who worked in the pre-financial crisis economy most probably (at least vaguely) knew the (textbook variants of the) ethical thinking of philosophers like Kant and Mill. These widely-taught theories apparently did not help to make ‘financials’ more self-critical and socially aware. Seen from the moral ethological framework developed in this research, this is not surprising. For the ethos of a person is not only a matter of subtle arguments about one’s rights, duties, capabilities, and principles, but also a matter of how people have learned to relate to the world, what matters to them, how they have learned to deliberate on realistic dilemma situations, and so on. I do not doubt the worth of ethical deliberation with the use of utilitarian and deontological principles, but the issue is how to train such a deliberation and its application to serious real-world situations. I argue for a more practice-oriented view of ethics, parallel to ethics in the care sector, law, and so on (cf. Chapter 1). The scope of moral ethological analysis is broader than conventional ethics though. It is also about the application of abstract mathematical reasoning, strategy concepts and consultancy tools. The abstract, formalistic approaches seriously risk reducing management to a tool for attaining quantifiable output, preferably expressed in profit (cf. Chapter 5.2). At the same time, both the secondary literature and the Q-research show that students are relatively naive in their judgments about when to use which model. Students lack meta- 286 knowledge, an epistemology for business thinking, which would help them to determine when to correctly apply a certain theory or skill, be it Agency Theory in finance, BCG-Matrix in strategy, or deontology in ethics. In other words, they would benefit from more training in plural types of knowledge – analytical thinking, practical moral deliberation, meta-knowledge – as a part of their business-judgment capabilities. A new business student ethos, however, cannot be just about a certain understanding of ethics or science. The moral ethology I develop is also about understanding the specific context in which business students will work. After having analyzed modernization as the broader societal context, I therefore explored the role of management within businesses that operate in particular markets. In my Q-research, I found that business studies do not convey a clear idea of what a firm really is, how it functions in markets, and what role managers play in this economic architecture. There are students who offer a ‘thick’ description in which business is a mechanism of society. Others favor a ‘thin’ market definition in which the sole purpose of business is making money, possibly commodifying social wealth. Yet, even those students who adhere to a thick social description of a business seem ill-equipped to articulate the ‘market forces’ that implicitly force corporations to pursue profit through growth. I do not argue for just one business goal, but for a cultivated discussion about what the ends of business are in business schools. That is not to say that this topic and discussion does not appear in curricula, but from an ethological standpoint, we must conclude that the ability to reflect on this theme is not satisfactory and does not become part of the way business students ‘see’ business and the economy and how they ‘relate’ to it. This omission is a missed opportunity and part of large socio-economic problem: We need more public reasoning on the role played by business in today’s challenges – such as, financialization, marketization, managerialism, and the ecological crisis (cf. Chapter 1.2) – all of which require us to rethink the purpose of our economy. We should teach business students to ask more and better questions about the purpose of organizations and the criteria of vindication they use in the continuation and growth of their activities. For instance, we could teach students to tackle the corporate image of the oilindustry (cf. Chapter 6.5). Is this really a business, or does it rely too heavily on the common good of clean environment, and scarce earthly resources to such an extent that this business should ‘give account’ of the way it actually blocks the realization of prosperity? Students are undereducated in this type of fundamental societal questions. 287 MacIntyre provides a conceptual framework which I adjusted and complemented to develop my own moral ethological perspective on management. Management is an important topic, since students identify with it strongly as a realistic future job. One could argue, like MacIntyre, that the fact that students seem to lack the tools to address fundamental societal questions is no coincidence, for they study to become managers and these ‘characters’ of modernity are ‘amoral technicians’. Although I argued that this depiction of management needs some adjustment, I did use it to identify problems in business studies and formulate an alternative moral ethological idea of business management. Here, I summarize his criticism (cf. Chapter 5.5), with my suggestions for improvement in italics: • MacIntyre argues that the objective knowledge which managers claim to employ does not exist. Therefore, their role as ‘science-driven experts’ is false. I argued that this is overly critical, although there is a strong need to raise awareness of what ‘science’ is and amounts to. Students would benefit from more knowledge of the reach and limits of models used in business schools. • MacIntyre argues managers focus solely on means. Ends and values are regarded personal and not relevant to the organization of society. Perhaps management sometimes entails nothing more than means-end thinking, but business schools should train purpose-thinking, ‘Why is a business doing what it does?’ • Managers do not follow a substantial idea of ‘the good life’. They are part of our emotivistic culture in which the realization and maximation of personal preferences is the only criterium for judging behavior. This individualistic perspective is itself part of a history (of ideas); students need an introduction to this history and to learn more about the common goods presupposed in our individual lives. In addition, they should be trained in personal ethical deliberation. • Managers are manipulative, because their faux-objectivity enables them to push their personal ends and values. Manipulation is a strong accusation, appropriate for signaling a danger, not an adequate total characterization of the business student ethos. We do need to train students to become aware of the normativity of their mindset. Relying on MacIntyre’s concepts of ‘internal goods’ and ‘external goods’, I proposed a vocabulary that helps to articulate the purpose of firms. External goods, in MacIntyre’s interpretation, are goods people strive for, like money, 288 fame and power. These are goods for which the practice may be instrumental, but they are not definitive for the practice. Internal goods always characterize a practice; goods that are intrinsic to the practice, such as that of science or sports. When people cooperate towards a shared goal – irrespective whether this results in gaining external goods like money – they bring forth internal goods by following shared ‘standards of excellence’. In my (adjusted) MacIntyrean perspective, business serves customers to make profit, but at the same time it focuses on meeting those standards of excellence. This integrative definition of a firm – as an institution based on practices – allows us to see the firm as an ‘end’. Managing a company – not only making it profitable but also excellent in this sense – requires a manager to observe, and to a certain extent internalize the standards of excellence. This in turn presupposes a knowledge of specific occupations and industries. One could argue that this MacIntyreinformed argument brings us from the consumer to the producer-craftsmen perspective on work. At the same time, one cannot ask these students to specialize up to the level of being experts whom we regularly associate with practices, such as logistic experts, scientist, ICT-specialists, and so on. I propose that the following sources can nevertheless make them capable and more sensitive in that regard: more case-studies focusing on business at the level of practices, more investigative business journalism, more general knowledge about sectors of the economy (far beyond the focus on consultancy and finance, for instance, food, ICT, gastronomy, and so on) and knowledge of certain production chains and technologies. Implementing these worldly and practical sources requires business faculties to hire practically-experienced business professors, arrange internships, encourage students to study societal and ethical debates in business newspapers, intensify case-study research, promote working at start-ups, and offer industry-specific minors. Importantly, such a practical reorientation of business studies would enrich the ethos of students in a pragmatic and moral sense. There is morality in every workplace and occupation and students should get accustomed to this dimension and develop some sensitivity to it. In the academic context, students should receive encouragement to articulate what they have experienced first-hand and learn how to systematically reflect on it. Teachers need to challenge students to understand the mores of workplaces or the lack thereof. An important focus in such lectures could very well be the difference between an amoral and moral work perspective. There is little reason to think working people have a ‘greed is good’ mentality, and ignore ethics all together, but research reveals that moral neutralization is quite normal and 289 common (cf. Chapter 1.2). That is, people find it hard to follow their shared and personal moral ideas, and generally manage to ignore them in the context of business. Such moral neutralization and our (dis)agreement with it should be the subject of ethics courses. But beyond such courses, students need the raw-material from experience, cases, journalism, and so on, to work with realistic examples. One cultivates an ethos by training – facing reality, being involved in it – not by subjectively reflecting on what one happens to ‘think’ about a certain situation. I consider the Giving Voice to Values program (cf. Chapter 8.3, footnote 497) to be a great example in line with this proposal, and one that deserves further implementation. I propose to integrate the terminology developed here: balancing internal/external goods, the value of recognition in work, reflection on traditions of work and its mores. I also include knowledge and reflection on the difference between the profit goal and the societal purpose of firms within markets. Such concepts need to shape and test moral deliberation about concrete issues. As Aristotle convincingly argues (cf. Chapter 8), we need to train our actions: The courageous person becomes courageous by facing fear and hence fulfilling courageous actions. The business student increases his or her morality by exercising moral deliberation, especially in situations where an amoral approach seems acceptable or has become normal. On the base of Hegel, I argued in favor of a broader understanding of free markets than the currently dominant liberalist-business interpretation. The advantage of the theories of Hegel (over those of MacIntyre) is that they endorse the individualized society and at the same time, point towards the importance of culture, society, and its institutions. Hegel is a typical Rhinelandic author in his focus on the need to understand the market as a societal and institutionalized realm. Due to today’s rapidly unfolding processes of globalization and digitalization, the connection between the economy and state has become loose. This loosening confronts us with new moral dilemmas, like the loss of labor demand, the reality of unjust labor practices elsewhere, the exploitation of earthly resources, the global practices of taxavoidance, the growth of shareholder-driven corporations at the expense of social corporations, and so on. In the economistic idea of markets, states are infrastructural, or even constraints to economic prosperity. But ethologically speaking, markets are parts of societies and hence societal mechanisms that help people fulfil their notions of the good life. I argued (against MacIntyre) that markets bring prosperity and individual freedom and I also argued for an ethical perspective of ‘good’ markets. This enables us to see that markets do not always foster freedom and can also segregate society by exploiting the earth, 290 alienating managers from workers, eclipsing internal goods, undervaluing the importance of non-instrumental education, and so on. We do not lose individual freedom when we have the theoretical courage to face this shadow side of our economy, rather we lose an outdated concept of markets. However, more than MacIntyre realizes, market mechanisms – consumer satisfaction and management for profits – can also bring good things. With reference to the practices of medical care and science, I showed that practices risk being too introverted and thus placing themselves outside society (cf. Chapter 6.5). There is a parallel here with economic institutions without a sense of practice, which focus on customers and shareholders only. There is a tendency in practice-driven organizations to justify their right of existence in formal terms, like the ‘production’ of peer-reviewed papers in science or the number of medical treatments in health care. I argued that market mechanisms might well be able to help organizations aspire to realize ‘goods’. Therefore, it is reasonable to involve end-users (or: customers) in our public organizations, just as it is reasonable to ask citizens to be involved in choosing the criteria that scientists and care-professionals set themselves. The balanced view on practices and institutions – internal and external goods – also implies a certain view on the purpose of business in relation to society. Dutch business studies should educate students more about the specific contexts of the Dutch economy, its sectors, companies, localities, and so on. This is no workable argument against globalization, but against ignorantly echoing its dangers in courses of strategy, marketing, and business economics. Most students proceed to work in specific Dutch occupations, industries, and companies, most of are rather small, compared to the businesses referred to in case-studies. This also implies a different view of their future jobs; the current international-market-management focus conforms most to general management and CEO-like types of work, creating high and potentially hubristic expectations among business students. My emphasis on practices of business perhaps raises the question of how an academic business school differs from a hogeschool, a university for applied sciences. My short answer here is that academic education should pay much more attention to theory and especially social theory, in order to vindicate its academic substance and education role. Academic institutions should do more to prepare students to understand and add to the public reasoning on and organization of commerce in society. Business schools tend to think that analytical thinking is academic par excellence – logic, mathematics, statistics, finance – but it clearly needs to be supplemented with a good portion of social theory, i.e. with history, the history of ideas, social theory, and ethics. It 291 is possible to partly fill this gap by teaching ‘Grand Social Theory’, such as that of MacIntyre, which helps one to understand the way markets bring prosperity when they are an integral (not a separate) part of society. Despite this major difference in theoretical focus, I propose that business schools re-connect to real-world business and thus shift towards applied programs. Academic business schools have ‘scientized’ for understandable reasons, but the course of history has shown that their object of study requires less general and more context-dependent knowledge. In fact, it is part of scientific insight itself that there are more types of knowledge than strict analytical thinking, and that some subjects require different knowledgestrategies than other. The difference with hogescholen could be precisely to convey much awareness of these plural forms of knowledge. After analyzing managers, business, markets, and society, I elaborated on the ethos that would conform to my proposals about these issues (cf. Chapter 8). I reconstructed and applied the work of Aristotle to better understand how an ethos – a sustained disposition – functions and how different types of knowledge are part of it. Aristotle describes how people become accustomed to a certain ethos throughout their lives. Due to upbringing, education and the general culture, people learn to appreciate some things, while ignoring others; they learn to relate to the world in a specific way. This is not simply a matter of random habituation to ones’ environment, but of the meaningful fulfilment of one’s way-of-life. In a good life one fulfils one’s commitments and at the same time those of the common good. A good person recognizes the true character of situations. He or she is reflective about what to do in certain situations, in what proportion, for how long, and relating to which other goods. In other words, a good person is attentive to the contexts in which (s)he functions and to what happens there and what does not. Importantly, a good person does not make ‘decisions’ purely on the basis of ‘arguments’ but of judgments, based on experience, with the ‘right’ kind of feelings. As I argued, this Aristotelian insight is in line with recent psychological research on intuitive judgments, as opposed to strictly rational judgments (cf. Chapter 8.3). Aristotle distinguishes between different faculties of mind: (1) Scientific, objective knowledge (epistèmè) is concerned with context-independent knowledge, such as mathematics. (2) Craft (technè) deals with pragmatic and context-dependent knowledge. (3) Practical wisdom (phronèsis) is also directed towards certain contexts, but more value-laden. Where phronesis concerns action, technè concerns production. Many scholars of business (cf. Chapter 2), as well as MacIntyre, argue for a revival of practical wisdom (phronèsis). Indeed, this faculty of mind would help us understand how a good manager should 292 balance internal and external goods. However good this suggestion, I have doubts about MacIntyre’s aversion to (‘emotivistic/expressivist’) personal moral reflection and his idealization of shared (‘phronetic’) deliberation. That is why I developed a different understanding of moral deliberation with the help of Taylor (Chapter 8.3), which is more subjective than MacIntyre’s ideas, but nonetheless related to common goods. In addition, I developed an interpretation of practical understanding, which I situate somewhere between phronèsis and technè. Students need training in context-independent knowledge – analytical thinking – in the form of mathematics, statistics and to a high level in finance and economics. But this thinking is inadequate for understanding practices and their internal and external goods. With the notion of practical understanding, I offered a vindication for context-dependent knowledge (cf. Chapter 8.2). Practical understanding implies an observation of particularities, and mentorship relations, so as to raise one’s discretionary capacity or skillful thinking. One does not acquire this from textbooks alone, but through involvement in the social, practical, and psychological realities of work. The typical business student ethos should regard practical thinking on two levels: Management activities themselves are partly practical, and the activities of others with whom one works are usually also practical. It is wrong, but unfortunately rather likely – as the Q-research shows – that students think of the work of others as simply mechanical means-end thinking. Business studies needs a reappraisal of practical and of moral judgment and hence of character formation. This means that we should teach students to ask what they find important and to reflect on that. Such ‘strong evaluations’, as Taylor calls them, should enable students to articulate what ‘goals in themselves’ they find and to what extent these goals dovetail with the common good. We need to help students find inspiration for the development of their moral identity. ‘Bildung’ is the keyword here. With the help of culture – books, music, films – we get to know how other (generally fictional) people deal with the issues we experience ourselves. We train our moral selves by reading about, listening to, and looking at the lives of others. We do not simply have ‘evaluations’ about what we find important in life; we need to discover and reveal them by articulation. Identification with other people and their selfquestioning and sociological self-knowledge helps us to ‘cultivate’ our own identities. It might seem odd for a business student to follow this (humanistic) line of reasoning, but art often depicts topics from the field of the economy, work choice dilemmas, entrepreneurial failure and success, equality, and so on. There is a lot of low hanging fruit in the ‘business humanities’. 293 Another helpful source is the exchange of thoughts with fellow students: A university offers the ‘moral space’ for learning to practice forming judgments and discussing and resolving disagreement. The different types of ethos signaled in business studies chafe or collude with one another. Business values like growth, efficiency, effectivity, and market share, may conflict with those of sustainability, tax-duty, solidarity. It would be a major improvement if students were to learn to test and discuss the conflicts inherent to their ethos and that of others. Again, a film or a good book might help to bring this into the appropriate focus during the discussion. Approaching the end of this research, I recall two challenges confronting today’s business schools: (1) I argued that they should develop plural forms of knowledge to a higher degree than currently. (2) The attractiveness of the market-logic. I argued that we need to balance market management with societal purposes, which also means that business studies should prepare for more than strictly business motives. These two challenges are related to a broader debate on the purpose of academia in general. (1) The undervaluation of different types of thinking – public reasoning as in newspapers, practical understanding as by artisans and moral deliberation as by ethicists – is also related to the different visions that teachers have relating to the university. Positivism and behaviorism have lost much of their attractiveness, but nonetheless, many conceive of business ‘science’ as an abstract, impractical way of reasoning, exercised and tested within the format of scientific publications. But this research (cf. sections 4.1-4.3) demonstrates that business schools originated as professional schools and only later, in the post-WWII period, exchanged practical-societal thinking for formal methodologies. This history of business schools is itself part of the broader history of universities, in which a value-neutral theory is highly acclaimed. This also explains why business schools shy away from articulating implicit values, let alone taking the next step in cultivating normative aspects of business education. Meanwhile, the debate on the role of universities, which questions this strict scientific ambition, continues. There are (counter) voices that say academia in general should relate more to the concrete practices and wishes of citizens (cf. Chapter 6.5). The dominant discourse is nonetheless a vision of academia that privileges international theoretical discussion among peers over public reason and professional reason. One effect of this discourse is that business teachers risk specializing to the level at which they have little general and practical knowledge of business, organizations, work cultures, innovation, and so on. The question is really whether this ‘scientization’ is worth the loss of real-worldliness of business schools. 294 This is also a university policy issue. In terms of research and education organization, business faculties liken themselves to general social studies, such as sociology and economics, not (or to a lesser degree) with professional studies, such as law, medicine, dentist, divinity. There is a specialization culture in those latter studies too, but due their orientation towards certain work fields, analytical thinking mostly coexists with other types of knowledge. I propose that business schools look outside the box to those faculties to ‘professionalize’. At the same time, I realize that business work does not require professional education in the same manner as a doctor. Business education lacks the coherent tool-box of the professional academic studies and, perhaps more importantly, business schools have no field-monopoly in supplying managers and consultants. Nonetheless, I suggest that business schools plot themselves on the axes of professional schools and scientific studies, instead of ambitiously pretending to be scientific only. Now this is not only a matter of educational policy and the vision of teachers, but also concerns the visions of students. In fact, I propose to involve students in the positions in this debate on the question ‘What is the university for?’ and already train them in the notion that there are various legitimate answers. The Q-research suggests that students themselves would prefer a more practical side to their business education; and quite a few wish to have more courses in ethics as well. In any case, I believe that such a discussion itself – on the purpose of academia and business studies in particular – already brings us to the intellectual domain of public reason and the training of meta-knowledge, i.e. when to apply which type of reason. The question ‘What is the purpose of my academic study?’ is part of a training in what I refer to above as social theory. (2) However, a large group of students has difficulties understanding the value of education, other than preparing for a managerial job, and the curricula tend to support this market thinking. The premise of business schools is that students study the economic world of consumption, production, trade, and so on. Business students learn that the satisfaction of people’s wishes is desirable and they learn to analyze and answer these wishes with the help of theories and tools. The problem is that this object of study effects the ethos of business students; it affects their inner lives. Education plays an unsatisfactory role in discriminating and cultivating what goes on in students. We are hesitant to discriminate between the wishes, feelings and ideals students endorse. At the same time, we realize that our inner lives are subject to marketization. Perhaps we dislike evaluating our ‘needs’, but we also dislike it when companies exploit the same needs – be it the oil industry, social media, or food companies. 295 We are ambivalent about commerce, yet our programs in business studies under educate our students in this ambivalence. As academics we should ask ourselves whether this freedom-perspective on education really fosters free students, or leaves them ignorantly at the mercy and will of consumer society. Even the idea of education itself – of becoming an educated citizen; an intellectual – has lost ground in business schools and in the minds of students. The dominant shared ideal seems to be that students should be able to think scientifically and work as managers in an ever more globalizing economy. Business theories amplify this condition, due to the focus on satisfaction and the maximation of needs, rather than on the qualitative evaluation of and discrimination between these needs. Yet, a training in qualification and discrimination – in other words: Bildung or ‘formation’ – would be very logical if MacIntyre is right in his thesis that we live in individualistic and even emotivistic times, in which everybody eventually needs to decide for him or herself how to live a ‘good life’. Note that I emphasize the issue of economization slightly differently here: the point is not only that business schools study markets – and perhaps risk perceiving themselves more as a business than as a business school – but also that students risk acquiring a consumerist understanding of their study and their lives in general. They risk becoming ‘aesthetes’ in the MacIntyrean sense: representatives of the culture of emotivism/expressivism, in which they lack any other authority than following their own momentary needs. I say ‘risk’ because this is much more of a ‘market force’ than reality for many students, although a certain group of students (those with the Marketers Ethos) are overly vulnerable to it. Indeed, some students perceive studying in a consumerist manner – following lectures in a mindset of ‘I order, you deliver’. The market-oriented theories and tools support this, so that students perceiving themselves as ‘consumers of knowledge’ is no accident, but even rational. Importantly, the ‘individualistic bureaucratic’ organization of studies strengthens this ethos. That is, I am not only talking about theory and skills, but also about socialization within the walls of the institutions that universities truly are. Students learn to study bureaucratic-individualism and at the same time become accustomed to it; they learn to deal with abstract procedures, deadlines, anonymous teachers, digital check-in systems, minimal or absent of secretarial help, arbitrary grade requirements, and so on. As students, they learn how to flourish in a mass-organization in which few people know who they are, and where processes are standard, such as prefabricated bachelorthesis topics or grading scales. Universities invite students to ‘deal’ with the given mean-end-structure of university itself, which may mean: ‘manipulate’ 296 your way through the program, for instance by unjustly asking teachers for higher grades, making just-enough effort, etc. This research has shown that such a mentality does not apply all business students – but there is dominant ‘market force’ that attracts us all and in which comfort seems to be more important than curiosity. We need to cultivate our ethos is order to develop a subtle but compelling understanding of management, business, markets, and our own personal role in this world. Such an understanding requires different types of knowledge and a certain attitude. This is today’s challenge for business schools. I hope that the moral ethological vision of the past, present and future of business schools will help us all to master it. 297 Summary In this dissertation, I describe and evaluate the ethos of business students in the Netherlands. With the notion of ‘ethos’ I refer to a set of habits that have become part of our mentality and determine how we see the world, relate to it, and learn to speak about it. I dub the overall approach of this research a ‘moral ethology’. It begins with an investigation of the current business student ethos in the Netherlands, both from an empirical and a historical perspective. Subsequently, I show how focusing on ethos enables us to rethink the moral formation of business students. This research is interdisciplinary in nature and combines ethical-philosophical, sociological, educational, and historical lines of reasoning. Such an encompassing approach is in line with recent trends in applied ethics and social practice theory in general. Still, the focus on ‘ethos’ makes it relatively original. It requires us to be empirically informed and nonetheless enables normative conclusions, for instance, by showing the hiatus and contradictions within the current business student ethos and developing conceptual improvements that can help deal with these issues. The research is divided into three parts: Part I offers a description of the contested business school ethos. I use the adjective ‘contested’ because literature on business schools is critical of the functioning of business schools and the academic legitimacy of these institutions. My qualitative empirical investigation offers a more fine-grained picture than the literature, although the overall impression of business schools remains worrisome nonetheless. The main problem seems to be that business school graduates are not ready to face the challenges our economy is facing, such as financialization, managerialism and the infinite economic-growth ideal. Their ethos only prepares them to be as efficient and productive as possible. If students are to face the challenges our economy is facing, they should learn to fundamentally reflect on the economy and society. At the same time, business schools themselves are also part of the economy and society – with their focus on consumers, shareholder value, and so on – and we can only understand them if we analyze them considering this context. If we do so, we find that the current business student ethos is part of the larger history of modernity in which a certain understanding of market-economies and individual-abstract morality have become dominant. Part II sets out to describe this larger history that business schools belong to. In Part III, I turn from description to evaluation, as I analyze and amend the fundamental concepts of the business student ethos. This means developing a socially and morally adequate understanding of management, corporations, and markets, as well as developing ideas about what it would require instilling 298 in business students habits that correspond with these ideas. MacIntyre, Hegel and Aristotle are my main discussion partners here. In the remainder of this summary, I describe the content of these three parts more elaborately. Part 1: The contested business school ethos Chapter 2 takes inventory of the current state of the academic debate on business schools. The tenor is mainly critical, and scholars agree that most current business schools do not offer enough courses in the personal ethical direction to make a significant impact. There is, however, reason to be optimistic about the future: All discussed authors offer constructive ideas and suggestions for new directions for business schools. They argue, to mention two important examples, for a more differentiated concept of knowledge and teaching a business model that is less shareholder-focused. They also see potential for active identity-formation and envision universities ‘professionalizing’ business students by making them more ethically aware. Chapter 3 presents the results of a Q-study on the current business student ethos, encompassing 20 interviews and 43 Q-respondents at three Dutch universities. The Q-study identifies five types of ethos, grouped into two distinguishing main types of which the other three types of ethos are combinations or extremes. I named these main types the ethos of the DoGood Managers and that of the Market-Managers. Students who adhere to the ethos of the Do-Good Managers recognize the need for business values such as money-making and efficiency but are also aware of the function of business in society as a mechanism that enables us to work together to achieve shared goals. Students who adhere to the ethos of the Market-Managers, lack this societal awareness, and have a high appreciation for strict business values, such as profit and efficiency. The existence of the ethos of Market-Managers is odd, considering the amount of attention paid in programs of business studies to corporate social responsibility, social entrepreneurship, and business ethics – all subjects one would expect to teach the importance of the social responsibility and moral evaluation of business-decisions. This underscores insights from the secondary literature (cf. Chapter 2) that such fundamental courses are not enough to make an impact. They seem to be a rather isolated part of the curriculum that does not reach all students. However, regarding knowledge, the Q-study does not confirm the claim present in the secondary literature (cf. Chapter 2) that students have a onesided belief in scientific or academic business thinking and that they have little ethical awareness. I find that some do and some do not. Even so, the results are coherent with a subtler line of argument in this literature: that 299 business education, by assuming a value-neutral educational strategy, fails to acknowledge the fact that instillation of values takes place nonetheless. Regarding business, many students acquire a rich notion of business in which it is a function of society, yet many others commit to shareholder capitalism. Business schools do not address this issue; rather, they present the values inherent in business in an objectified way. The implicit message is that students themselves should choose which model they want to believe in, for teachers only introduce the ‘facts’ and the different and conflicting ways one can analyze them. The results of the Q-study seem to suggest that students, worryingly, are not taught how to properly make this kind of judgment. In fact, students seem largely unable to elaborate on their notion of business and remain unaware of the existing debate about business. Students lack a meta-perspective on business, thus even those students that prima facie engage in social and moral considerations in relation to business, find it hard to speak about work from a perspective beyond ‘profit’ or ‘do-as-asked’. The tool-box of business students is filled with tools for market-management – be efficient, get things done, make money, work in tasks, etc. – but offers few skills required for social and moral reflection and action. The study of business does not necessarily make students less social and moral, but it does not actively cultivate an overall ethical (or: professional) notion of management either. At the same time, business studies pay much attention to theories and models that are supposed to be value-neutral but are, in fact, normative. Students, for instance, learn to see themselves as managers in large corporations. This is not necessarily what teachers want them to think, but it is the hidden curriculum students pick up from textbooks, lectures, and the all-round experience of studying business (cf. Chapter 3, and 5.2). Students learn to identify with managerial positions that see the ‘bigger picture’ in the form of balance sheets. They learn to perceive themselves as problem-solvers that get things done and help define tasks for others. The literature on business studies suggests a strong hierarchal and financial mind-set but the Q-research – in contrast – suggests a fundamental interest in communication and the vision of other people. This is good news, for it makes students more attentive than much theory suggests, but I do note that we need to shape and cultivate communication, for instance, on topics such as disagreement, the meaningfulness and ‘internal goods’ of work, to which I return below. Another normative aspect of the business student ethos is that corporations and markets are perceived in a neutral way, which makes it hard for students to understand the shadow sides of our economy – such as managerialism, financialization and ecological problems – and find inspiration, knowledge, and tools to improve this situation. 300 Chapter 3 concludes the first line of thought: The Q-research offers a clear idea of the various types of business school ethos identified. Its results are compared to the secondary literature. The inconsistencies and lacunas in the current Dutch business school ethos are articulated. Part II addresses the history and cultural background of these schools. Part 2: Origins of the contested business school ethos Chapter 4 offers a historical analysis of business schools. I distinguish three phases in this history. (1) The practical and engaged ethos, 1900-1960. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, schools began to adopt a vocational and practical focus. Until the late 1960-1970s, these studies not only aimed to imbue their students with a set of academic theories, they also hoped to teach skills and to instill in them a sense of duty-bound artisanship. This changed, however, not only in the Netherlands, but world-wide: (2) The scientific ethos, 1960-1990. Business studies reoriented towards a strictly scientific self-understanding. Management lost its professional identity. Its focus became self-referential: business was good for business, and its relation to the outer-world became secondary and, in the case of some sectors, such as finance, petrol-industry, and food, almost non-existent. Universities mirrored and indirectly legitimized this development in business. (3) The money and consumer ethos, 1990-present. Eventually, business schools entered a phase in which the consumer and especially the shareholder became focal interests in curricula. Science was still important, as was the idea of creating future professional managers, but money became the central point of interest. How can we interpret this development? Locke (1989) emphasizes the loosening of theory from real-world business and Khurana (2007) emphasizes the loosening between market thinking and societal engagement. Both interpretations are convincing and I add a third dimension, namely the replacement of Rhinelandic with Anglo-Saxon thinking in business schools. With this historical development in mind, we can identify some traditional motives in the current business student ethos. The self-perception of students as future managers is an old idea. In fact, it is more compatible with early business thinking than with the current literature. Today, the focus of business studies is more on markets and finance, and less on bureaucratic organization. Still, students apparently remain attracted to the archetypical type of job we call management (or the flexible variant, consultancy). The focus on science and therewith the premium on rigor rather than relevance is an invention that came after the 1960s but is already visible in the work of Fredrick Taylor. Thus, the one-sided focus on science is less innovative than one might 301 expect, whereas the current call for more plural forms of knowledge by business scholars is. This call also brings us back to the beginnings of business schools, in which there was more academic plurality. To make such a (re)turn in the current business school environment would also mean the (re)discovery of some business authors, such as Henri Fayol, who might replace Taylor in the canon, as well as a further development of certain tools, such as SWOT, which might complete strictly analytic thinking to a much higher degree than is currently the case. Chapter 5 presents an interpretation of the changing business schools ethos against the background of the process of modernization. The analysis of MacIntyre is leading in this interpretation. His work helps analyze the relation between modern science, modern ethics, and the rise of the culture of ‘bureaucratic individualism’. I demonstrate that the problems business schools face can be understood as examples of the issues MacIntyre identifies in modernity, especially the role of rationalization and marketization and the inability to integrate ethics into these two major forces in modern society. Business schools reflect the process of modernization in the presumption that the world of business can be studied and organized in a decontextualized manner, without knowledge of its specific domains, with a distanced, balance-sheet perspective on people. This strategy of abstraction is mirrored in the history of ethics that also became segregated from the values of society and narrowly focused on abstract individuals instead of the mores of occupations. MacIntyre argues convincingly that management has received much élan in our modern-emotivistic society; it is by far the biggest study program in the Netherlands. Following MacIntyre, it is no coincidence that it is typical for the Dutch business student ethos to mainly consider managerial or consultancy work as work. Artisanship and entrepreneurship are less en vogue with business students than bureaucratic functions in large-scale corporations such as KPMG or Unilever. MacIntyre also argues that managers embody the scientific ambition of a value-free morality. We already concluded that implicit values are prevalent in the business student ethos and MacIntyre helps articulate them. He shows that we risk perceiving management as an amoral, technical job. I nuance this depiction of management, although it does prove to be a heuristic perspective that helps articulate what is necessary for developing an ethical understanding of management. Chapter 5, the second circle of argumentation closes. It has become clear that the problems in the business school ethos are related to a specific and contested history of modernization. From a moral ethological framework, I stipulate an alternative route to articulate elementary concepts of business education in Part III. 302 Part 3: Towards an enriched business school ethos The third and final part offers further scrutiny of questions I regard as fundamental to the business student ethos: What is the purpose of business? How is business related to society and the government? These two questions – regarding business and its relation to society – bring forth a third ethological question: (3) How can we develop a good and knowledgeable personal ethos? The arguments take the shape of a discussion with some classic authors in business ethics and philosophy in general. Chapter 6 reconstructs and adjusts the alternative framework MacIntyre offers to understand corporations as embedded in the larger contexts of what he calls ‘practices’. This framework helps identify corporations in an ethical way and offers a different idea of management in terms of balancing internal and external goods. MacIntyre’s concept of ‘practice’ enables us to have a professional understanding of work and business, but it also has disadvantages. Macintyre is overly critical of the effects of marketization. In the work of MacIntyre, (1) institutions in general are only a ‘necessary evil’ in structuring society. Moreover, (2) the value of individual deliberation is eclipsed by his emphasis on community over individual life. Chapter 7 turns to Hegel to develop a line of argument that goes beyond the restrictions of MacIntyre’s argument. Hegel offers a fundamental understanding of the relation between individuals in terms of reciprocal ‘recognition’. This perspective helps us come to an ethological understanding of both society and economy. Furthermore, Hegel helps analyze the market as the domain in which modern individuals can realize the good life. Business students seem to presume a market-view of the economy and society at large, but Hegel helps to alternatively see the market embedded in mores and society, within the confines of the state. In this view, markets are mechanisms that help realize the good life (which is at odds with MacIntyre’s ideas, which idealize pre-market communities) and it is also at odds with a thin ‘freedom’ perspective in which markets are a priori understood as fostering individual freedom, which is not always the case. Moreover, Hegel helps address the need for a general state perspective on the role of academic (business) education as an alternative to the current market perspective, in which we risk seeing students as consumers of knowledge, instead of people becoming educated citizens that learn to understand the common good prevalent in our institutions and economy. Chapter 8 focuses on the personal side of the business student ethos and asks what kind of knowledge business students should cultivate. It commences with a reconstruction of ethos in the works of Aristotle. He emphasizes the need for moral identity formation and the role of practical wisdom. Chapter 8 continues with an analysis of practical knowledge and judgment with 303 the help of, among others, Polanyi, Schön and Heidegger. It closes with an elaboration on moral formation – or: Bildung – with reference to the work of Taylor, Frankfurt, and Nussbaum. Taken together, these parts of Chapter 8 offer a broader understanding of what moral, discretionary and phronetic judgments mean and therewith contribute to a broader understanding of knowledge for an alternative business student ethos. With this line of thought, we have developed a more constructive understanding of intuitive personal ethical judgment than MacIntyre is able to. At the end of Part III, the third circle closes: the concept of ethos is fleshed out and applied to relevant concepts for business studies. In a concluding section, the overall argument is recapitulated and concretized. I present some building blocks for an alternative blueprint for business school education in the Netherlands: • Relate business education to specific business domains. Business schools need to realign with concrete domains of production, consumption, and trade. Much of the real-world of business – its traditions, sectors, histories, and current dilemmas – is represented poorly in current curricula. This omission is the result of the undervaluation of plural forms of knowledge in business schools and overvaluation of (a specifically modern, decontextualized form of ) science. • Develop an idea of professional managerial judgment. I recommend there be more attention for the cultivation of typical ways in which a business graduate thinks and acts in business education. My suggestion is that this cultivation lies more in the tradition of applied models, such as BCG, SWOT, and case-studies, than in strictly scientific theories. If the idea of the typical business ethos – the way graduates think, relate to the world and themselves – is more cultivated, one could also expect business programs to gain consistency. Professional schools in law and medicine seem ahead in this regard and might be able to provide best practices. Although a business graduate is not a professional in the classic sense, business schools should compare themselves more to those institutions than to, say, economics or sociology, as they do now. • Situate ethics in society and its history and practices. A student of business has to be able to think ethically – in a constructive way – about consumption, work, and the economy at large. Modern (analytic) ethics focuses on abstraction and individuals and could find much more relevance in practices of the realworld, analogue to care ethics. The problem with the (continental) tradition, which I consider MacIntyre to be part of, is that it tends to be overly critical regarding business. We are in need of new approaches in ethical reasoning 304 and I think applied models – such as Giving Voice to Values – are promising. In such models, the focus should not only be on what we think is morally good, but also on rationalizations that legitimize amoral behavior. Such models can be enriched with other philosophical concepts developed in this research, such as ‘internal/external goods’, ‘recognition’, ‘market-state-nexus’ and ‘practical thinking’. • Balance Anglo-Saxon and Rhinelandic business ideas. This research signals a large enthusiasm for Anglo-Saxon business theory and models, without consideration of the overall context of the Anglo-Saxon world. This leads to a situation in which students are insufficiently equipped to deal with the context and values of the economic reality in which they will come to work after graduation. Especially regarding marketization, financial markets and the role of management, the Rhinelandic model could make business schools more down-to-earth. 305 Appendix: Q-Statements A B C D E (factors, interpreted as ethos) 1 Just like doctors and lawyers, managers should make a moral oath. 1 -3 -2 -1 -2 2 I expect to supervise/manage over 10 people or more within a few years after graduating. 1 1 0 0 3 3 For me, it is of high importance that I contribute to society with my work. 4 -1 0 1 -1 4 In my work, I want to get a promotion, grow, and move to better positions. 3 3 1 3 4 5 For me, work enables me to live my life and I take my parents careers as an example. 0 0 0 -2 1 6 Graduates in business studies know right from wrong and don’t need laws and regulations as an assistance. -4 0 -4 -3 -3 7 Nice colleagues are more important to me than the contents of my job. 0 -2 0 -1 0 8 In my work I want to help others with their personal development. 4 0 1 3 3 9 Managers tend to place their own interests above those of customers or society. 1 -2 3 2 0 10 For a successful career, it is important to do what your employer asks you to do. -1 -1 -3 -4 -3 11 I my work, I am prepared to be harsh and I see myself firing others, even if there is no immediate cause. -2 0 -1 -3 -1 12 I find it important to add value with my work, but what kind of value exactly, I find difficult to say. 0 -2 4 1 2 13 Whether people are successful or not depends on their personal effort. 2 2 2 4 2 14 Trusting each other is a good thing. As a manager, however, you are a kind of inspector. -2 -1 -1 -1 -3 15 I often speak to fellow students about the low level of my studies. Many of them recognize my doubts. -3 -4 0 -2 -4 16 If an instruction of my employer conflicts with my conscience, I will not carry it out. 3 0 0 2 -2 17 Society is a battle, survival of the fittest, and it is your task to survive. 1 -1 1 0 1 18 The world changes rapidly. A business student adapts well and helps others to change. 2 0 2 1 -1 19 Philosophy and ethics have little added value within the curriculum of business studies. -3 -3 -3 -2 -1 20 Sometimes you have to do unethical things for a client. If you don’t do it, a competitor will. -4 -3 -1 -4 0 21 Difficult debates are often decided by shareholders. He who pays the piper calls the tune. -1 1 -1 0 0 22 A manager makes decisions, that’s his job. 0 1 0 0 0 306 23 A business man should be loyal towards clients, not towards society. -2 2 -3 -1 1 24 The market determines the decisions of managers. You should never underestimate the competition. 1 4 2 0 2 25 As a businessman it is my order to make sure others do what they are supposed to do, it’s a kind of taskmanagement. 0 1 -2 -2 1 26 As a businessperson I see it as my duty to watch over the pennies. 1 1 -2 -1 0 27 I have learned to solve problems. Others come with problems and I will help to solve them. 2 3 1 2 0 28 Efficiency (making things smarter and cheaper) is a core-value in business studies. 0 3 2 3 1 29 The mission of a company is important. But eventually it is, of course, about the money. -2 3 3 -1 -1 30 I have a clear picture of what types of jobs I can get with these studies. 0 -1 -3 0 -3 31 Honestly, I find business studies too easy. -1 -3 1 -3 -4 32 Leading means that the manager decides and that others have to follow. -3 0 -4 -3 -2 33 As long as it is legal, it is important to do what a client requires. -3 2 0 1 1 34 Working means doing tasks, this also applies to the manager himself. 1 0 2 3 3 35 There are places where you cannot work when you have done business studies. -1 -2 -2 1 -2 36 If you have done business studies, you typically oversee things. You can get the bigger picture of the company. 3 4 1 2 2 37 To be honest, I have no clear idea of the type of job I will do in a few years. -1 -2 3 0 2 38 I know how to deal with disagreement, but in the end, a manager is almost always right. -1 -1 -1 -2 -2 39 The ambition to do things for the lowest price often goes at the expense of good craftsmanship. 2 0 3 0 3 40 Skills in communication are crucial for business people. 3 2 4 4 4 41 I honestly don’t know what typical business thinking would be. -2 -4 0 -1 -1 42 I understand the need for having a scientific perspective on companies. The facts are important. -1 1 -1 1 -1 43 There are several companies and lines of business that I really know. 0 1 -2 2 1 44 In a company you find creativity and craftmanship, as a business manager you can supervise this. 0 2 1 1 0 45 I’ve been trained to see moral dilemmas, for example, relating to money and power. 0 -1 -1 0 0 307 Literature Abernathy, William J., Robert Hayes, ‘Managing our Way to Economic Decline, in: Harvard Business Review, July-august 1980, pp. 67-77. Alajoutsijärvi, Kimmo, Katharina Juusola, Marjo Siltaoja, ‘The Legitimacy Paradox of Business Schools: Loosing by Gaining?’, in: Academy of Management Learning and Education, 2015, vol. 14, no.2, pp. 277-291. Albert, Michel, Capitalism vs. Capitalism. How America’s Obsession with Individual Achievement and Short-term Profit has led it to the Brink of Collapse, tr. Paul Haviland, Four Wall Eight Windows, New York, United States, 1993 (or. Capitalisme contre Capitalisme 1991). Alzola, Miguel, ‘The Empirics of Virtue: What Can Psychology Tell Us About Moral Character?’, in: in: Handbook of the Philosophical Foundations of Business Ethics, ed. C. Luetge, Springer, Dordrecht, the Netherlands, pp. 89-107. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, tr. W.D. Ross, Generic NL Freebook Publisher, 2000 Baalen, van, Management en Hoger Onderwijs. De Geschiedenis van het Academisch Managementonderwijs in Nederland. PhD, independently published, 1995. Baalen, van, Luchien Karsten, ‘The Social Shaping of the early Business Schools in the Netherlands. Professions and the power of abstraction’ in: Journal of Management History, vol. 16, no. 2, 2010, pp. 153-173. Baalen, van, Luchien Karsten ‘The Evolution of Management as an interdisciplinary field’, in: Journal of Management History, vol. 18, no2., 2012, pp. 219-237, p.229-230. Baardewijk, van, Jelle, ‘Gegoogle met studenten’, in: Onderwijs in Tijden van Digitalisering, eds. Ad Verbrugge, Jelle van Baardewijk, Uitgeverij Boom, Amsterdam, the Netherlands, 2017, pp. 281-301. Badaracco, Joseph, Defining Moments, Harvard Business School Press, Boston, United States, 1997. Badaracco, Joseph, ‘The discipline of building character’, in: Harvard Business Review, May 2009, pp. 115-124. Bakker, Sjoerd. From Luxury to Necessity. What the railways, electricity and automobile teach us about the IT revolution. Amsterdam, Boom Uitgeverij, Amsterdam, the Netherlands, 2017. Balstad Brewer, K, ‘Management as a Practice: A Response to Alasdair MacIntyre’, in: Journal of Business Ethics, 16, 1997, pp. 825-833. Barnard, Chester, The Functions of the Executive, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom, 1938. Baron R.S., Vandello, J.A., Brunsman, B., ‘The forgotten variable in conformity research: impact of task importance on social influence, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 71/5, 1996, pp. 915-27. Bauman, Zygmunt, Liquid Modernity, Polity Press, Cambridge United Kingdom, 2000. Bavel, van, Bas, The Invisible Hand? Oxford University Press, Oxford, London, 2016. Beabout, Gregory, ‘Management as a Domain-Relative Practice that Requires and Develops Practical Wisdom’, in: Business Ethics Quarterly, 22:2, 2012, pp. 405-432. Beabout, Gregory, The Character of the Manager. From Office Executive to Wise Steward. The Palgrave MacMillan, London, United Kingdom, 2013. Beadle, Ron, ‘Why business cannot be a practice’ in: Analyse & Kritik, Lucius & Lucius Stuttgart, 30/2008, pp. 229-241. 308 Beadle, Ron, ‘Review of Ethics in the Conflicts of Modernity: an essay on Desire, Practical Reasoning and Narrative, in: Journal of Business Ethics, 144, 2017, pp. 219-222. Beadle, Ron, Geoff Moore, ‘MacIntyre on Virtue and Organization’, in: Organization Studies, 27 (3), 2006, pp. 323-340. Beck, Ulrich, Wolfgang Bonss, Christoph Lau, ‘The Theory of Reflexive Modernization. Problematic, Hypothesis and Research Programme’, in Theory, Culture & Society vol. 20(2), pp. 1-33. Bemelmans-Videc, M.L., Economen in Overheidsdienst. Bijdragen van Nederlandse economen aan de vorming van sociaal-economisch beleid, independently published (accessible in Dutch libraries). Biesta, Gert, “Education, Accountability, and the Ethical Demand: can the Democratic Potential of Accountability be Regained?”, in: Educational Theory, vol. 54, no. 3, 2004, pp. 233-250. Biesta, Gert, The Beautiful Risk of Education, Paradigm Publishers, Boulder, United States, 2014. Blackledge, Paul, ‘Alasdair MacIntyre: Social Practices, Marxism and Ethical Anti-Capitalism’, in: Political Studies, 2009 vol. 57, pp. 866-884. Blasco, Maribel, ‘Aligning the hidden curriculum of management education with PRME: an inquiry based framework’, in: Journal of Management Education, 36(3) pp. 364-388. Blok, Jos, Herman Suichies, Thijs Jansen, Het Alternatief voor de Zorg. Humaniteit boven Bureaucratie. Uitgeverij Stichting Beroepseer, Culemborg, the Netherlands, 2016. Bloom, Allan, The Closing of the American Mind. Simon and Schuster, New York, United States, 1987. Boer, de, Karen, ‘De verwikkeling van markt en staat in het licht van Hegels Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts. In: Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor de Wijsbegeerte, jaargang 105, nr. 2, mei 2013, pp.70-87. Booth, William, ‘On the Idea of the Moral Economy’, in: American Political Science Review, vol. 88, no.3, sept. 1994, pp. 653-667. Bos, ten, René, ‘Purpose’, in: Handbook of the Philosophical Foundations of Business Ethics, ed. C. Luetge, Springer, Dordrecht, the Netherlands, 2013 pp.507-516. Bos, ten, René, Bureaucratie is een Inktvis, Uitgeverij Boom, Amsterdam, the Netherlands, 2015. Boyacigiller, Nakiye Avdan, Nancy A. Adler, ‘The Parochial Dinosaur: Organizational Science in a Global Context, in: Academy of Management Review, 1991, vol. 16, no. 2, pp. 262-290. Breen, Keith, ‘Work and Emancipatory Practice: Towards a Recovery of Human Beings’ Productive Capacities’, in: Res Republica, 13 4, 2007, pp. 381-414. Brink, van den, Gabriël, Moderniteit als Opgave. Een antwoord aan relativisme en conservatisme. Sun Amsterdam 2007, esp. pp. 21-60. Brink, van den, Gabriël, Moral Sentiments in Modern Society, Amsterdam University Press, Amsterdam, the Netherlands, 2016. Braun, V. and V. Clarke, ‘Using thematic analysis in psychology’, in: Qualitative Research in Psychology, 3(2), pp. 77-101, p. 10. Brown, Steven, Political Subjectivity: Application of Q-Methodology in Political Science, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1980. Brown, Steven, ‘A Primer on Q methodology’, in: Operant Subjectivity, 16, 1993, pp. 91-138. Bruni, Luigino, Robert Sugden, ‘Reclaiming Virtue Ethics for Economics’ in: Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 27, fall 2013, pp. 141-164. 309 Brunnermeier, Markus, ‘Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch 2007-2008’, in: Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 23, no. 1, Winter 2009, pp. 77-100. Chandler, Alfred, The Visible Hand. The Managerial Revolution in American Business. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, United States, and London, 1977. Cobben, Paul, ‘Hegel’s concept of education’, in: Institutions of Education. Then and Today. The Legacy of German Idealism, ed. Paul Cobben, Brill, Leiden, the Netherlands, 2010, pp. 65-82. Cobben, Paul, The Paradigm of Recognition. Freedom as Overcoming the Fear of Death, Critical Studies in German Idealism, Brill, Leiden, the Netherlands, 2012. Cobben, Paul, Value in Capitalist Society. Rethinking Marx’s Criticism of Capitalism, Critical Studies in German Idealism, no. 13, Brill, Leiden, the Netherlands, 2015. Cobben, Paul, ‘Der ontologische Status des Betrieb in den aktualisierten Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts’, in: Sozialontologie in der Perspective des Deutschen Idealismus, eds. Stephan Zimmerman, Christian Krijnen, De Gruyter, Berlin, Germany, 2018, pp. 141-159. Cobbenhagen, P. ‘Economische wetmatigheid, economische mogelijkheid en zedelijke eisen’ in: De Economist nr. 82 pp 3-19. Colander, David, ‘Integrating Sex and Drugs into the Principles Course: Market-Failures Versus Failures-of-Market Outcomes, in: Journal of Economic Education, Winter 2003, 34, 1 pp. 8291. Colby, A, T. Ehrlich, W. M. Sullivan, J.R. Dolle, Rethinking undergraduate business education. The Carnegie Foundation for Advancement of Teaching, Stanford, United States, 2011. Collini, Stefan, What are universities for? London, Penguin Books United Kingdom, 2012. Collini, Stefan, Speaking of Universities, London, United Kingdom, Verso, New York, United States, 2017. Cooke, Sandra, David Carr, ‘Virtue, practical wisdom and character in teaching’, British Journal of Educational Studies, vol. 62, no.2, June 2014, pp. 91-110. Cross, R.M., ‘Exploring attitudes: the case for Q methodology’, in: Health Education Research, vol.20, no.2, 2005, pp. 206-213. Cummings, Stephan, Todd Bridgman, ‘The Relevant Past: Why the History of Management Should Be Critical for Our Future’ in: Academy of Management Learning & Education, 2011, vol. 10, no. 1, pp. 77-93. Datar, Srikant M, David A. Garvin, Patrick G. Cullen, Rethinking the MBA. Business Education at a Crossroads, Harvard Business Press, Boston, United States, 2010. Davies, Richard, ‘After Higgins and Dunne: Imagining School Teaching as a Multi-Practice Activity’, in: Journal of Philosophy of Education, vol. 47, no.3, 2013, pp. 475-490. Dawson, David, Craig Bartholomew, ‘Virtues, Managers and Business People: Finding a Place for MacIntyre in a Business Context, in: Journal of Business Ethics, 48, 2003, pp.127-138. Dobson, Johan, ‘Utopia reconsidered: The Modern Firm as Institutional Ideal’, in: Philosophy of Management, 7 (1) 2008, pp. 77-92. Dobson, Johan, ‘Alasdair MacIntyre’s Aristotelian Business Ethics: A Critique’, in: Journal of Business Ethic, 2009, 86: pp. 43-50. Dolata, Ulrich, ‘Apple, Amazon, Facebook, Microsoft. Market Concentration – Competition – Innovation Strategies.’ SOI Discussion paper. University of Stuttgart. Download: http:// www.unistuttgart.de/soz/oi/publikationen/soi_2017_1_Dolata.Apple.Amazon.Google. Facebook.Microsoft.pdf Doorsman, Leen, Peter Jan Knegtmans, ‘Studium General: een mislukte doorbraak (1945-1960), in: Universiteit en Samenleving. Universitaire Vormingsidealen. Verloren B.V. 2006, pp. 55-68. 310 Donaldson, Thomas, James P. Walsh, ‘Three ethical roots of the economic crisis.’, in: Journal of Business Ethics, 106(1), 2012, 5–8. Donaldson, Thomas, ‘Toward a Theory of Business’, in: Research in Organizational Behavior, 35, 2015, pp. 181-207. Dryzek, J.S., J. Berejikian, ‘Reconstructive Democratic Theory’, in: American Political Science Review 87, 1993, pp. 48–88. Dworkin, Ronald, ‘liberalism’, in: ‘A matter of Principle’ (chapter eight), Oxford University Press, Oxford, United Kingdom, pp. 181-204. Dulk, Allard Den, Existentialist Engagement in Wallace, Eggers and Foer, Bloomsbury Academic, London, United Kingdom, 2014. Dunne, Joseph, ‘Alasdair MacIntyre on Education. In Dialogue with Joseph Dunne, in: Journal of Philosophy of Education, vol. 36, no. 1, 2002, pp. 1-19. Eeten, Michel J.G., ‘Recasting Intracable Policy Issues: The Wider Implications of The Netherlands Civil Aviation Controversy’, in: Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, vol. 20, no. 3, 2001, pp. 391-414. Engelen, Ewald, Ismail Ertürk, Julie Froud, Sukhdev Johal, Adam Leaver, Michal Moran, Adriana Nilsson, Karel Williams, After the Great Compliance. Financial Crisis and the Politics of Reform. Oxford University Press, Oxford, London, 2011. Enrich, David The Spider Network: the wild story of a math genius, a gang of backstabbing bankers, and one of the greatest scams in financial history, Harper Collins Publishers, New York, United States, 2017. Errington, Alison, David Bubna-Litic, ‘Management by Textbook: The Role of Textbooks in Developing Critical Thinking’, in: Journal of Management Education, 2015 vol. 39(6), pp. 774-800. Espeland, Wendy N., Michael Sauder, ‘Rankings and Reactivity. How Public Measures Recreate Social Worlds’, in: American Journal of Sociology, 113, 2007, no. 1, pp. 1-40. Evans, Joel M., Linda K. Trevińo, Gary R. Waver, ‘Who’s in the Ethics Driver’s Sea? Factors Influencing Ethics in the MBA Curriculum.’, in: Academy of Management Learning & Education, 2006, vol. 5, no. 3, pp. 278-293. Ewing, Jack Faster, Higher, Farther. The Volkswagen Scandal. W.W. Northon and Company Inc. 2017. Exel, Job van, G. de Graaf, ‘Q-Methodology: A sneak preview’, see: https://www.researchgate. net/publication/228574836_Q_Methodology_A_Sneak_Preview. Exel, Job van, G. de Graaf, W.B.F. Brouwer, ‘‘Everyone dies, so you might as well have fun!’ Attitudes of Dutch youths about their health life-style.’, in: Social Science and Medicine, 63, 2006, pp.2628-2639. Feltovich, Paul, J., Michael J. Prietula, K. Anders Ericsson, ‘Studies of Expertise from Psychological Perspectives’, in: The Cambridge Handbook of Expertise and Expert performance, eds. K. Anders Ericsson, Neil Charness, Paul, J. Feltovich, Robert J. Hoffman, Cambridge University Press. pp. 41-68. Ferguson, John, David Collison, David Power, Lorna Stevenson, ‘Accounting education, socialisation, and the ethics of business’ in: Business Ethics: A European Review, vol. 20, no. 1. Ferrero, I. & Sison, A.J., ‘A quantitative analysis of authors, schools and themes in virtue ethics in business ethics and management journals’ Business Ethics: A European Review, 23(4), 375-400. 311 Fineman, Stephen, Yianus Gabriel, ‘Paradigms of Organizations: an exploration in Textbook Rhetorics’, in: Organization, vol. 1(2), pp.375-399, 1994. Floyd, A. Larry, Feng Xu, Ryan Atkins, ‘Ethical Outcomes and Business Ethics: Toward Improving Business Ethics Education’, in Journal of Business Ethics, 2013, 117, pp. 753-776. Flyvbjerg, Bent, ‘Phronetic Planning Research: Theoretical and Methodological reflections.’ In: Planning Theory & Practice, vol. 5, no. 3, 2004, pp. 283-306. Flyvbjerg, Bent, ‘Five Misunderstandings About Case-Study Research’, in: Qualitative Inquiry, vol. 12, no. 2, April 2006, pp. 219-245. Frank, H. Robert, Thomas Gilovich, Dennis T. Regan, ‘Does Studying Economics Inhabit Cooperation?’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 7, no.2, 1993, pp. 159-171. Frankfurt, Harry G., The Importance of What We Care About, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United States, 1988. Frankfurt, Harry G., ‘Replies to…’, in: Contours of Agency. Essays on themes from Harry Frankfurt, The MIT Press. Cambridge, United States, 2002. Frankfurt, Harry G., The Reasons of Love, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2004. Freidson, Eliot, Professionalism. The Third Logic. Polity Press, New York, United States, 2001. Friedman, Milton, Capitalism and freedom, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, United States, 1962. Friedman, Milton, ‘The Social Responsibility of Business is to increase its profits’, in: The New York Times Magazine, Sep.13, 1970. Fournier and C. Grey, ‘At the Critical Moment: Conditions and Prospects for Critical Management Studies’, in: Human Relations, 53, 1, 2000, pp. 171-194, p.180. Fukuyama, Francis, The End of History and the Last Man, Penguin Books, London, United Kingdom, 1992. Fukuyama, Francis, Political Order and Political Decay. From the Industrial Revolution to the Globalisation of Democracy. Profile Books, London, United Kingdom, 2014. Gargalianou, Vasiliki, Diemo Urbig, Arjen van Witteloostuijn, ‘Cooperating or competing in three languages: Cultural accommodation or alienation?’, in: Cross-Cultural and Strategic Management, 24(1), 2017, pp. 167-191. Garcia-Ruiz, Pablo, Rodriguez-Lluesma, Carlos, ‘Consumption Practices: A Virtue Ethics Approach’, in: Business Ethics Quarterly, 24:4 2014, pp. 509-553. Geiger, Rolf Philipp Brüllmann, ed. Aristoteles Lexikon, Kröner Taschenausgabe (459), Stuttgart, Germany, 2005. George, David, ‘The Rhetoric of Economics Texts’, in: Journal of Economic Issue, vol. XXIV, no. 3, 1990, pp. 861-878. Goshal, Sumatra, ‘Bad Management Theories are Destroying Good Management Practices’, in: Academy of Management & Education, 2005, vol. 4 no. 1, pp. 75-91. Goshal, Sumatra & S. P. Moran, ‘Bad for Practice: A Critique of Transaction Cost Theory’, in: Academy of Management Review, Vol. 21, No.1, Jan 1996, pp. 13-47. Graaf, de, Gjalt, Tracible Morality. Customer Discourses of bankers, veterinarians and charity workers. ERIM Ph.D. Series Research in Management 31, 2003. Graaf, de, Gjalt, ‘Veterinarians’ discourses on animals and clients’, in: Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics, 18, 2005, pp. 557-578. Graaf, de, Gjalt, ‘Business Ethics and Discourse Theory, the Case of bankers’ Conceptualizations of Customers’, in: Journal of Business Ethics, vol. 31, no. 4, pp. 299-319. Graaf, de, Gjalt, Zeger van der Wel, On Value Differences Experienced by Sector Switches, in: Administration & Society, 2008, 40 79, pp. 79-103. 312 Graaf, de, Gjalt, ‘The Loyalties of Top Public Administrators’, in: Journal of Public Administration Theory and Research, 21, pp. p.285-306. Graafland, Johan J., Bert W. van de Ven, ‘The Credit Crisis and the Moral Responsibility of Professionals in Finance’, European Banking Center Discussion Paper N. 2011-012, pp. 1-19, p.7. Granick, David, The European Executive, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, United Kingdom, 1962. Grey, Christopher, ‘Management as a Technical Practice: Professionalization or Responsibilization.’ In: Systems Practice, Vol. 10, No. 6, 1997 Grey, Christopher, ‘We are all managers now’; ‘We always were’’: on the development and demise of management, Journal of Management Studies, 36:5 Sept. 1999, pp. 561-585. Grey, Christopher, ‘What are business schools for? On silence and voice in management education.’ In: Journal of Management Education, Oct. 2002; 26, pp. 496-511. Grey, Christopher, ‘Reinventing Business Schools. The Contribution of Critical Management Education.’, in: Academy of Management Learning & Education, 2004, vol. 3, no. 2, pp. 178186. Grey, Christopher, A Very Short, Fairly Interesting and Reasonably Cheap Book about Studying Organizations, Sage Publications, London, United Kingdom, 2012. Habermas, Jürgen Theory of Communicative Action. Vol. I. & II tr. Thomas A. McCarthy, Cambridge Polity Press 1984, Cambridge, United Kingdom, (or. Theorie des Kommunikativen Handelns. Suhrkamp 1981). Hall, Peter A., David Soskice, ‘An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism’, in: Varieties of Capitalism. The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage. ed. Peter A. Hall, David Soskice, Oxford University Press, Oxford, United Kingdom, pp. 1-68. Hartogh, Govert den, Frans Jacobs, Theo van Willigenburg, Wijsgerige Ethiek. Hoofdvragen, discussies en inzichten, Budel: Damon, Eindhoven, the Netherlands, 2013. Heath, Joseph, Morality, Competition and the Firm: The Market Failure Approach to Ethics. Oxford University Press 2017 Higgins, C. (2010) ‘Worlds of practice: MacIntyre’s challenge to applied ethics’, Journal of Philosophy of Education, 44 (2–3), 237–273 Hegel, Georg. W. F., Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, tr. T.M. Knox, Oxford University Press, 1942 (or. Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts oder Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft in Grundrisse, Suhrkamp 1986 [1821]), §260. Herzog, Liza, Inventing the Market: Smith, Hegel and Political Theory, Oxford University Press, Oxford, United Kingdom, 2013. Heidegger, Martin, ‘The Question Concerning Technology’, in: The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, tr. William Lovitt, New York. Harper and Row, 1977, pp. 3-35 (original stems from 1954; publication in Gesamtausgabe, book 7, Vorträge und Aufsätze. Frankfurt Klosterman, 2000). Hijmans, Ernst, Hoofdlijnen der Toegepaste Organisatie, Kluwer, Deventer, the Netherlands, 1949 Hijmans, Ernst, Zestig Jaar Organiseren, Nijgh & Van Ditmar, Rotterdam, the Netherlands, 1973 Hühn, Matthias, P. ‘Unenlightened Economism: The Antecedents of Bad Corporate Governance and Ethical Decline.’, in: Journal of Business Ethics, 2008, 81:823–835. Hühn, Matthias, P. ‘You reap what you sow: how MBA programs undermine ethics’, in: Journal of Business Ethics, June 2014, Volume 121, Issue 4, pp. 527-54. Hühn, Matthias, P. Inspectie van het Onderwijs. Ministerie van Onderwijs, Cultuur en Wetenschap, De Staat van het Onderwijs, 2017. 313 Jensen, Michael C., William H. Meckling, ‘The Nature of Man’, in: Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 1994, V.7, NO.2, pp. 4-19. Jensen, Michael C., William H. Meckling, ‘Theory of the firm: managerial behaviour, agency costs, and ownership structure’, in: Journal of Financial Economics, 1967, 3(4), 305-60. Jusola, Kateriina, Kertu Kettunen and Kimmo Alajoutsijärvi ‘Accelerating the Americanization of Management Education: Five Responses from Business Schools.’ In: Journal of Management Inquiry 2015, Vol. 24(4), 347-369. See especially: pp. 350-352, 356. Kaptein, Muel, Johan Wempe, The Balanced Company. A Theory of Corporate Integrity. Oxford University Press, Oxford, United Kingdom, 2002. Karsten, Luchien, and Kees van Veen, ‘From initiator to consumer: The changing role of the government in the field of Dutch management in the period 1945-95, in: Management Learning, 2005, pp. 237-255, pp-243-247. Keat, Russell, ‘Market Boundaries and Human Good’, in: Philosophy and Public Affairs, ed. J. Haldane, Cambridge University press, 2000, pp. 23-36. Keat, Russell, Cultural Goods and the Limits of the Market, Palgrave MacMillan, London, United Kingdom, 2001. Keat, Russell, ‘Ethics, Markets, and MacIntyre’, Analyse & Kritik, 2008, 30/, pp. 243-257. Keat, Russell, ‘Practices, Firms and Varieties of Capitalism’, Philosophy of Management, 7 (1) 2008, pp. 77-92. Keat, Russell, ‘Social Criticism and the Exclusion of Ethics’, in: Analyze & Kritik 30/2008, pp. 291-315, pp. 302-305. Keen, Steve, Debunking Economics, Zed Books, London, United Kingdom, 2011. Khurana, Rakesh, From Higher Aims to Hired Arms. The Social Transformation of American Business Schools and the Unfulfilled Promise of Management as a Profession, Princeton University Press, Princeton, United States, Oxford, United Kingdom, 2007. Khurana, Rakesh, ‘MBA’s gone wild’, in: American Interest, Jul. vol. 4, no. 6, 2009, pp. 46-54. Kish-Gephart J.J., D. A. Harrison, L.K. Treviño, ‘Bad apples, bad cases, and bad barrels: meta-analytic evidence about sources of unethical decisions at work, in: Journal of Applied Psychology, 2010, vol. 95, no1, pp.1-31. Klaver, K., E. van Elst, A.J. Baart, ‘Demarcation of the ethics of care as a discipline: discussion article.’, in: Nursing Ethics, 2014, 21, pp. 755–765. Knight, Kelvin, ‘Goods’, Philosophy of Management, vol. 7. No. 1 2008, pp. 107-122. Knorr Cetina, Karin, ‘The synthetic situation: interactionism for a global world’ in Symbolic Interaction 32 (2009), 1, pp. 67-87. Korsgaard, Christine M., ‘Morality and the Distinctiveness of Human Action.’, in: Primates and Philosophers: How Morality Evolved, ed. Stephen Macced, Jdsiah Ober, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 98-119. Krantz J. and T.N. Gilmore, ‘The Splitting of Leadership and Management as a Social Defense’ in: Human Relations, Volume 43, Number 2, 1990, pp.183-204. Krijnen, Christian, ‘Values and the Limits of Economic Rationality: Critical Remarks on ‘Economic Imperialism’, ed. Peter Koslowski, in: Elements of a Philosophy of Management and Organization, Springer, Dordrecht, the Netherlands, 2009, pp. 111-136. Kvalnes, Oyvind, Salvor Nordal, ‘Normalization of Questionable Behavior: An Ethical Root of the Financial Crisis in Iceland.’ In: Journal of Business Ethics. 2018 Download: https://doi. org/10.1007/s10551-018-3803-8. 314 Lepisto, Douglas A., Michael G. Pratt, ‘Meaningful work as realization and justification: toward a dual conceptualization.’ In: Organizational Psychology Review, vol. 7, no. 2, 2016, pp. 99121. Liang, Neng, Wang, Jiaqian Wang, ‘Implicit Mental Models in teaching Cases: An empirical Study of Popular MBA cases in the United States and China’, in: Academy of Management Learning and Education, vol. 3, no. 4, 2004, 397-413. Liddell, Henry, George Robert Scott. A Greek-English Lexicon, revised and augmented throughout by Sir Henry Stuart Jones with the assistance of Roderick McKenzie. Clarendon Press, Oxford, United Kingdom, 1940. Locke, Robert, The End of Practical Man. Entrepreneurship and Higher education in Germany, France, and Great Britain, 1880-1940, Jai press Inc. London, United Kingdom, 1984. Locke, Robert, Management and Higher Education since 1945. The influence of America and Japan on West Germany, Great Britain and France, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom, 1989. Locke, Robert, The Collapse of the American Management Mystique, Oxford University Press, Oxford, United Kingdom,1996. Locke, Robert, John S. Spender, Confronting Managerialism. How the Business elite and their Schools threw our Lives out of Balance. 2011, Zed Books, London, United Kingdom, 2011. Locke, Robert, ‘Reform of finance education in US business schools: an historian view’, in: Real-world economics review, 2011, issue no. 58, pp. 95-112. Lo, Andrew W., ‘Reading About the Financial Crisis: A Twenty-One-Book-Review’, in: Journal of Economic Literature, 50:1, 2012, pp. 151-178. Loo, Hans van der, en Willem van Reijen, Paradoxen van Modernisering, Continho, Muiderberg, the Netherlands, 1993. Lorenz, Chris, ‘Surveillance? Universities, Neoliberalism, and New Public Management.’ in: Critical Inquiry (38), 2012, pp. 599-630. Lutz, Christopher, Reading Alasdair MacIntyre’s After Virtue, Continuum, London, United Kingdom, 2012. Luiten van Zanden, Jan, The Economic History of the Netherlands, 1914-1995, Routledge, London, United Kingdom, 1998. Luyendijk, Joris, Swimming with the Sharks, (or. Dit Kan Niet Waar Zijn, Atlas Contact) Guardian Faber Publishing, London, United Kingdom, 2015. Mazzucato, Marianna, The Entrepreneurial State. Debunking Public vs. Private Sector Myths. Anthem Press, New York, United States, 2015. Mazzucato, Marianna, The Value of Everything. Making and Taking in the Global Economy, Allen Lane, New York, United States, 2018. McCloskey, Deirdre N., Bourgeois Equality. How ideas, not capital or institutions, enriched the world. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, United States, 2016. MacIntyre, Alasdair, ‘After Virtue and Marxism: A Response to Wartofsky’, in: Inquiry, vol. 27, Nos. 2-3, July 1984. MacIntyre, Alasdair, After Virtue. A Study in Moral Theory, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, United States, 1984, third edition 2007. MacIntyre, Alasdair, Dependent Rational Animals. Why human beings need the virtues. Carus Publishing Company, Peru, United States, 1999. MacIntyre, Alasdair, ‘Three Perspectives on Marxism: 1953, 1968, 1995’, in: Ethics and Politics, selected essays, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom, 2006, pp. 145-158. 315 MacIntyre, Alasdair, ‘A partial response to my critics’, in: After MacIntyre, J. Horton and S. Mendus eds., Cambridge Polity, Cambridge, United Kingdom, pp. 283-304. MacIntyre, Alasdair, Ethics in the Conflicts of Modernity: An essay on Desire, Practical Reasoning and Narrative, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom, 2016 Mangham ‘MacIntyre and the Manager’, Organization 2(2), pp.181-204. McDonald, Duff, The Golden Passport. Harper Collins Publishers, New York, United States, 2017. Meadows, Donella H., Dennis L. Meadows, Jørgen Randar, William W. Behrens III (eds.), The Limits of Growth Universe Books, New York, United States, 1972. Merkle, Judith Management and Ideology. The Legacy of the International Scientific Management Movement, University of California Press, United States, 1980. Mesny, Anne, ‘Taking Stock of the Century-long Utilization of the Case method in Management Education’, in: Canadian Journal of Administrative Sciences, 30, 2013, pp. 56-66. Metze, Marcel, De Hoogmoedigen, Uitgeverij Balans, Amsterdam, the Netherlands, 2011. Miedema, Siebren, ‘Overdracht of Vorming als doel van het onderwijs. Waarom levensbeschouwing en kwaliteit van leven alles met elkaar te maken hebben’, in Radix 35:4, 2009, pp. 229-237. Mill, John S., An Introduction of the Principles of Morals and Legislation, Dover Publications Inc., United Kingdom, [1789] 2007. Miller, ‘Virtues, Practices and Justice’, in: After MacIntyre, ed. J. Horton, S. Mendus, Polity Press, Malden USA, 1994, pp. 245-264. Mintzberg, Henry, “Training Managers, not MBA’s”, in: On Management. The Free Press, New York, 1989, pp. 78-89. Mintzberg, Henry, Managers, not MBA’s. A hard look at the soft practice of managing and management development, Berrett-Koehler Publisher, Inc. San Francisco, United States, 2004. Moore, Geoff, ‘Re-imagining the Morality of Management: A Modern Virtue Ethics Approach’ in: Business Ethics Quaterly, 2008, 18(4), pp. 483-511. Moore, Geoff, ‘Humanizing Business: A modern virtue ethics approach’, in: Business Ethics Quaterly vol. 15, no. 2, 2015, pp. 237-255. Moore, Geoff, Virtue at Work. Ethics for Individuals, Managers and Organizations, Oxford University Press, Oxford, London, 2017. Moore, Geoff, ‘In search of Organizational Virtue in Business: Agents, Goods, Practices, Institutions and Environments’, in: Organization Studies 27(3), 2006, pp. 369-389 Morgan, Seirol, ‘Moral Philosophy, Moral Identity and Moral Cacophony: On MacIntyre on the Modern Self’, in: Analyze & Kritik, 30/2008, pp. 157-175. McMylor, Peter, Alisdair MacIntyre. Critic of Modernity, Routledge, London, United Kingdom, 1994. Nichols, Theo, Ownership, Ideology and Control, George Allen Unwin, London United Kingdom, 1969. Noe, Raymond, John Hollenbeck, Barry Gerhart, Patrick Wright, Human Resource Management. Gaining a competitive advantage, McGraw-Hill, New York, United States, 2003. Nussbaum, Martha, The Fragility of Goodness. Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy. Cambridge University Press, London England, New York, United States of America, 1986 Nussbaum, Martha, Love’s Knowledge, Oxford University Press, 1990. Nussbaum, Martha, Cultivating Humanity. A classical Defense of Reform in Liberal Education, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachutes, London, England, 1997. 316 Nussbaum, Martha, Frontiers of Justice. Disability, Nationality. Species Membership. The Belknap Press of Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachutes London, England, 2006. Obermayer, Bart, Obermaier, Frederik, The Panama Papers: Breaking the Story of how the Rich and Powerful Hide Their Money, One World, London, United Kingdom, 2017. O’Neill, John, The Market. Ethics, knowledge, and Politics. Routledge, London, United Kingdom, 1998. Painter-Morland, M., E. Sabet, P. Molthan-Hill, H. Goworok, S. De Leeuw, ‘Beyond the curriculum: integrating sustainability into business schools’, in: Journal of Business Ethics, 139 4, 2016. Pearce, Colin D., ‘Aristotle and Business: An Inescapable Tension’, in: in: Handbook of the Philosophical Foundations of Business Ethics, ed. C. Luetge, pp.23-43. Peperzak, Adriaan T., Modern Freedom. Hegel’s Legal, Moral, and Political Philosophy, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Studies in German Idealism, series ed. Reinier Munk, Dordrecht, The Netherlands, 2001. Peperzak, Adriaan, ‘The Foundations of Ethics according to Hegel’, in: International Philosophical Quaterly, 23(4), 1983, pp. 349-365. Petriglieri, Gianpiero and Petriglieri, Jennifer, ‘Identity Workspaces: The Case of Business Schools, in: Academy of Management Learning & Education, vol. 9, no.1, 2010, 44-60. Petriglieri, Gianpiero and Petriglieri, Jennifer, ‘Can Business Schools Humanize Leadership?’, in: Academy of Management Learning & Education, vol. 14, no.4, 2015, pp. 625-647. Petriglieri, Gianpiero, K. Starkey, ‘The legitimacy and impact of business schools – key issues and a research agenda.’ In: Academy of Management Learning & Education, Vol. 15, no. 4, 2016, pp. 649-664. Piketty, Thomas, Capital in the Twenty-First Century, tr. Arthur Goldhammer, Cambridge Massachusetts, London England, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2014 or Le Capitel au xxie siècle, 2013. Pfeffer and Fong, ‘The end of business schools? Less success than meets the eye.’, in: Academy of Management Learning and Education, 2002, vol. 1, no. 1, pp.78-95. Philips, Nelson, Cynthia Hardy, Discourse Analysis. Investigating Processes of Social Construction, Sage, London, United Kingdom, 2002. Polanyi, Karl, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of our Time. Beacon Press, Boston, United States, [1944] 2001. Polanyi, Michael, Personal Knowledge. Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy. Routledge, London, United Kingdom, 1958. Petersen, Verner C., ‘Self-Fulfilling Aspects of Unrealistic Assumptions in Management Theory’, in: Philosophy of Management, vol. 9, no. 3, 2010, pp. 27-48. Pettigrew, Andrew, Ken Starkey, ‘From the Guest Editors: The Legitimacy and impact of Business Schools – Key Issues and a Research Agenda’, in: Academy of Management Learning & Education, vol. 15, no. 4, 2016, pp. 649-664. Philips, N. Hardy, C. Discourse Analysis. Investigating Processes of Social Construction. Qualitative Research Methods Series 50, Sage Publishing, London, United Kingdom, 2002. Popper, Karl, The Open Society and its enemies. Vol. II The High Tides of Prophecy: Hegel, Marx and the Aftermath, Routledge, London, United Kingdom, 1945. Priestland, David, Merchant, Soldier, Sage. A New History of Power. Allen Lane, New York, United States, 2012 317 Reckwitz, Andreas, Die Transformation der Kulturtheorien. Zur Entwicklung eines Theorieprogramms, Velbrück Wissenschaft, Weilerwist, Germany, 2000. Reckwitz, Andreas, ‘Toward a theory of social practices. A development in cultural theorizing’, in: European Journal of Social Theory, 2002, 5(2), pp. 243-263. Readings, Bill, The University in Ruins, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, United States, 1996. Ricoeur, Paul, Oneself as another, tr. Kathleen Blamey, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, United States, 1992 (or. Soi-même comme un autre, 1990). Rooy, Piet de, Een Geschiedenis van het Onderwijs in Nederland., Wereldbibliotheek, Amsterdam, the Netherlands, 2018. Rosa, Hartmut, Social Acceleration. A New Theory of Modernity. tr. Jonathan Trejo-Mathys, Colombia University Press, Colombia, United States, 2013. Roubini, Nouriel, Stephen Mihm, Crisis Economics. A Crash Course in the Future of Finance. The Penguin Press, New York, United States, 2010. Sass, Steven. A., The Pragmatic Imagination, A history of the Wharton School 1881-1981, University of Pennsylvania press, Philadelphia, United States, 1982. Scharff, Robert C., ‘Becoming a Philosopher: What Heidegger Learned from Dilthey, 1919-25’, in: British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 21:1, pp. 122-142 Schipper, Frits, ‘A philosophical reading of a classic of management and organization: F W Taylor’, in: Philosophy of Management, vol. 6, no. 3, 2008, pp. 23-38. Schleef, Debra, Managing Elites: Professional Socialization in Law and Business Schools, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Oxford, United Kingdom, 2007. Schmitt, Robert, Soziologie der Praktiken. Konzeptionelle Studien und empirische Analysen. Suhrkamp Taschenbuch, Berlin, Germany, 2012. Schön, Donald, The Reflective Practitioner. How Professionals Think in Action. Maurice Temple Smith Ltd., London, United Kingdom, 1981. Schrempf-Stirling, Judith, ‘State Power: Rethinking the Role of the State in Political Corporate Social Responsibility’, in: Journal of Business Ethics 150, pp. 1-14. Schwarz, Barry, Kenneth Sharpe, Practical Wisdom. The Right Way to Do the Right Thing, New York, United States, Riverhead Books, 2010. Sennett, Richard, Authority, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, United States, 1980. Sennett, Richard, The New Culture of Capitalism, Yale University Press, New Haven, United States, 2006. Sennett, Richard, The Craftsman, New Haven, Yale University Press, New Haven, United States, 2008. Sent, Esther Mirjam ‘Amerikaanse toestanden op Nederlandse universiteiten?’, in: Waartoe is de Universiteit op Aarde? eds. Ad Verbrugge, Jelle van Baardewijk, Boom Uitgeverij 2014, Amsterdam, the Netherlands, pp. 95-103. Sheikh, Haroon, Embedding Technopolis. Uitgeverij Boom, Amsterdam, the Netherlands, 2017. Sigurjonsson, Throstur, Olaf, Vlad Vaiman, Audur Arna Arnardottir, ‘The Role of Business Schools in Ethics Education in Iceland: The Managers’ perspective’, in: Journal of Business Ethics, 2014, 122, pp. 25-38. Sims, Ronald R., Johannes Brinkman, ‘Enron Ethics (or: Culture Matters More than Codes), in: Journal of Business Ethics 45, pp. 243-256, 2003 pp. 243-256. Sinnicks, Matthew, ‘Leadership After Virtue: MacIntyre’s Critique of Management Reconsidered’, in: Journal of Business Ethics, pp. 736-746. Smith, Gerry, ‘Key Books in Business and Management Studies: An Analysis of Heavily Used Literature in UK Business Schools’, in: Management Education and Development, 8, 1977, pp. 119-130. 318 Solomon, Robert C., Ethics and Excellence. Cooperation and Integrity in Business. Oxford University Press, Oxford United Kingdom, 1992. Solomon, Robert C., ‘Corporate Roles, Personal Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach to Business Ethics’, in: Business Ethics Quaterly, 1992 no. 2, pp. 317-339. Solomon, Robert C., ‘Historicism, Communitarianism, and commerce: an Aristotelian Approach to Business Ethics. In: Contemporary Economic Ethics and Business Ethics. ed. Peter Koslowski Springer Verlag Berlin-Heidelberg 2000, pp. 117-146. Spender, J.C., ‘Management as a Regulated Profession’, in: Journal of Management Inquiry, vol. 16, no.1, 2007, pp. 1-11. Spender, J.C., ‘A Rumination on Managerial Judgment’, in: Revue Française de Gestion, no. 238, 2014, pp. 19-32. Spender, J.C., Business Strategy: Managing Uncertainty, Opportunity, and Enterprise, Oxford University Press, Oxford United Kingdom, 2015. Starkey, Ken, Armand Hatchuel, Sue Tempest Rethinking the business school, in: Journal of Management Studies, 41:8 December 2004, pp. 613-643. Stephenson, William, The Study of Behaviour: Q-technology and its Methodology. Chicago University of Chicago Press, Chicago, United States, 1953. Stephenson, William ‘Ideal types’, in: The Psychological Record, vol. 12, 1962, pp. 9-16. Stewart, Matthew, The Management Myth, W.W. Norton, New York, United States, 2009. Strikwerda, ‘Vijftig jaar SMS: een visionaire enclave in het poldermodel’, in: Een Rijke Historie met Toekomst. Assen, Uitgeverij Koninklijke van Gorcum, pp. 3-41. Stuijvenberg, Johannes H, De Nederlandse Economische handelshogeschool, 1913-1916, Nijgh en van Ditmar, 1963. Sturdy, Andrew, Michael Brocklehurst, Diana Winstanly, Margaret Littlejohns, ‘Management as a (Self ) Confindence Trick: Management Ideas, Education and Identity Work’, in: Organization, vol. 12(6), 2006, pp. 841-860. Taylor, Charles, Sources of the Self, The Making of the Modern Identity, Cambridge University Press, 1989. Thomas, D.B., L.R. Baas, ‘The issue of generalization in q methodology: “reliable schematics’ revisited.’, in: Operant Subjectivity; 16 (1), 1992, pp. 18-36. Thomas, Howard and Robbie Guerriero Wilson, ‘‘Physics Envy’, Cognitive Legitimacy or Practical Relevance: Dilemmas in the Evolution of Management Research in the UK.’ In: British Journal of Management, vol. 22, 2011, pp. 443-456. Thompson, John. B., ‘The Metamorphosis of a Crisis’ (chapter 3), in: Aftermath. The Cultures of the Economic Crisis. ed. Manuel Castells, João Caraça, Gustavo Cardosa, Oxford University Press, Oxford United Kingdom, 2012, pp. 59-81. Thompson, Paul, ‘The trouble with HRM’, in: Human Resource Management Journal 21:4, 2011, pp. 355-367. Tieleman, J., S. de Muijnck, M. Kavelaars, F. Ostermeijer, Thinking like an Economist? A quantitative analysis of economics bachelor curricula in the Netherlands. May 2018 Download: http://www.rethinkingeconomics.nl/uploads/5/3/2/2/53228883/thinking_like_an_ economist.pdf Tiratsoo, Nick, ‘‘What you need is a Harvard’, the American influence on British management education, c. 1945-1965’, in Missionaries and managers: American influences on European management education, 1945-1965, (eds. T.R. Gournvish and N. Tiratsoo), Manchester University Press, 1998, Manchester, England, pp. 140-156. 319 Tiratsoo, Nick, ‘The ‘Americanization’ of Management Education in Britain’, in: Journal of Management Inquiry, vol. 13, no. 2, 2004, pp. 118-126. Urbig, Diemo, Vivien Procher, Katrien Muhlfeld, Arjen van Witteloostuijn, ‘Come on and take a free ride: Contributing to public goods in native and foreign language settings’, in: Academy of Management Learning & Education, 2016, vol. 15, no.2, 268-286. Vaara, Eero, Eric Fay, ‘How can a Bourdieusian Perspective Aid Analysis of MBA Education?’ in: Academy of Management, Learning and Education, 2011, vol. 10, No. 1, pp. 27-39. Verbrugge, Ad, Verwaarlozing van het Zijnde. Een ethologische kritiek van Heideggers Sein und Zeit. Boom Uitgevers, Amsterdam, the Netherlands, 2001. Verbrugge, Ad, ‘De idee van de vrijheid in Hegels staatsfilosofie’, in: Hegel. Een inleiding. eds. Arie Leijen, Ad Verbrugge, Amsterdam, Boom Uitgeverij, Amsterdam, the Netherlands, 2002, pp. 118-158. Verbrugge, Ad, ‘Culture of Education’, in: Institutions of Education: then and today. The Legacy of German Idealism, ed. by Paul Cobben, Brill, Critical Studies in German Idealism vol. 2, Leiden, the Netherlands, 2010, pp. 117-140. Verbrugge, Ad, ‘De vorming van cultuur en de dynamiek van de tijd. ‘Globalisering, onderwijs en de lokale opgaven van de hoge cultuur’, in: Wat heet Beschaving? Roger Scrutons cultuur en onderwijskritiek, Amsterdam, the Netherlands, 2011, pp. 158-230. Verbrugge, Ad, ‘Wie weet hier de weg? Over kunde en onkunde door digitalisering van het onderwijs.’ In: Onderwijs in Tijden van Digitalisering. ed. Ad Verbrugge, Jelle van Baardewijk, Amsterdam, the Netherlands, 2017, pp. 191-241. Verbrugge, Ad, Govert Buijs, Jelle van Baardewijk, Het Goede Leven en de Vrije Markt. Een cultuurfilosofische analyse. , Lemniscaat, publication October, 2018. Vorstenbosch, Jan, ‘A day in the practical life. Toward a taxonomy of social practices’ (unpublished). Vosman, F., A. Niemeijer, A., ‘Rethinking critical reflection on care: late modern uncertainty and the implications for care ethics’ in: Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy, 2017 (doi: 10.1007/s11019-017-9766-1). Waal, de, Steven, ‘Transformatie van Publiek Leiderschap’, in: Waartoe is Nederland op Aarde? ed. Gabriel van den Brink, Amsterdam, the Netherlands, 2018, pp. 269-299. Walzer, Michael, Spheres of Justice. A Defense of Pluralism and Equality. esp. Chapter 4 Money and Communities, United States, Basic Books, 1983. Watts, Simon, Paul Stenner, Doing Q Methodology: Theory, Method and Interpretation, in: Qualitative Research in Psychology, 2, 2005, pp. 67-91, pp. 88-89. Weber, Max, ‘Science as a Vocation’, in: From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, ed. and transl. H.H. Gerth, C. Wright Mills, New York Oxford University Press, 1946 pp. 129-156 (original: ‘Wissenschaft als Beruf’, in: Gesammelte Aufsätze zu Wissenschaftslehre, Tübingen, Germany, Verlag von J C B Mohr, 1922) 320 Weber, Max, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretative Sociology, Berkeley, United States, University of California Press, 1968, pp. 956-1005 (tr. and ed. Johannes Winckelmann, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Grundriss der Verstehenden Soziologie, J.C.B. Mohr, 1956 [1925]). Whitely, Richard, Divergent Capitalisms, Oxford University Press, 1998. Willigenburg, Theo, ‘Reasons, Concerns and Necessity’, European Journal of Analytic Philosophy, vol.1 no. 1, 2005, pp. 75-87. Wilson, Robbie, Guerriero, ‘The Struggle for management education in Britain: The Urwick Committee and the Office Management Association’, in: Management and Organization History, vol. 6(4), 2011, pp. 367-389. Wilson, Robbie, Guerriero, ‘The Loss of Balance Between the Art and management: Observations on the British Experience of Education for Management in the 20th century’, in: Journal of Management Education, vol. 39(I), 2015, pp. 16-35. Wright, Norman S., Bennett, Hadyn, ‘Business ethics, corporate social responsibility, sustainability and the MBA’, in: Journal of Management and Organization, 2011, 17: 641655. Zakaria, Fareed, In Defense of Liberal Education, London, United Kingdom, Norton & Company, 2015. 321 Index Accountability 198, 219, 269 Anglo-Saxon 64, 99, 120, 140-147, 209, 240 Aristotle 4, 10, 21, 249-257 authority 229, 236, 271 Badaracco, Joseph 137, 138, 156 Barnard, Chester 122 BCG-Matrix 159-165, 304 Beabout, Gregory 213, 272, 273 Beadle, Ron 185, 204, 208, 222 Bos, ten, René 125 Bretton Woods 131 Bureaucracy 171-178 Business ethics 17, 71, 257, 272 Business humanities 272 Capitalism 140-147 Care ethics 18, 19 Carnegie Foundation 66-68, 128 Citizen involvement 215-221 Cobbenhagen, Martinus 122 Competition as emulation 214 Concerns, first order 170-171, 276 Corporation in ethological view 207-215 Coase, Ronald 203-204 Cobben, Paul 158, 228, 233, 236, 239, 241 Colonization 155, 157 Common good 27, 108, 146, 192, 284, 287-288 Communication 212, 257, 269, 271, 285, 300 Communism 128, 209 Communitarianism 32, 158, 236 Concourse 84-95 Cooperation over competition 72, 204 Crafsmanship and business 207-215 Deontology 150, 166 Dilemma’s 213 Disagreement 170, 271, 284, 294 Discourse 33, 34, 294 Domain-specific 68, 266 Donaldson, Tom 273 Dutch as academic language 218 Duties 30, 268 Ecological crisis 25-26, 287 Efficiency 30, 68, 93, 100-103, 106, 109, 126, 132, 175 322 Embeddedness 179, 201, 286 Emotions and morality 251-252 Emotivism 169-181 Enlightenment 166-168, 227 Entrepreneur 24, 75, 94, 293, 299 Episteme 249 Ethics and literature 272-274 Ethos 28-40; business student ethos 104-113 Ethology/ moral ethology 28-40 Ethnography 135-140 Eudaimonia 250, 254 External goods 190-196, 260, 277 Fayol, Henri 143, 302 Finance 202, 285, 301 Financial crisis 21-22 Frankfurt, Harry 170-171 Freedom 31-32, 42, 178, 186, 227-242, 278-279, 290 Ford Pinto 167 Ford Foundation 36, 128 Fukuyama, Francis, 152, 156, 235, 240 Galbraith, John K, 127 Gentile, Mary 270-271 Grey, Christopher 51, 68-71, 74-75, 161 Goldman Sachs 214-215 Good life 18, 27-28, 156-157, 174, 178, 185, 227, 238, 245 Goods 28, 167, 191 Goshal, Sumatra 59-63, 78-79, 101 Habermas, Jürgen 194 Hall and Soskice 140-145 Harvard Business School 164 Hegel, Georg W. F. 225-245 Heidegger, Martin 262-265 Herzog, Lisa 239-240 Hidden curriculum, values 19, 37, 59, 138, 159-165 History of business schools 118-134 Hogeschool 16, 291 Homo economicus 79, 133 Honesty 195, 215 Human resource management 135, 137, 158-161, 179 Identity 32-33, 55, 77, 113, 179, 196, 223 Industrial revolution 119, 152 Institutions 129, 132, 152, 190-196 Integrity 255, 284, 112, 168 Internal goods 190-196, 260, 277 Intrinsic motivation 71, 191-192, 235, 264 Invisble hand 119, 233, 236, 272 Ishiguro, Kazuo 273 Journalism 124, 132, 289-290 Judgment 128, 163, 169-172, 179-180, 205, 213, 229, 230, 253, 256 Justice 95, 255, 273 Kant, Immanuel 166-169, 181 Keat, Russell 157, 185, 193, 203, 209, 211, 214, 216, 229 Khurana, Rakesh 27, 41, 59, 123-134, 140, 155 Kierkegaard, søren 176-177, 272-273 Locke, Robert 17, 24, 27, 120-121, 130-131, 140, 161, 301, Management as a practice 207-215 Management as a profession 68-71, 263-268, Managerialism 22, 24, 287, 298 Marx, marxism 159, 169, 204, 209, 222, 239, 241, 277 McNamara, Robert 130 Meaningfullness 264, 300 Medicine, Medical schools 69, 76, 122-123, 138, 217, 258, 261 Meritocracy 71, 79 Mill, John Stuart 160, 177, 181, Miller, David 214-221 Mintzberg, Henry 27, 54-59 Modernity 150-158 Moldoveanu and Martin 63-66 Mono-scientific thinking 77 Moore, Geoff 185, 205, 208-213, 222, Moral identity 266-274 Moral space 272, 274, 294 Narrative and morality 196-201, 266-274 Neoclassical economics and MacIntyre 201207 Neoliberalism 43, 218 NGO 213 Nietzsche, Friedrich 168 Non-market, support of 23, 155-156, 193, 239 Nussbaum, Martha 31, 32, 253, 266, 272, 274, 280, 304, O’Neill, John 235 Pedagogy 51-52, 62, 113 Pflicht 168 Phronèsis 66, 68, 74, 274 Pleonexia 199, 213-214, 279 Pluralism 62, 74, 88, 292, 294 Political 77, 123, 158, 210, 234 Practical understanding 258-265 Practice 190-200 Practice-institution combination 212, 214, 221 Preference-satisfaction 26, 132, 203, 221, 231, 240, 257, 295-296 Pre-modern society 151, 206-207 Principal Agent Theory 159, 162 Professions 68-71, 122-124, 245, 261, 266 Profit 32, 39, 61, 77, 107-108, 125, 127, 160, 283 Protestant 201 Purpose 160, 185, 194, 201 Q-method 184-187 Q-set 84-86 Q-sort 84-86 Recognition 223, 228, 229-230, 233-245, 253, 261 Regulation 94, 101, 132, 142, 153, 186 Rhinelandic 140-147, 157, 182, 221 Schleef, Debra 27, 71-74 Schön, Manfred 258-274 Shell 16, 25-26, 108, 110, 119, 129, 153, 223, 277 Skills 258-265 Social responsibility 16, 72, 77, 93, Standards of excellence 190-196, 208, 229 Spender, Joseph C. 24, 27, 38, 41, 131, 162, 180, 204 Solomon, Robert 243 Strong evaluations 267, 269, 271, 280, 293 Students as consumers 139, 303 SWOT-analysis 159-165 Tacit knowledge 57, 64, 65, 67, 260-261 Taylor, Charles 266-274 Taylor, Fredrick 37, 38, 125 Technology 121, 158, 194, 255, 258-266 323 Teleological 166, 190, 196 Telos 80, 197, 207, 216, 250, 252 Tradition 151-152, 178, 198-200, 280, 294 Truth 30, 34, 60, 88 Trust 166, 168, 195 Utilitarianism 30, 150, 166-167 Values 210, 223, 251, 257, 268, 271, 273, 276, 282, 284, 288, 290 Verbrugge, Ad 18-19, 29, 43, 54, 137, 139, 151, 213, 218, 222, 254 Vermeer, Johannes 193, 201 Virtues 190-207, 249-258 Walzer, Michael 156, 195 Weber, Max 38, 151-158, 172, 179 324